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THE COMMANDEMENT INDIGENE  
IN SENEGAL, 1919 - 1947

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis concerns the interaction of the French colonial administration and indigenous chiefs at village, cantonal and provincial levels during the interwar and Second World War periods. Indirect rule was as important to the French as to the British, as chronic shortages of European personnel throughout the period necessitated cooperation with local intermediaries.

By examining the selection, education and functions of the chiefs, this thesis will show the way in which the character of the chieftancy was transformed from a traditional ruling group before the arrival of the French to agents of the colonial power.

The way in which the commandement indigène operated in practice had little connection with French colonial theory. Decisions concerning the appointment of chiefs were often political, and had to balance the French desire for literate, trained and reliable chiefs against African demands for a legitimate ruler. Sometimes, appointments were a compromise between local rivals.

The chiefs had to bear the brunt of unpopular administrative tasks, the most important of which was the census, which laid the groundwork for taxation, conscription, forced labour and agricultural campaigns. In these duties, the chiefs were to act as intermediaries between the colonial administration and their subjects, but in practice, their functions alienated them from the latter and identified them with the French colonial power. At the same time, French protection gave them opportunities for arbitrariness, for as long as they produced results, the administration turned a blind eye to methods of extraction. The enormity of these abuses were exposed in the world depression of the 1930s, when pressures on the Senegalese cultivator from the administration and chiefs became intolerable.

Anxious to preserve the fiction that the chiefs represented their subjects, the French appointed them to consultative councils where they could generally be relied upon to endorse government proposals.

The French developed an intricate system of salaries and hierarchy among the chiefs so that they became more like civil servants. But Association policy dictated that the chiefs should not lose their "traditional" character. In this way, they fell between two stools for alienated from their peoples, they never quite attained civil servant status.



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GLOSSARY of important terms

Additional Tax - a tax in money which replaced prestations (see below)

Agent Ambulant - indigenous tax collector

Assistance Médicale Indigène (AMI) - a tax to be used to improve medical facilities

Boubou-long robe worn by both Senegalese men and women

Capitation (impôt personnel)- a head tax to be paid by all adult citizens and subjects

Cercle-an administrative district. Senegal was divided into approximately 16 of these, though the number varied during the period under consideration

Chef bénévole-an unpaid chief, exercising authority on behalf of the colonial administration

Chef-lieu-capital of a cercle

Chef de race-a chief of the same ethnic group as his subjects

Citizen - a native of one of the Four Communes

Commandant de cercle-equivalent to the District Officer in British Territories

Commis/écrivain expéditionnaire - a clerk

Conciliation-method of solving disputes without recourse to the courts, with adjudication by the chef de village or a local notable

First Contingent (Portion)-those recruits who entered the colonial army immediately after conscription

Second Contingent(Portion) - those recruits who returned to their village after conscription but who could be called up by the military authorities for public works projects

Ecole régionale-recruited from pupils of village schools after a rigorous selection process and directed by a European teacher

Evolué/assimilé-an African educated in the French system who has adopted French culture

Garde de cercle- a local policeman

Hamalliyya (followers known as hamallists)-tidjanès à onze grains- a splinter group of the Tijaniyya brotherhood who questioned the authority of the French

Indigénat- a code giving the French administrator arbitrary powers over his subjects, whereby the latter could be imprisoned for "subversive activities" without a trial

Marabout-religious notable

Navetane-a seasonal agricultural worker, often from one of Senegal's neighbours

Prestations-a labour due consisting of several days' work for the administration (people performing these known as prestataires)

Prime de rendement-commission received by the chef de canton and de province in the form of a share of the tax he had collected. The amount varied according to the chief's performance in his other tasks.

Qadriyya - a Sufi brotherhood, older than the Tijaniyya

Rachat- a sum of money paid instead of performing prestations

Remise- commission received by the chef de village in the form of a share of the tax he had collected

Secco - an area of earth, sometimes cemented, enclosed by a corrugated iron fence on concrete posts to protect groundnuts against rodents

Société Indigène de Prévoyance - societies of cultivators which distributed groundnuts and food to their members before the sowing period, to be repaid to the society after the harvest

Subdivision - a further division of the cercle, to make it easier to administer, headed by the chef de subdivision

Subject- an inhabitant of the Protectorate. Subjects formed the bulk of the Senegalese population and did not have the same rights as citizens

Talibé- disciple of an Islamic religious leader

Tijaniyya - a newer Sufi brotherhood, allegedly of a more democratic character than the Qadriyya

Tournée-a tour of inspection of a region by a French administrator or chief.

Traite-trading period between the harvest and the next sowing when groundnuts were sold

Tribunal de premier degré, de subdivision - a court presided over by a chief or local notable, with the power to judge civil and commercial cases

Tribunal de deuxième degré, de cercle - a court presided over by the commandant de cercle or his assistant, with the power to judge civil, commercial and criminal cases

ABBREVIATIONS TO THE FOOTNOTES

AN	Archives Nationales, rue des Francs-Bourgeois, Paris.
ANSOM	Archives Nationales Section Outre-Mer, rue Oudinot, Paris.
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française.
ARSD	Archives de la République du Sénégal, Dakar.
C	Carton.
D	Dossier.
EFC	Ecole des Fils des Chefs.
IFAN	Institut Fondamental de l'Afrique Noire.
JO	Journal Officiel.
PV	Procès Verbal, Procès Verbaux (Official Report(s)).
RPA	Rapport Politique Annuel, Rapport Périodique Annuel.
RPM	Rapport Périodique Mensuel (monthly report).
RPS	Rapport Périodique Semestriel (half-yearly report).
RPT	Rapport Périodique Trimistriel (quarterly report).
SIP/SP	Société Indigène de Prévoyance, Société de Prévoyance.

Unless otherwise stated, assume that the Governor General referred to is the Governor General of the AOF, Governors are Governors of colonies in the AOF, the Governor is the Governor of Senegal and commandants de cercle are commandants of cercles in Senegal. The Administrateur Supérieur is the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance, and the Headmaster referred to is the head of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.



## INTRODUCTION

This study of the commandement indigène in Senegal attempts to bridge the gap between colonial administrative history and the African view of the colonial period. The commandement indigène may be defined as the interaction of the French colonial administration and indigenous chiefs at village, cantonal and provincial levels. It is hoped that this examination of the education, designation and tasks of the chiefs will demonstrate not only the significance of the collaboration of the chiefs with the colonial government, but the way in which this affected the relationship between the chiefs and their peoples.

By 1895, most of Senegal with the exception of the Basse Casamance had been brought under French control. Although they might have preferred to administer the AOF directly, the French, like the British in their colonies, were confronted with the problem of how to control this vast and diverse territorial expanse with very limited funds and personnel. They also found it difficult to export their system of administration to colonies where the vast majority of people were illiterate.

Immediately following the period of conquest, direct rule was attempted but was abandoned over most of Senegal once the French realised it was not viable, and a protectorate system was introduced. By 1904, direct rule applied only to the largest towns, a strip along the coast from Dakar to St. Louis which was 2 km. wide and for an area of 1 km. around stations and ports.<sup>1</sup>

During the First World War, the numbers of European personnel fell further and expatriate staff shortages remained a chronic problem even after 1918. In a speech to the Council of Government of the AOF in December 1930, Brévié revealed there were only 1,000 French civil servants to 13,000,000 Africans in the whole of French West Africa.<sup>2</sup> In addition, many administrators were hampered by not knowing the local languages.

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1. C. Newbury, "The Formation of the Government General in French West Africa" Journal of African History, Vol. I, No. 1, 1960, p. 124.
  2. ANSOM - Affaires Politiques-C 838 D IB, extract from Annales Coloniales, 26 January, 1931.

The French were therefore forced to rely on Africans to mediate between themselves and the local populations. There has been surprisingly little research into those middlemen who cooperated with the French colonial power. In this thesis the indigenous chiefs were selected for study because of their unique position. While the rest of the intermediaries were created during, or underwent considerable expansion under, colonial rule, chiefs had been in existence well before the French conquest. The persistence of this pre-colonial institution gave an appearance of continuity which belied underlying changes. Prior to the French conquest, the chiefs in the north of Senegal increasingly assumed the role of military leaders (chefs de guerre). Military defeat by the French was therefore disastrous for their prestige, as they lost their powers of coercion to their new masters.<sup>1</sup>

At the local level, the European commandant de cercle or chef de subdivision provided an authority over the head of the chiefs in theory if not in practice: "Seul le commandant de cercle commande, seul il est responsable."<sup>2</sup> With the help of the chiefs, the French were able to introduce a cash crop economy into the countryside which gradually transformed social patterns.

Colonial rule modified the character of the chieftancy, so by 1919, we can distinguish three main groups of chief:

- a) The traditional chiefs, the ruling group before the arrival of the French, ousted by the colonisers.
- b) Traditional chiefs who after an initial period of resistance entered into cooperation with the French and thus became administrative chiefs- this would apply to nearly all chefs de province who served under the French plus a number of chefs de village and de canton.

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1. D. Cruise O'Brien, Saints and Politicians, Cambridge 1975, p.96;

2. J. Van Vollenhoven, "Les chefs indigènes en AOF", Bulletin du comité de l'Afrique Française, Vol.1-2: Renseignements Coloniaux, No.12, December 1917, p.270, hereafter referred to as "Les Chefs indigènes"...

Chefs de province like Bouna N'diaye, Mbakhane Diop and Abdoul Salam Kane were sons of chiefs who owed their titles to birth.

- c) Purely administrative chiefs who owed their appointments solely to the French colonial power, and had no traditional claim to the chieftancy whatsoever. These included a number of chefs de canton who had originally been interpreters, civil servants, former soldiers, traders, gardes de cercle and servants of traditional rulers. They had been made chiefs because the administration considered it could count on their obedience.

As a study of the interaction of the chiefs with the French, rather than one of the traditional chiefs, this thesis will focus mainly on the latter two groups.

In its aim to exploit Senegal's resources and maintain social control, the colonial administration was confronted with the debate of traditionalism versus modernism in having to decide on which African intermediaries to rely; whether to woo the chiefs on the one hand, or the new emerging elites- the évolués, trade unionists, civil servants, former soldiers or religious leaders.

Since the vast majority of people in French West Africa were rural producers, it was felt after the First World War that the establishment of the commandement indigène throughout the AOF was the key to the success of French native policy. "Il n'y a pas de politique indigène sans commandement territorial et pas de commandement territorial sans chefs indigènes qui servent de rouages entre l'autorité coloniale et la population."<sup>1</sup> Unlike other intermediary groups who cooperated with the French, the chiefs were expected to perform a most delicate balancing act. Like Bailey's rural Indian middleman<sup>2</sup>, a chief was expected by the administration to achieve a "dédoublement fonctionnel."<sup>3</sup>

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1. R. Delavignette, Service Africain, Paris 1946, p. 121

2. F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, Oxford 1969.

3. F. Zuccarelli, "De la Chefferie traditionnelle au canton; l'évolution du canton colonial au Sénégal 1855-1960," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, Vol. XIII, No. 50, 1973.

To his traditional role as representative of his subjects, he added his new role of agent of the administration. In this thesis, we will examine the question of how the chiefs' dual role affected their position in the colonial hierarchy on the one hand and their position in African society on the other.

In order to keep this study within manageable proportions, it was decided to focus on one country in the AOF, and on two areas in particular. Senegal was chosen as the commandement indigène here has not been the object of much study. Because Senegal, with the exception of the Casamance, appeared so far in advance of the rest of the AOF with a highly developed commandement indigène, there has been less interest in the chiefs here than in other colonies where resistance of chiefs and their peoples to the French was vigorous well into the twentieth century. In 1928, the Governor General of the AOF in a circular to all the governors stated, "Je me plais à constater que le Sénégal est une des rares colonies du groupe-Casamance mise à part, où il soit donné de dire que le commandement indigène, à quelques exceptions près, donne entière satisfaction."<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the period 1919-1946 was one of rapid Islamisation in Senegal, when the colonial administration appreciated the importance of establishing good relations with the marabouts as a means of controlling the bulk of the population. During the colonial period, the marabouts continued to win popular support at the expense of the chiefs by defending cultivators against chiefly and administrative exactions.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, in post Independence Senegal, the Islamic brotherhoods wield a great deal of power because of their influence over a considerable proportion of the electorate. On the other hand, because of their growing identification with the colonial administration during the period under consideration, the chiefs lost much influence and have never been able to play a comparable role as power brokers. The result has been that

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1. AN 2G28-8 Senegal RPA 1928.

2. D. Cruise O'Brien, op.cit., p. 106.

studies of native policy in Senegal have tended to focus on Islamic brotherhoods at the expense of the chiefs.

It is essential to note that although parallels may be drawn between policies regarding the commandement indigène in Senegal with those of the rest of the AOF, Senegal is by no means typical, with a political structure and education system in advance of its fellow colonies, and having undergone a longer period of colonisation.

In general, it would, however, be fair to say that the French imposed the same system of chef de province, de canton and de village throughout the AOF regardless of customary local structures. The two contrasting areas chosen, Cayor and the Basse Casamance, were both given a similar **system of chiefs**.

The office of chef de village originated in pre-colonial times. It was, in theory, supposed to be held by a member of the family who had first occupied an area, who had made a pact with the "génie du sol."<sup>1</sup> This chief was sometimes known as the "maître du sol", as he alone had the right to divide the land between the chefs de famille who would then cultivate it for their subsistence. According to Delavignette, the most important task of the administrator at village level was to distinguish between the real chief and the man of straw.<sup>2</sup> The office of chef de canton was created by the French for administrative convenience, and this chief had control over several villages. Cayor and the Basse Casamance were subjected to numerous territorial reorganisations from 1919-47, with the arbitrary creation, fusion and abolition of cantons.

From the conquest begun by Faïdherbe till 1907, a "politique du commandement territorial indigène" was practised, whereby the French used chefs de province to administer large areas composed of a number of cantons.<sup>3</sup> Once resistance on the part of rulers of local principalities had been quashed, a large number signed treaties with

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1. unpublished letters of F. J. Marie, a colonial administrator.

2. Delavignette, op.cit., p. 124.

3. P. Marty, La Politique Indigène du Gouverneur Général Ponty en AOF, Paris 1915.

the French and were given territorial commands over their former spheres of influence. Where those local principalities did not exist or where where the original rulers were hostile to the French, men more amenable to colonial rule were put in charge of large areas - marabouts, former soldiers and interpreters - often without regard for the religion or ethnicity of the peoples concerned. In a letter of 5 November 1891, the Director of Political Affairs wrote; "L'idée de placer dans les villages diolas de Basse Casamanace des chefs ouloffs nommés par nous, idée qui a été émise par toutes les personnes au courant de l'état politique de cette région, serait à mettre à l'essai." <sup>1</sup>

In allowing these rulers a free hand, the French left the door open to the persistence of widespread abuses. In the case of the Basse Casamance, the result of the policy of appointing stranger chefs de province "a été joli - ils ont pillé plus que tous les autres". <sup>2</sup> By the time Ponty became Governor General in 1907, the chefferies de province were seen as a threat to the French monopoly of power.

The new French policy, pursued from 1907 till the beginning of the First World War and known as the "Politique des Races", involved the division of many former provinces into cantons, which were intended as far as possible to be units comprising the same ethnic group. The chiefs of such cantons were to be from a chiefly or notable family of the same ethnic group and religion as their subjects. Senegal was to consist of "des groupes ethniques avec leurs chefs particuliers." <sup>3</sup> The French could claim to be sweeping away the great territorial commands "qui sont une barrière dressée entre nous et nos administrés". <sup>4</sup>

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1. ARSD 13 G 42(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Quinquaud, "Report on the cercle of Ziguinchor," 30 December 1938, quotation from letter 240 of the Director of Political Affairs, 5 November 1891.
  2. Ibid, comment of Administrateur Supérieur Labritoigne de Mozel, 1904.
  3. ARSD 18G 62 (17) Governor General of the AOF to Governors, 22 September 1909.
  4. J. Suret-Canale, "La Fin de la Chefferie en Guinée," Journal of African History, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1966, p. 461, quotation from Governor General Ponty, "Report for the Council of Government of the AOF", 20 June 1910.

How was colonial policy and more especially Native policy formulated?

As far as metropolitan France was concerned, the impetus came not from the French government, where the machinery for colonial administration was confused and manned by the least able, but from the Parti Colonial whose members included businessmen, former colonial administrators, ethnologists, professional men, academics, politicians, civil servants and army officers.<sup>1</sup> During the First World War, the Parti Colonial started to mobilise public opinion in France with the result that the idea of Empire became popular for the first time. The War had demonstrated the potential of the colonies to provide soldiers and factory workers making up for the fall in the French birth rate vis à vis that of Germany, and also to furnish raw materials which might aid post-war recovery in the metropole.

But far more important in shaping colonial policy were the men on the spot - at the Government General at Dakar, the Government of Senegal and the local administration in the cercles. Yet again, there was a gap between the schemes of the government of a colony and of the government general and what was actually achieved in the cercles.

1919 appeared to be an appropriate starting point for this thesis as it marks a point when the French had just had sufficient breathing space after the rigours of the First World War to consider a new policy of mise en valeur (Le Plan Sarraut) to develop the colonies in order to contribute to France's economic recovery. One of the major objectives was to commercialise agriculture in the AOF, which in the case of Senegal, meant concentrating on the groundnut.<sup>2</sup> The date also marks the firm adoption of a policy of Association by the Ministry of Colonies and important administrators. Sarraut declared "Je repousse les systèmes de naturalisation en masse."<sup>3</sup> Association was launched in 1910 with Harmand's "Domination et Colonisation", a sharp attack on the way Assimilation operated in practice. One obvious form of assimilating the peoples of the AOF would have been to allow them to acquire French

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1. C. Andrew, "The French Colonialist movement in the Third Republic: the unofficial mind of Imperialism", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, Vol. 26, 1976.
  2. A. Sarraut, Grandeur et Servitude Coloniales, Paris 1931, p. 178
  3. Ibid, p. 166.

citizenship. But by 1923, the largest proportion of Africans in the AOF to acquire French citizenship were to be found in Senegal, and they constituted only 2% of the population.<sup>1</sup>

Although the difference between the implementation of Assimilation and Association policy was not nearly as great as it might appear in theory, it would be fair to say that the latter entailed more respect in principle for existing African institutions and ruling groups. Lord Hailey defined Association as "a policy which, for the time being, concentrates its attention on the formation of an elite",<sup>2</sup> as opposed to attempts to assimilate the mass of the people. In contrast to Blaise Diagne, Senegal's deputy in the National Assembly who advocated the assimilation of Senegal into the French political system, supporters of Association like the ethnologist Delafosse wanted indigenous participation in government to be a much more gradual affair. "Il faut que la forme à donner à la participation indigène soit proportionnée à la mentalité et à l'état de civilisation des autochtones."<sup>3</sup> Delafosse wanted the administration to be divided into two parts-one, staffed wholly by Europeans, was to be responsible for the direct rule of the four communes, and an administration mixte involving African notables was to be in charge of "indigenous" affairs.

The concept of working more closely with a long-established group like the chiefs was encouraged by the First World War when the French had relied on the chiefs' help in conscripting troops and labour. Chefs de province like Bouna N'diaye of Djoloff and Coumba N'dofene Diouf, the

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1. R. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. 1, New York, 1928, p. 947. In 1921, 23,000 Senegalese (including the inhabitants of the four communes) were citizens, out of a total population of about 1,250,000. In the Niger, only nine Africans held French citizenship.
  2. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, London 1938, p. 484.
  3. Marc Michel, "Un programme réformiste en 1919: Maurice Delafosse et la Politique Indigène en AOF," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, Vol. XV, No. 58, 1975, p. 313.



Bour Sine, had been instrumental to the success of Diagne's recruitment of 1917. Association policy gained currency in the colonial service as its advocates came to dominate the teaching posts at the Ecole Coloniale, with a monopoly for training colonial administrators after 1912.<sup>1</sup>

One of the most important documents concerning Association was the Van Vollenhoven circular of 1917, but there had been no opportunity to put these directives into practice before the war. Rejecting Ponty's Politique des Races to some extent, Van Vollenhoven and his successors like Carde intended to restore the chiefs to their important role in administration, by using them as intermediaries. "Le commandant de cercle perd toujours le contact quand il cherche à l'établir directement,"<sup>2</sup> But the chiefs were to remain subordinate to the commandant de cercle "Il n'y a pas deux autorités dans le cercle, l'autorité française et l'autorité indigène; il n'y a qu'une... le chef de canton n'est qu'un instrument, un auxiliaire".<sup>3</sup>

The French policy towards the chiefs was based on this fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, they acknowledged the chiefs must be shown some respect by the administration to retain the standing in the eyes of the local peoples - were the chiefs mere ciphers, the bases of French native policy would collapse. On the other hand, French administrative attitudes towards the chiefs were steeped in the knowledge that the latter depended for their existence on the goodwill of the coloniser.

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1. W.B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: the French Colonial Service in Africa, Stanford 1971, p.84.
  2. ANSOM, Affaires Politiques- Carton 838, Dossier IA-Governor General Carde, circular No. 279b AP/2, 14 October 1929, hereafter referred to as Circular of 14 October 1929.
  3. Van Vollenhoven, "Les chefs indigènes ..." op.cit., p.270.

Van Vollenhoven believed that the chiefs could in time be persuaded to discard some of their more despotic ways for French administrative methods by educating their successors in special schools and by improving their rewards and pay. In 1922, Faidherbe's Ecole des Otages was revived as the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and measures were introduced to improve and regularise chiefly pay.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, Van Vollenhoven was opposed to the chiefs becoming civil servants and insisted that administrators show them the respect due to traditional chiefs.

This thesis will show that during the period 1919-29, the French could delude themselves that their native policy, at least in the north of Senegal, was quite successful. The Governor could with some justification claim in a letter to Governor General Carde in 1929 that "Le corps des chefs de province et de canton constitue la solide armature de l'organisation politique de la colonie."<sup>2</sup> The peaceful state of the colony during this period was linked in political reports to the good price the groundnut was commanding on world markets and to the cooperation of native chiefs.

But by the 1930s, the commandement indigene was in crisis. The price of oilseeds on the world market plummeted, and the chiefs found themselves torn between their double role as auxiliaries of the administration and as representatives of their peoples. This called for a revision in current French native policy. The policy of Association was to be continued for pragmatic reasons-" La politique coloniale française est caractérisée par un besoin pressant de la collaboration des chefs,"<sup>3</sup> but Brévié, Governor General from 1930-36 and an important theoretician of native policy went further than Van Vollenhoven in some respects. Like Delafosse, Brevie rejected the idea of mass

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1. See Ch.1 on "The Chiefs' Education".
  2. ARSD 18 G70 (17) Letter from the Governor of Senegal to the Governor General, "The Reorganisation of Native Administration in Senegal", 30 January 1929.
  3. J. Brévié, Circulaires de M.le Gouverneur Général Brévié sur la Politique et l'Administration Indigènes en AOF, Goree 1939, hereafter referred to as Circulaires...

assimilation of the peoples of the AOF, "En politique indigène, les choses vont lentement ... le(the people) laissant évoluer dans le cadre de ses institutions coutumières et l'élevant progressivement par une direction vigilante vers une collaboration de plus en plus intime... au fur et à mesure des progrès réalisés".<sup>1</sup>

French attempts to turn the chiefs into educators of their peoples were to be intensified "Aux politiques des races doit se superposer une politique de l'élite".<sup>2</sup> Brévié echoed Carde's insistence that "Le commandement indigène doit être le plus solide point d'appui du levier avec lequel nous proposons d'élever la masse."<sup>3</sup> Rather than being simply the agents of transmission of Van Vollenhoven, the chiefs were to have a higher status as "une noblesse administrative indigène" with certain powers of initiative. Chiefs were to continue to be kept separate from civil servants, as "feudal rulers discharging the duties of an official".<sup>4</sup> At the same time, chiefs were still to be firmly kept under the control of European administrators. Commandants de cercle and chefs de subdivision were instructed to increase the number of inspections they made of their districts and a rise in the number of administrators was proposed.

Furthermore, not only were the chiefs to continue to act as mediators between the administration and rural population, but were to be reintegrated into their local communities from which the French had often unwittingly estranged them. Delavignette recognised that "C'est une des plus grandes questions de la politique africaine et qui domine toute l'économie agraire et commerciale de fortifier, éduquer et rajeunir les aristocraties locales."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Brévié, Circulaires...

2. Ibid.

3. Carde, Circular of 14 October 1929.

4. Delavignette, op.cit., pp. 131-136.

5. Ibid.

During the 1930s, Associationist literature focused increasingly on the village as the "cellule sociale indigène par excellence. Seule cette collectivité a une âme, une mentalité propre"<sup>1</sup> as opposed to the canton, which was regarded purely as a "cellule administrative". It was felt chiefs de village as "émanations des milieux traditionnels" more truly represented their subjects than the chiefs de canton who by this time were often too closely associated with the administration. Brévié considered the system of a chef de village assisted by a conseil des anciens as "le régime démocratique en expression la plus simple". He therefore advocated the regeneration of customary conciliar bodies as the basis of "une véritable administration indigène." During his term of office and during the Popular Front government of the AOF, legislation was introduced which established consultative organs at village, cantonal and provincial levels to appoint and advise the chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

In the Second World War as in the First, the tendency of the colonial power to use the chiefs as auxiliaries was accentuated during the period of Vichy government and later under the Free French. In both of these colonial governments, this was a period of autarky, of "dirigisme" of the Senegalese economy. Like its counterpart in France, the Vichy regime in the AOF looked forward to "the abolition of the political regime and the restitution of the rights of custom and tradition"<sup>3</sup> Governor General Boisson in his circulars on native policy reiterated Association theory, possibly in a more exaggerated form.

Like Brévié, Boisson was concerned that the masses should not evolve too rapidly as this would result in the destruction of traditional authority. In his "Three Directives on African Colonisation" of 21 August 1941, Boisson saw as the African elite "les anciens du

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1. Brévié, Circulaires...
  2. See Ch.2 on "The Selection of Chiefs".
  3. AN 2G40 - 2 Senegal RPA 1940.

village" and not the évolués, and argued that the real communal organs were not municipal bodies, but the village and canton. This document was clearly an assault on the elected institutions of the Four Communes. Boisson realised that because the numbers of European personnel in the AOF had fallen below pre-First World War levels, the support of the chefs de canton and de village was vital for the implementation of points 2 and 3 of the circular - evolution of the masses and the development of the African economy.<sup>1</sup> Vichy France had a special interest in French West Africa's economic effort as the AOF was one of the few parts of France's African Empire which had rallied to Marshal Pétain. The chiefs were to help impose the basic disciplines of "habitat, alimentation, production et revêtement, "on their subjects and to assist the spread of primary education in the countryside. Interesting parallels can be drawn between Boisson's recommendations for the AOF and the Vichy regime in France, where a return to the land by the urban population was seen as a prerequisite for economic development and the restoration of traditional social patterns. Non-citizens were to be deported from Dakar and St. Louis to their villages of origin, which were to be regrouped to prevent further disintegration.

At the same time, the Vichy government's plans to increase the numbers and duties of French personnel shows that it was basically distrustful of the indigenous chiefs, and that its native policy was formulated with some degree of despair. European administrators were encouraged to practice a "politique de contact" with the local people, increasing the number of visits they made to villages and encouraging people to take their complaints against the chiefs direct to the administration. In this way, it was hoped they would "supprimer.. l'écran que peut constituer le chef de canton entre l'autorité et l'autochtone."<sup>2</sup> But a large number of these projects remained on the drawing board because of the continuing shortage of personnel in wartime conditions.

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques\_C 598 D5 RPA 1941 Circular No. 600C, 21 August 1941.

2. Ibid.

While not admitting self-government for any of France's West African colonies, the Brazzaville conference (January 1944) held by the Free French during the war, had promised Africans a greater role in the political process and freer access to positions of power. One secret resolution stated "que les emplois des cadres d'exécution soient le plus rapidement possible tenus par les indigènes quelque soit leur statut personnel."<sup>1</sup> An increasing number of Africans were thus enabled to take part in the 1945 and 1946 elections for the territorial assembly and metropolitan parliament, as franchises were gradually widened. With the Loi Lamine Gueye (May 1946) the status of subject was abolished, so that all Africans became citizens, while by the Second Loi Lamine Gueye, indigenous civil servants were to win the same conditions of service as the Europeans. The upsurge in numbers and importance of the new African elites-civil servants, businessmen, professional groups and trade union leaders was in part the result of these political reforms. They also benefitted from FIDES, the programme of economic development.<sup>2</sup>

But the Ministry of France Outre-Mer (the former Ministry of Colonies) and officialdom at Dakar and St. Louis still hoped for the evolution of African society within the framework of customary political institutions and under their traditional rulers along the lines laid down from Van Vollenhoven to Eboué (Governor General of the AEF). Marius Moutet, the Minister of FOM in 1947 reaffirmed France's commitment to the traditional chiefs who "gardent dans l'Afrique moderne toute leur raison d'être lorsqu'ils sont investis de leur autorité selon le consentement de leur groupement humain."<sup>3</sup> They were still "les

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1. ANSOM Minister of Colonies (Giacobi) Confidential Report, 20 October 1945.
  2. The Senegalese elites had always had access to educational facilities not available to the mass of the people. Having attended schools like the Ecoles Blanchot and Ponty, they were then eligible for higher education in France.
  3. ARSD 2D13-32 Minister of France Outre-Mer, Marius Moutet, "Circular of 25 September 1947", p.2.

représentants de l'Afrique la plus authentique." It was still widely believed in administrative circles that France could have no policy in Africa without firm territorial control and that this was not possible without relying on "l'armature coutumière des chefferies". Although representative institutions were becoming increasingly important in African political life, the chief was still regarded as a vital intermediary. "Les administrateurs sont les représentants de la souveraineté française et les chefs sont les tenants de l'autorité locale."<sup>1</sup>

Attempts were made to keep the chieftancy abreast of the latest developments in Senegalese society by introducing the principle of election to the appointment of chiefs at village, cantonal and provincial levels. However, in La nouvelle politique indigène en AEF, Eboué reiterated that the chiefs should continue to be chosen from families having a right to command. From Lyautey, the theoretician of the politique indigène in Morocco, Eboué drew the principle "Il y a dans toute société une classe dirigeante née pour diriger".<sup>2</sup> He continued to put forward pre-war ideas on the chiefs, such as the importance of educating the sons of chiefly families. He emphasised that the chiefs were not to be confused with civil servants as they were aristocrats. Thus they were not to be bound by the rules of the administrative cadre and care had to be exercised in disciplining them.

But this thesis will show that by 1947, the chiefs could not longer be considered as "tenants de l'autorité locale". This could in part be attributed to the rise of new politicised elites, but a more telling factor is that in the course of the period under consideration, the chiefs became too closely identified with the administration and were no longer seen by their subjects as representatives.

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1. F. Eboué, La Nouvelle Politique Indigène en AEF, Rufisque 1948. Written in 1942, this work was published posthumously (Eboué died in 1944).

2. Ibid.

Foundations for later developments were laid in 1948, with the formation of a chiefs' union, the Association of Chefs Coutumiers. In its statutes, the Association defined the chiefs as "citoyens chargés d'un ministère de service publique,"<sup>1</sup> deriving their validity from their ability to respond to the needs of the population and to interact with the new political elites. In this way, the chiefs retained their ambiguous position. Having lost much of their customary legitimacy, they never quite became civil servants.

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1. ARSD 2D13-32 Draft of the 1948 decree establishing the Association des chefs coutumiers in AOF, AEF, Cameroun and Togo.



CHAPTER ONE

The Chiefs' Education

As the French extended their control over Senegal in the nineteenth century, the shortage of European civil servants forced them to look to local intermediaries like the chiefs. Not only was the colonial administration keen to teach future chiefs their language, but also to impart its ethos to them. The demands of tradition and administrative efficiency could be reconciled by choosing members of chiefly families to be inculcated with French ideas and administrative methods. This could be done in a variety of ways-potential chiefs could be taken from écoles régionales to work under the supervision of the commandant de cercle right away; but it was felt that chiefs would have greater authority and would feel more closely associated with the aims of the French administration if they were given a general as well as a professional training at a special school for chiefs. Leaving aside the education of future chiefs at village and regional schools along with other French subjects which has already been adequately covered by Denise Bouche, the concern here is primarily with the elite education provided for the sons of chiefs and notables alone at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.

The Ecole des Fils des Chefs had its origins in the Ecole des Otages, established in 1855 by Faidherbe in order to (in his own words) "donner aux fils des chefs une instruction appropriée à leurs besoins et faire rendre en affection à l'Ecole les représentants de l'autorité française"<sup>1</sup>. Faidherbe hoped to accelerate the unification of Senegal by bringing together the sons of chiefs from all over the country. He believed that over a period, the school would encourage future chiefs to shake off traditional attitudes to ruling in favour of French ideas of public service.

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1. ARSD 1G45 Anonymous report on the Ecole des Otages, 1894.

Closed on 1 January 1872 as an economy measure, the Ecole des Otages was re-established on 27 May 1895 as the Collège des Fils des Chefs et d'Interprètes in the quarter of Sor in St. Louis. The highly political nature of the school was recognised by placing it under the control not of the Inspector of Schools but the Director of Political Affairs. Like its successor, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, the College taught general subjects and offered a four year education (generally after candidates had undergone a two-year introductory course).

A number of chiefs considered in this work who were in office in 1919 were educated at this Collège des Fils des Chefs. Among them were Macodou Sall (the chef de province of Guet, Tivaouane), the sons of Lat Dior, the former Damel of Cayor, Mbakhane Diop (who entered the school in 1892), Masseck and Abdoulaye Diop (entering the college in 1894 and 1895).<sup>1</sup> Entering the College in 1902 were Ely Samba Laobe, the son of Samba Laobe Fall, a former Damel of Cayor, Mamdou N'diaye, the son of Sanor N'diaye, the former chef de province Sereres(Thies) and Alioune Sylla, the son of Cadi Masylla of Thies. The contingent from the Casamance that year included Amadou Seck, the son of Guedj Seck, an interpreter at Carabane, and Alioune N'diaye, the son of the chef de canton of Elinkine. The interpreter Tété Diadhiou, troubleshooter for the French in the Casamance who held the status of a chef de province for many years, attended the College des Fils des Chefs from 1907 to 1910, but was taken away by the administration before the end of his studies as his services were required as interpreter at Bignona.

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1. 1G45 Collège des Fils des Chefs. Lists of pupils entering the Collège des Fils des Chefs in 1892, 1894, 1895, and 1902 and pupils graduating from the College des Fils des Chefs in 1894. This file also contains information on appointments of pupils leaving the College des Fils des Chefs.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, chiefs who had been educated at the college formed a minority of chefs de canton and de province. The majority of sons of chiefs attending the college came from the Muslim north of Senegal. The administration sought chiefly posts for the graduates of the Collège des Fils des Chefs. Ahmadou Fall Ibra was made secretary to the President of the Confederation of the United Provinces in 1896, to be succeeded in this function by Macodou Sall. Both later became chefs adjoints of Saniokhor Oriental and Guet respectively in 1893. Mbakhane Diop was made chef supérieur of Baol Oriental in March 1898 while his brother Abdoulaye became chef adjoint of Mbakol in March 1899.

Yet the immediate precursor of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was the medersa of St. Louis created on 15 January 1908 on the site of the College. This was not to be specially for the sons of chiefs but rather was to be a "small indigenous university" (Marty)<sup>1</sup> with higher education programmes in Arabic language and literature, Muslim law, customary languages and law, and French language, literature and administrative organisation. Nevertheless, sons of chiefs numbered 37 out of the 100 pupils. Professors from Algeria taught pupils of ages ranging from seven to twenty five. Students over the age of eighteen were grouped into an advanced class. Although the majority of pupils were on scholarships from the government of Senegal, there were an additional twenty five from Mauretania, and a few from elsewhere in the AOF. Requests for entry rose each year, with an increasing number of subjects from foreign colonies registering as auditeurs libres.<sup>2</sup> By the decree of 17 May 1919, permission to form a Friendly Society was readily granted to former pupils who had become chiefs and who were regarded by the administration as being very devoted to the French cause.<sup>3</sup>

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1. P. Marty, Etudes Sur l'Islam au Sénégal, Vol. 2, Paris, 1917, p. 114.

2. Ibid.

3. AN 2G20-5 Senegal RPT - Second quarter 1920.

With the shrinkage in European personnel in proportion to the population of Senegal as a whole during the First World War and in subsequent years, the chiefs were being called upon to carry out an increasing number of functions. Association theory advocated better education for the chiefs to facilitate the execution of their tasks. Beurnier, when Governor of Senegal, spoke of "le besoin dont le rôle devient de jour en jour plus complexe d'une formation plus poussée"<sup>1</sup> As Governor General, Van Vollenhoven had criticised the lack of a clearly defined policy towards educating the chiefs in preceding periods "Le vice principal de notre administration est de ne pas savoir prévoir."<sup>2</sup> He pointed out the need for the administration to carefully prepare eventual successors to the chiefs currently in power and replacements for unsatisfactory ones. It was widely felt that the medersa did not provide a sufficiently practical training for potential chiefs.

By the early 1920s, it also seemed that the rules governing the selection of pupils for the medersa had been lost sight of for some time. The percentage of pupils who were sons of merchants or cultivators had grown since the school's inception when it had stood at 22% of the total. The Governor of Senegal consequently stressed in his circular of 19 August 1921 to the commandants de cercle "Les élèves de la Medersa doivent constituer une élite sociale et appartenir-sauf de très rares exceptions que pourraient justifier des aptitudes intellectuelles tout à fait remarquables-aux grandes familles qui exercent une influence politique ou religieuse réelle."<sup>3</sup>

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1. 1G34 Governor of Senegal to Governor General of the AOF, "Report on the Commandement Indigène", 8 May 1931, hereafter referred to as "Report..."
  2. Van Vollenhoven, "Les chefs indigènes", *op.cit*, p.268
  3. 4 G 6 (14) Colonial Council. The Governor is here reminding the Commandants de cercle of the decree of 23 September 1916.

Moreover, there were increasing fears among French colonial theorists like Marty that the medersa was becoming a Muslim seminary, and that by promoting it, the French were accelerating the Islamisation of Senegal. Marty stipulated that the medersa should not be used for educating pupils, particularly not the sons of chiefs, from non-Islamised areas of Senegal.. French policy in the AOF should, on the contrary, "capter et faire tourner à notre profit les forces de l'Islam.... mais nous garder soigneusement de favoriser son essor dans les sociétés fétichistes." <sup>1</sup>

The Governor of Senegal resisted the proposal to create a new school for the sons of chiefs. <sup>2</sup> He maintained that his circular of 9 February 1921(recommending that commandants de cercle take those sons of chiefs who were pupils at the medersa to work with them in the school holidays) would give these future chiefs sufficient foretaste of what their task would be.

But as far as the Governor General was concerned, the Governor of Senegal's remedies were but a drop in the ocean and a drastic overhaul of the medersa was called for. The decree of 27 May 1922 established the Ecole des Fils des Chefs et d'Interprètes at St. Louis in place of the medersa. In accordance with the Association Policy's aim to reinforce the indigenous elite, the entry requirements, relaxed during the period of the medersa, became fundamental to the new school "Cette école est exclusivement réservée aux fils des chefs et de notables." <sup>3</sup> Like its

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1. Marty, op. cit., p. 122.
  2. ARSD 1G34, Governor to Governor General, 19 September 1921.
  3. 1G34 Headmaster of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs-Annual Report for 1923-24, quotation from Governor Maillet.

predecessor, the Ecole des Otages, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs aimed to "donner aux jeunes gens ayant déjà le prestige de leur nom une instruction et une éducation susceptibles d'en faire des auxiliaires utiles de notre administration et capables d'en comprendre et de faire apprécier le rôle civilisateur de la France."<sup>1</sup>

The avowedly political role of the school was acknowledged when it was put under the control of the Bureau Politique.

By the decree of 1922, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was to be a boarding school, with the pupils' food, clothing and travelling expenses to be financed by the Government of Senegal, a system which will be explored later on in this chapter.

#### Selection procedures of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs

According to the headmaster of the school in his annual report of 1924-25, "Sélection et éducation sont devenues les assises fondamentales de l'Ecole."<sup>2</sup> The statutes for the new school made provision for a comité de perfectionnement to supervise the selection of pupils composed of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs as President, and the chef de bureau politique, the headmaster of the school, one chef de province, and the cadi of St. Louis as members. Bouna N'diaye was the chef de province member in 1922 and 1923. Applications to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs came from candidates between the ages of thirteen and fifteen studying at regional (primary) schools. They were to make a written application to the Governor of Senegal enclosing birth, medical and good conduct certificates and a transcript from the headmaster of their école régionale. Meanwhile, the commandant de cercle was to prepare a detailed report on their family background. This was nothing new; candidates to the College des Fils des Chefs had had to comply with similar conditions according to the Governor's circular of 8 January 1907.

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1. AN 2G23-11 Senegal RPA 1923.

2. IG34 Headmaster's annual report, 16 July 1925.

The transition from medersa to Ecole des Fils des Chefs provided the opportunity to do some weeding out before the new school really got underway. In the year 1921-22, the medersa started off with 137 pupils, but by the end of the year, 39 had been expelled for not fulfilling conditions of age, "nobility" or academic achievement. When the introductory course was abolished in 1922, 24 of its pupils were selected for the first year of the new school. This left 71 pupils to start the year in 1922-23. In 1923-24, while 13 pupils left with certificates, only 7 new ones were admitted, leaving the school with 64 pupils. It was decided that in the years following 1924, a maximum of 12 new pupils were to be admitted into the first year. That the restricted entry at first helped to improve the quality of the school can be seen as follows:-

Year	No. of pupils receiving a diploma at the end of their studies	total No. of pupils in all four years
1921	2	137
1921	10	71
1923	13	64
1924	12	58
1925	14	53

One innovation in the statutes of the new school was that candidates had to take an entrance examination, but the one scheduled for July 1922 never took place. Instead, the administration decided to give preference to candidates with a certificat d'études primaires. Third and fourth year students already at the medersa could return without such a qualification provided they had passed the annual examination.<sup>2</sup>

A number of other articles in the 1922 decree proved unworkable and were altered during the period under consideration. In 1923, the

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1. 1G34 - compiled from statistics in the Headmaster's reports for the years 1923-24 and 1924-25.
  2. ARSD 1G36 Governor of Senegal to Governor of Mauretania, 1922-23,

Governor of Senegal supported the Comité de Perfectionnement's request to make the age limit for entry seventeen instead of fifteen in order to "donner satisfaction à des familles qui nous sont dévoués en permettant, le cas échéant à leurs enfants de disposer de deux années de plus pour la préparation de leur examen d'entrée." <sup>1</sup> The problem here was that the decree of 30 July 1919 fixing at twenty the age at which subjects could be conscripted would be contravened if pupils did not enter the Ecole des Fils des Chefs until the age of seventeen for a four-year term of studies. At first, the Governor was willing only to approve of sixteen as the maximum age, but once the agreement of the department responsible for military affairs was obtained, the decree of 27 February 1926 raised the maximum age of entry from fifteen to seventeen. This was further raised to eighteen by the decision of 20 July 1933.

In several instances, candidates falsified their birth or school certificates to make themselves appear younger. Momar Cissé of Thies, who applied to the school in 1925, altered the date on a birth certificate given him by the Cadi of Rufisque from 1904 to 1914 and again to 1910.<sup>2</sup> In 1942, two cases of forged documents were discovered. Both culprits, Mahmadou Moustapha Bâ, son of the chef de canton Alassane Isma Bâ of Ferlo, and Samba Toure belonging to a royal family from Gambia were sent home in disgrace, although neither was charged because of the importance of their families.<sup>3</sup>

Without sufficient statistical evidence, it is difficult to assess the extent of the demand for places among those with some claim to the chieftancy. It would appear from the limited material available that demand from notable families in the north soon after the school's

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1. ARSD 1G42 Governor of Senegal to the Governor General, July 1924.
  2. 1G42 Telegram for the Commandant de Cercle of Thies to the Governor, 16 May 1924.
  3. ARSD 1G40- The case of Alassane Isma Bâ is discussed in a letter from the Secretary General to the Commandant de Cercle of Matam, 13 March 1942, and that of Samba Toure in a letter from the Commandant de cercle of Kaolack to the Governor of Senegal, 30 June 1942.



inception was high. This was because even those with the most solid claims to the chieftancy considered attendance at the school would increase chances of obtaining a post. Attendance at the school could also legitimise the appointment as chiefs of those with dubious claims. This gave the colonial administration the opportunity to flex its muscles, in determining which applicants were suitable. In certain cases, the most patrician families were snubbed while the children of more questionable rural claimants were admitted. In this way, access to the school became a mode of control not only of the future, but of the existing chieftancy.

This can be seen in the case of some applications from Tivaouane in the early years. While Amadou Diop, the son of Sala M'Batta Diop, a cousin and diaraf of the chef de province Meissa M'Baye Sall was admitted to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, in 1923, Demba War Sall and Meissa M'Baye, son and nephew respectively to Meissa M'Baye Sall were rejected.<sup>1</sup> In the same year, Mbakhane Diop Soutou, the grandson of Lat Dior and nephew of Mbakhane Diop was rejected on the grounds of age, and Samba Laobe Fall, the son of Tanor Latsoukabe Fall, the chef de canton of Fadene(Thies) failed the entrance examination.<sup>2</sup> Yet a stranger to the region, Alioune Ba<sup>A</sup>, from a notable family in Nioro Rip (Sine Saloum) and son of the chief interpreter at Tivaouane, Diougou Ba<sup>A</sup> was admitted as part of the Tivaouane contingent.<sup>3</sup> Successful candidates from the Basse Casamance in the early years of the school were generally non-originares whose fathers were acting as interpreters in the region, like Boubakar N'diaye, admitted in 1923.<sup>4</sup>

Few members of chiefly families in the Basse Casamance attended the Ecole des Fils des Chefs in its early years. Even by 1928,

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1. ARSD 1G41 Commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to the Governor, 23 June, 1923.
  2. 1G41, Letter from Governor Maillet to Mbakhane Diop Soutou, 8 September 1923 and Samba Laobe Fall's examination results, July 1923.
  3. 1G41 Commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to the Governor, 23 June 1923.
  4. 1G41 He was the sole candidate for the Basse Casamance to take the entrance examination on 23 July 1923.

there were no originaire candidates from these regions at the school, attributed by the administration to "L'état social anarchique des peuplades arriérés de la Basse Casamance".<sup>1</sup> Edouard Diatta, son of the chef de province of Oussouye applied to the school from the Ecole de Carabane in 1925 at the age of twelve, but was rejected for being too young.<sup>2</sup>

But recruitment for the Ecole des Fils des Chefs began to fall off after 1925. An increasing number of young men from chiefly families, particularly the more able ones, were choosing the Ecole Primaire Supérieure (Ecole Blanchot) in preference to their own special school. It was generally felt that the Ecole Blanchot offered a better education, greater employment prospects, and the possibility of a year's less study as Arabic was not taught. One chiefly pupil, justifying his choice of the Ecole Blanchot, explained "Quand je serai vétérinaire, l'administration pourra me trouver si je dois devenir chef de canton."<sup>3</sup> Initially, the administration saw no harm in this. "Les jeunes gens issus des familles des chefs du pays n'ont pas renoncé à l'instruction, ils la recoivent ailleurs que dans l'Ecole créée à leur intention... et j'estime qu'il y a là quelque chose d'excellent".<sup>4</sup> The decision of 1 May 1924 making it compulsory for sons of chiefs to attend the school set aside for them had little practical effect. Because of the rather complex entry procedure to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, some sons of chiefs like Salif Cheikhou Diao (later chef de canton in Kolda) were forced to enter the Ecole Blanchot because of delays in handing in their application forms.<sup>5</sup>

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1. 1G34 "Report ... " 8 May 1931.
  2. ARSD 1G43 Entrance examination of Edouard Diatta, 8 June 1925. The Board noted that he required a dispensation as he was too young (born on 8 September 1913).
  3. 1G34 Director of Political Affairs, "Report on the results of the merger of the Ecole des Fils Des Chefs and the Ecole Blanchot," 25 March 1930, hereafter referred to as Director... "Report...."
  4. 1G34 Letter from the Inspector of Primary Education to the Chef de Bureau Politique, 26 March 1930.
  5. Interview with Salif Cheikou Diao, 29 March 1981.

Throughout the history of the school, the desire to improve educational standards amongst the chiefs had to be balanced against the wish to recruit pupils from the relatively small number of notable families. In a drive to eliminate illiteracy among future chiefs and to reduce variations between the academic levels of pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, the decree of 10 October 1927 stipulated that all pupils at the school should have the Certificat d'Etudes Primaires (CEP). No new candidates were admitted to the school in 1928 while provision were made for all future candidates to take this examination. The decree also aimed to raise the standard of the school by amalgamating it with the Ecole Blanchot, to be supervised and staffed by the Inspection de l'Enseignement Primaire rather than by the Bureau Politique.

Carde hoped that bringing the pupils of both schools under one roof-"les cadres futurs politiques et économiques"<sup>1</sup> would benefit all concerned: the future chiefs would improve their intellectual standards by mixing with pupils destined to go to the Grands Ecoles of Dakar, while pupils of the Ecole Blanchot would become acquainted with the children of the great families of Senegal. But the merger of the schools was primarily for reasons of economy with headmaster, treasurer and some teachers to be shared. For the last two years, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was to continue to follow its old programme while the first two classes were to be joined to those of the Ecole Blanchot.

Several years later, the merger was being criticised as a prime example of "the spirit of academic uniformity pushed to the extreme."<sup>2</sup> It was felt that the essential goal of the original Ecole des Fils des

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1. AN 2G27- 18 Senegal RPA 1927.

2. IG34 "Report...." 8 May 1931.

Chefs had been lost as "cette jeune élite aristocratique" was being suffocated by alien elements. As Brévié saw it, future chiefs were being not only "confondus avec leurs congénères sur les bancs de l'école primaire, puis de l'école régionale,"<sup>1</sup> but at the Ecole des Fils Chefs itself. The result was a diminution of the prestige of future chiefs, particularly when comparisons between academic levels at the Ecole Blanchot and Ecole des Fils des Chefs sections always found the latter wanting.

The very future of the school was at risk when in 1931, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section had only eight pupils for three classes (Two pupils in the first year, none in the second, six in the third and fifteen in the fourth.)<sup>2</sup> This drop in the number of pupils can to some extent be attributed to the loss of pupils to the Ecole Blanchot section, but also to the elimination of many potential candidates by having the CEP as an entry requirement. In 1927, when the CEP was not an entry requirement, twenty four candidates were presented before the comité de perfectionnement and ten were accepted. But in 1928 when the CEP was obligatory, the only candidate who took it failed. Similarly in 1929, of the two candidates for the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, only one got in.<sup>3</sup>

In an effort to keep the Ecole Blanchot and Ecole des Fils des Chefs separate, Brevie restored the latter to the control of the chef de bureau politique in 1933, and made changes in the recruitment of pupils. Opposed to recrutement being purely a political affair, Brévié wanted the Ecole des Fils des Chefs to have its own entrance examination, to be taken in addition to the CEP. Introduced by the decree of 24 April 1930, this test was to be taken annually in July at St. Louis, Rufisque and all chef-lieux of cercles in the colony with

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1. ARSD 17G 119 (17) J. Brévié, "Circular of 27 September 1932".
  2. 1G34, "Report.....", 8 May 1931.
  3. 1G34 Director..."Report.....", 25 March 1930.

an école régionale. At St. Louis, the invigilators were to consist of the headmaster of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, and two instituteurs chosen by the Inspector of Primary Education, while in the cercles the commandant de cercle and two civil servants chosen by him were to invigilate. A commission consisting of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs as President, the chef de bureau politique, the headmaster and a teacher of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, was to correct the papers.<sup>1</sup>

As Beurnier, the then Governor of Senegal had foretold, the recruitment to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was not in the least improved by adding a further intellectual obstacle. The comité de perfectionnement deplored the fact that sons of chiefs often failed to turn up at the examination centres. What was needed was rather a confirmation of the elitist as opposed to the academic nature of the school's entry requirements. As the Inspector General of Education reported in February 1932, "soumettre les futurs chefs à un concours, c'est rompre le fondement même de l'autorité indigène."<sup>2</sup> The conditions of entry needed to be made easier for candidates from traditional chiefly families. By the decree of 23 October 1932, special dispensation could be granted to a candidate without a CEP or who was over-age provided he was related to a chief currently in office by a direct paternal link, and had a good written and spoken knowledge of French.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the entrance examination was to be abolished. One of the first exemptions, granted the day after the law was proclaimed was for Abdel Kader Sylla, the son of the chef de canton of N'Goye (Baol), Alioune Sylla, admitted to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs without a CEP or having sat an entrance examination.<sup>4</sup>

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1. 1G34 Decree concerning the entrance examination to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, 24 April 1930.
  2. 17G 119 (17) Quoted in a letter from the Governor of Senegal to the Governor General, 19 March 1937.
  3. ARSD 18G 70 (17) Governor to the Governor General, October 1932.
  4. ARSD 1G37 Letter from the Chef de Bureau Administratif Indigène to the Governor, 24 October 1932.

A further loophole was provided for candidates without a certificat d'études primaires when they were authorised to produce instead a certificate from the headmaster of their école régionale stating that they could read and write French very well.

But although requirements for entry were relaxed, academic standards at the Ecole Primaire Supérieure remained the same, with the result that in the school year of 1933-34 four pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were having to repeat the first year.<sup>1</sup> The whole class was two months behind in the syllabus as a number of those who had been selected were illiterate. By 1934, the Inspector General of Education and the headmaster of the Ecole Blanchot were recommending that headmasters of regional schools pre-select potential recruits to be specially groomed for the Ecole Primaire Supérieure. In a further attempt to raise standards, academic entry requirements were re-introduced with the decision of 28 March 1935, stating that candidates without a certificat d'études primaires would have to do an entrance examination. This was to consist of three written tests-dictation, French composition and mathematics. Efforts were made in this direction even before the law was passed when Ameth Fall, whose father was a cousin of the Damel Samba Laobe Fall was rejected in 1934 after failing his certificat d'études primaires élémentaires.<sup>2</sup> In 1933 and again in 1934, the application of Momar N'diaye, the son of Code N'diaye, the chef de canton of Sandock Diagianao was deferred till he had taken the CEP as he possessed only a certificat de scolarité.<sup>3</sup> The 1935 legislation also stated that any pupil

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1. 1G34 Headmaster's Annual Report 1933-34 , 4 August 1934.
  2. ARSD 1G38 - File on Ameth Fall. This includes references from Meissa M'Baye Sall, the chef de province, the headmaster of the Ecole Régionale at Tivaouane, and information gathered by the commandant de cercle of Tivaouane.
  3. 1G38 File on Momar N'diaye. He applied to the school for three years from 1G36 onwards until he was accepted in 1938 (1G34).

failing an examen de passage for the second time or receiving an average of less than seven out of twenty the first time was to be expelled.

At the same time as intellectual obstacles to the admission of chiefs' relatives to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were removed, the exigencies of pedigree were tightened up, resulting in a number of rejections for sons of chiefs who were not originaires of a region or were not from traditional families. Assane Seck, the son of Ibrahima Seck, the chef de canton of Adeane (Ziguinchor) was rejected by the 1933 commission for examining candidates on the grounds that his family were strangers to the Casamance.<sup>1</sup> The French used the rather dubious applications they occasionally received to justify these measures. One such case was that of Moctar Diallo, of coutûme toucouleur, who applied to the Ecole Régionale of Thies in 1940, claiming to be the nephew of the chef de province of Firdou, Abdoul Diallo.<sup>2</sup> Closer investigations revealed he was unable to give exact details of his relationship with this chief apart from some of his Toucouleur relatives having told him his father was Abdoul Diallo's brother,

Many of these decisions were clearly political, and were determined by whether the French smiled or frowned upon a candidate's family. The application of Idrissa Cissé, the son of the former chef de province of Diambour Meridional, Samba Khary Cissé, was turned down in 1933 in spite of the fact that his family was one of the oldest and most influential in the region. They were descendants of marabouts who had settled in Louga in 1905.<sup>3</sup> Yet the commandant de cercle of Louga maintained that the Cissés were not a traditional chiefly family "La famille

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1. 1G38 Table drawn up by the Commission examining candidates for the Ecole des fils des Chefs, September 1933, hereafter referred to as "Table ..."
  2. 1G38 Moctar Diallo at the Ecole Régionale of Thies to the Governor, 6 September 1940.
  3. 1G38 Idrissa Cissé to the Governor, requesting entry to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, 28 July 1933, and report by the Commandant de cercle of Louga on the Cissé family, 11 August 1933.

Cissé ne semble pas pouvoir être strictement considérée comme descendants des grands chefs du pays , qui sont les N'diaye, les Diop, les Fall ou les Sall." A more likely explanation for Idrissa's rejection lies in the fact that his family had fallen out with the French. In 1931, Samba Khary and three of his sons serving as chefs de canton in Diambour were dismissed on charges of corruption. Similarly, it was argued only five years after Assane Secks's rejection in 1933, in the case of another member of his family, Amadou Moussa Seck, that the Seck family were no longer strangers to Adeane as a result of intermarriage with Mandinkas and Diolas in the region.<sup>1</sup>

With increasing difficulties in finding suitable pupils for the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section, the examination commission of 1934 suggested a three yearly recruitment.<sup>2</sup> This would also prove an economy measure, effecting a saving in teachers, and would be academically beneficial in that pupils' work could be more closely followed. The bigger classes of 15-20 were more practical than the classes of 4-5 which had become the general rule at the school by the early '30s. In addition, fewer (7-8) graduates were produced for the job market (in the form of secrétaires d'administration indigène). Whereas in 1934, eight pupils were admitted to the first year together with three repeaters and five pupils from the second year whom the headmaster decided were incapable of following the lessons of the equivalent class at the Ecole Blanchot, there was no recruitment in 1935. Sidy N'diaye, the chef de canton of Pass Bakhel (Djoloff) and brother of Bouna N'diaye, was informed that his son Alioune could not enter the Ecole des Fils des Chefs that year as recruitment had been suspended.<sup>3</sup> By 1937-38, there was only one class left at the Ecole des

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1. 1G38 "Table...." September 1933.

2. 1G37 Official report of the meeting of the Commission examining candidates for the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, 1934.

3. 1G37 Letter from the Govern<sup>or</sup> to the Commandent de cercle of Djoloff, 11 June 1935.



Fils des Chefs, the fourth year of the 1934-38 intake consisting of six pupils.<sup>1</sup>

In the years of the Popular Front government and afterwards, hopes of improving the quality of the chieftancy were pinned increasingly on the intellectual attributes of pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. During the 1938 recruitment, the Governor, while acknowledging the importance of the origin and status of a candidate's family, stipulated that in future, more emphasis should be placed on intelligence and on the teacher's certificate concerning the candidate's knowledge of French.<sup>2</sup> The headmaster had already recommended to the Governor that candidates from regional or urban schools should have the CEP, for while all pupils managing to graduate had this at admission, none of those expelled had.<sup>3</sup>

But notables complained that this three-yearly recruitment meant that they could not send their children to the school till the class of three years before had left. This meant that their children would sometimes be over the maximum age limit by the time places were again available. An important transformation was carried out by the decree of 2 August 1939, whereby recruitment again became annual, and ten places were offered for competition. In an attempt to achieve greater homogeneity amongst pupils, a strict age limit was again introduced. Since the 1933 legislation, ages of pupils at the school had varied from fourteen to twenty three, but the legislation of 1939 stating that candidates had to be between the ages of fourteen and sixteen brought this under control.

Even stricter academic standards were introduced as pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs continued to trail behind those of the Ecole Blanchot. Candidates not only had to have the CEP or be on a

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1. ANSOM - Affaires Politiques C598 D5 - Senegal RPA 1938, Section: Ecole des Fils des Chefs.
  2. Ibid.
  3. 1G37, Headmaster of the Ecole Blanchot's Annual Report, 8 August, 1936.

list for the examination that year but had in addition to do an entrance exam to make sure they were up to the standard required by the Ecole Blanchot. Unfortunately, this meant in practical terms that because of the dates of these examinations, pupils entered the school one term behind their counterparts at the Ecole Primaire Supérieure.

The French continued to take political factors into account in selecting pupils for the school. In view of the importance of the Sall family in Cayor, the commandant de cercle of Louga asked the Governor in October 1939 for a dispensation for Macodou Sall, the son of Sangone Sall, the chef de canton of Ndayene Dagam Ndour as he was already sixteen years old.<sup>1</sup> Youssouf Sonko, a descendant of Lamine Sonko, the former chef de province of Djougouttes, was granted a similar dispensation in the same year. Yet the application of Ousman Lô, the son of Sidy Lô, the former chef de canton of Thor Diander and Diack and great nephew of Fara Biram Lô, the former colonial councillor, was rejected on the grounds of his "undesirable family background."<sup>2</sup>

During the Vichy period in Senegal, the hereditary claim of a chief's relative to the post of chef de canton or de province assumed increasing importance and was thoroughly investigated before the final decision on whether to admit him was taken.

By 1940 there were more originaire entrants from the Casamance. Youssouf Sonko came top of the entrance examination for the school.<sup>3</sup> Other originaires included Salif Diallo, the son of Abdoul Diallo, the chef de canton of Fouladou (Kolda) and Alimou Komma, the son of Malan Binta Komma, the chef de canton of Pakao Tilibo, whose family

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1. 1G38 commandant de cercle of Louga's report to the Governor of Senegal concerning the application of Macodou Sall, 20 October 1939.
  2. 1G38 Maestracci, the commandant de cercle of Thies to the Governor of Senegal, 3 May 1940.
  3. 1G37 Official report of the Selection Committee, 17 November 1939.

had always commanded the village of Diannah Ba.<sup>1</sup>

### The Syllabus at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs

Having examined one of the touchstones of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, "sélection", we can now examine the actual syllabus and its development in the course of the period under consideration. The decree of 1922 laid down the guidelines for all future programmes which were to be "une oeuvre de civilisation" but their action on the pupils was to be one of "cultiver sans déraciner".<sup>2</sup>

The first syllabus of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs at its foundation in 1922 aimed to give a training as humanist as that of the former medersa together with a more administrative training to prepare them for their future role, as a true "établissement de l'enseignement supérieur indigène".<sup>3</sup> General subjects like French, mathematics and the metric system, history and geography, and physical and natural sciences were combined with more specialised subjects. Courses taken from the medersa were given a more practical bias. "Morale et pédagogie" became "morale civique, devoirs et droits du chef."<sup>4</sup> The headmaster of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs viewed this subject as a vital ingredient in a chief's moral development. "Il arrive que les acquisitions intellectuelles sont fort dommageables aux acquisitions morales."<sup>5</sup> It was hoped that the introduction of this subject would cultivate "moral qualities" in this chiefly elite. In practical terms "morality" in the context of the chief's education meant inculcating obedience to French authority and "la reconnaissance à cette grande fleur française."<sup>6</sup> Later on, Carde reiterated the importance of this subject in order to ensure that

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1. 1G38 Files on Salif Diallo (3 April 1940) and Alimou Komma, (23 April 1940).
  2. 1G34 Governor General Carde's circular to the Governors of the AOF, 22 April 1930.
  3. 1G34 Headmaster of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, Annual Report, 1923-24.
  4. 1G34 Headmaster's annual report, 30 July 1923.
  5. 1G34 Headmaster's annual report, 16 July 1924.
  6. 1G34 Headmaster's annual report, 30 July 1923.

"au lieu d'avoir l'esprit constamment fixé sur leurs droits, les fils des chefs songent avant tout à leurs devoirs."<sup>1</sup>

A new course of "administration coloniale et comptabilité publique" was added to the old medersa subjects. Pupils examined in this subject were expected to tackle practical problems, such as what a chief was expected to do in cases of theft.<sup>2</sup> Even French composition papers were based on topical subjects. The 1922 final examination read as follow:

"Vous êtes chef à...  
Les habitants manquent d'eau.  
Ils veulent creuser un ou plusieurs puits mais ils manquent d'outils.  
Ecrivez à M. l'Administrateur de cercle pour lui exposer la situation et pour solliciter le prêt des outils disposés à la Résidence."

Although Arabic literary, judicial and administrative studies continued, the study of Arabic was "neutralised". Arabic translations came to be regarded merely as "une excellente gymnastique intellectuelle,"<sup>3</sup> equivalent to a Latin or Greek translation for a French secondary school pupil.

Initially, the commission appointed to examine the diplôme de fin d'études was composed of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs as president, a colonial administrator, the headmaster and two instituteurs of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and the President (Cadi) of the Muslim tribunal of St. Louis.

Grégoire, the headmaster of the school in its early days, wanted its studies to be made increasingly practical. In 1924, he asked if agricultural studies could occupy a greater part of the timetable in order

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1. 1G34 Gasset, the Headmaster's Annual Report, 1924, quotation from Carde's speech.
  2. 1G34 Headmaster's Annual Report, 1924. Question from the examens de passage, 30 July 1923.
  3. 1G34 Headmaster's Annual Report, 30 July 1923.

to overcome traditional Senegalese attitudes equating manual work with slavery. "C'est par les chefs que doit pénétrer dans les masses l'amour du travail."<sup>1</sup> Based on the recommendations of M. Denis, an agronomic engineer on the staff of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, the decision of 14 September 1925 introduced practical agricultural education ("agriculture et élevage pratiques") to the school syllabus, for the "vulgarisation des méthodes nécessaires au développement agricole du Sénégal par nos représentants les plus qualifiés auprès des populations."<sup>2</sup> All four classes at the school were to have lessons in this subject for one and a half hours every week. First year pupils were to learn general theories of agriculture and animal husbandry, while second year pupils learnt about agricultural machinery as well. In the third year, in addition to these subjects, students were to go to the "farm school" at Louga in the summer holidays<sup>3</sup> to learn about cash crop agriculture, as this period coincided with the full cycle of groundnut cultivation from sowing to harvesting. Fourth year pupils were to receive weekly lectures from agriculturalists and administrators in the agricultural service on animal husbandry and illnesses, agricultural legislation and technology, the rural economy, the Sociétés de Prévoyance and agricultural credit societies.

It therefore became necessary to add civil servants from the agricultural service to the teaching staff. Once they had obtained their final diploma, the graduates of the school served as élève chefs on a year's stage at a neighbouring farm school in their region under the supervision of the manager.<sup>4</sup> They in turn were to be put in charge of a team of sons of notables, and taught to specialise in agricultural products native to their region. The pupils food and board at the farm school during the stage was subsidised

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1. 1G34 Headmaster of the Ecole des Fils Chefs to the Chefs de Bureau Politique, 9 February 1924.
  2. 1G34 Chef de Service Agricole to Chef de Bureau Politique, 29 October 1925.
  3. Journal Officiel du Senegal, Decree of 14 September 1925.
  4. 1G34 Governor to Governor General, 28 November 1925.

by the Government of Senegal. However, M. Denis' proposal that fourth year students should go on excursions to see French agricultural achievements like Richard Toll, and to oil processing plants was rejected by the Governor as liable to incur too much expense.<sup>1</sup> Gradually, agriculture won equal status as a subject with French composition.

By 1939, constant modifications in the syllabus meant that agriculture was taught only to fourth year pupils.<sup>2</sup> Because students had spent the holidays at the end of the third year at a farm school, it was felt to be superfluous to offer a fairly in-depth study of cultivation of the most important plants-groundnut, millet, and cassava. Instead the administration decided to give extra weight to a topic dealing with the importance of forests in the general economy of the country. For as chiefs, graduates of the school would have to assist in the classification of forests, the upkeep of forest reserves, combatting fires, and looking for offenders who had violated forest regulations. The topic was to be given four lessons a year instead of two. As far as practical agriculture was concerned, it was decided that the study of sowers and hoes, which the pupils would have considered in their holidays, had also become superfluous. More time was instead to be devoted to horticulture and the cultivation of trees. Future chiefs were shown how to create model orchards with a view to setting an example to their subjects.

The amalgamation of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and the Ecole Blanchot in 1927 aimed at improving the standard of future chiefs as the Government of Senegal had received a number of complaints about the quality of commis expéditionnaires who had graduated from the school. This is in part explained by the higher standards required by a

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1. 1G34 Report by M. Denis.- mentioned in a letter from the Chef de Service d'Agriculture, Elevage and Forêts to the Governor, 6 March 1926.
  2. 1G34 Chef de Service d'Agriculture to the Governor, 8 November 1939.

white administration when educational standards at home were progressively improving during the period under consideration.

In addition to following the same courses as their counterparts at the Ecole Blanchot, pupils in the first two years at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section were to continue to study morale civique and administrative organisation. For the last two years, students in the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section could follow the old programme. In fact, the really able pupils in the third and fourth years were allowed to study with the third year of the Ecole Blanchot in a special section for preparation for the Ecole Ponty.<sup>1</sup> In 1930, all pupils in the fourth year of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs but one presented themselves for the entrance examination for the Ecole Ponty, determined not to be considered as academically inferior to subjects from other schools.

But the fusion of syllabi of the two schools meant that the Ecole des Fils des Chefs still failed to prepare future chiefs for their functions. It was said that pupils failed to appreciate the usefulness of the stage at the farm school while accountancy and administrative law were of a purely theoretical character. At the same time, the special education for the sons of chiefs was frequently attacked in the local press for reinforcing caste prejudices.<sup>2</sup>

For financial reasons, teaching in the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and Ecole Blanchot sections could not be conducted separately, but in a move to protect the former, the comité de perfectionnement was to meet once a year to examine the syllabus and a permanent commission of at least three members - a civil servant, a chief and a teacher - was to visit the school at least once a year.<sup>3</sup>

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1. 1G34 Headmaster's Annual Report, 4 August 1934.
  2. As in an article La Sirène Sénégalaise, 18 August 1932.
  3. 1G34 Governor to Governor General, 8 May 1931.

The administration hoped that the merger would halt the drift of able sons of chiefs to the Ecole Blanchot in order to avoid the study of Arabic which entailed an additional year's study at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. By the early 1930s, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was attracting only young men drawn to the study of Arabic, nearly all of whom were Toucouleur from the Fleuve. In order to curb this tendency, Bouna N'diaye, a member of the comité de perfectionnement,<sup>1</sup> advocated the phasing out of Arabic and the introduction of identical programmes for the two schools in the first three years. Instead, the Governor of Senegal insisted that Arabic should be retained at the school but should also be introduced to the Ecole Blanchot programme. As far as he was concerned, "La langue arabe me paraît s'imposer."<sup>2</sup>

At Brévié's instigation, a major reorganisation of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs programme took place in 1933, in the hope of improving the quality of future chiefs. This reform confirmed that the first two years of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section should share a programme of general education with the Ecole Blanchot, and laid down the syllabus for the third and fourth years. The third year was to offer a mixture of general and professional education, with fifteen hours of special studies: nine hours for administrative and six for practical studies, like agriculture, hygiene and animal husbandry. New topics were introduced into the administrative studies course, like coutumes indigènes or customary law, inspired by Geismar's studies on this subject.<sup>3</sup> Another was the economic geography and political economy of the AOF, which was divided into three parts-a study of the West African economy, and of Senegal's particular place in it, the French economic achievement in the AOF and general economic notions like supply and demand. The only general education offered in the fourth year was French and maths which were allocated only four hours a week while the rest of the syllabus was to be specialised-

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1. IG34 Director. "Report....", 25 March 1930

2. IG34 Inspector of Primary Education to the Chef de Bureau Politique, 26 March 1930.

3. IG34 Headmaster of the Ecole Blanchot-Annual Report, 8 August 1936.



agriculture and administrative and judicial organisation. The study of Arabic and Koranic law became an optional subject from the second year onwards.

However, the Inspector-General of Education wanted more time given to the role and duties of the chiefs in the third and fourth years. This subject, known as "morale civique et française", was to impart the aims of French colonial policy by explaining the texts of colonial theorists like Van Vollenhoven, Sarraut, Hardy and Brévié to these future representatives of the administration. But the Governor, believing that a more practical bias was necessary, hoped to devote a larger part of the timetable to specialist studies, by inviting administrators to give lectures on administrative organisation, the principles of administrative law and the colonial economy.<sup>1</sup>

With better inside information on the workings of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, the headmaster did not share these views. He believed on the contrary that even third year pupils lacked sufficient general knowledge to follow a large number of specialist studies.<sup>2</sup> In the academic year 1934-35 he found support amongst the specialist teachers who agreed that apart from two or three pupils in the third year, the rest had great difficulty in understanding the work. The general low standard of the pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section was reflected in the headmaster's report for 1934-35. He called into question the merger of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and Ecole Blanchot by requesting an extra instituteur for the first and second years of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section so as not to hold back their counterparts at the Ecole Blanchot.

The headmaster therefore recommended concentration on general education in the third year, with professional education being reduced to customary law, morale civique and practical science (This involved the allocation of two hours a week to agriculture, one hour for animal husbandry and one for hygiene.) The time allotted to the study

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1. 1934 Governor to Governor General, 10 June 1934.

2. 1934 Headmaster's Annual Report, 29 March 1935.

of French was to be increased from four to ten hours a week at the expense of history and geography. These were struck off the timetable as a result of the poor response to these subjects in the first two years, when the history and geography of the world and France had been studied. These measures would effect a saving as an instituteur rather than specialist teachers could be employed to teach the third year, which was in future to consist largely of general courses. Thus the third years of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and Ecole Blanchot sections could be combined for general education, although the former would still be taught certain extra subjects by an instituteur. This would leave the fourth year reserved for professional education with the teaching of practical courses allotted to civil servants-an agricultural engineer, a doctor for hygiene, a veterinarian for animal husbandry, an adjoint de services civils for accountancy and and the chef de bureau des affaires indigènes for Administrative Organisation. This time, the Governor of Senegal accepted the headmaster's contention that the Ecole des Fils des Chefs should not merely be a school, but should also provide first hand experience with outings for pupils to clinics and experimental fields.<sup>1</sup>

But even by the fourth year, pupils were still lacking in general knowledge and unable to speak "correct" French. Consequently, the examination commission meeting on 6 September 1934 suggested that three hours be taken out of courses on Administrative Organisation and Accountancy, which had already been studied in the third year, to be given to French and history and geography of the AOF, no longer taught in the third year. This would ensure that pupils did not leave the school without knowing the approved history of their country.

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1. 1934 Governor to Governor General, 10 June 1934.

On the recommendation of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs,<sup>1</sup> the commissions of examination at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were made smaller and were staffed with fewer civil servants and more teachers. From 1934, there were to be two examinations: for the final examination, the commission was composed of the headmaster of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, the Head of the Agricultural Service, one chef de canton (in 1934, this was Mambaye Diaw, the chef de banlieue of St. Louis) and to be attended by teachers of final year pupils. The commission for examens de passage was to consist of an instituteur of the Ecole Blanchot, a civil servant and the headmaster, and was to be attended by teachers of pupils in the relevant year and the Cadi of the tribunal musulman of St. Louis.

The final examinations and examens de passage for the third year were to be held in June. In the case of the former, this was to avoid the absence of masters who in July would be supervising certificat d'études exams in the bush, and in the latter, to allow pupils to go off to their stage at the farm school earlier. Meanwhile, the examens de passage for the first and second years were held in July. Examination questions remained topical. The examination in administrative organisation in 1935 asked questions about the census - what it was, its purpose and the role of the chef de canton. Even mathematics exams involved calculations that a chief might have to make, such as working out quantities of seed.<sup>2</sup>

But in spite of these reforms in the syllabus, general academic standards at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs remained low. In the examens de passage in 1935, eight out of twenty two pupils failed to obtain the average and were expelled.<sup>3</sup> The French may also have used a high

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1. 1G44 Inspector of Administrative Affairs to the Governor, 5 June 1934.
  2. 1G44 Final examination for the school year, 1934-35.
  3. 1G34 Official report of the staff meeting, 30 December 1935.

failure rate to demonstrate their authority over the chiefs in service to remind them to whom they owed their positions. In his 1935-36 report the headmaster told the Governor that seven out of thirteen pupils in the second year of Ecole des Fils des Chefs had been excluded for bad marks at the end of the first term. Even after the elimination of this so-called "dead weight", those left were of an inferior educational standard to the pupils of the Ecole Blanchot. The pupil who came top of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs in that year was equivalent to the pupil who came fifteenth at the Ecole Blanchot. Three out of a total of five pupils were expelled at the end of the third year for bad marks and in the fourth year, only two of the four pupils were given diplomas, with an annual average mark less than those of their contemporaries at the Ecole Blanchot. Of the nine pupils originally admitted to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs for the years 1934-38, five were dismissed for poor marks and one for bad behaviour.<sup>1</sup>

So bad had the situation become that a number of chiefly colonial councillors including Abdoul Salam Kane began to express concern about the prestige of pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. Apart from changes in the selection procedure, further separation of the two schools was required. Although the Ecole des Fils des Chefs continued physically to remain part of the Ecole Blanchot, an additional teacher was to be employed for the school year 1936-37 to teach general subjects, so that classes at the Ecole Primaire Supérieure and Ecole des Fils des Chefs could be further separated.

During the Popular Front era, a detailed programme was drawn up for 1938 - 42 by the Inspector of Administrative Affairs,<sup>2</sup> to give sons of chiefs an education more suited to their future office and designed to further improve academic standards.

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1938.
  2. IG34 Draft of a Report by the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, 17 October 1938, itself a copy of the report by the Inspector General of Education, 17 March 1934, hereafter known as "Draft ....."

The basic syllabus laid down in the decree of 15 April 1933 prevailed but in keeping with this period of Popular Front government, the chiefs were to learn the general principle of respecting progress as well as custom.<sup>1</sup> They were to be taught that they were "une forme provisoire du commandement" retaining office only as long as they kept pace with the times, and respected their duties towards their subjects. They were warned that if they did not fulfil their tasks as "représentants des collectivités ethniques et mandataires de l'administration française," they would be overtaken by the growing number of évolués. In addition to the new syllabus, the sons of chiefs were to learn the importance of integrity (probité)<sup>2</sup> and were to be instructed once they became chiefs to account for all they had done to their commandant de cercle, even for their mistakes.

This new syllabus was dominated by the idea that the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was "un coin de notre France intellectuelle et morale"<sup>3</sup> where the French were carrying out "une oeuvre de civilisation dans un pays barbare". Since the key aim of the education of these future chiefs was to enlist their support as "des collaborateurs avant tout" in the French "mission civilisatrice", much of the syllabus reads like a French colonial propaganda exercise. In History, future chiefs were to be taught the history of France and French colonisation. They were to be taught about the French "pacification" of the AOF which "put an end to pillaging and exactions" by suppressing the great territorial commands and replacing them with a new administrative structure - "cellules de paix". In lessons about the economic geography of the AOF, the sons of chiefs were to learn about the poverty stricken state of the AOF before the advent of the French, and how the French introduction of cash crops like the groundnut helped integrate the AOF with "modern

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1. 1G34, "Draft...", 17 October 1938
  2. 1G34 Inspector of Administrative Affairs to Headmaster of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, 1938.
  3. 1G34 "Draft....", 17 October 1938.

civilisation." It was hoped that as a result of their education, these future chiefs would assist the French in realising their economic plans for the AOF, by publicising ideas about irrigation, cultivation, animal husbandry, and forests. Ideas of Association and the need for solidarity between the chiefs and French were imparted to them, especially in cases where this would benefit the French as in the annual military recruitment. They also learned about the role of the chiefs on councils.

Initially, all subjects were to be taught in French and all conversations in indigenous languages were forbidden at the school, but it did just occur to the colonial administration that it might in this way be alienating future chiefs from their subjects. In order to ensure that sons of chiefs did not completely lose touch with local customs and remained attached to their lands and peoples, the colonial administration stipulated that two of the twelve hours a week allocated to French should be devoted to African legends and songs, with half an hour a week on African instruments and music.

During the Vichy period, the pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs section were to be imbued with the directives of the National Revolution.<sup>1</sup> It was felt that the commandement indigène was in need of improvement, to be achieved by upgrading the education of future chiefs at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs by increasing the number of stages they had to go through. Marks received by each pupil at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were to be recorded in a book, to follow him not only through his four years study but his stages and career. In the final year, students were to be in direct contact with their future job, following a six-month practical course spent with chefs de service and in administrative departments. After this, pupils were sent to complete a second stage at a farm school from 15 May to 30 November, a complete

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D<sup>5</sup>-Senegal RPA 1941, Section: Ecole des Fils des Chefs.

agricultural cycle. These pupils were to be divided between the Ecole pratique d'Agriculture (Louga), the Agronomic station of Diorbivol (Matam) and Guérina (Ziguinchor). The Chef de Bureau Politique finally regained control of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs from the Inspector of Primary Education. In order to ensure that pupils at the school did not fall out of contact with their region, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs was to liaise between the chefs de canton in the bush and their children at the chef-lieu, giving the former news of their children and the latter a qualified résumé of events in the parental canton.

Despite all reforms in recruitment and in the syllabus from 1922 onwards, the French administration continued to find during the Vichy period that pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs continued to be of a lower intellectual standard than the pupils of the Ecole Blanchot. Even in the year 1941-42<sup>1</sup>, despite the new orientation of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, five out of ten pupils in the first year failed to obtain the annual average and three were expelled. In the third year, five out of seven pupils did not obtain the annual average, three of whom had not obtained it for three years, and one was expelled.

#### Structure of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs

It would seem appropriate at this point to consider the internal organisation of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. By the legislation of 27 May 1922, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was established as a boarding school. The Government of Senegal was responsible for feeding and clothing the pupils and for their travelling expenses. Unlike the medersa, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was to radiate a European atmosphere: food and lodging were to be European and pupils had to speak French.

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1. 1G34 Official Report by the Staff of the EFC, 14 June 1942.

Another point of difference from the medersa was that the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was reserved for families who originated from Senegal or Mauretania. In 1922, Abdou Hazagou, a Guinean who had been at the medersa for three years was forced to terminate his education at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs as he was no longer entitled to a bursary from Guinea.<sup>1</sup> Several Mauretanian pupils were admitted to the school each year, making up half the school in 1938 (eleven out of twenty two pupils). The Mauretanian intake for 1938 included the son of the Emir of Traza, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumir.<sup>2</sup> The Mauretanian pupils had the greatest difficulty in adapting to the school, and three out of the eleven pupils dropped out in the course of the year 1938-39.<sup>3</sup>

According to the decision of 3 June 1922, the personnel of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was to consist of a headmaster, with a brevet supérieur and a teaching certificate, who had spent ten years in Senegal, and was to receive a salary of 2400 francs a year. Other members of staff were a treasurer, instituteurs from the cadre supérieur and cadre secondaire and a master from the medersa supérieur of Algiers. The tasks of the headmaster were largely administrative and he taught for ten hours a week at most. At the end of the year, he was to send a report to the chef de bureau politique regarding possible improvements to the school. Teachers were to perform a minimum of twenty hours teaching a week in addition to supervising the boarding school. Those of the cadre supérieur were paid 100 francs a month and those of the cadre secondaire 50 francs a month.

Prior to the expansion of the dormitory at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, a number of students had attended the school as day pupils. In 1925, 50,000 francs were added to the school's budget to enlarge the dormitory and add a refectory and a study. By

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1. 1G34 letter from Abdou Hazagou to Governor of Senegal 1922-23.
  2. 1G35 Decision of 21 June 1938.
  3. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.



October 1925, the school had acquired a complete boarding school system. In 1921, 2,000 francs were advanced to the school's treasury for expenditure on food, for which pupils received a monthly allowance of ten francs.<sup>1</sup> On 21 February 1925, a decision was made to give bursaries to several day pupils of the school including Baila Bouna Niang and Ousmane Elimane Kane who had left their écoles régionales at Louga and Podor respectively to come to St. Louis. The reason each gave for continuing their education at the school was "ne voulant pas renoncer à mes études de français." The Inspector-General of Education commented on the real school spirit he discovered on his visit to the school in November 1925.<sup>2</sup>

Since chiefs had to fulfil their military duties before taking up their functions, and could be conscripted on leaving the school, pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were registered at a société de préparation militaire, "La Diane de St. Louis", as part of their training. In 1925, the headmaster at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs wrote to the Governor of Senegal expressing the hope that the internal organisation of the school would impart notions of discipline to future chiefs in the manner of the "Ecole des élèves officiers de la Ligue au Camp de Fréjus".<sup>3</sup> A certain number of pupils requested exemption from courses at the society as they already had the brevet de préparation militaire élémentaire, but the Governor decided that this exemption would not be granted. Instead, he and the Colonel at the military headquarters of Senegal suggested that these pupils went on to take a brevet de préparation militaire supérieure at the school, and that they could act as monitors during training sessions. In 1923, out of the twelve military brevets distributed, eleven were awarded to pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.

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1. 1G35 Decision of 22 November 1921.
  2. 2G25-43 Senegal RPA 1925.
  3. 1G34 Headmaster's Annual Report, 30 July 1923.

As far as conscription of pupils from the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was concerned, it was suggested by the President of the Colonial Council in 1924 that they be nominated écrivains expéditionnaires on leaving the school to facilitate their incorporation into the first regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais.<sup>1</sup> In this way, they could also obtain part of the salary to which they would have been entitled had they taken up employment. Again the Governor refused this request on the grounds that these young men were obliged to do military service between the ages of eighteen and twenty eight and should receive no preferential treatment or special idemnity. They were to obtain the job of écrivain expéditionnaire only on leaving the regiment.

When the merger of 1928 of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and Ecole Blanchot did not seem to be producing altogether desirable results, one method of restoring the former to some degree of independence was to physically separate pupils of the two schools, so they would be fed and lodged apart. This of course necessitated the enlargement of the Ecole Primaire Supérieure. But by 1944, lack of funds meant that pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were again subjected to a similar regime to the pupils of the Ecole Blanchot, sharing the same dormitory and rules.<sup>2</sup>

Unlike their counterparts at the Ecole Blanchot, pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs did not have to wear a uniform. The government of Senegal was however, supposed to provide clothing for the pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. But the headmaster told the chef de bureau politique in 1922 that in a recent survey,<sup>3</sup> he had discovered that twenty nine pupils possessed hardly any clothes. Pupils were also supposed to get their washing and ironing at the school done for free, but this service was so bad that the

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1. According to the decree of 30 July 1919, Article 4.

2. 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.

3. 1G35 Headmaster of the EFC to the Chef de Bureau Politique, 12 November 1922.

headmaster reported that many preferred to get this done in town at their own expense.<sup>1</sup> On 21 November 1933, the pupils at the school sent a petition to the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, claiming a monthly allowance for maintenance and asking for a new programme of enseignement technique to be introduced at the school. This situation was regulated by the decree of 13 September 1934, confirming the boarding school character of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, and the responsibility of the Government of Senegal for the maintenance of the pupils, including their laundry. Pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs continued to be exempt from wearing a uniform. Instead, they were to receive from the administration two pairs of trousers or a caftan, two boubous, two fez and two pairs of babouches, (slippers). During the period of Vichy in Senegal, pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs from 1940 onwards were obliged to wear the same uniform as pupils of the Ecole Blanchot but were to wear an insignia to distinguish themselves from the latter in order to win public respect for themselves as future chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

In the holidays, the government of Senegal paid the Ecole des Fils des Chefs' pupils fares to and from home, plus giving them an indemnity for meals during the journey. The transport of pupils within the Cayor region did not pose much of a problem as these could travel by rail from St. Louis. A list of pupils in this area to travel home during the summer holidays of 1922<sup>3</sup> includes the names of Massamba Sall, Meissa M'Baye Sall, Lat Fatim Sall, Thieyacine Fall and Morane Sall among pupils who were to travel to Tivaouane, Abdoulaye Lat Dior Diop for Kelle, Alioune Maba Diop for Kebemer and Sidy Kounta for Thies. However, pupils from such places as Matam and Bakel had to make very

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1. 1G35 Headmaster to Chef de Bureau Politique, 12 November 1922.
  2. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1941.
  3. 1G34 List of EFC pupils to travel by railway, 27 June 1922.

long journeys home, taking up to one month if they went by pirogue (canoe). Racine Kane, a pupil from Matam, suggested to the headmaster in a letter of 12 June 1924 that instead of being sent home by pirogue, he could travel more quickly by road to Tambacounda and from there by lorry to Matam.

The decision of 26 March 1925 regulating discipline at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs declared there was to be no corporal punishment. The only forms of punishment allowed were an individual or public reprimand, retention of pupils after class by their master or temporary suspension. Only the Governor or Inspector of Administrative Affairs could carry out expulsions. Pupils were expelled for indiscipline like Abdoul Aziz Wane in 1936,<sup>1</sup> or for bad grades like Seringe Fall, in 1941. The latter, in an attempt to ingratiate himself with the headmaster after his expulsion, wrote to him eulogising France and "notre grand maréchal Pétain". Pupils could also be made to repeat a year as in the case of Bounama Anta Sall, one of Macodou Sall's sons, demoted to the first year in 1935 after the second term of his second year.<sup>2</sup>

#### Employment for the graduates of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs

The colonial administration concerned itself not only with the education of sons of chiefs at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs but also with the problem of employing them afterwards. Pupils were able to obtain some idea of their future work during the holidays when they could be employed as clerks or census agents. In his circular of 17 July 1923, the Governor of Senegal authorised administrators to use pupils from the school for such purposes although their pay was not to exceed five francs a day.<sup>3</sup>

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1. 1G34 Decision of 29 May 1936.
  2. 1G44 Report book of Bounama Anta Sall, who attended the EFC from 30 October 1933 till 1938.
  3. 1G34 Headmaster to the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, 5 July 1923.

Graduates of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were not made chiefs at once because there were not sufficient posts available and because they were usually considered to be too young (about twenty years old) and lacking in authority. So after graduating, an Ecole des Fils des Chefs pupil generally became a commis expéditionnaire first of all, to assist the commandant de cercle. For example, Momar Ba was made an auxiliary with a daily salary of 9 francs under the commandant de cercle of Kaolack.<sup>1</sup> A commis expéditionnaire could then go on to become a secretary of a relative who was a chief, which would, as Carde pointed out, have the advantage of alleviating the tasks of this chief while at the same time providing the graduate with an apprenticeship to the chieftancy. Introduced in this way to the population he might have to administer, the latter could demonstrate a more "modern" outlook while retaining the people's respect because of his chiefly background. But he was forced into dependence on the generosity of his family, as this was an unpaid function. By 1933, among the secretaries to the chefs de canton were Alassane Kamara, secretary to Amadou N'diaye, chef de provinces orientales (Tambacounda) and Mamadou Lamine Kane, secretary to the chef de canton of Irlabes Ebiabes.<sup>2</sup> Other graduates of the school were nominated to other departments in the administration: Morane Sall, brother to Macodou Sall and later chef de canton of Thilmakha, was nominated commis adjoint to the justice department at Tivaouane in 1925.<sup>3</sup>

However, this system was too informal to be satisfactory. The job of commis expéditionnaire offered no real training for the post of chief as it gave no scope for initiative after the four years of study and was poorly paid.<sup>4</sup> A major reason for the decline in the number of

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1. 1G34 Decree of 29 August 1925.

2. 17G 119 (17) Governor to Governor General, 19 March 1933.

3. Interview with Morane Sall.

4. 1G34 "Report. . . .", 8 May 1931.

candidates for the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was that there was no guarantee of future employment. The diploma for the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was not very highly thought of in Senegal and was sometimes superfluous in acquiring a chiefly post. The Governor of Senegal's solution, mooted in 1931,<sup>1</sup> was to provide graduates with a long stage pratique which would contribute to the "formation des auxiliaires très sûrs et extrêmement utiles, "while at the same time filling in a few years between education and employment. The stage, lasting at least three years and to be paid, combined regional service with experience in administration at the chef-lieu in departments like Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry. Graduates, known as "stagiaires indigènes des services administratifs", were to attend lectures by teachers, doctors and veterinarians. Other educated notables' sons who had not been to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were to be allowed to join. The stage would also provide an opportunity to eliminate graduates showing insufficient promise. At the end of the stage, future chiefs were to play a similar role to the Administrateur Adjoint while waiting to be nominated to the post of chief, by liaising between the commandant de cercle and chefs indigènes. Nominations would be made as chiefly posts became free. A commission was set up to consider this reform, consisting of the Secretary General or Inspector of Administrative Affairs, the chef de bureau politique, the commandant de cercle and two members of the Education Service.

The outcome of this was the creation of the post of secrétaire d'administration indigène by the decrees of 23 October 1932 and 20 July 1933 to which graduates of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs could be nominated by the Governor on the proposal of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs. Although this post prepared them for the office of chef de canton, it did not give them the formal right to become one.

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1. 1G34 "Report...", 8 May 1931.

To be nominated to this function, graduates had to have a diploma from the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, a certificate of military service, a medical certificate and a curriculum vitae of what they had done since the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. The commandant de cercle allocated these secretaries for eighteen months to a chef de subdivision or to a chef de province or canton, on a salary of 6,000 francs a year, to be paid monthly. After five years, this could be increased to 8,000 francs, and by 2,000 francs every two years afterwards. Secretaries were kept under close scrutiny as potential chiefs and after a minimum of four years in the job, could be nominated to the post of chef de canton of the tenth class. If a secretary was already receiving a higher salary than a chief of the tenth class, he was allowed to keep it. Secretaries were placed on an equal footing with civil servants of the cadre commun secondaire (third category) as far as transport and hospitalisation were concerned. They were entitled to free transport and if a permanent move was involved, this applied to their families and baggage as well. Secretaries were to receive free medical consultations and were to be on half pay in hospital. Disciplinary measures for secrétaires d'administration indigène were dismissal, retention of salary or demotion to an inferior salary level.

In this way, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was becoming the Administrative section of the Ecole Primaire Supérieure in Senegal. In 1937, three of the eight graduates of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs could not immediately be made secretaries for budgetary reasons.<sup>1</sup> Instead they were given temporary work to await admission to the cadre of secrétaires d'administration indigène. Six new places were created in the 1938 budget, and the formation of a new class of secrétaires d'administration indigène permitted the recruitment of twenty to twenty five pupils to the school in the same year.<sup>2</sup>

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1. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.

2. 1G34 Circular from Governor of Senegal to his commandants de cercle, 25 April 1938.

Nevertheless the post of secrétaire d'administration indigène was not popular as the salary was as low as that of a commis expéditionnaire and there continued to be a long wait before the secretary could become a chef de canton. Evidently, this did not encourage applications to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. So the job of secrétaire d'administration indigène was reorganised on 27 August 1939. Graduates of the school were sent by the administration to work with a chef de canton, and access to the post of chef de canton was to be made easier. However, the secretary's salary was to remain equivalent to that of a commis expéditionnaire.<sup>1</sup> So great were pressures to obtain employment that Momar N'diaye, the best pupil at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs left after the second year, having passed an examination to become a commis expéditionnaire.<sup>2</sup>

The Vichy regime introduced the principle of a five-year engagement whereby pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs had to work for the administration so as to compensate it for maintaining and educating them for four years. Mamadou Lamine Seck, the son of Ibrahima Seck, the former chef de canton of Adeane had to sign such an engagement before his first year at the school in 1943. Pupils had to promise to pay back the government if they were dismissed from the school or their functions before the five years were up.<sup>3</sup> Vichy also tried to upgrade the Ecole des Fils des Chefs diploma which had by then fallen into some disrepute. On leaving the school, pupils were to receive a certificate of aptitude only, and could then become secrétaires d'administration stagiaires serving for six months at a Société de Prévoyance and six months in the cercle on general administration.

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1. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.
  2. 1G34 Decision of 10 January 1940.
  3. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5 - Senegal RPA 1941.



During this period, they received marks for work, conduct and physical endurance. If these were satisfactory they received a diplôme d'aptitude au commandement indigène (which replaced the old Ecole des Fils des Chefs diploma) after which they could be nominated secrétaires d'administration indigène.

For the first time five former pupils of the Ecole Blanchot became auditeurs libres in the fourth year of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs in the school year 1946-47, joining the four pupils already there. This was because a surplus of posts of secrétaires d'administration indigène was anticipated in 1948.<sup>1</sup>

During the period under consideration, the demand for educated chiefs became more frequent. Hence an increasing number of graduates from the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were chosen in preference to others. Attendance at the school of a number of future chiefs must have contributed to the increase in literacy rates amongst these auxiliaries. An administrative survey in November 1928 showed that 10 out of 20 (50%) chefs de province and de canton in the Fleuve region and 13 out of 15 (86%) chiefs in the Casamance were illiterate. A corresponding survey early in 1937 demonstrated that 37 out of 39 chiefs (95%) in the Fleuve and 22 out of 38 (58%) chiefs in the Casamance were now literate.<sup>2</sup>

#### Education for Chiefs outside the Ecole des Fils des Chefs

The Ecole des Fils des Chefs and other schools run by the French administration were not the only alternatives available beyond the regional, urban or village schools. This is the best illustrated by examining in greater detail the education of a few chiefs in the areas selected for closer study-Tivaouane and the Basse Casamance.

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1. 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948.
  2. ARSD 4E4 (14) Governor Lefebvre to Governor General, 15 September 1937.

In Tivaouane, at the beginning of the period under consideration, some chiefs had little education and were illiterate, like Meissa M'Baye Sall, the chef de province of Saniokhor. However, his cousin Macodou Sall attended the College des Fils des Chefs. The next generation of chiefs in Cayor were educated, some to a very high level, often combining Koranic with French education. Most at least had some primary education up to CEP level, like Massamba Kangui Sall, the chef de canton of Guet. Massamba Sall, Meissa M'Baye Sall's son and future chef de canton of N'doutte Diassane attended the Koranic school of the great Tidjiane marabout El Hadj Malic Sy at Tivaouane, although his father belonged to the Qadriyya.<sup>1</sup> At the age of thirteen, he went to the Ecole Régionale of Tivaouane and then enrolled in the cours préparatoire of the medersa at St. Louis for two years in 1916. Graduating from the medersa in 1922, he became a commis expeditionnaire with the commandant de cercle of Cayor, acting as an intermediary between the colonial administration and his father. The future chef de canton of Mbaouar, Meissa M'Baye Sall, was brought up in the court of his father Macodou Sall at Sagatta by the Qadriyya marabout Birame Coumba Gueye and his sons.<sup>2</sup> At the medersa, he was in the same class as Massamba Sall. One of the few chiefs to study in France, Meissa M'Baye Sall went to the Lycee St. Charles in Marseilles in 1923, after graduating from the medersa. Here he studied for three years, passing the first part of the bac in mathematics. He was on the verge of enrolling at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration when, ironically, his little educated uncle, Meissa M'Baye Sall, persuaded his father to bring him back from France, fearing he would be lost to the Sall family if he remained there. On his return, Meissa M'Baye Sall became secretary to his father and then to Massamba Kan'gue Sall, chef de canton of Guet, as the latter was not very literate.

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1. Interview with Massamba Sall.
  2. Interview with Meissa M'Baye Sall.

Far from being totally uneducated, chiefs from the Basse Casamance received either a more informal or religious form of instruction. The custom, to be found elsewhere in Senegal, which involved chiefs giving their children to a more learned chief to be educated, was practised here. In this way, Alassane Seck, the chief of Adeane, a sort of marabout whose literacy in Arabic raised him above other chiefs in the area, took into his care Dialaman Diadhiou, the son of Almaya Diadhiou, the great Diola warrior who fought the Mandinka.<sup>1</sup>

Ibrahima and Moussa Seck, each of whom were in turn chefs de canton at Adeane, were educated by marabouts.<sup>2</sup> Pierre Bassène, later chef de canton of Brin Séléki, and Benjamin "Wintz" Diatta, chef de province of Oussouye were educated by Catholic priests.

Many chiefs in this area never got beyond primary school. Both Bocar Ba and Alpha Bodian attended primary school in Ziguinchor up to the CEP level, although the former spoke and wrote a much better French than could be expected from his education.<sup>3</sup>

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It is evident that the Ecole des Fils des Chefs provided the French with a powerful instrument of control of the existing as well as the future commandement indigène. The school's selection procedure and high failure rate enabled the French to promote chiefs more likely to be amenable to the colonial power over some of the traditional ruling families.

It is more difficult to assess the degree to which education at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs prepared pupils for the commandement

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1. From unpublished manuscript dictated by Tete Diadhiou.
  2. Interview with Assane Seck, Inspector of Taxes at Ziguinchor.
  3. Bocar Ba was highly literate, as can be seen from his personal papers.

indigène. Carde in his circular of 11 October 1929 attributed the relative success of the chieftancy in Senegal to this colony's long tradition of providing special education for the chiefs. But by 1948, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was facing problems similar to those which had dogged it since its inception. Recruitment still proved problematic and the education level remained inferior to that of the Ecole Blanchot section. A major problem which the Ecole des Fils des Chefs experienced throughout its life was that the colonial administration never decided whether it wanted the chiefs to retain their traditional status or to become civil servants. Anxious to procure obedient auxiliaries, the French were slow to see that they had in many cases produced not future chiefs but clerks devoid of chiefly attributes.

Commandants de cercle on the other hand complained that many chiefs were not sufficiently prepared for their tasks, and would often have preferred pupils at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs to have been trained more like civil servants. A number of the school's graduates had not grasped the basic principles of accounting, vital to many of their functions. They lacked the initiative to play a role in the economic development of their areas. Commandants de cercle also felt that the Ecole des Fils des Chefs could have done more to complement their own education at the Ecole Coloniale, so that a common spirit would have pervaded the whole administration.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, graduates of the school, having spent four or more years at St. Louis, found themselves alienated from their local milieu. Their stature in the eyes of their subjects fell when the latter saw them being treated as subordinates by the commandant de cercle.

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1. M. Francois Marie expressed this opinion to me in a letter of 13 May 1981.

In 1949, after some debate as to whether the Ecole des Fils des Chefs should be retained in its present form, the school, together with the Ecole Primaire Supérieure, was upgraded to a collège moderne for secondary education. The colonial administration decided that any further reforms of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs should be linked to a general reform of the commandement indigène.<sup>1</sup>

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1. AN 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948 and AN 2G49-27 Senegal RPA 1949.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Selection of Chiefs

Although the French might ideally have preferred to administer their territories in the AOF directly, they soon came to realise that they lacked both the funds and personnel for such a massive enterprise. Association policy was a recognition of the fact that they would have to share power with the Africans. The interests of administrative efficiency demanded the Weberian ideal of a literate, trained bureaucrat. However, such Africans were in short supply at the end of the First World War. The French could look to improvements in the colonial education system to provide such an elite in due course, but immediate demands for auxiliaries in the countryside forced them to look to a rather different group of people. In deciding which Africans should mediate between the administration and the largely illiterate rural population, the French found themselves having in many cases to come to terms with the traditional notable elites where these existed.

We have already seen how the colonial administration attempted to mould the commandement indigène by a special school and syllabus. But in the short term, the most obvious way of reconciling demands of legitimacy with those of administrative efficiency was by careful selection methods. The appointment of a chief was not so much an administrative as a political decision governed by several principles: family background, ethnicity, education and service to the French. As the legislation on the selection of chiefs evolved with theories concerning the commandement indigène, emphasis on a particular factor changed. But the interests of the administration were always paramount.

Local notables quickly perceived how the question of nominating a chief might be turned to their advantage. Their interests would be best served by outwardly demonstrating acquiescence to the administration,

while using the process to push forward candidates amenable to them. Shortages of chiefs and administrative requirements often necessitated the re-ordering of cantons. Hence periodic major reorganisations of the commandement indigène coincided with the large scale redrawing of territorial boundaries.

During the period 1919-29, the colonial administration continued to follow Ponty's Politique des Races and a policy aimed at weakening the great chefs de province. A 1922 Rapport Politique for Senegal stated that "L'administration des cercles du Senegal, ainsi que l'évolution des populations ne semblent pas justifier le maintien des grands commandements indigènes encore subsistant créés au moment de l'installation du protectorat français"<sup>1</sup> 1923 was a year of important territorial reorganisations over much of Senegal, including Cayor. Chiefs of provinces considered to be of no use administratively were dismissed and their provinces dismembered. Such was the fate of Dioucounda N'diaye, whose province Mboul Mbakol was split into three cantons.<sup>2</sup> The remaining chefs de province in this cercle, Macodou Sall and Meissa M'Baye Sall had previously administered cantons in addition to their provinces, under the title of chef de canton supérieur-Ndour and Guet in the case of Macodou Sall and N'doutte Diassane in the case of his cousin. In addition, Meissa M'Baye Sall had been chef de village of Tivaouane.<sup>3</sup> But the reorganisation meant that chefs de province could no longer directly administer a territory except as a strictly interim measure. Their role was reduced to that of liaison between their chefs de canton and the commandant de cercle as "agents de surveillance et de direction générale."<sup>4</sup>

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1. ARSD 2G22-9 Senegal RPT First quarter 1922.

2. ARSD 2G23-46 Tivaouane RPA 1923.

3. ARSD 2D14-6 Decision of 21 December 1912.

4. ARSD 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM April 1923.

When a canton fell vacant during the course of this period, the Governor would write to the commandant de cercle asking him to submit the names of several candidates with details of family, ethnicity, education and behaviour. Birth was supposed to be the most important consideration as the administration hoped the appointment would satisfy "le sentiment traditionnel des indigènes en conservant à nos représentants auprès d'eux le prestige et l'autorité que donne la naissance."<sup>1</sup> The commandant de cercle would frequently consult local notables about the choice of candidates in order to claim that the designation of a chief "n'a été fait qu'après la consultation des populations intéressées."<sup>2</sup> The names would then be submitted to the Governor who would make his choice.

But as far as the selection of chiefs in this period was concerned, top priority was in fact given to the interests of the colonial administration, or as Carde more euphemistically expressed it, the interest of the "collectivity."<sup>3</sup> Although the French believed in general that preference should be given to ethnicity and family background, they recognised that it might be necessary to overlook these considerations where they precluded administrative efficiency. It was felt that it was better in certain cases to choose a candidate who might at first be opposed by the local population, than a traditional chief who exercised only nominal authority. "S'il est notre devoir, en effet, d'assurer à nos administrés toutes garanties nécessaires d'indépendance, morale et religieuse, nous pouvons encourager des tendances qui aboutiraient à une dispersion de l'autorité nuisible au bon fonctionnement de l'administration."<sup>4</sup> Attempts to follow a Politique des Races sometimes produced cantons too small to be viable, necessitating further territorial reorganisations.

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1. AN 2G23-11 Senegal RPA 1923.
  2. AN 2G24-14 Senegal RPA 1924.
  3. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C838 DIA-Circular from Governor General Carde to Governors of the AOF, No. 279b AP/2, 11 October 1929.
  4. ARSD 2D13-9 Governor to the commandant de cercle of Thies, 9 May 1920.



These are instances throughout Senegal of Wolofs being given the post of chief in non-Wolof areas. In the Thies, cantons like Mbayard Nianing and Sandock Diagianiao with a large Serere population were often given to Wolof chiefs. In 1920, the Bambaras petitioned the commandant de cercle of Thies for a chief of their own ethnic group.<sup>1</sup> The Wolof chef de canton Daouar Fall of Thor Diander, who had been given command over them, had told them that if they wanted their own chief, they should return to the Soudan. But the administration considered the appointment of a chef de race for the Bambaras impossible because of the diversity of ethnic groups in the canton and the dispersed nature of the Bambara settlement. The most the commandant de cercle was prepared to concede to the Bambaras was the right to have their own representative on the conseil de notables. The hopes of the Nones, a Serere subgroup in Thies cercle, met with a similar fate.<sup>2</sup>

The economic crisis of the 1930s threatened the survival of the commandement indigène, which had become too closely identified with the colonial power. The chef de canton of Essygnès was murdered in 1935 for being "too devoted to French orders." The Minister of Colonies Maginot and the Governor General called for "la restauration et la consolidation rapide du commandement indigène"<sup>3</sup>, in which a new selection process more in tune with the aspirations of the population would play an important role. As a result of Carde's survey of the chiefs in 1929, the years 1930-35 saw a major reorganisation of the commandement indigène and territorial boundaries.

The decision of 11 January 1935 attempted to consolidate on this achievement. As far as selection was concerned, it tended to reiterate former practices. The chefs de village were to be chosen according to "custom", that is to say, by election by a majority of chefs de famille, now known as the commission villageoise. Any disputes

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1. ARSD 2D13-9 commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor of Senegal, 15 June 1920.
  2. 2D13-9 Petition from the Nones to the Governor of Senegal, 30 March 1920.
  3. ARSD 17G81(17) Governor General Carde to Governors of the AOF, 9 October 1929.

were to be referred to the chef de canton and his advisers, now known as the cantonal commission, with the possibility of a final appeal to the commandant de cercle. Minutes were to confirm that customary forms had been respected; that is to say, the notables (cantonal commission) had been consulted.

The 1935 legislation also established a definite pecking order for the recruitment of chiefs, inspired by Brévié's theories concerning the commandement indigène. Top priority was to be given to "families qualified by custom to accede to the chieftancy." Second preference went to notables, particularly literate ones, with influence in the region, while third to be considered were secrétaires d'administration indigène (of the first class) who had served the chef de canton for at least four years. Fourth preference was given to commis expéditionnaires and interpreters of the local cadres who had served the administration for at least two years, and former soldiers above the rank of sergeant. Although preference for chiefs from the traditional ruling families continued, a circular of 1930 recognised the need "en certaines circonstances, de faire résolument table rase de l'armature traditionnelle pour lui substituer au besoin un cadre construit de toutes pièces." <sup>1</sup>

However, in the opinion of many notables, the 1935 legislation did not go far enough to ensure respect for custom. Chefs de canton and de province representing the "anciennes familles du pays", presented a petition to this effect in 1937. <sup>2</sup> They were more likely to obtain a sympathetic hearing from the Popular Front government, anxious to give the local population a greater say in the choice of chiefs.

The 1937 legislation <sup>3</sup> saw to some extent the "democratisation" of the institution of chef de canton as it brought the process of consultation

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C838 DIA-Governor General Carde to Governor of Soudan, 25 June 1930.
  2. AN 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  3. JO Senegal 1937, edition of 18 January 1937, Decree of 13 January 1937.

within the range of many more people. The democratic process was to be followed to the extent that each notable was to express his view on the candidate to the commandant de cercle orally but in confidence, in order to diminish opportunities for intimidation. Although their role remained consultative, conseils de notables, chefs de province and chefs de canton were to be given a greater say in the selection of candidates for the post of chief or interim chief. This was potentially very valuable, as the majority of these local dignitaries would be natives of the canton in question, and would be able to contribute their greater understanding of the aspiration and needs of the local people and the difficulties of the chieftancy in their area. The commandant de cercle or Inspector of Administrative Affairs was then to consult the chefs de village or notables of the canton to obtain their "vote" on the candidates. The whole process was to be made more official. All advice and consultations on a particular candidate were to be recorded in a report compiled by the commandant de cercle and sent to the Governor for consideration.

The 1935 and 1937 legislation was at times misinterpreted. In a letter to Le Sénégal on 13 October 1938, Galondou Diouf argued that these laws allowed the collectivity to vote not only for the chefs de village, but the chefs de canton as well.<sup>1</sup> However, the administration was quick to point out that the circular of 27 September 1932 had emphasised that the vote of the notables never bound the Governor in his choice of chefs de canton, although all the inhabitants of a village were entitled to choose their chief.

The post of chef de canton was becoming so hotly contested by the 1930s, that bribery was frequently involved in cantonal "elections". It was alleged that following the death of the chef de canton of N'Guénar,

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1 ARSD 18G70(17) Galandou Diouf to the notables of the Petite Côte, 13 October 1938.

Matam in December 1935, his son had beaten the other 13 candidates by bragging to the chefs de village that "Mon père avant de mourir m'a donné trente mille francs pour acheter le canton" and promising them a "cut" if they supported him.<sup>1</sup>

The 1930s saw a growing preference for educated chiefs particularly under the Popular Front government with its desire to reform this institution. The decision of 6 May 1937 acknowledged the importance of tradition in the selection of chiefs, but announced that in future preference was to be given to candidates who had been to the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and had served a stage as secrétaire d'administration indigène in the local administration. Educated experienced chiefs would sometimes be transferred within a cercle from the command of a less to a more important canton.

As a result of the increasing demand for educated chiefs loyal to the French administration, a growing number of African civil servants-mainly interpreters, and commis expéditionnaires, but even in some cases instituteurs, gardes de cercle and veterinarians<sup>2</sup>-were becoming chefs de canton. The decree of 11 January 1935 listed among interpreters serving as chefs de canton and de province Sidy N'diaye of Pass-Bakhel, Benjamin Diatta of Oussouye, Code N'diaye of Diaganiao, N'Diougou Bâ of Nioro Rip, Samba Yomb Mbodj of Gossas, Abdoulaye Racine Kane of Bossea and Massamba Aram Diop of Diamatil Djiguene Gallo. In a circular of 16 January 1936, Brévié expressed anxiety that traditional and customary rules for the designation of chiefs might be forgotten. A law passed on 6 May 1937 aimed to stop the chiefs from becoming merely another cadre of civil servants and at the same time to regulate the situation of those civil servants already serving as chiefs.

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1. ARSD 13G24(17) Matam "Information" - 6 May 1936.
  2. For example, AN 2G 40-92 Ziguinchor RPT 1st quarter 1940-Lonka Demba of Bliss and Karones was replaced by the veterinarian Joseph Diatta.

As far as the future selection of chefs de canton was concerned, preference could not be given to a civil servant unless his customary titles were at least equal to those of other candidates. If nominated, a civil servant was to be placed "en service détaché" or "en congé hors cadres" rather than being integrated into the corps of chiefs and was to retain his original salary, pension and conditions of promotion. If he proved unsatisfactory as a chief, he could simply be reintegrated into his corps of origin.

Mobility between the post of chef de canton and civil servant is reflected in the case of Code N'diaye, the interprète de première classe speaking Toucouleur, Serere, Wolof and French, who was placed "hors cadre" in 1922 to become chef de canton of Sandock Diaganiao, interim chief of Diobas, President of the Tribunal de subdivision of Provinces Sereres and member of the Conseil de Notables of Thies.<sup>1</sup> A graduate of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, he had been requesting the post of chef de canton in Sine Saloum or Baol as early as 1913 while serving as an interpreter in the latter cercle. He made several requests before finally being nominated a chief in Thies. A stranger to the area, born in Mandakh, Sine Saloum and a Wolof Muslim in a canton comprising mainly animist Sereres, he did in fact have claims to the chieftancy. As grandson of the former Bour Saloum Macodou N'diaye, he was entitled to a chiefly post, while his claim to a canton in Thies was legitimised by his relationship to Sanor N'diaye, his maternal uncle who had pacified the provinces Sereres and Diobas.<sup>2</sup> In 1941, considered at the age of 57 to be too old to command, he was reintegrated into the cadre of interpreters to serve in Louga cercle.<sup>3</sup> He subsequently served periodically as an interim chief because of the administration's shortage of experienced chiefs. When Cheikh Mandiougou N'diaye was

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1. ARSD IC11463 Code N'diaye- Personal file-Report Book 1946.
  2. IC11463 Letters from Code N'diaye to the Governor - 22 April 1913, 25 September 1913, 26 March 1919, 22 February 1920 and 18 June 1921.
  3. IC11463 Code N'diaye - Report book 1943.

suspended from the canton of Diaganiao for inefficiency in the 1944-45 agricultural campaign, Code N'Diaye was given charge of both Sandock Diaganiao and Sao N'Damack. After a brief spell as an interpreter again in Coki-Ourrack (Louga) he was sent to command Keur Bacine in 1946.

As can be expected, the Vichy regime's legislation on the nomination of chiefs was a reaction against the progress made under the Popular Front. The decree of 29 June 1940 eschewed the need for a report to say that customary forms had been respected, returning to the pre-1935 system whereby the chefs de canton and de province were nominated by the Governor according to the suggestions of the commandant de cercle. The Vichy government of the AOF argued that although the 1937 legislation was designed to avoid rival claims for the post of chief, it had encouraged, on the contrary, real electoral campaigns. It was felt that people would not vote for an "energetic" chief who would be able to control them. Commandants de cercle even went so far as to suggest to Boisson that the colonial administration should interfere in the appointment of the chef de village. "Le chef de village, falot loqueteux doit disparaître et laisser la place à un auxiliaire de l'administration conscient de son rôle et obéi de ses administrés."<sup>1</sup>

The Free French, in their efforts to obtain the support of the people, scrapped Vichy's system of appointing chiefs in 1943,<sup>2</sup> in favour of a new system similar to that of 1937. Although chefs de canton were still to be nominated and dismissed by the Governor, the commandant de cercle had to refer the matter of the chief's appointment to a consultative body. Half of this cantonal commission was to be composed of the most important chefs de village and the other half of notables, who as in the 1937 legislation, were to represent different ethnic groups and

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1. ARSD 13G34(180) commandant de cercle of Kolda to Governor, 4 October 1941 in reply to Boisson's "Three Directives on African Colonisation", 21 August 1941.

2. JO AOF 1943 Decision No. 1688 AP A/2 of 17 July 1943.

the most influential families. Similarly, as part of the attempt to revive the great territorial commands where these were of use to the French, chefs de province were to be nominated by the Governor on the advice of a provincial commission composed of 20 chefs de canton at most and the principal notables of the province. It was hoped that these cantonal and provincial commissions would remain in force, even after the appointment of the chiefs, as advisory bodies. The commandant de cercle was to continue to play a vital role in researching each candidate's suitability and claims on the chieftancy. Any chief elected was to be on probation, and confirmation of his title depended on his efficiency in carrying out administrative tasks, with particular emphasis on his participation in the agricultural campaign. The chiefly councillors strongly endorsed these measures in the August 1943 session of the Colonial Council, putting forward a motion that "Le nouveau texte sur le commandement indigène met en harmonie tous les intérêts. "1

The post of chef de canton was again hotly contested under the Free French. At the end of May 1944, a total of 27 candidates had submitted their names for the chefferies de canton of Diack and Diobas (Thies).<sup>2</sup> A month later, the total had risen to sixty. As was usual in these cases, the Governor decided that the commandant de cercle should make a preliminary selection of candidates according to the importance of their families, education, aptitude to command, and most important, merit, rejecting for example, those who in the view of the Governor, abused the Koranic Law in order to have the maximum number of wives and concubines'. By the following year, the number of candidates had been reduced to three: Abdel Kader Fall, the interim chief of Méckhé M'Bar, Amadou Manel Fall, the brother of Ely Manel Fall, the chef de canton of Mbayar, and Meissa Sagana Fall, a clerk at Dakar who came from a family of chiefs. The others were excluded

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1. AN 2G43-26 Senegal RPA 1943.

2. ARSD 13G18(17) commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 30 June 1944.

on the grounds of "immoral conduct", insufficient claims to the chieftancy, age or attempting to conduct "electoral campaigns" in their favour. Three candidates, Cheikh Diack, Mactar Dieng and Youga Dieng went as far as to give large sums of money to one Saliou N'Douty to secure their election by bribing members of the cantonal commission. N'Douty then simply pocketed the money.<sup>1</sup>

Some civil servants and notables who put themselves up as candidates were rejected on the grounds that they lived far away from the area, and had lost contact with the local population. By this time, the administration realised that the appointment of such individuals as chiefs was to be avoided where possible. "voilà une des causes du malaise qui pèse sur les chefferies indigènes actuelles." In the case of the cantonal commission for the appointment of the chief of Diack, seven chefs de village, three cultivators and four lamanes met on 10 April 1945 under the presidency of the chef de subdivision of Thies, Hillenweck.<sup>2</sup> As often happened in these cases, none of the notables concerned could agree and instead preferred to leave the commandant de cercle and Governor to choose the chef de canton, a choice which they would simply endorse. Predictably, all three candidates put up by the administration were "elected" to cantons in 1945: Meissa Sangone Fall to Diack, Abdel Kader Fall to Diagoniaó and Amadou Manel Fall to Mbayar.

The period following the Second World War aroused expectations of reform in the system of native administration amongst the emerging politicised African elites. They demanded that the election of chiefs should follow French democratic practices; that is to say, universal suffrage should be introduced. Replying to this, Maestracci, the Governor of Senegal argued that this would undermine the office of chief and hence the administration as a whole: "Le commandement indigène est encore à la base de notre administration; il faut donc que nos mandataires aient sur nos administrés une influence et une autorité incontestables et

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1. 13G18(17) commandant de cercle of Thies to the Director General of Political Affairs, 13 April 1945.
  2. 13G19(17) Report by the Conseil de Notables of the cercle of Thies, 10 April 1945.



incontestées."<sup>1</sup> The administration, still hoping for the evolution of African society within the framework of traditional political institutions and under its traditional rulers, emphasised that the chiefs should fulfil the conditions of origin as "émanations du milieu dont ils ont la charge."<sup>2</sup> They should at the same time be chosen from families with a right to command, should be educated and should have a sense of the duties required of them as chiefs.

At a time when reforms with major implications for the AOF were being carried out in the National Assembly, Senegal's local legislation of 1947 brought a further "democratisation" of the office of chef de canton. Governor Oswald Durand of Senegal was anxious to eventually replace the "customary" forms employed in the nomination of chefs de canton and de village by elections. The decree of 12 February 1947 set up a small electoral college, composed of all the chefs de village of the canton and an equal number of grands électeurs, to choose the chef de canton from a list of candidates compiled by the commandant de cercle. These grands électeurs had to be able to speak French and to be members of the local elite. They included civil servants, retired civil servants who had served the administration for at least ten years, holders of the brevet from an école primaire supérieure, landowners, anciens combattants above the grade of sergeant or holders of the Legion of Honour or military medal.

The post of chef de canton was thus brought within the range of a greater number of people, the main condition being that the candidate should be literate and speak fluent French.<sup>3</sup> Other requirements were that the candidate should be over 25, have satisfied his military

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1. ARSD 2D13-32 Governor Maestracci to the commandant de cercle of Thies, 10 April 1945.
  2. Ibid.
  3. JQ Senegal 1947, edition of 20 February 1947, Decree of 12 February 1947.

obligations, have no police record and have an authorisation from the Governor to stand for election. In order to obtain this, each candidate had to write to the Governor stating the canton over which he wanted to be chief, his own ethnic group, the name and address of his chef de famille, his relations with previous chiefs of the canton concerned and with the chef de province, his academic qualifications and whether he had performed civil or military service. The Governor was then to produce a list of candidates fifteen days before the election which was held by secret ballot. In the case of a temporary chief, no elections took place. He was merely appointed by the commandant de cercle after he had obtained the consent of the cantonal commission.

Governor Durand stressed that although chefs de village and de canton were to be elected in future, chiefs in power before the 1947 legislation were to be retained.<sup>1</sup> Worried about the chaos that might result from the new measures, he enjoined commandants should they see fit, to go as far as nominating chefs de village who should retain these positions as long as was necessary to restore calm before an election could be held.

As far as elections of chefs de canton were concerned, finding members for the second college of "grands électeurs" posed more problems than expected. In March 1947, Wiltord, the new Governor of Senegal, instructed the commandant de cercle of Thies that in the event of a shortage of grands électeurs, he should choose local notables.<sup>2</sup> The difficulty then was to define the term "notable". In the cantonal elections for Mboul Diamatil in 1947, there were only 26 "grands électeurs" as opposed to 192 chefs de village. The chef de subdivision of Tivaouane, Nunge, suggested to the commandant de cercle of Thies that instead of creating 166 notables to equalise numbers in the two

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1. 2D13-32 Governor Durand to commandant de cercle and chefs de subdivision of Thies, 14 February 1947.
  2. 2D13-32 Governor Wiltord to commandant de cercle of Thies, 25 March 1947.

electoral colleges, this case should be considered an exception where the number of grands électeurs did not have to equal that of chefs de village.<sup>1</sup> Another suggestion by the commandant de cercle, Paolini, was that the list of grands électeurs be enlarged by including all civil servants, agents d'administration, former soldiers and two notables from each village, to be chosen by him. He suggested that the electorate for the chefs de village be extended to include not only those already on the lists, but other notables of both sexes. With the extension of the office of chief and electors to more people, even more disputes arose from election results. The result of the election we have just been examining was contested by a former chief, Massamba Aram Diop, after his defeat by Ndongo Sall.<sup>2</sup>

This practice of electing the chef de canton was gradually transforming candidates for this office into real 'hommes politiques' at the mercy of their chefs de village and marabouts of whose votes they were in need. Their prestige diminished while indiscipline on the part of their subordinates became more frequent.<sup>3</sup> In the General Council debates of 14 and 15 May 1948, some councillors expressed the view that the election of chiefs undermined the principle of authority inherent in the chieftancy. Others felt that the election of chiefs for life was a contradiction in terms, antithetical to democracy.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Selection of Chiefs in Cayor

It would seem appropriate at this stage to examine more closely what determined the appointment of chiefs in particular cercles. Here the cases of Tivaouane in the north with its long tradition of chiefs and that of Basse Casamance, where virtually no commandement indigène

1. 2D13-32 chef de subdivision of Tivaouane to commandant de cercle of Thies, 25 March 1947.
2. ARSD 2G47-84 Tivaouane RPA 1947.
3. ARSD 2G45-101 Tivaouane RPA 1945 and ARSD 2G47-84 Tivaouane RPA 1947.
4. AN 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948.

existed prior to 1922, provide an interesting contrast.

The formation of the commandement indigène in Cayor began with the appointment in 1895 by the French of Demba War Sall as President of the Cayor Confederation after they had failed to obtain the collaboration of the Damels-Lat Dior and Samba Laobe Fall.<sup>1</sup> The principal lieutenant of Lat Dior, Demba War Sall had entered into an alliance with the French after quarreling with the Damel.

The Sall were from a family of Toucouleur warriors, descended from the Lam Toro and drew their origins not from Cayor, but the village of Guédé, Fouta Toro. The first Sall to come to Cayor in the mid-eighteenth century, Mediour Omar Sall, a son of the Lam Toro, had become a principal warrior of the Damel. His descendants retained this prominent position, and Demba War rose to such power that he became known as a "faiseur des Damels."<sup>2</sup> It was he who helped to install Lat Dior Diop as Damel. As president of the Cayor Confederation, Demba War installed or retained his relatives in key positions in the six provinces comprising the confederation. He kept his brother, Bounama Sall as chief of the province of Guet, an office he had held under the Damel, Samba Laobe Fall.<sup>3</sup>

The administration was anxious to keep the sons of Lat Dior well away from their father's former territories. Mbakhane Lat Dior Diop was given various unimportant posts outside Cayor, none of which he kept for very long. Dismissed from Keur Bacine (Louga) for exactions in 1921, he was made chef de canton of Thor Diander (Thies) in 1924. After a long

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1. ARSD IDI/3 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane, Monograph of Tivaouane 1903-11, 3 March 1911.
  2. IDI/3 Allys, Monograph of Tivaouane, 26 March 1904.
  3. IDI/3 Monograph of Tivaouane 1903-11(unpub.) and interview with El Hadj Kane Sambe.

spell away from the chieftancy, he was again given a post in Thies in Mbayar-Nianing (the Petite Côte subdivision) from 1934-37. His brother Abdoulaye had an even more inglorious career. After a month as chef stagiaire of Joal Gohé (Thies), he was imprisoned on 18 June 1932 for allegedly cheating a commercial house in Kaolack.<sup>1</sup>

The French took advantage of the death of Demba War Sall in 1905 to abolish the office of President of the Cayor Confederation, as it was felt he had wielded too much power. The highest indigenous authority thus became that of chef de province. Demba War's son Meissa M'Baye Sall, who had represented his father at Tivaouane, was left with the province of Saniokhor. His alliance with the French stretched back to 1883, when he had campaigned with them in Baol.<sup>2</sup> Since then, he had fought in many campaigns on their side, culminating in the conquest of Cayor and campaign in Diobas (1892). Much of his eagerness to cooperate with the French was inspired by fears that his position might otherwise be given to Mbakhane Lat Dior Diop.

On the death of Bounama Sall in 1902, his son Macodou, who was related to Lat Dior on the maternal side, became chef de province of Guet. He had already acquired some experience as secretary to his uncle Demba War Sall, and as chef adjoint to his father in 1899, and spoke Wolof, French and Toucouleur.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the French were putting Cayor under the control of a family who had once been strangers and although important notables, had never been members of the traditional ruling family. In many ways, the colonial administration preferred this alliance with the Sall to one with the traditional ruling family who, it was feared, might behave too independently. On the other hand, the Sall, in order to maintain their influence in the face of opposition from the traditional rulers, were dependent on French support. In the case of Cayor, the Sall who were

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1. ARSD 2G32-105 Thies RPA 1932.
  2. IFAN Paris-Dakar, 18 October 1935.
  3. ARSD 1Z58 Macodou Sall-Report Book 1949.

in important positions used this influence to raise members of their family to chiefly appointments in order to exclude these rival claimants. In this way then, in Cayor, a traditional aristocracy was being supplanted by an administrative one.

As a result of intermarriage between the Sall and Cayoriens from notable families the local people no longer saw the former as strangers. To a great extent, the presence of the Sall in positions of leadership for well over 150 years legitimised them, as did the fact that they were endorsed as chiefs by the colonial power.

Moreover, the Sall were able to obtain the support of the most important marabouts in the area. Macodou Sall's branch of the family were Qadria, but Massamba Sall and many others in the family were Tidjanes.<sup>1</sup> Although Mbakhane Diop became a Mouride to win the support of Amadou Bamba and subsequently of his son, Mamadou Moustapha Mbacké, Macodou Sall was able to find Mouride support closer to home.<sup>2</sup> He cultivated good relations with Thierno Ibra Faty Mbacké, who had settled with his talibés in Darou Mousty, Guet, around 1912.

The final province to be created after the death of Demba War Sall was Mboul Mbakol. Dioucounda N'diaye, a former trader was given the post of chief on 2 March 1906. This appointment was opposed by many, including a group of traders at Thilmakha led by Masseck Diop, one of Lat Dior's sons, on the grounds that Dioucounda had no claim whatever to the chieftancy.<sup>3</sup>

With a view to checking the power of the chefs supérieurs, the decisions of 28 December 1911 and 30 January 1912 divided the provinces of Cayor into a number of cantons. Although the chefs de province were to retain overall control, a number of former soldiers who were strangers or were not from notable families were made chefs de canton.

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1. Interviews with Massamba Sall, Meissa M'Baye Sall and Sanghone Sall.
  2. ARSD 1Z56 "The Darou Mousty Affair" - correspondence between Macodou Sall and the commandant de cercle of Louga in 1931 and again in 1937.
  3. ARSD 2D14-13 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane - Report on leaving his post - 5 May 1919 hereafter referred to as commandant... Tivaouane ... Report.

The administration believed that these men, who owed their positions to the French were likely to be more reliable. By these decrees, the province of Guet was to consist of Guet, N'doyène Dagam, N'Dour and Thilmakha. While the first three cantons were to remain in the hands of Macodou Sall, the last was given to a stranger, Yoro Coumba, a retired lieutenant of the Spahees with a Legion of Honour.<sup>1</sup> Mboul Mbakol was divided into the cantons of Mboul Diamatil and Mbakol Digue. The first of these was also put under the control of a stranger and retired serviceman, Samba N'Daw, a former maître pilote de première classe. Finally, Saniokhor was to consist of the cantons of M'Barre, N'Doutte Diassane, Méckhé, Tabby Gatteigne, Omar Kadene and Mbaouar. Sambou N'Dour, a former soldier was made chief of the latter. Unlike the other soldier chiefs, he was a "chef du pays" as a cousin of the Salls in power, but like most of the chiefs in Cayor at that time, he was illiterate.

These appointments brought an immediate reaction from the notables, who drew up a petition protesting against the appointment of strangers as chefs de canton, which they presented to the commandant de cercle of Cayor on 2 February 1912. They threatened to emigrate if this practice continued and if Meissa M'Baye Sall, "notre père et ami", was not restored to his former influence.<sup>2</sup>

But the administration continued to make loyalty to the French the greatest asset a candidate for the chieftancy could have over and above any claim based on tradition or education. Between 1912 and 1923 there were few changes in the commandement indigène of Cayor. Candidates for the chieftancy who were natives of a region or members of a family with a long claim to office, intelligent, educated and loyal to the French were in short supply. It was felt that the inadequacies of a number of chiefs in Cayor would have to be endured as their replacements were

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1. ARSD 2D14-6 Decree of 30 January 1912.

2. 2D14-6 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to Governor, 14 February 1912.

unlikely to be better. It was preferable to have as chief "l'indigène ayant l'expérience acquise que d'un auxiliaire inconnu."<sup>1</sup>

The 1912 reorganisation in fact confirmed the predominance of the Sall family as chiefs in Cayor as they retained control of the two major provinces. Meissa M'Baye and Macodou Sall used their influence with the local administration to install relatives and supporters in the majority of their cantons. Hence the chieftancy of Cayor became virtually a family affair. This began in 1916 with the appointment of an illiterate relative who could not speak a word of French, Massamba Yacine Sall, to the canton of Méckhé M'Bar.

Macodou and Meissa M'Baye Sall did not suffer much from the loss of territorial control in the 1923 reorganisation.<sup>2</sup> Since 1912, Macodou Sall had been unable to exert his full influence in that province because of the presence of Yoro Coumba as chief de canton of Thilmakha. This chief had a long-standing feud with his superior over the latter's control of the Peuls of Ndour, and claimed that "L'administration de la population entière de mon canton doit être dans mes mains".<sup>3</sup> But with Yoro Coumba's dismissal during the 1923 territorial reorganisation, Macodou Sall was able to extend his influence into Thilmakha. Although he could only take temporary charge of the canton in order to conform with the new legislation, he was able to ensure that one of his brothers, Gallo Thiéyacine Sall, succeeded him. He was also able to retain some degree of control over Ndour by supporting the appointment of another brother, Lat Sène Fall, who had served as interim chief of Mboul Diamatil after the dismissal of Sanor N'diaye in 1920.<sup>4</sup>

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1. 2D14-13 commandant ... Tivaouane ... Report, 5 May 1919.
  2. See p. 74.
  3. 2D14-7 Yoro Coumba to the commandant de cercle of Cayor, 4 July 1921.
  4. ARSD 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM June 1923.



The dismissal of Dioucounda N'diaye in 1923 benefited the chef de province of Saniokhor who was able to acquire control of the former's province of Mboul Mbakol which had been split into the cantons of Mboul Diamatil, Mboul Gallo and Mboul Khatta. A relative, Momar Dior Dieng, took command of the latter while one of Macodou Sall's brothers, Meissa Balle Sall was made chief of Mboul Gallo in 1925.<sup>1</sup>

The influence of the Sall family can also be seen in the appointments they prevented.

Massamba Aram Diop, an interpreter and secretary of the tribunal de cercle, might in many ways have seemed a reasonable choice for the canton of N'doutte Diassane left vacant by Ibra N'diaye in 1924. He was a nephew of the notable Salambata Diop, who had been a councillor to Demba War and Meissa M'Baye Sall and was highly educated, having attended the medersa at St. Louis. But Meissa M'Baye Sall feared that should he become chief, Massamba Aram might claim lands held for a long time by the Sall family.<sup>2</sup> As he wanted his own son Massamba to succeed, he argued for the idea of hereditary chieftancy, and strongly contested the appointment. He used his influence with the people and colonial administration to have Massamba Aram Diop replaced within a year by his son. Massamba Sall had already proved his worth as far as the administration was concerned by his service as interim chief of Mboul Khatta. Massamba Aram Diop did not, in the long run, lose out either. A few months later, he was appointed chief of Mboul Diamatil.<sup>3</sup>

The 1925 territorial reorganisation gave Macodou Sall a further opportunity to tighten his grip on the province of Guet. After the dismissal of Lat Sene Fall, the administration decided to abolish the canton of Ndour, occupied by nomadic Peuls for only one season of the

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1. AN 2G24-14 Senegal RPA 1924.
  2. 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM July 1923.
  3. 2G23-46 Tivaouane RPA 1923.

year, in the interests of administrative efficiency.<sup>1</sup> This was fused with the newly created canton of N'doyene Dagam whose chief was another of Macodou's brothers, Sangone Sall. Once Macodou's brothers and relatives had acquired control of all the cantons in Guet, the commandement indigène in this canton remained remarkably stable. There were no alterations from 1928 till 1935, when Meissa M'Baye Sall, Macodou's eldest son, succeeded Sambou N'dour at Mbaouar.<sup>2</sup>

The French continued their policy of encouraging the disappearance of the great territorial commands when they allowed the office of chef de province of Saniokhor to die with its holder, Meissa M'Baye Sall in 1934. The division of the province into cantons had been a first step in the process. The province readily disintegrated into its component parts-Diamatil, Djiguene Gallo, Mboul Khatta, Mboul Gallo, Tabby Gatteigne and Ndoutte Diassane-all of which had chiefs. So of the former cercle of Tivaouane, the only remaining province was Guet.

That Macodou Sall, like his uncle Demba War, had something of the reputation of a "kingmaker", even outside Cayor can be seen in the requests that he personally, rather than the commandant de cercle, received from individuals wishing to become chiefs. On the death of his brother Gallo Thiéyacine Sall, he received a number of requests for his vacancy from persons including members of the traditional ruling families of Cayor.<sup>3</sup>

In general, wherever any posts became vacant in Guet, Macodou would take them over himself temporarily and would use his connexions in administrative circles to secure the nomination of his family or supporters. In the case of Thilmakha, Samba Laobe Sall, a member of

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1. ARSD 2G26-13 Tivaouane RPA 1926.

2. Interview with Meissa M'Baye Sall.

3. IZ58 Fonds Macodou Sall - Correspondence on the death of Gallo Thiéyacine Sall, 1928.

Macodou's family and former soldier took control as an interim measure only, as he was illiterate.<sup>1</sup> He was succeeded on 13 November 1928 by Morane Sall, Macodou's youngest brother. But Macodou and Morane failed to see eye to eye, and by 1937, Macodou was requesting his brother's dismissal for flouting his orders and his replacement by his son Mamadou. Macodou had earlier unsuccessfully tried a similar manoeuvre to get his brother Sangone Sall of N'Doyene Dagam Ndour dismissed. However, the Governor objected on the grounds that Macodou's son had not attended the Ecole des Fils des Chefs. Macodou therefore decided to go over the head of the Governor and write to his old friend, the Governor General de Coppet, requesting his intervention in the affair. He argued "Or il y a au Sénégal des chefs de canton non seulement qui ne sont pas sortis de l'Ecole des Fils des Chefs mais illettrés."<sup>2</sup> He argued that his son, a graduate of the school at Sor (St. Louis) was sufficiently educated and had already obtained some experience of a chief's work by serving as private secretary to his father and as secretary of the Société de Prévoyance section at Mbaouar. The correspondence between de Coppet and Macodou Sall was amicable, each dressing the other as "cher vieil ami". Macodou was eventually successful firstly in securing his brother's dismissal when he himself took provisional command of Thilmakha and secondly in obtaining his son's appointment. De Coppet subsequently wrote to Macodou Sall expressing pleasure that his son had been nominated so quickly and the hope that "dans son commandement, votre fils saura suivre les belles traces de son père."<sup>3</sup>

That the French recognised the province of Guet was firmly within the Sall's sphere of influence is clearly shown in 1940 when the death of Mamadou Macodou Sall again left Thilmakha vacant. In the interests of administrative efficiency, the French would have preferred to fuse Thilmakha with Diadj Oulingara (Louga)<sup>4</sup>. But this would have

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1. ARSD 2G27-90 Tivaouane RPA 1927.
  2. 1Z56 Macodou Sall to Governor General de Coppet, 12 July 1937.
  3. 1Z56 Governor General de Coppet to Macodou Sall, 9 October 1937.
  4. AN 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.

precipitated a conflict between Sidy Khouya Diop, the chief of this canton and a descendant of Lat Dior, and Macodou Sall, as the canton had since 1902 been under his command. The latter insisted on the succession of a member of his family, particularly of his son, Massamba N'Goné Sall who had been educated at the Ecole Regionale of Kébémér, had volunteered for the army twice, and had assisted his father in his chiefly duties. Macodou offered to take temporary charge of the canton for his son, who was at the time serving in the army. So as not to hurt the prestige of the old chief or precipitate a rivalry between chiefly families, the administration acceded to his wishes, and on 14 November 1940 gave Macodou Sall interim command of Thilmakha, along with his other duties as chef de province.

Up to now, the reader may have the mistaken impression that the process of selecting chiefs was a straightforward one, and that posts in Cayor quickly became the near monopoly of one family.

In the first place, the administration had to sort through a myriad of bogus claims to the office of chef de canton. Claimants to the post of chief would often write letters of complaint against the incumbent purporting to come from the majority of notables of a canton. The 1923 territorial reorganisation in which a number of chiefs were dismissed led to a wave of accusations against their successors: Momar Dior Dieng, Gallo Thiéyacine Sall, Lat Sène Fall and Massamba Aram Diop.<sup>1</sup> The administration blamed this on dismissed chiefs like Sanor N'diaye and their followers and on rival families. In 1923, it was discovered that two charges against Ibra N'diaye, the new chief of Mboul Dimatil which appeared in the local press, had been written by his brother, Momar N'diaye, a tailor at St. Louis, who coveted his brother's post.<sup>2</sup>

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1. 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM December 1923.
  2. 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM July 1923.

The appointments of chiefs in Cayor sometimes ran into opposition on ethnic grounds. The nomination of Mbakhane Lat Dior Diop as chef de canton of Diobas in 1931 was unpopular with the Sereres, constituting the bulk of the population, who objected to the imposition of a Wolof chief and his entourage. They wrote to the Governor requesting the reinstatement of their former chief Sidy Lô, whom they strongly defended against the charges of embezzlement of taxes that the administration had brought against him.<sup>1</sup> So anxious were they to have him back, that they offered to make good his shortfall from their own pockets. They alleged that Mbakhane Diop and his followers had confiscated their lands and goods, while his son, an agent ambulant, had cheated taxpayers.

#### The Establishment of a Commandement Indigène in the Basse Casamance

In contrast to Cayor, the societies of the Basse Casamance were acephalous till the French conquest. An "anomalie géographique", regarded in many ways as being separate from the rest of Senegal, the Basse Casamance was the last region to be subjugated with its occupation by colonial forces which began in November 1917.<sup>2</sup> Two cercles in the Basse Casamance, Kamobeul with a subdivision at Diembéring and Bignona with a subdivision at Diouloulou were to be placed under military rule, with military officers as commandants de cercle.<sup>3</sup> Only Ziguinchor, very much reduced to an area consisting of the cantons of Bainoucks and Adeane, was to remain under civil administration,

But with the suspension of military operations for Diagne's recruitment, passive, and even in some cases, active resistance continued as much of the population remained armed. The 1918 recruitment, a resounding success in the rest of Senegal, was a failure in the Basse

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1. ARSD 13G6 (17) letter from the chefs de village and lamanes of Diobas canton to the Governor, 17 July 1931.
  2. For a full account of the occupation of the Basse Casamance see C. Roche, Conquêtes et Résistances des Peuples de la Casamance Paris 1974, Part 4, Chs. 6-8, and ARSD 13G384.
  3. ARSD 2D5-2 Governor Leveque to the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance 30 November 1917, referring to the Decree of 20 November 1917.

Casamance as "les Diola n'ont pas obéi ni fournis les recrues demandés."<sup>1</sup> Two Diola chiefs loyal to the French, unable to conduct the drawing of lots to select recruits in the villages could bring the administration only one conscript, while the chiefs heeded by the people were those counselling resistance. When Angoulvant took over as Governor General from Van Vollenhoven, he was anxious to see a return to civil administration in the Basse Casamance at the earliest possible moment. But even by June 1919, pacification was still not complete.<sup>2</sup>

The French therefore had to introduce a system of chiefs if they were to rule the area effectively: "S'il existait dans ces régions des chefs de province, de canton ou de village ayant l'autorité ou même de l'influence, nous pourrions peut-être par leur moyen arriver à les (the Diola) soumettre. Mais dans toute la Basse Casamance, les commandants de cercle ne rencontrent aucun chef capable de les seconder."<sup>3</sup> The task of finding chiefs was complicated by the absence in the Basse Casamance of a chiefly tradition. The most common form of chief was the chef de guerre, elected at the moment of combat but quickly disappearing into the ranks in peacetime.

The great diversity of language and custom amongst the Diola made it difficult to follow a straightforward Politique des Races. The clan, rather than the village was the most important collective unit in a society the French termed "anarchical". An important factor in the absence of a chiefly structure in the Basse Casamance was that even after the First World War, large areas of it had yet not been converted to Islam and still practised the traditional African religion. The influence of the féticheur outstripped that of the chief. The average Diola, who had not had much contact with the white man before the First World War, was reluctant to have any dealings with the French at all, let alone becoming a chief for the colonial administration.

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1. 13G384 Benquey, Administrateur Supérieur "Report on the disarming and pacification of the inhabitants of the Casamance, 19 August 1918.
  2. ARSD 13G548 Governor Didelot to Administrateur Supérieur, 10 June 1919.
  3. ARSD 13G385 Chef de Service Civils, "Note on the Casamance", February 1918.

The bare skeleton for the establishment of the commandement indigène in the Basse Casamance existed with the few official chiefs and chefs bénévoles already in operation. Chefs bénévoles were unpaid "anciens et vagues agents politiques",<sup>1</sup> most of whom operated in Bignona. The decree of 1 June 1907 provided for special credits to be allocated to the Administration Supérieure to reward Diola chiefs willing to take on missions for the French, as part of "l'administration non pas irrégulière mais spéciale de la Basse Casamance inorganisée".<sup>2</sup> One such example was Dialaman Diadhiou, the famous Diola warrior. He was sent on a mission of conciliation and enquiry to the Fogny in 1916 from which he sent back reports to keep the commandant de cercle informed on the state of affairs in Bignona.<sup>3</sup> Included among his assignments were trips to the Gambia to persuade French subjects who had immigrated there to return, assistance in the arrest of the Diola rebel, Kinédian Badji, and nipping a rebellion in Sinedian in the bud. Prior to 1922, there had been efforts to put chiefs particularly useful to the French on the administration's payroll. Amongst these officials chiefs were Birama Gueye, the chef des groupements ouloffs in the Basse Casamance, appointed to this position on 2 September 1909 having served as chef de village of Carabane since 1884, and Ansoumane Diatta, officially made chef de province of Djougouttes on 9 May 1916.<sup>4</sup>

Even with this smattering of chiefs, the Administrateur Supérieur correctly observed on 30 June 1922 that "Le commandement indigène est inexistant dans le cercle de Kamobeul... détesté dans le cercle de Bignona où sévit le chef bénévole."<sup>5</sup> So in 1922 was launched "la formule nouvelle d'administration qui constitue en Casamance la tentative d'organisation du commandement indigène presque inexistant."<sup>6</sup>

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1. ARSD 2G23-70 Casamance RPS 1st semester 1923.
  2. ARSD 13G545 Administrateur Supérieur to Governor, 8 October 1916.
  3. Ibid.
  4. ARSD 2G17-36 Ziguinchor RPM January 1917 (written by de Coppet, at that time commandant de cercle).
  5. ARSD 2G23-70 Casamance RPS 1st semester 1923.
  6. AN 2G22-9 Senegal RPA 1922.

This meant an end to the system of chefs benevoles in charge of cantons which had mainly been the arbitrary creations of the administration. Apart from Djougouttes, the "cantons" in Bignona had not proved successful.

Because of the difficulties of carrying out a simple Politique des Races, the administration decided to take more account of the clan structure and physical geography of the Basse Casamance in constituting cantons.<sup>1</sup> Chefs de canton and de village were to be chosen, if possible, from "the first occupants of the soil", that is to say, the most important families within the clan. The appointment of strangers was where possible to be avoided, and the administration aimed to check that the choice of a chief was acceptable to the majority of members of the clan.

An examination of the chiefs chosen confirms the notion that the majority of them were not the average Diola cultivator, but had "sortis de l'ordinaire". As most Diola were reluctant to become chiefs, the French looked to those who had had more contact with the white man in the course of their careers, and were less reluctant to treat with him. Such men were also more likely to be accepted as superiors by their fellow Diola. This group included indigenous traders, civil servants, soldiers and sailors. Where such men could not be found, strangers were appointed.

By the decree of 25 February 1922, the military cercle of Kamobeul and its subdivision at Diembéring were abolished, to be replaced by the province of Oussouye, consisting of the cantons of Pointe St. Georges, Floups and Elinkine.<sup>2</sup> In this area, considerations

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1. AN 2G24-14 Senegal RPA 1924.

2. 2G22-9 Senegal RPA 1922.



of administrative efficiency and of the lack of European personnel outweighed the desire to avoid the establishment of the grands commandements indigènes common to northern Senegal. Hence the province of Oussouye was entrusted to an African, Benjamin Diatta, an interpreter who fulfilled the qualifications of education, administrative experience and "origins". This appointment illustrates the French tendency to choose Diola chiefs with an unusual background compared to that of most of their compatriots. The French believed that as Diola Diamat born in Kabrousse, he would be more acceptable to the Floups of Oussouye than a complete stranger.<sup>1</sup> He was a descendant of the founder of Kabrousse and of a well known family of féticheurs. His uncle, Matama Diatta, had been chief of Kabrousse Niolon while his father, Senghor Diatta, had been chef de guerre of Diémbering Kabrousse and keeper of the fetish of the Ahona warriors. With his twelve years service in the administration, he was regarded as "un bon français" and had been awarded the médaille coloniale in 1920. He had been educated by the Holy Ghost fathers "dont il est l'élève chéri".<sup>2</sup>

The administration attempted as far as possible in the course of 1922 to appoint chefs de canton in Ziguinchor who were originaires, in the hope of satisfying the local people. Hence Eye, a well-known féticheur at Oussouye, was appointed chef de canton of Floups. But he was replaced before the year was out because of his reluctance to cooperate with the French by another originaire, Bakoual. Two other "chefs de race", Djiboudie Sambou at Pointe St. Georges and Bougnoul at Elinkine, were also to come under Benjamin Diatta's supervision. When Djivoasil, an originaire, was nominated chief of Diembéring Kabrousse, the Politique des Races was upheld, with Diola and Wolof groups being kept separate. Birama Gueye continued to serve as chief of the Wolofs.<sup>3</sup>

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1. ARSD IC11454 Benjamin Diatta - Administrateur Supérieur to Governor, 1922 and Notes on Benjamin Diatta's service, 1932.
  2. IC11454 Benjamin Diatta - Report Book 1929.
  3. ARSD 13G3 (17) Governor to Governor General, 6 December 1922. Chiefs were appointed to the cantons in Oussouye and to Brin Séléki, Diembéring Kabrousse, Bayotte, Essynges and Mandjacques by the decrees of 25 February 1922, 30 May 1922, 10 October 1922 and 24 November 1922.

In 1922, the cantons of Bayottes, Essyngnes, and Brin Séléki were formed from the former cercle of Kamobeul, with chefs de race Assane, Adéoberane Bassene and Diagnel.<sup>1</sup>

The region of Adeane, which had been dominated from the turn of the century by Alassane Seck, a Lebou Muslim from Rufisque, and his followers, was split as far as possible along ethnic lines in 1922. The only true chef de race appointed by the French in this area was Patron Gomis, in Mandjacques canton. The original inhabitants of the Basse Casamance, the Bainoucks, had virtually withdrawn from active participation in the administration of their region after the death of their king, Mansa.<sup>2</sup> After the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor, Lambert, had obtained the consent of the Bainouck elders, a stranger, Alceyni Cissé, a Sarakollé from Kaffrine, Sine Saloum, was nominated. He was literate, had already served the French as President of the tribunal coutumier at Ziguinchor from 1906 onwards, and was already known in the area as a former follower of Alassane Seck. As the remainder of Adeane was composed of an inextricable mixture of Wolofs, Mancagnes, Diola and Mandinkas, the French decided to constitute the new canton on geographical lines. It was to consist of the area surrounding the village of Adeane, Bangaga and Sindone. As Alassane Seck was dead and all his children were under age, one of his followers, Amat (Mbarrau) N'diaye, a Wolof from Saloum, was appointed chief of Adeane.<sup>3</sup>

Plans for the division of Bignona into cantons, not formulated till the beginning of 1923, were not put into effect till 11 April 1924, and Bignona was to remain a military cercle till 1944.<sup>4</sup> The subdivision of

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1. ARSD 13G3(17) Governor to Governor General, 6 December 1922.
  2. ARSD 2G30-60 Casamance RPM May 1930.
  3. ARSD 2G23-54 Casamance RPT 1st quarter, Section: Ziguinchor and interview with Assane Seck, Inspector of Taxes at Ziguinchor.
  4. 13G3 (17) Decree of 13 May 1944.

Bignona was divided into provinces corresponding to four clans, some of which were divided into a number of sub-clans (or cantons). Diola appointed to the post of chefs de canton were often already cooperating with the French as chefs de village in this area. They were selected on the basis of good service, intelligence and whether the French considered them to be respected by their peoples.

The clan of Djougouttes consisting of 20,661 people remained a province under its former chief Ansoumane Diatta. Kalounayes was divided into three sub-clans headed by Diola notables.<sup>1</sup> Kalounayes Nord was given to Kouyanga Koudiabe, and Kalounayes Sud to Andre Badiane, the former chef de village of Santac whose nomination was supported by all the chefs de village in his canton. Sonkarou Maria, a Mandinka Muslim from a village near Bignona who had already served the French as a chef b n vole, was made chef de canton of Bignona Kalounaye. The commandant de cercle of Bignona had been recommending as early as 1920 that he be made a chef de canton as he was respected by the people and had been successful in the military recruitment, tax collection, and as President of the tribunal de subdivision of Bignona.<sup>2</sup> In the third province, Kadiamoutes, Djilling Kamara, the former chef de village of Sillik became chief of Kadiamoutes Sud-Est and Moussa Goudiaby (a Diola originaire and chef de village of Kaniano) became chief of Kadiamoutes Sud-Ouest.<sup>3</sup> For Kadiamoutes Nord, Captain Troadec, the new commandant de cercle, proposed Kin dian Badji, the most influential notable in the canton and leader of the 1915 rebellion in Fogny Nord. Although the Governor was not prepared to go as far as nominating Kin dian, he agreed to appoint Sania Badji, Kin dian's eldest son and the right arm of his father. Kin dian's approval of this decision was sought and given.

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1. 2G23-70 Casamance RPS 2nd Semester 1923.
  2. ARSD 2G20-23 Bignona RPT 3rd quarter 1923.
  3. 2G23-70 Casamance RPS 2nd semester 1923.

The French felt that Kadiamoutes, the most turbulent province of Bignona was in need of a chef de province to keep a check on the influence of the chefs de canton. In Diola, Kadiamoutes literally means "a land where the men do not submit to any law and commit all the excesses they want"<sup>1</sup> and together with Djiragones, this clan had risen in armed rebellion in 1915. Lamine Sonko, a former chef b n vole of Kadiamoutes Nord and a Serere from Kaolack, was chosen as chef sup rieur, with his chef-lieu at Baila. Although he was disliked by the Diola as a stranger, he had served the French well for twenty years and was familiar with the area. The French hoped that Sonko, a pious Muslim would exert some influence over the new converts to Islam in the area. His role would be reduced however to one of surveillance: "Son r le consisterait surtout   exercer une surveillance attentive et   nous renseigner."<sup>2</sup>

The region of Djiragones could have been unified under one chief as Djiragones Est and Ouest had only 1337 and 1017 inhabitants respectively, but as two opposing clans were involved, two separate cantons were established.<sup>3</sup> It was decided that the size of cantons did not warrant the appointment of a chef de province. The most influential notable in Djiragones Est, Seremati Tamba, the chef de village of Guiro was proposed as chief of this canton.

In Diouloulou subdivision, the French nominated Diola chefs de village to head the cantons-N'Faly Diaban, chef de village of Kafountine was appointed to Bliss and Karones, Malic Sonko of Kabiline to Combo, Bourama Diatta of Tamba to Narangs, and Lan Diadhiou of Badiana to Fogny Diabancounda.<sup>4</sup>

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1. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  2. 2G23-70 Casamance RPS 1st semester 1923.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid.

Once the French had formulated their plans for the commandement indigène in the Basse Casamance, the first step was to explain their moves to the chefs de village concerned. In the case of Bignona, the Administrateur Supérieur travelled to the chef-lieu where the commandant de cercle had summoned all 250 chefs de village and notables.<sup>1</sup> In a three-hour speech, the Administrateur Supérieur announced the creation of chiefs and explained that the state of passive rebellion that persisted in the Fogny could bring nothing but harm. He cited as a warning the fates of those who had tried to resist the colonial power like Moussa Molo, Fode Kaba and the rebels in Bayottes and Essygnés.

In the case of Ziguinchor, the commandant de cercle called the chefs de village to the chef-lieu.<sup>2</sup> Here he explained to them that the establishment of the commandement indigène and demilitarisation of the cercle of Ziguinchor was the result of the state of peace which had prevailed over the last two years.

But as late as 1926, a "politique d'apprivoisement" was still being practised in the Casamance as the commandement indigène was far from a stable structure.<sup>3</sup> There was still little contact between the administration and the inhabitants who kept up their resistance to the French and their chiefly representatives. The administration had hoped that although all the chiefs with the exception of Benjamin Diatta were illiterate, they would at least have good judgement and some authority over their subjects. But the indivisibility of the authority of the clan made its exercise by a single person inoperable. Most village and cantonal chiefs preferred to abide by the will of their subjects rather than that of the administration-"le chef est devenu

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1. 2G23-70 Casamance, RPS 1st semester 2. Ibid.

3. ARSD 2G26-66 Casamance RPA 1926.

l'humble serviteur de la majorité."<sup>1</sup> The Diola were partial to vin de palme and brawls frequently broke out. This led the commandant de cercle to write of Bayottes, Essynges and Floups that "l'anarchie est à l'état ordinaire."<sup>2</sup> The féticheur continued to exercise more power than the chiefs. The administration frequently found it was having to dismiss chiefs after only a few months service. The French therefore felt obliged to reorganise the commandement indigène, particularly of Bignona, only a few years after its formation, with the aim of breaking the power of the clan structure in order to strengthen the chieftancy. This began in 1925 with the dismissal of Ansoumane Diatta, the chef de province of Djougouttes, for embezzlement of tax, to be replaced by Babakar Sagna, an educated Diola from Thionck Essyl, the largest village in the province. But following Sagna's dismissal in 1926 for embezzlement, Djougouttes was split in two, into Djougouttes Nord, given to Arfan Sonko, and Djougouttes Sud under Akanga D'Abone, from an old family in the region.<sup>3</sup>

The nomination of Arfan Sonko well illustrates the tendency to appoint Diola who were somewhat out of the ordinary as chiefs. He was a native of the region who had served as chef de village of Bessire, since 1905. The son of an animist, Wanta (alias Abounga), he was the first in his village to convert to Islam, changing his name from Animpa to Arfan. His maternal family were descendants of Kefi Koly, king of the village of Dianki. As a trader, he had done more travelling than the average Diola cultivator, making several trips to the Gambia and Fouta Djallon.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike Djougouttes, most cantons of Bignona were fused in 1926, and a number of chiefs dismissed.<sup>5</sup> Kadiamoutes Sud Est and Sud

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1. ARSD 2G28-61 Casamance RPA 1928.
  2. ARSD 2G30-83 Ziguinchor RPM November 1930.
  3. Interview with Ibrahima Sonko.
  4. Ibid.
  5. ARSD 2G26-66 Casamance RPA 1926.

Ouest were united in Kadiamoutes Sud under Youssouf Badji, a descendant of an old Diola family in the area, once Moussa Coudiaby and Djilling Kamara had been sacked. After the dismissal of Nali Bodian, Djiragones Est and Ouest were united under the former chef b'énévole Bala Sane, an originaire. Kalounayes Nord and Sud were united under Tepero Diadhiou, while Andre Badiane and Famara Djiba lost their posts. When Malic Sonko was sacked, Combo and Fogny were united under Lan Diadhiou.

Although dissatisfied with the majority of chiefs in the Basse Casamance, the French had by the early 1930s learnt that it was better, wherever possible, to avoid making strangers chiefs in this region. The influence of Brévié's theories can be seen during this period. He pointed out that short term measures like the dismissal of chiefs after a few months in office would only serve to weaken the chieftancy. In the cercle of Ziguinchor, three chiefs were given informal charge of unsatisfactory chiefs and their cantons, becoming virtual chefs de province.<sup>1</sup> By 1930, Tete Sagna, the chef de canton of Brin Seleki and a Diola Essyl, had been given informal control of the cantons of Bayottes and Essynges. Benjamin Diatta took command of Diemb'ering Kabrousse in 1929 after the dismissal of Aidier.<sup>2</sup> The inhabitants of the canton were prepared to accept him as he was an originaire of Kabrousse, and his wife was the daughter of a former king of Diémb'ering. By 1933, Alceyni Cissé of Bainoucks had virtually become of chef de province of the eastern part of Ziguinchor cercle, as Patron Gomis of Mandjacques and Moussa Seck at Adeane came under his sway. As a Muslim, Alceyni was able to exercise influence over co-religionists of the area, who were growing rapidly in number. But with the death of Lamine Sonko in 1930, the office of chef de province of Kadiamoutes was

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1. ARSD 2G26-66 Casamance RPA 1926.
  2. ARSD 2G29-101 Ziguinchor RPA 1929, Report of a tour of the cercle by the Administrateur Supérieur.

abolished as there no longer seemed to be any need to keep such a close watch over the peoples of this region.<sup>1</sup>

Brévié's influence can also be seen in the efforts of the administration in the early 1930s to woo traditional rulers in order to overcome popular opposition to chiefs installed by the French. On 14 July 1930, the "roi du riz" Issa Biane, son of the former king Sibaisondo was officially recognised by the Governor as "king of the Diolas".<sup>2</sup> But it was made clear that he was to be a figurehead only. While the chefs de province were to hold temporal power, the "chef naturel, organisme supérieur" was to be "débarrassé de tout souci permanent de service."<sup>3</sup>

As the Basse Cassamance had no long tradition of chiefs, the death or dismissal of a chef de canton generally presented the problem of who was to succeed him. In a few cases, succession became virtually a hereditary affair, as in the case of the Seck family in Adeane. The French excused the monopoly of the chieftancy by this family of strangers as "une exception que commandent les événements",<sup>4</sup> as they considered there were no originaires available to perform their tasks better. After the imprisonment in 1930 of Amath N'Diaye for exempting favoured individuals from the corvée, the chieftancy at Adeane passed back into the hands of the Seck family. Moussa, one of Alassane's sons and a merchant, took over the post of chief, which was to remain in the hands of this family with only a short break for the rest of the period under consideration.

On the death of Alceyni Cissé on 17 August 1938, the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor consulted the conseil de notables in his cercle

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1. AN 2G30-60 Casamance RPM June 1930.
  2. ARSD 2G30-83 Ziguinchor RPM August 1930.
  3. ARSD 2G29-91 Casamance RPA 1929.
  4. AN2G30-60 Casamance RPM May 1930.



and the local notables in Bainoucks to find a successor.<sup>1</sup> Although a stranger, his son Alassane had earned a good reputation with the people of Bainoucks and was unanimously chosen.

But the issue of succession was generally a much more complicated affair. The administration was often obliged to retain unsatisfactory chiefs as no replacement could be found. Such was the case of Patron Gomis, who held his office as chef de canton of Mandjacques for twenty years until his dismissal in 1943.<sup>2</sup> Even at the end of the 1930s, the colonial administration was still experiencing great difficulties in finding successors who combined origins in the Basse Casamance with loyalty to the French. None of the chiefs serving in Bignona in 1939 had children at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.<sup>3</sup> Arfan Sonko had taken his son Ibrahima away from the school before the end of his studies to be his assistant. Moreover, there were no secrétaires d'administration indigène to be found in the area.

As obedience to the French had become the main criterion by which candidates rose or fell, the colonial administration continued to appoint strangers to the post of chief. A heavy turnover of chiefs took place in Bignona between 1936 and 1937 with no less than six chiefs being replaced, in two cases by strangers.<sup>4</sup> One of these was Samba Bâ, a Peul adjutant who had served a long time in the Casamance. He was appointed chef de canton of Bignona by the French in 1937 without any consultation of the notables. He had changed his name to Maurice on his conversion to Catholicism in 1925. Although his mother was Diola, he had not been born in the canton of Bignona, but in Diouloulou.<sup>5</sup>

1. ARSD 13G42 (180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Quinquaud, "Report on the cercle of Ziguinchor", 30 December 1938 and interview with Alassane Cissé.
2. AN 2G43-67 Ziguinchor RPA 1943. His canton was subsequently shared out between those of Adeane and Bainoucks.
3. ARSD 13G42(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Quinquaud, "Report on the cercle of Bignona", 7 February 1939, hereafter referred to as Quinquaud report-Bignona.
4. Ibid.
5. ARSD 18G101(17) Governor to Governor General, 18 November 1937.

Another Peul stranger installed as chef de canton stagiaire in two cantons, Kalounayes and Kadiamoutes Sud, comprising mainly Diola was Bocar Bâ. His father, Thierno Mamadou Sina Bâ emigrated from the family home in the village of Djindjimma in the canton of Yimberim in Fouta Djallon (Guinea) to the town of Bignona to become first imam at the mosque.<sup>1</sup> Like Samba Bâ, Bocar had a Diola mother, Kadi Diatta. After his primary education in Ziguinchor, Bocar Bâ became a manager with Commerce Africaine for ten years (1 December 1924-30 October 1934). He served as chef de village of Djibidione prior to his appointment as chief.

During the 1940s, there are several instances of former servicemen being made chefs de canton as a reward for their services and because the French believed they could count on their loyalty. In 1942, Babadi Kamara from French Guinea who had served forty years as a soldier and interpreter was made chef de canton of Kadiamoutes Nord.<sup>2</sup> It was hoped that because of his long service in the Casamance, he would no longer be regarded as a stranger, but hostility forced him to resign a year later. In 1946, Alpa Bodian, a former second mate in the navy and Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur was elected chef de canton of Djougouttes Sud by the notables. A native of the region, he had been born in Balingore.<sup>3</sup>

In the course of the period, the selection of chiefs became the object of conflict between different religious groups in an area. In the case of Bignona, Catholics whose religion was somewhat longer established in the area attempted to halt the penetration of Islam which had made great headway with the French conquest of the Casamance. Catholic fathers and their followers, the majority of whom were clerks in the administration and business conspired to replace Muslim and

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1. Private papers of Bocar Ba. 2. AN 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.

3. Interview with Doudou Bodian.

animist chefs de canton with Christians. In 1929, they scored a victory on the death of the chef de canton of Bignona, Sonkarou Maria, a Muslim, when they persuaded the people and administration to accept Demba Sane, a Diola Catholic and stranger in his place.<sup>1</sup>

In the 1930s it was alleged that Catholics were actually hiring people to keep an eye on non-Christian chefs de canton and de village so they could quickly bring their faults to that attention of the administration.<sup>2</sup> In general, the administration resolutely opposed the efforts of Catholics to manipulate the selection process, reminding them that they should not seek "à faire des noirs catholiques une caste privilégiée et indépendante des chefs du pays".<sup>3</sup>

The Catholics added fuel to the inflammatory situation which already persisted in the cercles of Kalounayes and Kadiamoutes Sud during the Bocar Ba<sup>^</sup> affair. This chief alleged that Catholics from the town of Bignona had falsely accused him of abusing his powers because they resented the fact that he had married a Catholic girl who had subsequently become a Muslim.<sup>4</sup> But the intrigues of the Catholics during this period backfired, as the commandant de cercle concluded that the chef de canton of Bignona, Demba Sane, was unable to control his fellow Christians. The chief's secretary was in fact one of the most zealous Catholics in Bignona. So Sane was dismissed, to be replaced by another Catholic, Samba Ba<sup>^</sup>.<sup>5</sup>

In the cercle of Ziguinchor, Catholics clashed with animists over the designation of chiefs. Benjamin Diatta was viewed as a traitor by the animists as his father had been one of their fetish keepers.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Interview with Augustin Coly.
  2. AN 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  3. ARSD 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.
  4. For further details see Ch.4 on "The Chiefs and Forced Labour."
  5. ARSD 13G29 (17) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Tasson, "Report on the Bocar Ba Affair"; 23 February 1937.
  6. IC11454 Benjamin Diatta-Personal file-Notes on his service, 5 December 1936.

When Tete Sagna, chief of Brin Seleki died of leprosy in 1936, the Catholics in the area persuaded the notables of this canton to support the nomination of Pierre Bassene, a catechist and chef de village of Séléki, as their chief. The French were willing to accept him as he was the most educated candidate, but he too was to run into problems with the animists in the area.<sup>1</sup>

Other disputes over the nomination of a chief occurred when certain individuals were prepared to go to great lengths to obtain a post as chief. One such character whose name appeared regularly in the files of the commandant de cercle of Bignona was Ousman Gueye Sambou, an ex-instituteur who had lost his post in 1917 for flouting French orders.<sup>2</sup> In 1933, Ousmane Gueye was reported to be seeking popular support for his claim to a post of chef de province<sup>3</sup> in Bignona. He travelled all over the cercle and was allowed to speak in several villages by claiming the Administrateur Supérieur had sent him.

He turned up again in 1937, with designs on the office of chief of Djougouttes Nord, and was able to find sufficient enemies of Arfan Sonko among the notables and chefs de village to obtain signatures for a petition which he sent to the Administrateur Supérieur.<sup>4</sup> This document accused Arfan of all manner of abuses of power, such as the confiscation of land and animals, extortion and "exacting bribes in judicial matters".

An enquiry by the Administrateur Supérieur Carbou exposed the accusation as a "campagne calomnieuse" by Ousman Gueye. The only charge which held any water was that Arfan Sonko had interfered in the appointment of some of his chefs de village, although even this had been grossly exaggerated.<sup>5</sup> As a result, Ousman Gueye was sentenced

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1. AN 2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936, AN2G44-85 Ziguinchor RPM September 1944.
  2. AN 2G31-74 Casamance RPA 1931.
  3. ARSD 2G33-138 Bignona RPA 1933.
  4. 13G41 (180) Governor to Governor General, 2 October 1937.
  5. ARSD 13G29 (17) Governor to Governor General, "Complaint against Arfan Sonko", 21 August 1937.

to two years in Kaolack prison, well away from the Casamance, and two years deportation. His followers were punished equally harshly by the military administration at Bignona. The chefs de village involved in the plot were dismissed while a few cultivators were sentenced to prison terms equal in length to Ousman Gueye's and deportation orders which would cause considerable hardship to their families.<sup>1</sup>

Nemos, the Administrateur Supérieur was highly critical of the administration's unreasoned support for the incumbent chiefs and the total failure to consult the local people for their opinions. He warned "La politique suivie dans le cercle de Bignona pour soutenir l'autorité des chefs de canton est celle la plus propre à ruiner entièrement leur prestige."<sup>2</sup>

The spread of Islam in Bignona after the French "pacification" of the Casamance is demonstrated in a survey of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Quinquaud in 1939. This showed that the majority of chiefs in the cercle were Muslim, as was most of the population.<sup>3</sup> The only exception were Erikakene Sagna of Djougouttes Sud, an animist, and two Catholic chiefs, Lonka Demba of Bliss and Karones, and Samba Bâ of Bignona, a canton whose chef-lieu had a substantial Catholic population.

As the influence of the marabouts over the rural populations of Senegal grew, they increasingly came into conflict with the chefs de canton. The 1930 Annual Report for the AOF spoke of the chiefs' jealousy of the religious leaders' political power.<sup>4</sup> Some marabouts directly competed with chiefs for their posts, but more usually, tried

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1. 13G42 (180) Administeur Superieur Nemos to Governor, 3 March 1938.
  2. 13G42(180) Nemos to Governor, 31 August 1938.
  3. 13G42(180) Quinquaud report - Bignona, 7 February 1939.
  4. AN2G30-6 AOF Rapport Annual d'Ensemble, Section: Islam, 1930.

to install their clients as chiefs.

In the case of Cayor, the Tidjanes consolidated their position and the Mourides extended their influence over the chefs de canton and de village. In the Casamance, the Haidara family became increasingly powerful. Whereas Islam was well entrenched in most of Senegal by 1940, the Second World War gave the spread of Islam in the Basse Casamance a tremendous boost. Cherif Maty Haidara reached an agreement with the Vichy regime in the AOF whereby he would assist the French in publicising the need for conscription and increased production during his travels in Sedhiou and Bignona in return for being allowed to practice conversions to Islam.<sup>1</sup> He was allowed to continue his activities under the Free French, setting up the "Combat de l'AOF" movement at Bignona. During the War, his elder brother Abba Haidara extended his control over the Fogny Combo, where he had the reputation of being a great cultivator, while two other brothers Chems Ed Dine and Bachir Haidara established their sphere of influence in Kolda.<sup>2</sup>

In 1937, Cherif Abba Haidara was reported to have been stirring up opposition to chiefs in Bignona from his headquarters at Darsilame in Diouloulou subdivision.<sup>3</sup> Most troublesome to the administration was Chems Ed Dine Haidara at Velingara. He proposed to the commandant de cercle of Kolda in 1933 that he be made chef de canton of Kantora in return for persuading a number of talibés to return with him from the Gambia. When this failed, he made similar proposals to the British and Portugese authorities. In 1938, he plotted with Abdoul Diallo, the chief of Fouladou, to get rid of a personal enemy, Moulaye Balde, the chef de canton of Patim Kandiaye.<sup>5</sup>

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1. AN 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  2. AN 2G30-60 Casamance RPM November 1930.
  3. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  4. 13G42(180) Commandant de cercle of Kolda to Governor, c.1933.
  5. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.

He wrote to the Governor promising to repopulate Patim Kandiaye were he given Moulaye Balde's position, and threatening to emigrate with his talibés to Gambia or Portuguese Guinea if this wish was not granted. The French fervently hoped he would commit some offence to justify his deportation from the region.

Colonial theories and legislation had little to do with the actual practice of nominating chiefs. Each appointment involved the interaction of administrative needs with a variety of local interests. The main requirement for both the French and Africans of the area concerned was to find a chief who would be sympathetic to their objectives. Although the Governor and commandant de cercle always had a final say in appointments, account had to be taken throughout the period of the desires of the local peoples, particularly of powerful marabouts and notables. A chief's ability to carry out his functions was to a large extent determined by the acceptability of his nomination in the eyes of his subjects. The French discovered in the course of the period under consideration that in the case of all regions of Senegal, including the Basse Casamance, it was best where possible to choose chiefs from the same ethnic group as their subjects and from a traditional notable family. But this thesis will show that the commandement indigène in Cayor was in general more successful in executing its functions than that of the Basse Casamance. For Cayoriens were accustomed to chiefly rule, whereas the chieftancy in the Basse Casamance was a recent creation of the French. In this region, the shortage of willing or educated natives sometimes forced the administration to appoint strangers. Often the quest for power and authority would provoke a confrontation between the French and various African groups who had an interest in the appointment. Those clashes could arise from family and religious rivalries, from the resentment of dismissed chiefs and their followers, or from the activities of intriguers, seeking the potentially lucrative office of chief, who crop up frequently during this period.

The Chiefs' Functions: General

Having abandoned attempts at direct rule due to the lack of personnel, the French looked to the chiefs to carry out a wide variety of administrative measures. But theorists of Association from Van Vollenhoven onwards stressed that the commandant de cercle had to keep a close watch on the chiefs. "Le concours du chef indigène dispense l'administration d'agir mais jamais de savoir lui-même."<sup>1</sup>

The chief had to play a dual and often contradictory role as "le représentant de la collectivité auprès de l'administration en même temps que l'agent d'exécution des ordres et des instructions émanant de l'autorité supérieure."<sup>2</sup> For a start, it was obvious to the local people that the chiefs were not their representatives, but French nominees, who owed their authority entirely to the backing of the colonial power. The chiefs' initiative was from the beginning strictly limited by having to receive orders from the administration, and by being accountable to it for their actions. Van Vollenhoven had stressed that the people should always feel free to address themselves to the French if they felt the chiefs were abusing their functions. Nor did the chiefs ever become fully fledged civil servants. Instead the French found it convenient to call upon a body of intermediaries with some understanding of the local people to carry out the more unpopular tasks of enumeration and tax collection. The next six chapters will demonstrate the incompatibility of the chief's administrative and representative functions, and how the chief's "duties" became a source of profit to him and his entourage at the expense of the majority of his subjects.

In the course of the period under consideration, the range of activities of the chefs de canton and de village grew at the expense of that of the chefs de province. Until the decree of 11 June 1913,

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1. Van Vollenhoven, "Les chefs indigènes...", op.cit. p.270.
  2. 1G34 Governor Beurnier, "Report on the Commandement Indigène" 8 May 1931, hereafter referred to as "Report..."



the chefs de province were responsible for the application of administrative measures in areas where the commandement indigène was well established. The decree, which introduced a system of chefs de canton with fixed salaries, was partly intended to check the influence of the chefs de province, reducing their role to one of surveillance. But this step was also necessary as the work of the chefs de province had grown to the extent that, as the Governor explained to them, "C'est du travail à peu pres que vous faites et non pas du travail fini."<sup>1</sup> Hence the advantage of having a chef de canton in charge of say, ten thousand people, as opposed to a chef de province in charge of sixty thousand.

But even after 1913, the chef de canton was still to receive his orders from the chef de province. Whenever the former received a direct order from the commandant de cercle, the chef supérieur was supposed to receive a copy. The commandant de cercle informed all the newly appointed chefs de canton in Cayor in 1913 that "Vous relevez du chef supérieur de votre circonscription. Vous devez lui obéir en tout ce qu'il vous commandera et qui ne sera pas contraire au bien du service et à l'honnêteté."<sup>2</sup> But the result of this legislation was that the chef de canton, although in theory supposed to be under the orders of the chef supérieur, started to act independently. Some administrators feared that the chef supérieur risked becoming an authority in name only. There was no danger of this happening to Macodou Sall, the chef de province of Guet, who took a very independent line, corresponding directly with other authorities over the head of the commandant de cercle and arguing with the latter about the orders given to him.<sup>3</sup> As late as 1929, the commandant de cercle of Louga had to remind chefs de canton that all correspondence between them and the

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1. ARSD 2D14-11 Graffe, commandant de cercle of Cayor to the chefs de province of Saniokhor, Guet and Mboul Mbakol, 11 June 1913.
  2. 2D14-11 Model letter from the commandant de cercle of Cayor to Monsieur... chef de canton de ..., c.1913
  3. ARSD 2G20-35 Tivaouane RPT second quarter 1920.

administration was to travel via the chef de province, "votre chef direct."<sup>1</sup>

The chef de canton took over the functions formerly exercised by the chef de province plus many accumulated over the period 1919-47. In all these tasks, the chef de canton was responsible for the rapid transmission of orders from the administration to the chefs de village. When a tournée by the commandant de cercle or the chef de subdivision was announced, the chef de canton was to inform the chefs de village of the purpose of the visit and warn them to make the necessary preparations. The chefs de canton were to assist the European agents on tournées, helping them to find porters for their luggage, and in obtaining food. In the event of an official visit to a cercle by the Governor General, the chef de canton or chef de province was to be informed. For instance, the chief interpreter at Dakar wrote to Macodou Sall on 28 May 1937, informing him that de Coppet would be passing through Kébémer on his way from Dakar to St. Louis and requesting the chief's presence at the station to greet him.<sup>2</sup>

Evidently, even with the assistance of the chefs de village, the chef de canton required additional help in order to carry out his functions effectively. In the 1920s, chiefs who could speak French were generally not provided with a secretary unless they were prepared to recruit and pay one themselves. From the inception of the Colonial Council, both chiefly and citizen members advocated the appointment of secretaries for the chefs de canton. Amadou N'diaye, the chief of Provinces Orientales, Tambacounda, pointed out in the 1921 session that only two or three out of every ten chefs de village could read or write Arabic or French.<sup>3</sup> However, as the chef de canton's tasks multiplied over the period, secretaries were provided either from the Sociétés de Prévoyance or the état civil and paid by the administration.

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1. ARSD 1Z70 Circular from the chef de province of Guet to all his chefs de canton, 13 May 1929.
  2. 1Z58 in Fonds Macodou Sall, ARSD.
  3. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 18 November 1921.

Morane Sall had no secretary as chief of Thilmakha for the first six years, but was eventually assigned Mamadou Sall in 1934, who was to be paid 150 francs per month by the local Société de Prévoyance.<sup>1</sup> As we have seen in the chapter on the education of chiefs, programmes were established in the 1930s for training secretaries of the chefs de canton. In 1939, they were to be recruited by competitive examination from the pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.<sup>2</sup> After a year's service, they could be promoted from the rank of stagiaire to the second class, dismissed, or given a further year's "stage". Two years after entry to the second class they could be promoted to the first. However, the Ecole des Fils des Chefs could only provide a limited number of secretaries. As late as 1939, some chefs de canton in Bignona who could not speak French still did not have secretaries. Quinquaud, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, suggested as a possible remedy giving the chiefs secretaries who had worked on the Colonial Council.<sup>3</sup>

In the Casamance, the chiefs' staff was often reduced to one secretary, as in the case of the Cissés at Kande and the Secks at Adeane. In the north, where chiefs had traditionally possessed a large retinue, a chiefs' staff was generally larger. In addition to an official secretary, chefs de canton in Wolof areas would often have a beuk neck, or private secretary, entrusted with the affairs of the chief's large household.<sup>4</sup> Also in a chief's service were a number of diarafs (henchmen), who were generally descendants of former servants of the chief's family or one of his relatives. The chief would divide his canton into a number of regions consisting of 20 to 30 villages, the names of which bore no relation to administrative divisions, and possibly corresponded to "traditional" boundaries. Morane Sall of Thilmakha attempted to appoint Peul diarafs for Peul groups.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Interview with Morane Sall.
  2. ARSD 18G84(17) Draft decree, c. 1939.
  3. 13G42(180) Quinquaud report-Bignona, Section: Chiefs, 7 February 1939.
  4. Interview with Massamba Sall.
  5. Interview with Morane Sall.

The diarafs would ride round the canton, liaising between the chef de canton and chefs de village, and would pay customary visits once a week to the chef de canton in his chef-lieu, to receive his instructions and to carry his subjects' grievances to him. When the chef de canton went on tournee round his canton, several diarafs would accompany him on horseback.<sup>1</sup> These officials, appointed and paid by the chief, would function completely outside the control of the administration, and were unlikely to be familiar with French administrative practices. Rather, they often took advantage of their functions to earn their own keep through their old traditions of plunder.

#### The Role of the Chiefs in the Census

Evidently, the success of the French in exploiting Senegal's resources depended on an accurate census. They would have preferred enumeration of rural areas to be carried out by European administrators but generally, shortages of personnel forced them to rely on the chiefs or their agents in areas with a long-established commandement indigène. But in areas like the Basse Casamance, where the commandement indigène was always somewhat unstable, it was more usual for European agents to carry out the census. The chief's annual census was vital to the French, as it provided the groundwork for all administrative demands on the Senegalese.

The census became a highly sensitive issue as both the chiefs and their subjects were quick to realise that it was not merely a bureaucratic formality. It provided the French with information on a whole range of military, social, economic and political questions; such as on conscription for the army and public works projects, on the agricultural potential and resources of an area, on the sick and on strangers. But the administration's primary concern with the census was for tax purposes, hoping to ascertain from it the number of taxpayers

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(1) Interview with Morane Sall.

and animals in each village. As a particular area's share of fiscal and other obligations was based on the figures the chief obtained in the census, the French were anxious that these should be reasonably accurate. "L'importance des charges est moins critiquée que sa répartition."<sup>1</sup> So important was the census that the administration awarded the chiefs marks for their performance as a means of determining what commission they were to receive.<sup>2</sup>

During the First World War, there had been attempts to have the census carried out solely by European agents, but as the latter were few in number and busy with other tasks, the whole process was very slow. Thus the French were obliged to ask the chiefs for declarations which frequently proved inaccurate. In 1919, chefs de province and de canton entrusted with the census were to give information on each village: the name of the chef de village, his importance and the number of notables.<sup>3</sup> As there was no commandement indigène in the Basse Casamance and the chef bénévoles were not regarded by the French as being sufficiently experienced or trustworthy, the interpreter Tete Diadhiou who had almost chef de province status was given the task of carrying out the census.<sup>4</sup>

In the course of the 1920s, a set procedure developed for the census. It was to take place between April, when people would have returned to their villages for the sowing before the onset of the hivernage (rainy season), and December, when the harvest would be over and the traite (trade in groundnuts) about to begin. By 1929, the census seems to have become scheduled for September and October, the last months of the hiverange, when cultivators would be preparing

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1. ARSD 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  2. See Ch. 10 on "The Income of the Commandement Indigène".
  3. AN 2G19-21 Bakel RPA 1919.
  4. ARSD 2G19-20 Ziguinchor RPM June 1919.

for the harvest.<sup>1</sup> The primary duty of a census agent was to make sure that all persons were counted in the area in which they lived. After summoning all the members of a family along with their chef de carré to meet him, the census agent was to divide the men, women, children, old and infirm into separate groups. Each had to state his age and relationship to other members of the family.<sup>2</sup> From the men, the agent was to find out whether the family possessed taxable goods from the harvest, or livestock for the tax on animals. At the same time, the chef de canton was to provide general information to the commandant de cercle on the inhabitants of all the villages under his control, particularly on the chefs de village, notables, former soldiers, religious chiefs and "suspicious" characters. He was also to give an account of a village's economic resources such as wells and the type of agriculture practised. European and African census agents were generally accompanied round the village by 3-4 gardes de cercle in case they met with active resistance.

In 1929, the administration decided that to enumerate the inhabitants and goods of a village every year involved too much work.<sup>3</sup> In future, all the chef de canton would have to do was to notify the commandant de cercle by letter of the year's alterations unless changes were numerous, in which case the census would have to be redone.

An examination of the census in Cayor shows how the indigenous personnel involved varied from year to year. By 1929, the administration decided that the chiefs already had enough work to do and that the census should instead be carried out by their secretaries assisted by pupils from the Ecole des Fils des Chefs on holiday and former NCOs.<sup>4</sup> The role of the chefs de canton and de village was reduced to facilitating their task. The following year, the sons of chiefs together with some notables were to carry out the census under the supervision of the chefs

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1. ARSD 2G29-99 Thies RPA 1929.
  2. ARSD 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  3. ARSD 1Z62 Circular from the commandant de cercle of Louga to his chefs de province and de canton, 24 July 1927.
  4. AN 2G23-11 Senegal RPA 1923, circular from the Governor to commandants de cercle, 3 April 1922.

de canton.<sup>1</sup> Although they were slow in performing this task, the commandant de cercle of Cayor concluded they had carried out a reasonably accurate census. This looked forward to a greater yield in tax and reflected the population increase resulting from the growing prosperity of the region. By 1926, the census agents included commis expéditionnaires, moniteurs of schools on vacation, and former pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.<sup>2</sup> If none of these were available "grands élèves" possessing a CEP were acceptable. By 1929, the administration had taken on the secretaries of the chefs de canton as census agents for about fifty days of the year.<sup>3</sup> In Guet province, these included Meissa M'Baye Sall, the son of the chef de province and former pupil of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, who was secretary to the chef de canton of Guet. Other secretaries who carried out the census for their chiefs in that year were Mamdou Diop for N'Doyene Dagam, Mactar Fall for Thilmakha, Sidy Fall for Mbaouar, and Amadou Fall for Ndour.

From the early 1920s, the administration tried wherever possible to entrust the census in the Basse Casamance to Europeans because of the lack of prestige of the chiefs, the dispersal of settlements and the mistakes of indigenous census agents. These Europeans included the assistant commandant de cercle, the chef de subdivision, agents spéciaux, agents of the Sociétés de Prévoyance or agents de services civils. They were expected to perform the census of the villages at least once a year, and often travelled by bicycle.<sup>4</sup>

But shortage of personnel at times meant that indigenous agents were called in to perform the task. In the case of Ziguinchor, the census for the year 1928 well illustrates the variety of African agents that was employed.<sup>5</sup> During the period from July to September, Tete

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1. ARSD 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM September 1923.
  2. ARSD 2G26-10 Senegal RPA 1926.
  3. 1Z62 Telegram from the commandant de cercle of Louga to the chef de province of Guet, 16 September 1929.
  4. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  5. ARSD 2G28-59 Ziguinchor RPA 1928.

Sagna, the chef de canton of Brin Séléki (in Ziguinchor) carried out the census of his own canton, together with that of Bayottes and Essyngnes. This was because the French considered Tete Sagna to be a much more reliable chief than his counterparts in these neighbouring cantons. As Benjamin Diatta was too busy to carry out the census of Oussouye and the French did not trust his chefs de canton, schoolchildren on vacation were employed to undertake the census of this province. The census of Adeane, Bainoucks and Mandjacques was carried out by a son of the chief of Adeane. But the results of the 1928 census were called into question by the Administrateur Supérieur as neither the commandant de cercle nor his assistant had time to check these.

The colonial administration preferred to use Europeans for the census because the chiefs and other indigenous agents often made major errors. Generally, a census by a European when compared with that of an African agent would show a rise in the total population of an area but a drop in the number of taxpayers and animals. The 1930 census in Bignona was begun by indigenous agents but completed by the chef de subdivision while the 1931 census was carried out solely by Europeans. This led to a drop in the total taxpaying population from 64,944 in 1929 to 64,487 in 1930 and 57,657 in 1931.<sup>1</sup> When in 1933 European agents checked the 1932 census of Bignona performed by the chiefs, they found a rise in the total number of taxpayers of only 229, as opposed to the chiefs' figure of 3200.<sup>2</sup>

These mistakes on the part of the chiefs and their assistants can be attributed to several factors. As the number of duties expected of the chiefs increased throughout the period under consideration, the whole system broke down because too much was expected of them.

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1. ARSD 2G30-78 Bignona RPM October and November 1930.

2. ARSD 2G32-96 Bignona RPA 1932.



As Governor Beurnier remarked, by the early 1930s, "On leur demande beaucoup, on leur demande trop."<sup>1</sup> Like the commandants de cercle, they received a constant stream of orders and circulars which they simply put to one side. The census therefore suffered from being rushed as the chief had too many other tasks on his plate.

Chiefs and their agents often accidentally made recording errors or deliberately exaggerated the total number of taxpayers in their area, in order to boost their credit with the administration and more important, their commission (prime de rendement). This was calculated according to the total amount of tax collected.

Although the commandant de cercle and chef de subdivision were supposed to check the chiefs' work in the census during their tournées, they were often completely ignorant of these abuses. They were hindered from travelling round their cercles not only by inertia ("l'amour de chaise longue")<sup>2</sup>, but also by their huge load of work, the bad state of the roads, particularly during the hivernage, and health hazards like the plague in Tivaouane.

Moreover, when a local administrator came across corrupt practices by the chiefs, his hands were often tied by the central government which was determined to keep the flow of revenue into its coffers constant, irrespective of the suffering this might cause. Such was the case when Administrateur Adjoint Martin discovered during a tour of Ziguinchor in September 1934 that the people of Bayottes and Essynges were being overtaxed.<sup>3</sup> His census revealed that the taxpaying population of these two cantons numbered only 1,933 rather than 2,534, the figures the chiefs had obtained for that year's tax roll. This was because many children under the age of ten had been counted as taxpayers by the chiefs, and also because of the high infant mortality in the Basse Casamance, which arose from poor standards of hygiene. But no action was taken against the chiefs who had made these errors.

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1. 1G34 "Report ...", 8 May 1931.

2. L' AOF Républicain, March 1934.

3. ARSD 2D5-5 commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor's account of the tour of his cercle, September 1934.

In 1937, the number of taxpayers in Thies was reduced by 12,998 from 166,839.<sup>1</sup> This was not only the result of an exodus of Wolof cultivators to more fertile lands but also because census agents were being more careful and crossing off the names of children listed by the chefs de canton as taxpayers. In that year, the inhabitants of Taiba M'Baye submitted a petition to the commandant de cercle alleging that the chef de canton of Méckhé M'Bar in the subdivision of Tivaouane had taxed 158 children under the age of fourteen<sup>2</sup> and therefore not liable to pay tax. The chef de subdivision of Cayor confirmed this when he checked the census made by the chief's secretary.

	<u>Census of 1936 by the Secretary of the chef de canton</u>	<u>Census of April 1937 by the chef de subdivision</u>
Taxpayers	578	390
Children	49	207
Exempt	<u>2</u>	<u>17</u>
	629	614 <sup>3</sup>

In an enquiry, the chef de subdivision discovered that at the census, the secretary of the chief had not asked for the children to be presented, but had simply asked their parents or the chef de carré for their names and ages. He then modified their ages so that the tax rolls would not be reduced. Thanks to these investigations, the village was given relief for those minors unjustly taxed.

Chiefs often inserted the names of newcomers to Senegalese territory on the tax rolls, although they were supposed to be exempted for a certain number of years. For example, the administration in the Basse Casamance had arranged for settlers from Gambia and Portuguese Guinea to be granted five years' exemption from taxation in order to attract labour from these areas.<sup>4</sup> In Cayor, the chiefs had

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1. AN 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  2. As the result of a decree in 1936, fourteen became the minimum taxpaying age.
  3. ARSD 13G43(180) chef de subdivision of Tivaouane to chef de province of Guet, 1923.
  4. ARSD 2G33-61 Ziguinchor RPA 1933.

great difficulty in distinguishing permanent residents whom they were supposed to include in the census from people who were just passing through, particularly in the case of nomadic peoples like the Peul or Laobe. The canton of Ndour consisted mainly of Peul nomads who left for Djoloff, Oualo and Baol in search of water, returning to Ndour only in the hivernage. Lat Sene Fall received strict instructions in 1923 to count only those "installés chez eux".<sup>1</sup>

The frequent outbreaks of disease in the earlier part of the period slowed down the census, as agents were unable to enter districts where an epidemic was raging. Most censuses in Cayor between 1923 and 1931 were hindered by a plague epidemic in one or more regions of the cercle. As a result of the plague, the populations of the subdivision of Tivaouane fell from 66,670 to 66,075 in 1929.<sup>2</sup> In the Basse Casamance, smallpox, malaria and sleeping sickness were obstacles to the free passage of census agents.

The dispersed nature of settlement in the Basse Casamance hampered the activity of census agents, while the Diola, anxious to avoid all contact with the foreigner, did their utmost to hinder them. The administration warned anyone embarking on a census of the Basse Casamance of the "dissimulations classiques et ruses multiples"<sup>3</sup> of the Diola. Their chefs de village would often "forget" to present the census agent to every chef de carre in the village and would sometimes deliberately hide people. The Diola had the confusing habit of changing their names, and often concealed the age of potential conscripts. During the period of the census they would either flee into the forest or towns like Ziguinchor where they could "disappear" for a while. Those living in border cantons in Bignona would flee to the Gambia during the census, while those in Ziguinchor would go to Portuguese Guinea. In this way, about 15% of the population escaped the census which meant that the administration was losing 300,000 francs a year in tax.<sup>4</sup> In 1933, it was

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1. ARSD 1Z57 chef de subdivision of Tivaouane to chef de province of Guet, 1923.
  2. ARSD 2G29-99 Thies RPA 1929.
  3. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  4. ARSD 2G23 70 Casamance RPS First semester 1923.

estimated that there was a "floating population" of five to six thousand in the Basse Casamance which never paid tax.<sup>1</sup> Even by 1944, it was well known that the census figures for Floups, Diembering and Pointe St. Georges were well below the actual numbers.<sup>2</sup>

In order to counterract Diola evasion of the census, European administrators were instructed to turn up unexpectedly in the villages at the beginning of the dry season (October-November) and summon the chefs de village and notables, who were to be told to bring forward those they had hidden in the census. If they complied with this order, chefs de carre were to be fined 15 francs for each person they had hidden, but if they were discovered still to be concealing people, even heavier fines or possibly jail sentences were to be inflicted on them.<sup>3</sup>

Similar difficulties beset the census of animals both in Cayor and the Basse Casamance. Errors arose from people hiding their animals or giving them false ages, and from animal diseases like cattle plague (peste bovine) which occured frequently in the Casamance.

The census often led to disputes between chiefs for the control of villages. In 1929, the chef de canton Sangone Sall claimed that Lat Sene Fall had counted a large number of Peul villages as part of Ndour when they rightfully belonged to N'doyene Dagam. After an enquiry, the commandant de cercle declared the villages to be part of Ndour. He and Macodou Sall blamed Sangone for provoking the quarrel. "Le chef de province Macodou Sall est mieux désigné que vous pour trancher ces différends."<sup>4</sup> The main concern of the administrator and of the chef de province was that the villages should not be counted twice rather than to which canton they belonged.

The chiefs' unpopularity with their subjects grew as a result of their role in the census. Any errors they made in enumeration were used by their enemies to discredit them.

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1. ARSD 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.
  2. AN 2G44-85 Oussouye RPM September 1944.
  3. 2G23-70 Casamance RPS First semester 1923.
  4. 1Z70 Chef de province of Guet to chef de canton of N'doyène Dagam, 29 August 1929.

In 1938, the Sereres of Mt. Rolland, who wanted a chef de race, complained to the Governor that their chief, Massamba Sall of Ndoutte Diassane, had included children, the old and infirm on the roll of taxpayers.<sup>1</sup> A subsequent enquiry by the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Maestracci, showed that while the villages of Mt. Rolland, Tivigne Tayor and Tivigne Diasse had 950 inhabitants, there were only 663 taxpayers on the rolls, so the accusation was groundless. The misunderstanding probably arose from the fact that during the census carried out by an agent of the Société de Prévoyance, chefs de carré were required to present all members of their families, giving the name and age of each. The inhabitants also asked if all the tax had been paid between the years of 1935-37, as they had received no receipts. In closing his enquiry, Maestracci defended Massamba Sall, who, in his opinion, was one of "nos auxiliaires les plus actifs et les plus dévoués."

The approach of the Second World War again threw the census into confusion. The apparent drop in the population of Senegal from 1,604,372 in 1934 to 1,155,568 in 1939 was partly attributable to mobilisation, but also to the inaccuracy of the wartime censuses.<sup>2</sup> These had to be carried out in 1939 by the chefs de canton who were already overburdened with the extra tasks resulting from the opening of hostilities while the local administration had no time to check their work. Quinquaud, in his inspection of the census of Bignona in 1939 by the chiefs, their secretaries, secretaries of the Sociétés de Prévoyance, instituteurs and moniteurs observed that these census agents had taken the declarations of the chef de carre at face value as they did not have the time or energy to check them.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, this census was incomplete, containing no information about the wealth or revenue of the region.

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1. ARSD 13G28(17) Maestracci, commandant de cercle of Thies "Enquiry into the complaints of the inhabitants of Mt. Rolland", 10 March 1938.
  2. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.
  3. 13G42 (180) Quinquaud report-Bignona.

In 1939, in Thies, the chefs de canton were given charge of the census rather than teams of agents because of the shortage of personnel. Gatin, the chef de subdivision of Thies, complained that he was obliged to make quick sorties in his car, over a huge road network, in an attempt to check the chiefs' work.<sup>1</sup> Therond, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, pointed to a drop in the same year of the number of taxpayers resulting in part from the errors of the chiefs, who had largely ignored Thies' sizeable floating population. In 1938, 90 francs had been recovered from this sector and in 1940, nothing. The overall decrease in the taxpaying population can also be attributed to the emigration of Wolofs from Thies to richer areas in the Sine Saloum, and to the raising of the taxpaying age from twelve to fourteen from 1936 onwards.

The 1940 census was more accurate than that of 1939 as it was carried out during the rainy season, when most people were at home and because of the tendency of the Vichy regime to make greater use of the chefs de village in administrative tasks.<sup>2</sup> The fall in population was not as great as it had been in 1939 because of demobilisation. In 1941, the census of Bignona showed a drop in numbers of 5258 while the floating population on the Gambia frontier was observed to have risen. The tendency of the inhabitants of Narangs, Kadiamoutes Nord and Djiragones to emigrate to the Gambia rose during the war, as a result of increased demands for soldiers and supply from the administration.<sup>3</sup>

The animal population of Senegal also fell during the Second World War due to diseases like cattle plague and to inaccurate censuses by the chefs de canton. Anxious to avoid requisitioning of their animals to supply meat to the towns, the people concealed them, frequently aided and abetted by the chiefs. In 1940, it was suggested that veterinary

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1. ARSD 13G43(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Therond, "Report on the subdivision of Thies", 22 July 1939.
  2. ARSD 13G43 (180) Governor of Senegal-Reply to Boisson's circular "Three Directives on African Colonisation", Transmission 3032/C, 1941.
  3. AN 2G45-73 Ziguinchor-Bignona subdivision RPA 1945.

reports should be used to work out the correct number of animals.<sup>1</sup> But the administration feared that should the people learn of this, they would refuse to allow their animals to be vaccinated, making the outbreak of epidemics more likely.

By 1944, the role of the chef de village in the census had become very important, as the system of censuses by the chef de subdivision had to be given up completely due to the lack of personnel.<sup>2</sup> Instead, the census was to be carried out by the chefs de village, aided by a secretary, while the chefs de canton were to have overall control of operations. Where possible, teachers on holiday were to be enlisted to act as clerks to the chefs de village who were often illiterate. The chef de village was to hold one copy of the census list, the chef de canton another and the chef de subdivision or commandant de cercle a third. The chefs de canton and European administrators were to modify their copies after checking the chefs' de village figures. The French also decided in 1944 that as the census of a subdivision took up too much of the time of all concerned if it was performed annually, it should be quinquennial, with a fifth of the population of a cercle being counted each year. The rolls were to remain annual, and yearly changes of the population were to be recorded. The census was in future to provide more general social, demographic and economic information, and the chef de canton was to keep a register of his visits to villages in the cercle.

But this system remained imperfect. In the same year, it was argued that in the case of the Basse Casamance, no duplicates for the census should be given to those chefs de village who were illiterate and had no secretary. A check by a European agent following the census of the village of Ayoume, Ziguinchor, for example, revealed that 33 children of both sexes had not been declared.<sup>3</sup>

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1. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  2. 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.
  3. AN 2G45-73 Ziguinchor RPA 1945.

Etat Civil

In a letter to the Governor General concerning the reorganisation of Native Administration, on 7 April 1933, the Governor of Senegal, Beurnier suggested that as a first step in the creation of an "état civil" (national register of births, marriages and deaths) for the African population of Senegal, the chefs de village and de canton should be encouraged to keep a register of births and deaths for each village.<sup>1</sup> This would be an extension of their functions regarding the census. In the same year, the "état civil" became part of the judicial service.

Although the état civil was considered to be too important for the chiefs to be made officers in this field, its success really depended on them as far as rural areas were concerned. For it was often the chief who informed the commandant de cercle of population movements, and who could popularise the idea of the état civil. It was therefore necessary to demonstrate the need for the état civil to the chiefs who would in turn act as "agents de liaison et de transmission" encouraging the people to subscribe to it.

By the decree of 11 January 1935, the chef de village was to declare information he received from chefs de famille regarding deaths, births, marriages and changes of residence to the chef de canton within 15 days. The chef de canton was to centralise all this information in a nominative register on births, marriages and deaths and send this to the chef-lieu of the cercle. If the chief was illiterate, the register was to be kept by his secretary.

In 1937, graduates of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs were allocated where possible to the chefs de canton as secretaries for the état civil

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1. ARSD 18G84(17) Director of Political Affairs Vidaud, "Note on the Etat Civil Indigène", 16 December 1937.



alone, and were paid by the administration.<sup>1</sup> However, this system could not be generalised because of a lack of budgetary resources and of sufficient graduates from the school. At the same time, the chiefs and other local authorities were instructed to step up promotion of the *état civil*, encouraging people to register births, marriages and deaths. This proved successful in eleven cercles of Senegal, in part because the introduction of the *état civil* coincided with an increase in administrative personnel. In Thies, declarations of births, marriages and deaths rose from 372 in 1936 to 1,061 in 1937 to 1,931 in 1938.<sup>2</sup> Declarations of births and deaths rose especially. However, in the more remote cercles of the interior, Tambacounda, Kedougou and Linguère, among the Mancagnes and Mandjacques in the Casamance and the Peul and Sereres everywhere in Senegal, the idea of declaring births, marriages and deaths met with resistance. In these areas, the popularisation of the *état civil* was hampered on the one hand by poor communications and the isolation of the administration from the people, and on the other, by deficiencies on the part of the chiefs. Chiefs in these regions were often illiterate, still lacked secretaries and were too busy with their other functions to have a time to register the declarations. Chefs de canton continued to be misinformed by chefs de village.

The Second World War was a great setback to the establishment of an *état civil*, because of the mobilisation of personnel and increase in the tasks of the chiefs which it entailed. In 1940, the declarations of births decreased slightly, those of deaths a lot, while those of marriages increased.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, there was still insufficient coordination of the *état civil* with the census. By 1941, the lack of paper led to the almost total suspension of the chefs' de canton

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1. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  2. ANSOM - Affaires Politiques - C598 D5.Senegal RPA 1938.
  3. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.

registers.<sup>1</sup> The census became a substitute for the état civil during this period, but it was a poor one.

Even by 1948, the état civil was still not working very well, largely because of its optional character.<sup>2</sup> Only students for the ecoles primaires supérieures and civil servants were really in need of such declarations; they were not an essential part of the everyday life of the rural cultivator.

#### The Chiefs and Population Movements.

As part of their responsibility for the census, the chefs de canton and de village were also supposed to keep the local administration informed about movements of the population within the canton, investigating where possible the causes of immigration and emigration. This became particularly important in the case of those parts of Ziguinchor on the frontier of Portuguese Guinea, and Bignona, on the border of British Gambia. Often whole villages of Diola, Mandjacques and Mancagnes would flee to Oussouye from Portuguese Guinea to escape the brutal methods of the local administration; sometimes as a temporary measure only. If notables from Portuguese Guinea expressed a wish to settle permanently in French territory, the chefs de village were, according to local custom, to give them any "masterless" land available for cultivation. In 1924, chefs de village in Oussouye reported that five villages from Portuguese Guinea had arrived in the Casamance.<sup>3</sup> In 1931, refugees from the villages of Kahene, Bassehor, Kerrouheue and Santiabie Mandjacques fled from Portuguese Guinea in the wake of operations by police who had set fire to their rice harvests and seized their fields.<sup>4</sup> The chefs de village were instructed to negotiate with the notables and let the administration know if they intended to go or stay.

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1941.
  2. ARSD 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948.
  3. AN 2G24-14 Senegal RPA 1924.
  4. ARSD 2G31 -61 Ziguinchor RPM November 1931.

Apart from receiving those who had fled to French territory, chiefs were to keep a look out for those who made a habit of travelling between French and Portuguese territory in order to avoid the prestations and tax of both colonies. In some cases, chiefs were to play a more active role in influencing the movement of peoples. Together with village councils, they were to consider measures to stop exoduses from French territory.

The British and French authorities in the Gambia and Basse Casamance respectively were engaged in a running battle which consisted of trying to attract cultivators from frontier villages across the border to settle in their territories, over much of the period under consideration. Chiefs of those villages on the French side were encouraged to lure back those who had gone to the Gambia to escape tax, prestations and conscription, as in 1929.<sup>1</sup> As a result of this propaganda, 250 had returned by the end of the year, and in 1930 immigration to these villages from the Gambia outweighed emigration.<sup>2</sup> By 1938, chiefs in Bignona cercle were recording an influx from the Gambia because of the lower price of the groundnut, the poor harvests and the severity of some chiefs in the British colony.<sup>3</sup> In the same year, the increase in tax and prestations in Portuguese Guinea drew a number of Mandjacques and Mancagnes to Oussouye.

During the war, the Vichy regime made the chiefs responsible for measures to stop the drift of the rural population to the towns.<sup>4</sup> The chef de canton was to refuse to supply identity cards to cultivators who left to settle in urban areas without authorisation from the government.

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1. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  2. ARSD 2G30-84 Bignona RPA 1930.
  3. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1938.
  4. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1941.

## The Chiefs' Role in Taxation

The chiefs' role in tax collection was considered to be their most important. Chefs de canton were reminded by their commandants de cercle in 1929 to "ne pas oublier que les qualités d'un véritable chef se mesurent à la rapidité avec laquelle rentre l'impôt."<sup>1</sup> Many Senegalese who were alive during the interwar period can testify that as long as there were no "histoires" in the canton and the tax was coming in regularly, the chiefs were left to their own devices.

The French were faced with the problem of raising revenue from an indigenous population which ranged from the nearstarving to the relatively affluent, from nomad to cultivator to business and professional men. In order to exploit the resources of their subjects to the full, the French imposed a myriad of taxes. African subjects in the Protectorate for example were expected to pay a head tax, prestations, taxes on land and buildings, on animals, patents and licenses, weights and measures, firearms, vehicles and elephant hunting.

Foremost among these was the head tax, capitation (personal tax), which the central administration quickly imposed on a territory once it had been completely subdued. It was equivalent to a tax of the same name in France, and was to be paid by all inhabitants whose names appeared on the census lists. Although citizens and subjects paid different taxes, both shared the burden of capitation. In 1922 male citizens paid a head tax of 15 fs and subjects a tax of between 4 and 15 francs, depending on which cercle they inhabited.

At the beginning of 1919 the only persons exempt were soldiers in the French or Senegalese army, those invalided out of the army who were unable to work, widows and orphans of the first World War, the second portion of the contingent recruited at the same time as the soldiers for public works projects, frontier guards, gardes de cercle, persons of no fixed abode, school-children and paupers too sick or old to work. Children under 12 and women in the Four Communes and children

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1. ARSD 1Z62 Note from the commandant de cercle of Louga to the chefs de canton and de province concerning the recovery of tax, 20 February 1929.
  2. Annuaire du Gouvernement Général de l'AOF 1917-21, Paris 1921, pp. 512-521.

under 8 in the Protectorate were also exempt. Before the widespread introduction of chefs de canton in 1913, personal tax was collected by the chefs de province. For this, they received a commission of 5%.<sup>1</sup> Despite the reduction of their role in 1923, chefs de province continued to help chefs de canton and de village to collect the annual tax, from which all received a certain percentage in commission.<sup>2</sup>

From the time of its imposition, capitation was recovered at the beginning of the year, but it was not until 1924 that the administration fixed on a specific period for collection just after the traite had finished (between January and March).<sup>3</sup> It was feared that were the date for collection left much later, the local people, with their legendary "improvidence", would have spent all the money they received from the harvest. The French maintained that the practice of paying the tax after the traite would free the cultivator from the worry of not being able to pay the tax before the hivernage, allowing him to concentrate his energies on agricultural production.

Under new pressures to raise money to pay personnel and for public works projects, the administration was anxious to tap every available source of revenue. Taxation became a form of plunder as tariffs were imposed on practically everything that moved, and everything that did not. In 1921, the French introduced a new tax on animals (taxe sur le bétail) to be collected at the same time and in the same way as capitation. This tax was intended to take account of the herdsmen who had hitherto escaped the full burden of taxation, and the initial tariffs proposed, common to the whole of Senegal, were:

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1. IDI/3 Allyls, Monograph of Cayor, 26 March 1904.
  2. See Ch.10 on "The Income of the Commandement Indigène", Section: Prime de Rendement.
  3. ARSD 2G24-66 Tivaouane RPA 1924.

Camels over three years old	30 francs	per annum
Horses over three years old	6 francs	
Donkeys over two years old	5 francs	
Cattle over one year old	4 francs	
Pigs over two years old	0.5 francs	(1)
Sheep and Goats	1 franc	

Animals under these age groups or destined for slaughter were to be exempt. Owners were to declare animals for tax to an administrative agent every January, and anyone acquiring one of these animals had to inform an agent within 30 days of purchase. The penalty for failure to declare an animal was to pay double the normal tax.<sup>2</sup>

Both subjects and citizens had to pay a tax on firearms which rose every few years. The chiefs would make lists of those to tax according to who had licenses to hold such weapons and would collect these sums throughout the year. In the early 1920s, the following tariffs were imposed:

	<u>tax(fs)1921</u>	<u>tax(fs)1922</u>
tax: on more sophisticated <u>armes perfectionnés</u>	5	10-20
" :on hunting guns	3	7 fs 50
" :on <u>armes de traite</u>	3	5

Firearms belonging to public services, guns given to notables as a reward by the administration and firearms for sale in shops were all exempt from this tax. A large number of people without licenses for their weapons were also able to escape.

In addition, subjects in the Protectorate had to pay an annual tax on buildings and on land (taxe sur la propriété bâtie et non-bâtie). The tax on buildings to be paid by the owner was 6% of the rental, although straw huts were to be exempted. The tax on land was imposed on any area which cost over 4 francs a square meter and amounted to 0.6% of the value of the land.

The chiefs also had to collect taxes on patents and licenses from tradesmen in villages under their control. Depending on the type of business, the tax on patents was 5-10% of the rental of the premises

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1. Sénégal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses, 1929, Statutes on taxation. This particular statute came into effect on 1 January 1922.

2. Ibid.

employed, due annually if the sum was over 100 francs and quarterly if less. The amount to be paid varied widely, from the 60 francs per annum levied on small shopkeepers, to the 720 francs per annum on large commercial houses. Licenses to sell alcohol cost between 300 and 800 francs per annum.<sup>1</sup>

While French taxation policy in Senegal might have been a legalised form a plunder, the activity of the chiefs and their agents was of a much cruder kind. They often abused their influential positions as tax collectors to enrich themselves at the expense of their subjects, and in some cases, the administration. Many took advantage of their subjects' ignorance concerning the level of tax to demand more than was owed. As late as 1934, some villages in the Casamance were being charged 40 to 60 francs a head instead of 18 francs.<sup>2</sup> The Governor of Senegal in his circular to the commandants de cercle in 1933 stressed that it was up to them to inform people as to how much they should pay and that the collectors should give the taxpayers receipts.<sup>3</sup> But this remained a dead letter!

There are frequent cases of embezzlement of tax by chiefs throughout the period 1919-1947. When such cases were discovered, the administration's remedy was to make the chief concerned sell off his assets to pay the tax. An important reason for the territorial reorganisation of Cayor in 1923 was that many of the chefs de canton could not be trusted to pay all the tax into the coffers of the administration. A year before the main reorganisation, Sanor N'diaye was suspended from his post as chief of Mboul Diamatil when the commandant de cercle of Tivaouane discovered that he collected sums in 1921 which had not been fully paid into the regional receiver's office.<sup>4</sup> Following complaints

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1. Annuaire du Gouvernement General de l'AOF 1917-21, pp. 512-521 and Ibid, 1922, pp.509-535.
  2. ARSD 2G34-67 Casamance RPA 1934.
  3. ARSD 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 14 December 1933.
  4. ARSD 1C945 Sanor N'diaye-Personal file, 1921. Commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to Governor, 25 February 1922.

from inhabitants beginning in May 1920, the commandant de cercle summoned all the chefs de village of the canton to Yess, the chef-lieu, to help him with his enquiry. It was revealed that Sanor N'diaye had taken 1,280 francs in personal tax, 928 francs in animal tax and 935 francs in subscriptions to the Société de Prévoyance. In addition, his diarafs had taken 1,980 francs in tax. It seemed Sanor needed the money he took to buy alcohol from merchants at Kelle and Ndande, and to give to marabouts and concubines. But the administration preferred to drop criminal charges as Sanor had a military medal and had served the French for fourteen years. He was instead forced to resign on 22 March 1923 and to sell his livestock to pay his debts.

Another chief dismissed in the 1923 reorganisation was Yoro Coumba, the chef de canton of Thilmakha, who by 1923 had amassed debts of 34,000 francs in arrears in personal tax dating back to 1919.<sup>1</sup> Investigation by the commandant de cercle exposed him and his secretary, Abdoulaye Ly as guilty of embezzlement. The administration felt more kindly disposed to Yoro Coumba as he had been a Lieutenant in the colonial army and possessed a Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur. He was therefore released from having to pay back the 5494 francs he still owed and from prosecution once he had sold all his livestock. Two other chiefs forced to resign for embezzlement of tax and for irregular sales of impounded animals during the same reshuffle were Ibra Issa N'diaye of Diamatil and Laba Issa Dieng of Mboul Khatta.<sup>2</sup> Sambou Ndour of Mbaouar who agreed to reimburse the tax he had embezzled was demoted to the thirteenth class of chiefs.

The commandant de cercle of Bignona began investigations into the chief of Djougouttes, Ansoumane Diatta, in 1923, when he failed to pay the arrears of the 1921 and 1922 tax.<sup>3</sup> The administrator discovered that although many villagers in Djougouttes had paid tax,

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1. ARSD 2G20-35 Tivaouane RPT 1920 Second quarter 1920.
  2. AN 2G23-11 Senegal RPA 1923.
  3. ARSD 2G22-33 Bignona RPT 3rd quarter 1922.



their chiefs had spent it all. In order to prevent their subjects revealing this to the administration, the chiefs told them that the commandant de cercle would arrest anyone he saw. So when the latter arrived in a village to investigate the tax situation, the inhabitants would flee into the bush. These revelations led to Ansoumane Diatta's dismissal.

In a move to counter such abuses, a new system of tax collection was introduced as an experiment in a few cantons, including Tivaouane in 1924. This was based on the principles laid down in the Ponty circular of 30 January 1914 "C'est dans la perception de l'impôt que nous devons nous efforcer d'assurer aux contribuables le maximum de garanties... Les intermédiaires indigènes entre la masse de la population et les administrateurs ne sont le plus souvent que des parasites vivant sur la population sans aucun profit pour le fisc..."<sup>1</sup> Although tax collection continued to require the "collaboration de tous les organes de la société indigène", that is all ranks of chief, the tax was to be collected by the chefs de village alone, who were to pay it directly into the treasury. This reduced the number of intermediaries through whose hands the tax had to pass, in accordance with Ponty's maxim "autant d'intermédiaires, autant de déprédateurs". In addition to collecting the tax, the chef de village had to make sure that it was fairly divided among families.

The French believed that giving responsibility for tax collection to the chefs de village would promote contact between the local administration and these "représentants les plus directs de la population".<sup>2</sup> Chefs de canton, on the other hand, were no longer allowed to manipulate "les deniers de l'impôt".<sup>3</sup> Instead, they were simply to transmit orders from the administrator to the chef de village concerning the total sum required, the period during which collection was to take place, and

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques - C838 DIB. J. Brévié "Circular on native administration", 28 September 1932.
  2. AN 2G25-43 Senegal RPA 1925.
  3. Brévié, Circulaires...

the latest date at which it could be returned. At the beginning of January, chefs de canton were to send their secretaries to the chef-lieu of the cercle to collect a copy of the tax rolls.<sup>1</sup> The chiefs were to watch over the collection, keeping the authorities informed of its progress and making sure there were no irregularities.

The practice of giving the chefs de village control over tax collection was generalised in 1925 as it was less open to abuse, ensuring that the administration would receive more tax. In Tivaouane in 1926 for example, collection began on 8 January at a rate of 20 to 30 villages per day. By February 1,259 villages out of 1,656 had paid capitation and the tax on animals, and the only canton which had at this stage paid nothing was Ndoutte Diassane.<sup>2</sup> By 20 April, everyone had paid save twelve groups of nomads owing between nine and ten thousand francs. But the new scheme was by no means foolproof. In 1925, the chief of Méckhé (Mékhé M'Bar, Tivaouane) absconded with his village's tax.<sup>3</sup>

Confusion as to exactly who was to collect capitation and the tax on animals prevailed in the interior. In 1929, the chef de canton of N'Doyene Dagam wrote to the chef supérieur of Guet asking whether the chefs de canton or de village were supposed to collect the tax. Macodou Sall replied curtly that "La perception de l'impôt ne regarde pas au chef de canton. Les chefs de village en sont seuls responsables et doivent effectuer le versement eux-mêmes à la paierie de Louga."<sup>4</sup> Once the bulk of the tax had been paid into the treasury by the chefs de village, the chef de province would send his secretary, at that time Pathe Gueye, to Louga with the remainder.<sup>5</sup>

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1. 1Z 62 Commandant de cercle of Louga to his chefs de province, 1 January 1929.
  2. ARSD 2G26-65 Tivaouane RPM January to April 1926.
  3. ARSD 2G25-55 Tivaouane RPM August 1925.
  4. 1Z70 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 30 January 1929.
  5. 1Z70 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 16 February 1929.

Brévié in his circular of 28 September 1932 felt it necessary to reiterate that chefs de canton were not allowed to handle the sums involved in tax collection. The chef de village was in future to be assisted in his division of tax among families by the commission villageoise.

By the late 1930s, several methods of tax payment by the chefs de village had evolved. They could either pay the various taxes to an agent spécial under the surveillance of the chef de canton or by postal order to the nearest post office. When he received the tax, the chef de subdivision would send the chefs de canton receipts entitling them to a prime de rendement and their chefs de village to remises (commission), according to their efforts in the collection.<sup>1</sup> After the tax had been handed in, villages which had been counted in error or which had good reason for inability to pay like poor harvests or disease, were given tax relief (dégrèvements).

A grey area arose as far as the non-collection of tax by the chefs de canton was concerned when it came to the payment of arrears. In order to obtain the remainder of the tax after the bulk had been paid, the administration was obliged to send out agents ambulants, otherwise known as porteurs de contraintes. But the shortage of European agents posed a major problem. In his Inspection of the Senegalese tax system in 1928, Muller suggested the use of more indigenous agents for this task, such as the chefs de canton.<sup>2</sup> In 1930, the agents ambulants for Guet province were the chefs de canton, with Macodou Sall in overall control.<sup>3</sup> The position of porteur de contraintes appears to have been quite sought after, and is likely to have provided unofficial opportunities for enrichment. Powerful chiefs had some influence over appointments. In 1929, one Amadou Ndiaye of Louga wrote to Macodou Sall asking if his son could be made a porteur de contraintes.<sup>4</sup> In Louga and Thies,

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1. 18G84(17) Berthet, Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to Director of Finance, 9 September 1934, see also Ch. 10 on "The Income of the Commandement Indigène".

2. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-3062/17-Mission Muller-Inspector General Muller to Minister of Colonies, 17 April 1928.

3. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Louga to Macodou Sall, 3 February 1930.

4. 1Z62. Amadou N'diaye of Louga to Macodou Sall, 3 July 1929.

despite the poor harvest and bad traite in 1929, most tax was recovered at the beginning of the year as a result of the activity of the porteurs de contraintes.<sup>1</sup> It is not clear from the archives how porteurs de contraintes succeeded in obtaining money from poor cultivators where the chef de village had failed. It is probable that their methods were often quite brutal, including the threat or use of force on the cultivator or his family, and the confiscation of land, goods and animals.

A number of chefs de canton and de province had some influence in helping to fix tax levels in their role of colonial councillors. The general view is that these chiefs endorsed the measures put forward by the administration in every matter including taxation. But the chiefs at times genuinely stood for the interests of their regions. In the November 1921 session of the Colonial Council chiefs supported the elected members proposals to reduce the tax on animals as follows:

	Proposed reduced rate of tax for 1922 (francs)	Fleuve-Proposed reduction (francs)	Actual tax in 1921 (francs)
Camels over three years old	25	4	30
Horses over three years old	4	4	.6
Donkeys over three years old	3	1	5
Bulls and Cows over 2 years old	2	1	4
Oxen over 2 years old	3	1 f 25	4
Goats, sheep and pigs over 2 years old	0.25	0.10	0.50
			(2)

This would mean a fall in the value of the tax on animals of 1,289,500 francs. The proposals of Mbakhane Diop and Meissa M'Baye Sall went even further. They argued that in view of the five years of plague which Cayor had suffered, the tax on their subjects was excessive, and suggested the abolition of the tax on animals except on those used for portorage. But the chiefs from the Fleuve supported the administration

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1. ARSD 2G29-99 Thies RPA 1929.

2. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 19 November 1921.

against attempts by citizen councillors to have the tariffs on animals in the Fleuve reduced drastically.<sup>1</sup> Although the majority of animals were to be found in this region, Duguay Cledor, the president of the Council, had tried to argue that many were of no practical use to their proprietors.

Chiefs in the same session supported administrative proposals to reduce personal tax which had risen in some areas to 10 francs a head, by between one and two francs. But fearing that a decline in their own incomes might result from this, they opposed the citizens' proposal to raise the taxpaying age of children from eight to twelve years old. Abdoul Salam Kane and Ely Manel Fall pointed out that many parents had no idea of their children's ages.<sup>2</sup> But in the session of November 1922, chiefly and citizen members agreed to an administrative proposal to raise the minimum taxpaying age from eight to ten.<sup>3</sup>

Chiefs in several sessions raised objections to the preferential treatment given to the inhabitants of the communes over the payment of capitation. Abdoul Salam Kane argued in 1922 that it was not fair for women in the communes to be exempt from this tax, while women in the protectorate were not.<sup>4</sup> Some chiefs complained that although their cercles were no better off than others, they were being taxed at a higher level. Samba Niebe Couly Diop, the chef de province of Foss Gallodjina, requested that the capitation tariff for the cercle of Dagana be lowered one franc to correspond with that of the rest of the Fleuve region (Podor, Matam and Bakel cercles).

In the November 1922 session, chiefs also disagreed with administrative proposals to raise the tax on some animals. The tariff

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1. ARSD 4E12 (135) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the extraordinary session of the Colonial Council", 25 November 1921.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 18 December 1921.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 22 November 1922.
  4. Ibid.

on horses and donkeys was to be raised to 6 francs a head, that on oxen to 4 francs, and on cattle to 2.5 francs.<sup>1</sup> Amadou N'diaye of Provinces Orientales, Tambacounda, argued that it was unfair to tax Arab horses worth 2000 francs and Mpars (local) horses worth only 60 francs at the same level.

Three years later, the colonial councillors accepted the following administrative proposals for an increase in the tariffs on animals, to come force the following year:

	1925 tariff (francs)	Proposed tariffs			
		Fleuve (fs)	Tambacounda + Kedougou (fs)	Casama- nce(fs)	Else- where (fs)
Camels	25	30	50	50	50
Horses	4	10	10	10	10
Donkeys	5	6	10	6	10
Oxen	5	6	10	6	10
Cows and bulls	2 fs 50	3	2 fs 50	2fs50	3
Sheeps and Goats	0 fs 25	0 fs 50	0 fs 50	0 fs 50	0 fs 50
Pigs	1	2 fs 50	2 fs 50	2 fs 50	2 fs 50

These new tariffs took more account of differences in wealth between the various regions of Senegal. During the lifetime of the Colonial Council, the Fleuve was always taxed 'at a lower rate than the rest of Senegal in order to avoid encouraging emigration to Mauritania.

In 1925, the councillors agreed to an increase in capitation which varied between one and five francs, according to the region concerned:

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 18 November 1922.
  2. ARSD 4E16(135) Government of Senegal's proposals, presented to the Colonial Councillors, 20 October 1924.

	<u>New tariff</u> <u>(francs)</u>	
Louga	15	
Tivaouane	15	
Thies	15	
Podor	11	
Matam	11	
Bakel	11	
Dagana	12	
Ziguinchor	15	
Bignona	15	
Sedhiou	15	
Kolda-Kolda subdivision	14	
-Velingara subdivision	12	
Baol	15	
Sine Saloum	15	
Tambacounda-Bassariss	9	
Tambacounda-other	12	
Kedougou	8	(1)

These tariffs were to remain virtually unchanged till 1932.

On the insistence of chiefs from the Fleuve, this area continued to benefit from a lower rate of taxation. Amadou N'diaye drew attention during this session to the fact that the Bassaris in Tambacounda would have to pay 9 francs while their counterparts in French Guinea had only to pay 4 frs. He warned that if the French went ahead with their proposed measures, there would be a mass exodus from this region.

#### The effect of the World Depression on Tax Collection

The administration was most concerned with the effects on tax collection of the economic crisis which hit Senegal in the early 1930s in the wake of the World Depression. It feared that the Africans might find the combination of the desperate economic situation and financial pressures from the administration intolerable. At the end of 1931, one million francs still had to be recovered for Senegal.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 13 November 1925.
  2. AN 2G31-17 AOF Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble, 1931, Section: Senegal.

The financial difficulties of African subjects were exacerbated by the introduction in 1929 of a new tax, the Assistance Médicale Indigène (the AMI), which aimed at improving medical facilities and the standard of hygiene in the interior, at the following tariffs:

	<u>AMI (fs)</u>
Podor )	
Matam )	
Bakel )	3
Bas-Sénégal )	
Djoloff )	
Louga )	
Thies )	
Banlieue of )	4
Rufisque )	
Baol )	
Sine Saloum )	
Tambacounda )	3
Kedougou )	2
Ziguinchor )	4
Bignona )	3
Sedhiou )	
Kolda )	

(1)

With the onset of the crisis, the administration feared that if it taxed cultivators at the beginning of 1931, they might try to get rid of their groundnut crop at the very low prices being offered at that stage.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the recovery of capitation, the tax on animals and Assistance Médicale Indigène at the start of the year coincided with the repayment of advances made by the Société de Prévoyance and of food distributed to the people during the bad harvest of 1929 and 1930. The commandant de cercle of Thies therefore decided to suspend tax collection till the end of the year, when it was hoped trade might have picked up. But this sparked off rumours, encouraged by the local press and some chiefs, that the rural population, accustomed to paying its tax at the beginning of the year, had been exempted from payment. The people spent the money they obtained from the groundnut harvest with the result that by March or April, they had nothing left. Moreover, inhabitants of villages bordering

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1. Sénégal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses 1929.

2. ARSD 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931.



Thies in Baol, where the economic situation was marginally better, were angered when their chiefs informed them they would have to pay their tax by the end of February.<sup>1</sup> They had seen their counterparts in villages in Thies being treated with more regard, particularly when rumours had been circulated here as well by certain merchants leading many to believe they would be exempt from taxation.

The situation had grown much worse by 1932 as the 1931-32 harvest was half of that of 1930-31, which had itself been mediocre.<sup>2</sup> In Thies, arrears per year grew as follows:

Year	Arrears in capitation (francs)	Arrears in tax on animals (francs)	Arrears in Rachat of prestations (3) (francs)	Arrears in Assistance Médicale Indigène (francs)
1929	1,830	605	3,703	-
1930	700	804	18,735	389
1931	25,673	2,856	69,500	26,684
1932	344,586	93,156	320	234,749

Although hindering tax collection and hiding what was owed were punishable under the Indigénat,<sup>4</sup> the administration did not often invoke this law during the crisis. It was enforced only 54 times in Thies in 1932 and 86 times in Louga.<sup>5</sup> The French probably realised that in the majority of cases of non-payment of tax, the money was simply not available, and feared that attempts at stringent enforcement would lead to political upheaval.

In the initial stages of the economic crisis, the Basse Casamance did not suffer as much as other parts of Senegal as its agriculture was far more varied. Chiefs in the Basse Casamance experienced fewer difficulties than their contemporaries during this period. By June 1930, all Ziguinchor's tax had been collected except one village in Essynges.<sup>6</sup>

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1. AN 2G31-66 Baol RPM 20 January-20 February 1931.
  2. ARSD 2G32-105 Thies RPA 1932.
  3. See Ch. 4 on "The Chiefs and Forced Labour"
  4. See Glossary. The Indigénat was modified by the legislation of 15 November 1924.
  5. AN 2G32-21 Senegal RPA 1932, Section: Indigénat.
  6. AN 2G30-60 Casamance RPM June 1930.

The following year, all Ziguinchor's tax was collected in just over three months, beginning on March 1.<sup>1</sup> Diembéring, Bayottes and Essyngnes were among the last cantons to pay up. The arrears for Ziguinchor in February 1932 were only 136 francs for Assistance Médicale Indigène and 141 francs for the tax on animals.

Bignona experienced more difficulties than Ziguinchor at the opening of the crisis, and at the end of 1929, owed 630 francs in personal tax, 4173 francs in prestations and approximately 2,000 francs in the tax on animals and Assistance Médicale Indigène.<sup>2</sup> This was partly due to the negligence of the commandant de cercle, who took his leave in March and forgot to give the chefs de canton orders to collect the tax. Many chiefs were glad to take advantage of this opportunity to give their subjects some respite from their sufferings in the crisis.

But by 1933, tax collection had become more difficult in the Basse Casamance because of the low prices for the groundnut, palm oil and rice.<sup>3</sup> Certain villages in Kalounayes and Djiragones on the Gambian frontier were empty by 1933 as inhabitants stole across the border to avoid tax.<sup>4</sup> By this time, the chefs de canton were being hindered in their activities by the chefs de village who generally sided with the local people in helping to conceal their assets. Inefficiency in tax collection in the Casamance often started at the top. The Administration Supérieure occasionally did not have the rolls ready when the tax was due for collection, as in 1934.<sup>5</sup>

In the extraordinary sessions of the Colonial Council in November 1931 and July 1932, some chiefly members were moved by the crisis to defend their subjects against the burden of taxation.<sup>6</sup> The chiefs argued

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1. ARSD 2G31-88 Ziguinchor RPA 1931.
  2. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  3. AN 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.
  4. ARSD 2G33-138 Bignona RPA 1933.
  5. ARSD 2D5-4 Telegram from the Administrateur Supérieur to Governor, 13 January 1934.
  6. AN 2G31-17 Rough copy of the Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble for the AOF for 1931. Interestingly, the resistance of some chiefs to administrative tax proposals is omitted from the final copy.

that the tax cuts proposed by the administration for the 1932 budget were too small. These would have reduced the total revenue of the central administration as follows:

Year	Capitation (fs)	Animal tax (fs)	Prestations (fs)
1931	17,707,188	2,743,027	737,245
1932	16,296,195	1,946,172	203,874 (1)

These chiefs were supported in this by the Permanent Commission of the Colonial Council, which included some chiefs, when the following year, it rejected administrative proposals to reduce capitation and the tax on animals, on the grounds that these did not go nearly far enough.<sup>2</sup> Amadou N'diaye's suggestion that animals used in cultivation should be exempted from the tax as they would eventually be replaced by machines was unanimously accepted by his fellow councillors.

The enormous problems of tax collection during the economic crisis exposed many of the deficiencies of the commandement indigène. Many chiefs believed that their sole obligation to the French was to collect tax, while the methods they employed were unimportant. During the crisis, it became more difficult for the chiefs to obtain what was due to the administration, let alone the extra money they hoped for by demanding sums over and above what was required. Under pressure from the administration on the one hand and his retinue on the other, the chief and his agents resorted to even more vicious methods of extracting revenue. The most difficult areas for tax collection were Podor, Sedhiou and Louga where the commandement indigène was unstable or had been allowed too free a hand by the administration. Whereas Bignona and Ziguinchor had paid up completely by December 1932, Podor, Sedhiou and Louga between them owed 3,019,976 francs.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Sénégal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses, 1932.
  2. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 7 July 1932.
  3. AN 2G32-21 Senegal RPA 1932.

The administration became concerned with chiefly abuses once the tax yield became particularly low, and dispatched an Inspector of Administrative Affairs to the area. Lat Sène Fall was dismissed from Ndour for embezzlement in 1929, prompting the fusion of this canton with Ndoiyene Dagam.<sup>1</sup> In 1931, a major enquiry led to the dismissal of four chefs de canton in Podor and nine in Louga for negligence regarding tax collection, embezzlement, mismanagement of the Société de Prévoyance granaries and for extorting extra money and goods from their subjects.<sup>2</sup> Among these chiefs was Sambou Ndour of Mbaouar. Three years later, in Podor, a further two chiefs de canton were dismissed for negligence in tax collection and twenty chefs de village were sacked for embezzlement.<sup>3</sup> Action Sénégalais accused Massamba Sall of Ndoutte Diassane of exerting undue pressure on his subjects during the crisis, often making them sell off their livestock to pay their tax.<sup>4</sup> But these accusations went by without administrative investigation, as this chief always fulfilled his quota.

The upheaval engendered by the economic crisis meant that the census figures and tax rolls often bore little relation to the actual population distribution. During the crisis, the fact that the chiefs had inflated the number of taxpayers during times of prosperity became evident when people were no longer able to pay the tax. The Governor, fearing popular discontent, warned the commandants de cercle about the increasing inaccuracy of the census in a circular in 1934.<sup>5</sup> He stressed the need for a meticulous revision to avoid the inclusion of underage children, the old and sick on the roll of taxpayers. Yet at the same time, the administration was anxious that it should continue to receive its weight of gold in tax, "Que chacun paie ce qu'il doit et que nul ne paie plus qu'il ne doit." The governor therefore added the rather

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1. 1Z62 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province of Guet, 9 August 1929.
  2. AN 2G31-14 Senegal RPA 1931.
  3. AN 2G34-5 Senegal RPA 1934.
  4. Action Sénégalais, 12 March 1932.
  5. 2G34-5 This circular is included in Senegal's Rapport Politique Annuel for 1934.

contradictory proviso that the revised census should not compromise the equilibrium of the budget. He bemoaned the fact that the commandants de cercle seemed more concerned with correcting the census downwards than with making sure that people paid what they owed. He pointed out that while it appeared the overall population of Senegal had risen from 1,584,273 in 1931 to 1,604,372 in 1934, there had been no corresponding increase in the budget.

This administrative dilemma is clearly illustrated in the case of Tanor Latsoukabé Fall, the chef de canton of Fadene (Thies). In 1934, Le Progrès accused this chief of using brutal methods in tax collection in the village of Toul, like setting fire to huts, torturing the inhabitants and seizing their goods. This case became such a scandal, that it was even reported in L'Humanité.<sup>1</sup> In a petition to the Governor, the villagers of Toul claimed that between 1930 and 1932, Tanor had included children under ten, and the old and sick on the roll of taxpayers, and was making them pay more in the tax on animals than was due.<sup>2</sup> However, they made no mention of cruelty or the seizure of goods. The difficulties in tax collection arose from the emigration of many former inhabitants of Thies, because of economic difficulties, to the Sine Saloum and Baol, where Mouride "colonies" were forming. Tanor Fall informed the administration of this development, and went as far as to ask in 1933 if a fresh census could be carried out by a European agent. But the chefs de carré and de village were under pressure from the administration to collect the amount of tax on the rolls and not to correct earlier census figures concerning the number of taxpayers. Hence many were unjustly taxed. Complaints against Tanor were mainly from the three Serere quartiers of Toul, reflecting the antipathy between them and the Wolof chief and his entourage.

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1. L'Humanité, 4 December 1934.

2. ARSD 2D13-20. Carrière, commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 22 November 1934 and 12 February 1935.

In 1933, tax collection started to improve, which was partly the result of increased activity by the chiefs, for whom sanctions in Louga and Podor had served as a warning.<sup>1</sup> But as late as 1936, many parts of the country were still suffering from the crisis, and had large arrears. The recovery of taxes from previous years had to be given low priority, although the administration encouraged the chiefs not to abandon hope of eventual repayment.<sup>2</sup>

By 1934, commandants de cercle were advocating the simplification of the revenue system on the grounds that the majority of chefs de village were illiterate and unable to cope with the diversity of taxes.<sup>3</sup> After consulting a number of chefs de canton and de village, they recommended the abolition of the tax on animals. In the 1935 session of the Colonial Council, chiefs pointed out that during the crisis, the number of livestock had fallen, and that animals were often used for sacrificial purposes only, both in Islamic and Animist areas. Therefore, the number of animals owned by an individual were often not in direct proportion to his wealth. Abdoul Salam Kane argued persuasively in 1935, "On sait bien que la richesse de l'indigène est constitué par le bétail. Mais le bétail, du fait des mœurs de ce pays a quelque chose de sacré, il ne faut pas le dénombrer."<sup>4</sup> Moreover, any census of animals was difficult. Peul proprietors with diseased animals often hid them from vaccinators as they feared these might be reported to the census agents.

Most citizen councillors would have preferred the reduction and eventual abolition of capitation. But new accurate censuses following the 1934 circular and an administrative measure of 1936 raising the minimum taxpaying age in Senegal to 14<sup>5</sup> had led to a reduction in the number of taxpayers. As the administration also needed to make up for the shortfall

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1. AN 2G33-9 Senegal RPA 1933.
  2. AN 2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936 containing details of the Governor's circular to the commandants de cercle of 22 July 1935.
  3. AN 2G34-83 Matam RPA 1934.
  4. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 17 June 1935.
  5. 2G36-5, which refers to circular 182P/A of 30 March 1936 aimed at "humanising" capitation.

in revenue after the abolition of the tax on animals, it decided to raise personal tax and the Assistance Médicale Indigène for the 1936 and again for the 1937 budget.

	1936 budget (fs) capitation AMI		1937 budget (fs) Capitation AMI	
Podor	12.50	4	16	7
Matam	12.50	4	16	7
Bakel	12	4	16	7
Bas-Sénégal	12.50	4	16	7
Djoloff	13.50	5	17	7
Louga-except Guet	13.50	5	17	8
Louga -Guet	15	5	19	8
Thies-Cayor	15	5	19	8
Thies-subdivision of Thies, Petite Cote, Rufisque	18	5	25	8
Baol	18	5	25	8
Sine Saloum	18	5	25	8
Tambacounda-provinces orientales	10.50	4	14	7
Tambacounda-except provinces orientales	13.50	4	25	7
Kedougou	7	3	10	5
Ziguinchor	18	5	24	8
Bignona	18	5	24	8
Sedhiou	16.50	5	24	8
Kolda-subdivision of Kolda	14	4	18	7
Kolda-Velingara	12	4	16	7 (1)

In supporting these measures in the July 1936 session of the Council, the secretary for the chiefly members virtually acted as a spokesman for the administration, reminding his colleagues how the French had refrained from raising taxes during the crisis. He argued that to vote for the administration's tax proposals was "un devoir patriotique et de reconnaissance pour nous tenir compte des sacrifices consentis par l'administration en ce moment de crise."<sup>2</sup>

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1. Tables compiled from statistics in Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 17 June 1935 and 21 July 1936.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 21 July 1936.

But by 1937, the value of livestock had risen, tempting the administration to make capital out of the situation by reintroducing the tax on animals. This move was also designed to stop the growing gap in wealth between cultivators and animal owners. It was generally felt that with the improvement of veterinary care as a result of the arrival in Senegal of a number of veterinarians specially trained by the Ecole Nationale d'Alfort (in France), proprietors would stop concealing their animals from the administration. Abdoul Salam Kane, who two years previously had argued so persuasively for the abolition of the tax on animals now spoke of its fairness: "Les gens riches-ceux qui possèdent des troupeaux paieront la différence d'impôt. Voilà la justice."<sup>1</sup>

In the 1937 session, personal tax was reduced in most areas, while the tax on animals was reintroduced at rates lower than those of 1925. The tariff on camels was for example, 30 francs per head, on horses 10 francs, on donkeys 6 francs and on cattle and pigs 2 francs. In the 1938 budget, levels of capititation were as follows:-

Podor	14 francs	
Matam	14 francs	
Bakel	15 francs	
Bas-Sénégal	14 francs	
Djoloff	14 francs	
Louga-except Guet	13 francs	
Louga - Guet	18 francs	
Thies-Cayor	20 francs	
Thies- remainder	24 francs	
Baol	24 francs	
Sine Saloum	24 francs	
Tambacounda except provinces orientales	17 francs	
Tambacounda- provinces orientales	13 francs	
Kedougou	9 francs	
Ziguinchor	23 francs	
Bignona	23 francs	
Sedhiou	20 francs	
Kolda - Kolda subdivision	17 francs	
Kolda - Velingara	14 francs	(2)

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1. Colonial Council PV, fourth sitting, 23 July 1937.

2. Ibid.



This meant an overall rise in tax, opposed by the citizen members who protested that it would mean "l'étranglement du cultivateur et du contribuable". Instead, they had wanted the administration to reduce taxes by 20% because of the hardship brought about by the poor millet harvest of 1936, and the continued low price for groundnuts. But the administration, allying with the chiefs, pushed through the new measures. Abdoul Salam Kane expressed concern in the 1936 session that the disparity between the Fleuve region in Senegal and Mauretania had continued to grow. While Podor, Matam and Bas Sénégal were having to pay 23 francs in capitation and AMI, Mauretania was only having to pay 17 francs.<sup>1</sup>

As a measure of financial rationalisation, the Colonial Council agreed in 1938 to the abolition of AMI as a separate tax and its fusion with capitation.<sup>2</sup> Hence the new tariffs for personal tax for the 1939 budget became the sum of capitation and AMI. For example, the new combined tax for Cayor subdivision (Thies) was 20 plus 8 i.e. 28 francs.

In spite of administrative efforts to check abuses by the chiefs in tax collection, these continued after the economic crisis, though perhaps not on such a vast unbridled scale. Chiefs continued to tax those who should have been exempted and to use force in collection. In 1937, Malick Fall of the village of Gandouck, Thilmakha wrote to Macodou Sall complaining about the methods employed by Morane Sall and his diarafs in collecting tax.<sup>3</sup> He alleged that when he refused to pay tax for his son, who was nine years old, and therefore underage, Morane Sall and his henchmen had beaten him, and taken all the money he was carrying, 750 francs.

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 15 November 1936.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 16 June 1938.
  3. ARSD 1Z75 Malick Fall to chef de province of Guet, 25 February 1937.

In an attempt to reduce the role of the chiefs in the census and in the collection of capitation, the administration considered introducing a system similar to that practised in Dahomey, the carte fiscale familiale. Civil servants were to carry out a much more efficient form of census of each family at the time of cultivation when all members were generally at home. A collective identity card was thus established for fiscal purposes and was given to the chef de famille, who was to pay personal tax for his family directly to the agence spéciale. It was hoped that the removal of those "agents intermédiaires pour la perception des impôts indigènes," the chefs de village, would help eliminate the delay and trickery inherent in this system of collection, as well as the problems arising from the friction between the chiefs and their subjects.<sup>1</sup> The future role of the chefs de village, like that of the chefs de canton was to be reduced to that of surveillance and of drawing attention to difficulties in the collection of capitation, although they were to continue to collect other taxes.

By the decision of 8 December 1937, the carte fiscale was introduced as an experimental measure to the subdivisions of St. Louis (Bas-Sénégal), Ziguinchor and Dagana village.<sup>2</sup> Although the scheme worked well here, the administration soon appreciated that it was not viable for the whole of Senegal. It increased the burden of work on the personnel of the cercle, and gave rise to demands for more staff to establish rolls, fiscal cards for each family, and a mobile service of collection. Whereas 133 rolls had been required in Dagana when the chefs de village had collected the tax, 1537 were required with the new system, which necessitated the employment of eight extra agents. The use of the carte fiscale also assumed the existence of a short distance between the home of the chef de famille and area of recovery of the tax and an efficient nominative census.

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1. 2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936.
  2. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.

In 1939, the system was extended to the cercle of Linguère, the cantons of Boudhié and Yacine-Sud in Sedhiou, plus a number of villages.<sup>1</sup> However, Therond in his inspection of the workings of the carte fiscale in Pout and Diagianiao in the same year observed that the inhabitants could not understand the new method and simply paid the tax to the chef de village as before.<sup>2</sup> By 1942, the administration realised that the inconveniences of the carte fiscale outweighed the advantages and the system was abandoned except in the St. Louis subdivision and Dagana.<sup>3</sup> The following year, the scheme was dropped entirely.

The changing priorities of the administration are reflected in its replacements of the four days of prestations by the Additional tax in all cercles of Senegal except Tambacounda and Kedougou in 1938.<sup>4</sup> The French had learnt by experience that paid wage labour was more efficient than forced labour and that it was better to obtain money from their Senegalese subjects to buy free labour, rather than to expect the subjects to provide that labour themselves.

During the Second World War, tax demands on the Senegalese population rose sharply. These tax increases were supposed to contribute to the economic development of the cercles and were allegedly obtained with the consent of the Conseils de Notables. Tax on the "floating" population rose from 24 to 34 francs between 1939 and 1940.<sup>5</sup> While the tax on camels, horses and donkeys remained the same, the tax on cows, pigs, sheeps and goats rose by 1 franc to three francs. Rates of capitation rose every year from 1939. During this period, subscriptions to the Sociétés de Prévoyance became included with the main body of tax. In 1943, additional tax, capitation and subscriptions to

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1938.
  2. ARSD 13G43(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Therond, "Report on the subdivision of Thies", 16 July 1939.
  3. AN 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.
  4. See Ch. 4 on "The Chiefs and Forced Labour."
  5. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.

the SIPs rose again.<sup>1</sup> It was argued that this tax increase was required not only for administrative needs but to absorb the excess money in circulation in order to avoid a general price rise. The growth of the money supply resulted from the higher prices which were being paid to cultivators and animal owners in 1943. The cercles of the river continued to be taxed at lower levels as a general exodus to Mauretania was feared.

In 1944, capitation, additional tax and the tax on the "floating" population were again raised, and an exceptional tax for National Defence was introduced, to be levied on all those paying personal tax, and on the floating population.<sup>2</sup> The administration argued that this extra taxation was justified by the increase in salaries and the price of goods, the reasonable groundnut harvest of 1943 and the good price cultivators were receiving, that year for the crop. The additional tax on Tivaouane was reduced from 15 to 12 francs to be the same as that of Louga whose economic situation it most closely resembled. While these tax increases were accepted over most of Senegal, they met with resistance in the Basse Casamance. This region was subjected to some of the highest taxation in Senegal during the war, while at the same time, the commandement indigène was the weakest in the colony. Apart from having to contend with popular resistance to fiscal and other demands,<sup>3</sup> chiefs in the area were hindered in their collection of money by local preference for subsistence over cash crop agriculture like the groundnut.<sup>4</sup> (see separate table (page 162) showing tax increases over the war years).

In 1942, the Vichy government proposed the introduction of a tax en nature which would lessen the financial burden on the people and at the same time stimulate production for the metropole<sup>5</sup>. This was

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1. 2G43-16 Senegal RPA 1943.

2. AN 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.

3. See Chap. 6 on "The Role of the Chiefs in Conscription."

4. AN 2G45-73 Ziguinchor subdivision RPA 1945.

5. 2G42-1.

recognised to be impractical for most of Senegal, where groundnut production was already high and needed no stimulus but it was felt that it might be viable for the Basse Casamance, where efforts were being made to develop the production of palm oil. But a closer examination of this project showed that it would cost too much effort to implement and it was therefore abandoned.

The chiefs continued to use rough treatment to extract tax from their subjects. In the "Khombole incident" of 1944, the chef de canton of Diack, Salif Daouar Fall encouraged the garde de cercle Mamadou Baidy to use force on Pathe Diouf to make him pay his tax.<sup>1</sup> The latter died as a result of his injuries and Salif Fall's diarafs confiscated crops from the village. Périscopes Africain had already alleged in 1935 that Salif Fall whipped those unable to pay their tax, rubbing salt into their open wounds, and that he demanded special dues from his people.<sup>2</sup> Each chef de carré was expected to give him a bull.

At the end of the war, far from levelling off, the tax on the Senegalese soared. In a further attempt to reduce the number of taxes imposed on the population, capitation, the tax on animals, and subscriptions to the Sociétés de Prévoyance were combined in 1945 while additional tax became known as the taxe locale. Although latter was lowered for some cercles between 1946 and 1947, personal tax rose to more than compensate the administration for this loss.

	1946		1947	
	impôt	taxe	impôt	taxe
	personnel	locale	personnel	locale
Bas -Sénégal	60	8	70	8
Podor	60	8	70	8
Matam	60	8	70	8
Linguère	55	8	65	8
Louga-Guet	65	18	70	14
-Other	60	18	70	14
Thies-Cayor	70	20	80	15
- Thies and Mbour	70	20	80	15
Diourbel	70	20	80	15
Kaolack-Fatick	70	20	85	15
-Other regions	75	20	85	15
Tambacounda-Goudiry	55	18	65	15
- Other regions	60	18	70	15

1. 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944 (2) Périscopes Africain, 5 January 1935

	1946		1947	
	impôt personnel	taxe locale	impôt personnel	taxe locale
Kedougou	45	18	55	15
Oussouye	60	20	70	15
Ziguinchor	70	20	80	15
Bignona	70	20	80	15
Sedhiou	70	20	80	15
Kolda	60	20	70	15
Velingara	60	20	70	15 (1)

The role of the chiefs in the census and tax collection clearly shows how the number and importance of their tasks increased as a result of the shortage of European personnel. As the burden of work became increasingly heavy, the chiefs, like the commandants de cercle became "bureaucratized", that is to say, they remained at the chef-lieu and entrusted their tasks to underlings, whom they themselves had recruited. The more that was expected of a chief, the bigger his retinue became and the more he had to fund it out of the own and hence others pockets. So methods of extraction grew more brutal.

Throughout the period 1919-1947, the census never presented a really accurate picture and tax collection was never fairly shared out. The chiefs were either deceived by their subjects or allowed favoured individuals to escape the census lists and hence the roll of taxpayers and recruitment lists. So others had to pay the price. As long as the tax was coming in, the administration preferred to turn a blind eye as to how it was obtained. It was only when collection was well below the required level, as in the 1930s economic crisis, that the French began large-scale enquiries into the chiefs. As a result of the dirty work the chiefs had to perform and the harsh methods they often employed to satisfy the demands of the central administration, the alienation of many chiefs from their subjects was complete by the end of the Second World War.

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1. Table compiled from figures in 2G46-19 Senegal RPA 1946, and 2G48-30, Senegal RPA 1948.

## TAX IN SENEGAL ( 1938 - 44 )

(162)

Cercle	Personal Tax (fs)				Additional tax (fs)				SP Subscriptions (fs)						
	1938	1940	1942	1943	1944	1938	1940	1942	1943	1944	1938	1940	1942	1943	1944
Bas-Sénégal	14	21	24	28	30	7		4	5	5			2	5	10
Podor	14	14	21	28	30	7	(6)	4	5	5		(6)	3	7	10
Matam	14	14	21	28	30	7		4	5	5			4	8	10
Bakel (1)	15	14	21	28	30	7		4	5	5			4	8	10
Djolofoff-later Linguère	14	14	24	30	35	8		7	8	8			3	6	10
Louga-Guet	18	18	26	33	40	8		8	8	12			4	6	10
Louga - remainder	13	13	23	30	35	8		8	8	12			4	6	10
Thies-Cayor subdivision	20	28	28	35	40	8		10	15	12			4	10	10
Thies-Thies+Mbour	24	32	34	45	45	8		10	15	15			4	10	10
Diourbel(2)	24	32	35	45	45	8		8	15	15			4	10	10
Kaolack(3)	24	32	35	45	45	8		10	15	15			5	10	10
Foundiougne (4)	24	32	35	45	50	8		10	15	15			5	10	10
Tambacounda-Provinces	13	13	21	30	33	7		n o t available					4	5	10
Orientales															
- Goudiry	17	17	23	30	33	7		n o t available					4	5	10
- Remainder	17	17	24	30	33	7		n o t available					4	5	10
Kedougou	9	14	20	20	25	5		n o t available					4	5	10
Ziguinchor	23	31	33	40	50	8		9	12	12			5	7	10
Oussouye (5)	23	31	33	40	45	8		9	12	12			5	7	10
Bignona	23	31	33	40	50	8		9	12	12			2	7	10
Sedhiou	20	20	not available	50	50	8		10	12	12			not available	10	10
Kolda-Kolda subdivision	17	24	25	30	37	7		10	12	12			3	7	10
-Velingara	14	14	23	27	30	7		10	12	12			3	7	10

(1) Became a subdivision of Matam in 1940.

(2) Previously known as Baol.

(3) Previously known as Sine Saloum.

(4) Part of Sine Saloum till 1940

(5) Subdivision of Ziguinchor till 1944, then of the new cercle of Casamance.

(6) Not available

Compiled from figures in 2G42-1, 2G43-16 and 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### The Chiefs and Forced Labour

In their mise en valeur of Senegal, the French did not seek to establish a plantation economy as they appreciated that the production of the main crop, the groundnut, was best left to small cultivators. Instead, labour was required largely for the creation and repair of an infrastructure of communications to ensure the speedy evacuation of cash crops from the producing areas, and for the upkeep of villages. But the recruitment of manpower was a serious problem everywhere in the AOF, because of the low population density and the lack of skilled or paid labour. The administration was thus obliged to seek the help of the chiefs in finding workers for both its public works projects and for private enterprise. As few volunteers were forthcoming, much of this labour had to be compelled. The French argued that this practice, known euphemistically as "travail obligatoire", "répond à une nécessité de politique générale et nous devons nous efforcer par tous les moyens d'en organiser le plus rapidement possible l'utilisation rationnelle et pratique".<sup>1</sup> Forced labour was nothing new to the peoples of Senegal as a large percentage of them, possibly constituting as much as one third of the population, had been captives prior to the arrival of the French. But pre-colonial servitude differed greatly in character from colonial corvée labour.

Forced labour in the AOF can, broadly speaking, be divided into five categories: penal labour, requisitions at a time of disaster and for national security, a tax known as prestations, the deuxième portion of the military recruitment, and compulsory cultivation ("cultures obligatoires"). Like the corvée in France, prestations consisted of four days of compulsory labour on a public works project. According to the decree of 25 November 1912, prestations were a tax in kind to be imposed on all male subjects in the AOF over the age of twelve and under the age of sixty.

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1. ARSD K103 (26) Governor General Carde to Governors of the AOF, 11 October 1929.



While most of the rural population of Senegal were obliged by law to carry out prestations at the opening of the interwar period, chiefs not involved in organising prestations, civil servants earning over five thousand francs per annum, magistrates, all French citizens and the "floating" population had to pay a sum of money instead, called the rachat. This was to go towards public works within the cercle where it was paid. Prestations were also imposed on all vehicles and boats in the colony, although the owner had the option of paying a sum of money instead. Former soldiers, soldiers in active service, chiefs and agents involved in supervising prestations, women, schoolchildren and the infirm were exempt from both prestations and money payments.<sup>1</sup>

Chiefs played a triple role in prestations as members of the conseils de notables, as colonial councillors and as overseers of the work to be done. The Conseils de Notables, consisting of chefs de canton, de village and notables were called upon by the commandant de cercle in May to "advise", which in practice meant to "approve", the administrative plan of campaign for prestations each year. True to form, the councils agreed with their European presidents in 1922 that four days' prestations were insufficient and should therefore be doubled.

The chiefly members of the Colonial Council cooperated with the administration in fixing the number of days of prestations and the level of the rachat, and could generally be counted on to endorse administrative measures in this sphere. In 1921, both citizen and chiefly councillors supported administrative proposals to raise the minimum age requirement for prestataires from twelve to sixteen years old.<sup>2</sup> But when the elected members of the council wanted to give the people as a whole the right to make a payment instead of carrying out prestations, the chiefs backed the administration which objected that it would be deprived of essential manpower. Bouna N'diaye, the chef de province of Djoloff wanted to go even further than the French. He argued that the shortage of manpower justified putting an end to the practice of payment instead of doing prestations.<sup>3</sup>

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1. These exemptions were reiterated in the legislation of 1 January 1926 on Prestations.
  2. ARSD 4E12 (135) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the extraordinary session of the Colonial Council", 25 November 1921.
  3. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 19 November 1921.

Like their colleagues on the conseils de notables, the chiefly councillors backed administrative measures to increase the number of days of prestations to eight in 1922. This move was strongly opposed by the elected councillors who wanted to keep the number of days of prestations the same as in France.<sup>1</sup> The chiefs also supported administrative proposals in the 1925 session that car and lorry owners should be made to buy back prestations on the grounds that, "Quand on est assez riche pour avoir une voiture, il faut payer l'impôt."<sup>2</sup> All the councillors in this session agreed that the maximum age limit for prestataires should be lowered from sixty to fifty.<sup>3</sup>

Every move by the administration to raise the level of the rachat was backed by the chiefs. They argued that were the rachat generalised, the majority of people would prefer to buy back prestations rather than working on the roads, which would result in labour shortages. The June 1927 session saw a major clash over this issue between the chiefs and administration on the one hand and the elected councillors on the other. The administrative proposal to raise the rachat from two francs to five francs a day (i.e. 40 francs in all) was passed "avec l'appoint presque unique des chefs".<sup>4</sup> The citizens opposed this measure in view of the lack of control exercised by the administration over prestations in kind and the precarious situation in which many Senegalese were placed following a bad groundnut harvest. But the proposal was passed by 16 votes to 15 after the President, Duguay Clédor abstained and one elected councillor, Sourieux, voted with the chiefs. This prompted eleven citizens led by Galandou Diouf to walk out in protest.<sup>5</sup>

Once the administration had obtained the support of the chiefs on the Colonial Council or conseils de notables for their proposals concerning prestations in the cercles, these orders were transmitted to the commandant de cercle. He in turn passed these on to the chefs de canton and de village who then

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 24 November 1921.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 13 November 1925.
  3. Legislation of 1 January 1926 on Prestations.
  4. ARSD 4E18 (135) Governor General Corde to Governor, 16 June 1927.
  5. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 14 June 1927.

came to an agreement on the division of labour between villages. From the census lists compiled by the chiefs, the administration was able to produce rolls of prestataires, to be called up by the chefs de village who then organised them into teams. The chiefs were not only to guard against absenteeism but also against abuses, making sure that those exempt from prestations were not called up. The chefs de village often acted as chefs d'équipe supervising the prestataires at their tasks, and were assisted by diarafs and gardes de cercle.

The main work of the prestataires was the upkeep of roads, but they were also responsible for maintaining bridges and wells. Prestataires working over five kilometers from their villages were to be provided with food by their chiefs, or else were to receive payment in lieu of food. In the case of more complicated projects, the chiefs acting as foremen were to receive simple illustrated instructions from the commandant de cercle. If a village had a ferry, the chief was to see to it that its services were regular. Chiefs were to ensure that inhabitants of a village maintained its roads and buildings, and were to inform the authorities of any urgent work to be done on public highways and buildings. They were to assist civil servants from the Public Works Department in their tasks, such as by providing them with porters and a means of transport. Chefs de canton were to advise the commandant de cercle on the requirements of their region - on the need for wells, buildings, ferries, etc.

The commandants de cercle were torn between the exigencies of the agricultural cycle, that is to say, giving the people time to tend their crops, and the need for a good road network to evacuate the groundnut. In order to ensure minimum disruption of agriculture, prestations were in theory supposed to take place in the dry season. At the start of the rainy season, teams of prestataires were generally released temporarily to permit them to attend to the sowing, to be reemployed at the end of the harvest. In practice in Cayor, they could be called up again as early as 1 September by their chiefs.<sup>1</sup> In the Basse Casamance, the longer rainy season meant that the greatest efforts required of the prestataires were in November and December.

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1. ARSD 2G25-55 Tivaouane RPM September 1925.

The use of prestataires in the cercle of Cayor for the construction and upkeep of roads and wells was relatively successful, with roads being constructed where only bush had existed previously. Chefs de canton received instructions on roadbuilding from the commandant de cercle via the chef de province, and were supposed to keep up their particular section of the road. The Ndande-Kébémér section of the Thies-Kébémér road was completed by August 1923 by the chef de canton of Mbaouar, Sambou Ndour.<sup>1</sup> In 1925 two teams of prestataires were given the task of repairing roads along the Niayes under the supervision of the chefs de canton of Mbaouar and Méckhé M'Bar.<sup>2</sup>

The administration and the chefs de province it trusted had to keep a close check on the chefs de canton. In 1925, while travelling to Tivaouane, the Governor of Senegal noted that the part of the road from Gueoul to the frontier of Cayor was in a very bad state. He wrote to the chefs de canton concerned with this section ordering an improvement.<sup>3</sup> During the early 1920s Macodou Sall supervised the building of a road between Kébémér and Sagatta. In 1929, concerned about the bad state of the N'doyène section of this road, he wrote to the chef de canton Sangone Sall ordering him to maintain it properly.<sup>4</sup>

In repairing roads, prestataires would sometimes unwittingly make them more hazardous. In 1932, a somewhat anxious commandant de cercle of Louga wrote to Macodou Sall asking him to order the chefs de village concerned with the Louga-Kébémér road to ensure prestataires did not dig holes less than thirty meters from each side of the road.<sup>5</sup> This created a danger for cars as these holes were often hidden by grass. It was feared that an accident incurred because of this might lead to a court case against the government of Senegal.

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1. ARSD 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM September 1923.
  2. 2G25-55 Tivaouane RPM April 1925.
  3. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Cayor to chef de province of Guet, 16 April 1925.
  4. 1Z70 chef de province of Guet to chef de canton of N'doyène Dagam, 23 November 1929.
  5. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Louga to Macodou Sall, 27 July 1932.

In areas of Cayor and Louga where water was in short supply, chiefs were made responsible for building wells, which involved recruiting teams of men to transport equipment and assist the wellsinkers. The Peuls in these regions, most of whom were nomads who kept livestock, were reluctant to assist the construction of wells which they saw as facilitating the penetration of their regions by sedentary cultivators like the Mourides, many of whom were Wolof. But in spite of the ill will of the Peuls and shortage of skilled labour, much was achieved in the way of well construction. In 1924, Pass Bakhel and Djoloff Oriental were transformed when a two year project directed by a Wolof chief and a Peul Ardo under his orders brought water to the region.<sup>1</sup>

In Cayor, there were few problems in recruiting prestataires. Each chef de carré generally obeyed the call to send his representatives to the chef de village. However, as late as 1929, the Governor noted that the people were less inclined to accept the use of prestations for airstrip construction.<sup>2</sup> In order to demonstrate their utility to the people, he ordered that each airfield be visited by an aircraft at least once a year.

Occasionally, the administration complained about the apathy of some chefs de canton and de village, who failed to provide the teams of workers requested of them. In 1927, the commandant de cercle of Cayor reported to the Governor the ill will of the chefs de village regarding road repairs and digging new wells during the traite.<sup>3</sup> Such attempts, he realised, were doomed to failure as the people were too busy spending the money they had earned from the sale of the groundnut harvest. Sometimes, the chiefs allowed their workers to escape. The garde de cercle Yoro Diallo complained to the commandant de cercle of Cayor in 1925 that the chef de canton of Thilmakha had allowed five people to leave the roadworks at Belhelo and Maka Diougne after four days work, ostensibly to find food, without obtaining his consent.<sup>4</sup> Macodou Sall explained to the administrator that he had been in charge as the chef de canton had been absent at the time. When he eventually caught the prestataires, the chef de province

1. AN 2G24-14 Senegal RPA 1924.
2. Babakar Fall, "Le Travail Forcé au Sénégal 1900-46", maîtrise, unpublished; University of Dakar, 1977.
3. ARSD 2G27-90 Tivaouane RPA 1927.
4. 1Z56 correspondence between the commandant de cercle of Cayor and Macodou Sall, letters of 7 and 9 March 1925.

made them work an extra fifteen days.

There was more resistance to forced labour in the Basse Casamance, the last area of Senegal to be colonised by the French. This resistance was often encouraged by the chefs de village. Refusal to carry out prestations was punishable under the Indigénat, and in 1919 the commandants de cercle in this area suggested that the sanction for refusing to carry out prestations should be made tougher. Offenders should be made to work double the normal length of time, or to work without being reimbursed for food.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the will to avoid incurring prestations that whole villages would sometimes be abandoned by their inhabitants. The people of the village of Diougol and Djiboudié in the Fogny (Bignona) were visited for the first time by their chef de canton in 1925, with orders to construct a jetty into a tributary of the river Casamance.<sup>2</sup> When they refused, the Resident at Diouloulou travelled to the region to persuade the villagers. He found Diougol abandoned by its inhabitants and at Djiboudié one of the tirailleurs in his entourage was fired on. As a result of this incident, the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance himself travelled to these villages towards the end of the year to supervise the confiscation of weapons in the villages and of the property of Djiboudié's chef de village, who had fled to the Gambia.

Since the chiefs willing to cooperate with the French in the matter of prestations lacked influence with their subjects, they generally had to be supported in their efforts by European administrators. In the cercle of Ziguinchor, the inhabitants of Diembéring, Kamobeul and Oussouye, particularly the villagers of Youtou and Effoc, refused in 1929 to take part in the contingent of 200 labourers required to work on the track linking Oussouye to Diembéring.<sup>3</sup> The commandant de cercle made a show of force by sending the Administrateur Adjoint and twelve gardes de cercle to the region to recruit the prestataires. In addition, the French sacked

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1. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.

2. AN 2G25-43 Senegal RPA 1925.

3. ANSOM - Affaires Politiques-C598 D4-Senegal RPA 1929.

the uncooperative chiefs of Pointe St. Georges and Floups to replace them with younger chiefs who it was hoped would be more sympathetic to French aims.<sup>1</sup>

During the period of economic crisis, there are several instances of resistance to prestations in the Basse Casamance. Protestors included veterans of the First World War and the Catholics who disliked the Freemason spirit of the colonial administration and its policy of appointing Muslim and animist chiefs in the Basse Casamance. In April 1930, a group of "Portuguese" (immigrants from Portuguese Guinea) led by Pere Esvans demonstrated in the town of Ziguinchor against Sunday work, on the grounds that it was "une révolution dans les habitudes". They also threatened to complain to the League of Nations about being made to carry out road works under duress.<sup>2</sup>

Distrusting the chief of Essyngnes, the French entrusted the recruitment of prestataires in this canton in 1930 to the chef de canton of Brin Séléki, Tete Sagna, and a garde de cercle, Mamadou Traore.<sup>3</sup> On arriving at the village of Dialeng, Tete Sagna and the guard discovered that the chef de village, Issagna was away at a funeral in a neighbouring village. When they asked a child to seek out the chief and order him to return at once, a former tirailleur, Marka, intervened, telling the child not to bother. A scuffle broke out between Marka and the guard, but once the former had been overpowered, he called his fellow villagers to his rescue. At this moment, the chef de village and Alepa, another tirailleur, arrived, and attacked Tete Sagna and the guard, who both fled. An hour later, the commandant de cercle Reynier, informed of the village's recalcitrance, arrived, and arrested those who had taken part in the attack so that the recruitment of prestataires could go ahead. The chef de village and two tirailleurs were sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment at Ziguinchor while two others received a year's sentence. In 1934, of the sixty seven offences reported by the chefs de canton to the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor which were punishable under the Indigenat, twenty seven related to ill will in performing prestations.<sup>4</sup>

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1. ARSD 2G29-91 Casamance RPA 1929.
  2. 2G30-60 Casamance RPM August 1930.
  3. 2G30-60 Casamance RPM October 1930.
  4. ARSD 2G34-68 Ziguinchor RPA 1934.

Despite resistance of this kind, an extensive road network was constructed in the Basse Casamance in the interwar period. The establishment of the commandement indigène in Ziguinchor and Bignona benefitted road construction which grew from a single track in 1921 to 1302 km. of roads suitable for vehicles by 1923.<sup>1</sup>

Between 1927 and 1928, a road was constructed from Tobor linking Ziguinchor to the rest of the Casamance where previously a ferry had been necessary. Arfan Sonko, the chef de canton of Djougouttes Nord volunteered for this arduous task, after consulting his chefs de village and notables at Bessire, his chef-lieu.<sup>2</sup> Work began after the harvest, in December 1927. The section Arfan Sonko was dealing with was eight kilometers long, across mangrove forests and swamps. Fifteen thousand men from the canton of Djougouttes took thirty days to clear the mangroves and fifty days to build the road. Many contracted skin disease from their work in the swamps, but the chief and his followers kept the villagers at work. Women were brought from the villages of Djougouttes Nord to cook for the prestataires.

In 1941, Arfan Sonko was again employed by the colonial administration to recruit workers to replace the wooden supports on which the road across the swamp was built with stone ones.<sup>3</sup> One hundred and sixty canoes were used to bring stones to the area, a task which took over five months.

#### The Second Contingent From the Annual Conscription

The second portion were also recruited by the chiefs who were responsible for ensuring that all young men between the ages of 19 and 28 presented themselves to the commission of recruitment annually, and for seeking out absentees.<sup>4</sup> The drawing of lots determined who joined the first contingent consisting of soldiers, who was assigned to the second contingent, and who was released. The second contingent remained at home, at the disposal of the military authorities for three years.<sup>5</sup> During this period, they could be called up to participate in public works projects necessary to the economic development of the colony. After this, they became part of the military reserve.

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1. ARSD 2G23-54 Ziguinchor RPT fourth quarter 1923.
  2. From an interview with and unpublished article by Ibrahima Sonko.
  3. Ibid.
  4. See Ch. 6 on "The Role of Chiefs in Conscription".
  5. G.Peter, L'Effort Français au Sénégal, Paris 1933, pp.351-352.



Sometimes, as shown below, the number of workers required for the second contingent ("deuxième portion") outstripped the number of military recruits, but the total number of those who joined up was a relatively small percentage of the population of the cercle concerned. For example, in the cercles of Thies, Bignona and Ziguinchor:

Cercle	1929		1931	
	1st Contingent (soldiers)	2nd Contingent (workers)	1st Contingent	2nd Contingent
Thies	256	230	177	214
Bignona	55(+ 30 for navy)	69	31	37
Ziguinchor	n.a.	n.a.	20	93

Work was arranged along military lines and the men were formed into companies under the direction of technicians. Although less is known of the Second Contingent than of the main body of conscripts, it would appear that the work of the former was even more taxing without the same benefits as the soldiers received. Recruitment for this contingent was thus even less popular than that for the army among local people.

Generally, this system did not meet with much success in Senegal. As with the conscription of soldiers, chiefs sometimes tried to keep back the fittest workers rather than sending them for medical inspection for the second contingent. In a circular to the commandants de cercle in 1933, the Governor noted that the number of healthy people presented to the recruiting commission had dropped, and ascribed this to deliberate errors on the part of the chiefs.<sup>2</sup> Workers would often feign sickness in order to escape from their tasks.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike prestataires, workers in the second contingent could be sent to other colonies for these "travaux d'intérêt généraux". They took part in projects like the Dakar-Niger railway during the 1930s and an irrigation scheme for the Niger just before the Second World War.<sup>4</sup> The hundred or so workers in the contingent involved in the building of the railway would probably have taken part in the September 1938 strike, which began in Thies, but spread to Dakar.<sup>5</sup>

1. Table compiled from figures in 2G29-99 Thies RPA 1929, 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931, 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929 and 2G31-74 Cosamance RPA 1931.

2. ARSD 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 30 September 1933.

3. Peter, *op.cit.*, pp.351-352.

4. ARSD 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931.

5. N. Bernard-Duquenet, "Le Front Populaire au Sénégal," Troisième cycle, unpublished, Paris VII, 1977.

In order to stop defections, Muller, in his inspection of conscription in 1929, urged the Government of Senegal to improve the conditions of the three companies of the second contingent stationed in the colony.<sup>1</sup> The first company consisting of 150 men was stationed at St. Louis, for public works projects there, while the second and third companies consisting of fifty men apiece were working on the Thies-Niger railway. Muller wanted these camps to be provided with medical services, showers and food paid for by the administration. He suggested that rather than becoming soldiers, volunteers with specialist qualifications should be made to join the second contingent. Towards the end of the 1930s, chiefs were being encouraged to find recruits for the second contingent who were literate in French and had special skills.<sup>2</sup>

#### Forced Labour: Reforms

No reforms in the sphere of prestations had taken place since the original legislation of 1912. At the ILO conference on forced labour at Geneva in 1929, Blaise Diagne, the Senegalese deputy and delegate for the Tardieu government clashed with Leon Jouhaux, the secretary to the French CGT, over forced labour.<sup>3</sup> The fact that every male between the ages of sixteen and fifty had to carry out prestations would indicate that forced labour was widespread in Senegal. It should be noted, however, that whether or not prestataires were actually required to do the full quota of workdays would depend very much on administrative plans for the cercle. Diagne argued that the practice of forced labour was vindicated by the peculiar circumstances of the AOF, where labour was vital for economic development, but was in short supply. The official French position was for a "volonté formelle d'une suppression progressive de ce mode de travail, maintien temporaire des requisitions de travailleurs pour les seuls travaux publics".<sup>4</sup>

As far as the French were concerned, the resolutions of the conference that a colonial government should not intervene to provide manpower for private enterprise, that Africans should be allowed to circulate freely, and formally condemning

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-3062/41 Muller, "Report on the implementation of the decree of 31 October 1926 establishing the Second Contingent", 1929.
  2. 2G34-68 Ziguinchor RPA 1934 and ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598D4-Senegal RPA 1938.
  3. G. Wesley Johnson, "Centenaire de Blaise Diagne", Notes Africaines, No. 135, July 1972, p.93.
  4. ARSD K120(26) Decree of 21 August 1930 on "Travail Public Obligatoire dans l'AOF".

forced labour were in total opposition to their practices in the AOF. However, the ILO conference embarrassed the Government General of the AOF into introducing more legislation to curb the abuses inherent in this institution. But in their new legislation, the French made a clear distinction between "travail obligatoire public" on the one hand and the military obligations of their subjects and the requisitions of manpower in times of disaster on the other. At the same time, they distinguished between "travail obligatoire public" and "travaux de village", which had long roots in custom as the natural obligations of any community. This meant any work in the village not involving skill or special tools like weeding, keeping up footpaths and village squares and keeping the streets and buildings clean, all of which came under the orders of the chef de village.<sup>1</sup>

In the circular of 12 September 1930, Governor General Carde was willing to concede to all subjects the right to pay a sum of money instead of doing prestations because of the availability of voluntary labour.<sup>2</sup> Those choosing to buy back prestations were given three months instead of one in which to pay. The absolute maximum number of days an individual could perform prestations was to be fixed at ten throughout the AOF, and each prestataire was to be given a certificate indicating the periods of forced labour he had worked. Prestataires could be used only for local work, and could not be called to a work site in a neighbouring canton unless this was no further than the furthest site in their own. Prestations during the period of cultivation were forbidden. The Governor of each colony in the Council of Administration was to fix the maximum number of days of prestations, the rachats and the sum allocated to the daily ration of food, if the prestataire was working over five kilometers from home. The programme of prestations was to be worked out in May of each year; in the case of the communes mixtes, by mayors after consultation with municipal commissions and in the case of rural areas by the commandant de cercle or chef de subdivision in consultation with the conseils de notables. If possible the rachats were to be used to benefit the area in which it was collected, for example, to increase the number of tools available in local workshops.

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1. ARSD K 120(26) Decree of 21 August 1930.

2. K120 (26) Governor General Carde to Governors, 12 September 1930.

Further legislation introduced on 18 February 1933 established a commission of recruitment for public works to keep an eye on the practice of forced labour in each cercle.<sup>1</sup> This was to consist of the commandant de cercle or his representative, a doctor and the chef de canton or de province. In addition, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, the chefs de service de Santé, and chefs de subdivision were to be Inspectors of "travail public obligatoire". The maximum age of prestataires was lowered to forty five and the minimum raised to eighteen. Prestataires were to work a nine hour day at most, with a two hour break at midday. The list of exemptions from the rachat was lengthened to include all chiefs, civil servants, workers on long-term contracts, and anyone who could prove he had worked six months on a public works project within the last five years. All prestataires were to be vaccinated against smallpox during the first five days of work. But although the number of days prestations was restricted to ten, the administration reserved the right to call up subjects to do up to six months "travail public obligatoire" in one year.

Restrictions were also placed on the use of Africans as porters.<sup>2</sup> The maximum weight to be carried by a porter was not to exceed 25 kg. and he could not be expected to cover a distance greater than that separating the chefs-lieux of two neighbouring cercles. The carrying of Europeans by Africans was abolished except in cases where it was impossible to find animals to perform that task.

During the Popular Front era, efforts were made to improve the conditions of workers in many areas. Trade unions were legalised on 11 March 1937, but membership was restricted to those with a certificate of primary education who were fluent in French.<sup>3</sup> Although this did not in general help the prestataires or second contingent they benefitted from the introduction of the eight-hour day and forty-hour week.

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1. K120 (26) Decision of 18 February 1933.
  2. K120(26) Decree of 18 February 1933 regulating the transportation of administrative personnel and equipment by requisitioned manpower.
  3. N. Bernard Duquet, "Les débuts du syndicalisme au Sénégal au temps du Front Populaire", Mouvement Social, October to December 1977.
  4. K105 (26) Governor General de Coppel to Governor of Soudan, 3 May 1937.

Labourers on public works projects were to be paid a salary of 0.75 francs a day, with perhaps a bonus ranging from 0.5 to one franc a day depending on the effectiveness of their work. This compared favourably with the tirailleurs' salary of one franc a day. Workers of the second contingent were to receive half pay in hospital. The heirs of a worker who died as the result of an accident at work were to receive one thousand francs, and two thousand if this was shown to be due to negligence on the part of the service employing him.

During the 1930s the practice of consulting the conseils de notables on the plan of campaign for prestations became increasingly common. It was their task to divide the number of manpower days available between the various jobs which had to be done in the cercle, and they often met more than once a year. In 1933, the Annual Assembly of the Conseil de Notables in Ziguinchor was faced with the task of dividing up 72,000 manpower days as efficiently as possible for the 1934 plan of campaign.<sup>1</sup> In the same year, this council even discussed a five year plan for prestations.<sup>2</sup>

#### Forced Labour: Abuses and "Cultures Obligatoires"

Despite these reforms, abuses in the practice of prestations, particularly by the chiefs and their followers continued, and were frequently cited by citizen members of the Colonial Council. Prestataires were generally badly equipped and directed. The chiefs often behaved like "petits roitelets de brousse",<sup>3</sup> encouraging their diarafs and the gardes de cercle present to employ force to extract greater efforts from the prestataires. In some cases, horsewhips were used on roadworkers.<sup>4</sup> Diarafs supervising prestations sometimes demanded money or gifts from the workers. Macodou Sall wrote to the chief of Thimakha about a complaint against one of the latter's diarafs in 1929.<sup>5</sup> Work areas were often situated very far from villages, yet cultivators

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1. ARSD 2G33 - 61 Ziguinchor RPA 1933.

2. Ibid.

3. Périscopé Africain, 23 May 1931.

4. Interview with Soyibou Bassene, a village elder, Séléki.

5. 1Z57 Macodou Sall to chef de canton of Thilmakha, 13 October 1929.

were reimbursed neither for travel nor food. In 1923, Alioune Gueye, an elected councillor told his colleagues that Boubakar N'dene N'diaye, the chef de canton of Diokoul Gandiaye in the Sine Saloum had done just this when he sent 370 people to work at an airfield at Pont Noiro, thirty kilometers from their village.<sup>1</sup>

So frequently was the legislation banning prestations during periods of cultivation ignored, that the Colonial Council saw fit to pass a measure in 1935 forbidding prestations between June and October.<sup>2</sup> Some elected councillors alleged in 1927 that people coming to chiefs with requests to pay money instead of doing prestations were turned away or even imprisoned to oblige them to change their minds.<sup>3</sup>

A third main category of forced labour, the practice of "cultures obligatoires", gave rise to numerous abuses. The administration sometimes used the chiefs to make their subjects cultivate crops it required which it would then buy on the cheap. Alioune Gueye revealed at the October 1923 session of the Colonial Council that on the orders of the commandant de cercle, chiefs in Sine Saloum had forced the inhabitants of some villages to grow millet using land which could have been used for groundnut fields (lougans)<sup>4</sup>. The administration, which needed the millet for feeding prisoners and horses at the Kaolack residence, offered the cultivators derisory prices for it. Where cultivators could have obtained 60 to 70 francs for 100 kg. of millet from traders, they were receiving only 30 francs from the administration. The chiefly members of the Colonial Council strongly denied these charges, arguing that the fields for millet cultivation were held in common by all villagers.

In many cases, the chiefs themselves took advantage of the French practice of "cultures obligatoires" to make people work on their fields for little or no reward, claiming that this was customary. As late as 1938, an administrative enquiry concluded that unpaid work for the chiefs was generally accepted by their subjects.<sup>5</sup> Cases concerning the use of forced labour by the chiefs were often exposed in the

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1. Colonial Council PV, second sitting, 17 October 1923.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 17 June 1935.
  3. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 14 June 1927.
  4. Colonial Council PV, second sitting, 17 October 1923.
  5. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.

local press. Périscopé Africain accused Dongo Fall of Diack, Thies, in 1931 of making his subjects cultivate his fields without paying them, claiming that as a descendant of the Teigne (king) of Baol, he was entitled to their labour.<sup>1</sup>

The French usually turned a blind eye to these practices from which they benefitted. Firstly, the ability of the chiefs to extract free labour from their subjects saved the administration from having to pay the former a living wage, and was euphemistically termed part of their "frais de representation". Secondly, chiefs would often send dishonest commandants de cercle part of the harvest or part of their profits in order to ensure they were not reported to higher authorities.

One of the more notorious cases of the abuse of customary work on the chief's field is the case of Bocar Bâ, the chef de canton of Kalounayes and Kadiamoutes Sud from 1936 to 1937. Although Bocar claimed to have the support of the commandant de cercle of Bignona, in using customary labour for his fields, the Administration Supérieure felt obliged to open an enquiry into his activities and to subsequently dismiss him. This was partly because Bocar made use of this labour on a larger scale than most chiefs. His project involved the planting of 8 tonnes 150 kg. of groundnut seeds over an area of 150 to 160 hectares in 41 villages in his two cantons. As the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Tasson commented "Il n'a pas manqué de commercialiser son emploi".<sup>2</sup> Moreover, opposition to him had crystallized on several fronts for a variety of reasons. He was on bad terms with Administrateur Supérieur Chartier of the Casamance, he was unpopular as a stranger, a Peul in a predominantly Diola region and a Muslim in a canton composed largely of animists with a proselytising Catholic mission. The Catholic priests bore Bocar a grudge as he had married a Catholic girl and persuaded her to convert to Islam, and had made them rebuild their church on the grounds that it stood too near the mosque. Finally, Bocar was generally disliked by his subjects for his harsh methods of justice like beating those who failed to take part in the struggle against locusts.

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1. Périscopé Africain, 23 May 1931.

2. ARSD 13 G29 (17) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Tasson, "Report on the Bocar Bâ affair", 23 February 1937, hereafter referred to as Tasson-"The Bocar Bâ Affair".

After the commandant de cercle received anonymous complaints against Bocar Bâ, an enquiry was opened at the tribunal répressif du premier degré at Bignona. The charges were two fold; firstly, that he had beaten someone who had refused to carry out prestations, causing his death two days later, and secondly that he had forced people to work on his fields for derisory sums.

Bocar Bâ was acquitted of the first charge as evidence against him was contradictory and inconclusive. The prestataire's death was alleged to have taken place in 1935 at the village of Tankaron during the census tournée the chief was making with a follower, Malan Coudiaby and a garde de cercle.<sup>1</sup> His companions and others claimed that Bocar Bâ had hit no one and that the victim, Aminda Sane, had a stomach ache and was not even present. Suspicion was aroused by the fact that Aminda Sane's family had brought the charges two years after the event. It appeared that the charge arose from the intrigues of Racine Diakhité, a Wolof and stranger to the region, Ibou Cissé, and Bocar's secretary Sekou Danfa who coveted his position. They had persuaded three Diolas, Babakar Sane, Aminda's son and the chef de village of Tankaron, and Kekouta and Faly Sane to testify against Bocar.

After Bocar's acquittal on both charges, Chartier invited the Inspector of Administrative Affairs to open a further enquiry into the second charge. It transpired that Bocar had given the chiefs of 41 villages sacks of seeds which he borrowed from the Société de Prévoyance, to be planted by the young people of the village. He paid the chefs de village 25 francs for preparing the land and 50 to 75 francs for weeding the fields and for the harvest. While he himself made a profit of 21,000 francs, he paid the workers a paltry sum for their services. The inhabitants of the village of Tendine received only 35 francs for planting 192 kgs. of seeds where the normal pay would have been 825 francs. All the young people interviewed maintained they would not have worked for Bocar had he not been chef de canton.<sup>2</sup>

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1. 13G29 (17) Report by the commandant de cercle of Bignona, 15 June 1937, and from the private papers of Bocar Bâ.
  2. 13G29 (17) Tasson- "The Bocar Bâ Affair."



On 15 April 1937, Bocar was dismissed from both his posts as chief for "abusing his position", and the cultivators were compensated from the sale of seeds. It is interesting to note that in a letter to the Governor two months later, Governor General de Coppet expressed doubts that the commandant de cercle of Bignona Valentin had been ignorant as to what was happening, particularly after he had been alerted by both the Administrateur Supérieur and missionaries.<sup>1</sup>

Similar instances of exactions of customary dues by chiefs occurred in Thies. In 1939, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Therond, opened an enquiry into a complaint by the inhabitants of the village of Didjem Ouloff, Thor Diander, against their chief, Matar Diop. They accused him of making people work on his banana field for his benefit alone.<sup>2</sup> Precedents for Matar's action lay in the fact that during the time of Faidherbe, prestataires had been made to cultivate this banana field to feed troops in a nearby fort. When the soldiers left, the banana field was given to the incumbent chef de canton. On his death, the field came into the hands of Matar's father, but the tradition that the owner should give some of this fruit to the administration and that the field should be kept up by prestataires were maintained. When he acquired the fields on his father's death, Matar Diop promised the administration that he would maintain the banana field to supply the residence at Thies. In exchange he was to be allowed to keep it if he did his job well. Matar continued to send the commandant de cercle a lorryload of bananas every year, and to make use of prestataire labour, but when Maestracci took command of Thies, Matar started to keep the whole harvest. When prestataires from neighbouring villages forced to work on the banana field realised the commandant de cercle was no longer behind Matar, they started to make complaints against him. The Lebou in particular resented being obliged to work by a Wolof chief. Matar also tried to use prestataire manpower to extend his own fields. As a result of its enquiries, the administration decided to deprive Matar of his field.

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1. 13G29 (17) Governor General de Coppet to Governor, 10 June 1937.
  2. ARSD 13G43(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Therond, "Report on the subdivision of Thies", 16 July 1939.

Numerous complaints about prestations prompted the administration to begin an enquiry into forced labour in 1939.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the French resolved to persuade the chiefs to do away with these dues by giving them sufficiently high salaries and by educating them in their own methods of administration. The administration hoped that if prestations were replaced by a tax, subjects would soon refuse to execute personal services for their chiefs.

#### The Replacement of Prestations By Additional Tax

In the course of the 1930s, there was a switch from forced to voluntary labour. As early as 1931, the commandant de cercle of Thies wrote to the Governor calling for an extension of the system of paying money instead of doing forced labour. He pointed out that prestations had not been employed in his cercle for several years as voluntary labour was forthcoming and forced labour was recognised to be less efficient than wage labour.<sup>2</sup> By 1935, the administration realised that insufficient time was being given to people to declare that they wished to buy back prestations and for chiefs to publicise the rachat.<sup>3</sup> In a circular to the commandants de cercle, the Governor wrote that many who were evading prestations would have preferred to pay, had they been given the chance to do so.

The benefits of the rachat were shown in 1938, when a road between Thies and Tivaouane was built solely by penal manpower and day workers paid from the rachat, under the supervision of chefs de canton Massamba Sall of Ndoutte Diassane, and Lat Fatim Sall of Thor Diander.<sup>4</sup>

By the late 1930s, the demand for full time specialist labour increased. Prestataires had been unable to work during the period of cultivation and traite and their work had often been unsatisfactory. The argument for the extension of paid manpower throughout Senegal was assisted by the fact that those cercles which

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1. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.

2. ARSD 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931.

3. 13G33(18) Governor to commandants de cercle, 9 April 1935.

4. Périscopes Africain, 5 March 1938.

already possessed it, like Kaolack, Thies and Louga, seemed to have made the greatest material progress. The spread of the rachat meant that the administration could use the money to buy machinery so that fewer labourers were required for each task. With urbanisation, the source of manpower shifted from the countryside to the towns, and the growth of the educated sector of the population also accelerated the trend to wage labour.

Reform of the regime of prestations began under the Popular Front government, In 1936, the number of days of prestations was reduced to four in Senegal and the rachat was fixed at a level of five francs a day.<sup>1</sup> Prestations were in future to be used for non-specialised work only.

With the approval of the chiefs and conseils de notables, the administration decided to abolish prestations in Senegal from January 1938 in the following cercles, and replace them with the "additional tax", to be collected by the chiefs:

Cercle	additional tax (francs)
Louga	7
Thies	7
Banlieue de Rufisque	7
Sine Saloum	6
Baol	6
Ziguinchor	8
Bignona	9
Sedhiou	8
Kolda	8 (2)

It will be noted that tariffs were slightly higher in the Casamance, as labour was not in such plentiful supply as in the north. In the less developed cercles of Podor, Matam, Bakel, Tambacounda, Kedougou, Linguère and Bas-Sénégal, prestations continued and the rachat remained approximately equal to the average wage of the skilled worker, that is to say, between five and seven francs according to the region.<sup>3</sup> The chiefs were to continue to help with the road works programme.

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1. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  2. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, fifth sitting, 27 October 1937.
  3. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1938-according to the decision of 11 June 1937.

cle	prestataires on rolls	prestataires used	rachat (fs)	No. of prest- ataires buying back prestat- ions	total receipts (fs)	( 1 )	( 2 ) (fs)
-Sénégal	29656	3000	4 days @ 6 fs 24	3	72	675	4500
lor	75080	18000	4 days @ 5 fs 20	127	2172	nil	nil
tam	107368	26690	4 days @ 5 fs 20	244	4820	1768	3536
el	51436	38400	4 days @ 5 fs 20	760	11460	12798	12785
dougou	24360	5632	4 days @ 5 fs 20	573	12680	3000	nil
guère	55676	5981	4 days @ 5 fs 20	4426	91711	nil	nil
nbacounda	50376	12173	4 days @ 6 fs 24	178	4290	15000	15348(1)

= No. of prestataires on rations.

= Total expenditure on rations.

However, the elected citizen councillors had mixed feeling about an additional tax, which they felt would be a greater burden on the people than prestations in kind. They argued that instead of doing four days of forced labour, people would have to go several days without food in order to pay the tax. The chiefly councillors on the other hand felt the people would prefer to pay the Additional Tax. Massamba Sall expressed this by asking "pourquoi le Conseil Colonial qui toujours s'était dressée contre les prestations en nature refuse aujourd'hui de donner son approbation? Je précise que l'indigène préfère payer de travailler sous un soleil ardent."<sup>2</sup> Abdoul Salam Kane, the chef de canton of Matam, asked for lorries to transport workers in the cercles which were still subject to the ruling on prestations. Bakel, for example, had several hundred kilometers of road to keep up yet could not afford to buy vehicles itself.<sup>3</sup>

Additional tax was gradually extended to all the cercles of Senegal in the late 1930s and early 1940s, replacing prestations. In the August 1938 session of the Colonial Council, the additional tax was introduced to Linguère and Bas Sénégal, and tariffs in some cercles were modified.

Senegal RPA 1938, from table "Situation des cercles à prestations".

Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 16 June 1938.

Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 4 November 1939.

cercle	additional tax (fs)
Linguère	7
Bas-Sénégal	2
Kaolack	8 (a rise of 2 francs)
Thies	8 (a rise of 2 francs)
Bignona	8 (a drop of 1 franc). (1)

Tariffs in Kaolack and Thies were raised to provide for major road works projected for these cercles, but in the case of Bignona, the tariff was lowered to unify the Casmanace tariffs.

Over the period 1940-42, the administration obtained the consent of the conseils de notables to raise Additional Tax in a number of cercles, and also to introduce it to Podor, Matam and Bakel (which had become a subdivision of Matam).

1940	Cercle	New tariffs (fs)
	St. Louis	8 (a rise of 50%, as for other communes and communes mixtes)
	Podor	2
	Matam	2
	Diourbel	8 (a rise of 1 franc)
	Kaolack	9 (a rise of 1 franc)
	Foundiougne	9 (new cercle)
	Ziguinchor	9 (a rise of 1 franc)
	(including the subdivisions of Bignona+ Sedhiou)	
	Kolda	9 (a rise of 1 franc)

1942 - New tariffs (francs)

Cercle	1941	1942
Bas-Senegal	2	4
Podor	2	4
Matam	2	4
Louga	7	8
Thies	8	10
Kaolack	9	10
Foundiougne	9	10 (2)

By 1940, the benefits of additional tax as far as the administration was

- 1) 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940 and ANSOM Senegal RPA 1941.
- 2) ARSD 13G91 (180) Maestracci, commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 26 March 1938.

concerned could clearly be seen. In cercles where the new system operated, the chefs de canton could collect the tax at the same time as personal tax, and were thus released from collecting the rachat at an inconvenient period; that is to say, at the same time as the recovery of groundnuts after the harvest.<sup>1</sup> Additional Tax helped the development of road transport and other communications as the large sums it brought in facilitated the purchase of machinery and the employment of technicians. More ambitious projects could thus be conceived. The growing importance of Additional Tax is clearly shown in the following table:

Cercle	total amount of additional tax collected(francs)	
	1938	1942
Bas-Sénégal	Prestations	18,343
Podor	Prestations	218,461
Matam	Prestations)	323,024
Bakel	Prestations)	
Louga	643,510	810,976
Linguère	Prestations	238,175
Thies	1,077,112	1,618,400
Diourbel	819,318	1,086,960
Kaolack	1,735,432	1,032,768
Foundiougne	part of Kaolack	1,108,930
Ziguinchor	673,286	1,177,866
Bignona	not available	part of Ziguinchor
Sedhiou	419,872	part of Ziguinchor
Kolda	428,101	419,790 (2)

Prestations persisted in Tambacounda and Kedougou, where they were not finally abolished till 1944. In 1941 and 1942, the rachat rose to take account of the minimum wage for workers in the two cercles:

Cercle	Rachat of prestations (francs)		
	1940	1941	1942
Kedougou	5	6	7 fs 50
Tambacounda	6	7	9 (3)

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- 1) Table compiled from figures in Senegal RPA 1938 and 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.
- 2) Table compiled from figures in 2G39-34, 2G40-2 and 2G42-1.
- 3) Figures from Senegal RPA 1938 and 2G42-1, Section: Travail obligatoire.

The replacement of prestations by additional tax was not as revolutionary as it might first appear, nor did it mean an end to forced labour. The administration was still prepared to constrain people to work as a final resort, when voluntary manpower was lacking or when road repairs were urgent, as for example after the rainy season.

In the three most "backward" cercles, Matam, Tambacounda and Kedougou, requisitions continued on a regular basis during the Second World War for porters, ferrymen and vehicles, both for administrative purposes and for private enterprise. Pay for requisitioned labour was low in 1938, at 3-6 francs a day for porters, but rose to 8-9 francs a day by 1942, while ferrymen were paid 10-20 francs daily.<sup>1</sup> In the course of 1944, 500 workers in all were requisitioned by Kedougou cercle for the sisal manufacturing works, the Compagnie des Cultures Tropicales, while 70 workers a month were being provided for the sisal works at Soucoto (Kolda). In the same year, 3200 men were requisitioned to work on the rice plantations in Podor.<sup>2</sup>

In the Casamance too, the abolition of prestations simply involved a change in etiquette. Many Diola continued to be reluctant to participate in road works, so that the commandant de cercle had to resort to "persuasion", the only difference being that this forced labour was now paid. Often surveillance increased, as each chef de canton now possessed a register of cultivators and the number of days they had worked.<sup>3</sup>

The Vichy regime, still faced with the problems of labour shortage, was anxious lest the demand for manpower might encourage an abandonment of the land, giving rise to a proletariat. It was confronted with the contradiction of "L'Afrique doit rester paysanne, et pourtant, elle doit s'équiper."<sup>4</sup> For the Vichyistes, the situation lay in the maintenance of traditional values. The rural

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†) Figures from Senegal RPA 1938 and 2G42-1 Travail obligatoire.

2) 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.

3) 13G91 (180) Captain Chapoutier, commandant de cercle of Bignona, to Administrateur Supérieur, 5 April 1938.

4) ARSD 13G34(180) P. Boisson, circular 600C, "Trois Directives de Colonisation Africaine", 21 August 1942.

population was to remain attached to the soil continuing to carry out seasonal work on public works projects outside the hivernage. In addition, the number of workers employed by public and private concerns was to be limited and the eventual replacement of men by machines speeded up.<sup>1</sup>

Boisson in his "Trois Directives de Colonisation Africaine" stressed that where subjects could not be persuaded to carry out a public works projects they would still have to be coerced. The "travaux de village" remained compulsory and in 1941, the chiefs of certain villages received orders to recruit people to construct quarantine centres as part of the struggle against sleeping sickness, and to remove areas of stagnant water in the villages.<sup>2</sup> The people greatly resented such corvées as they had been led to believe that these had ended with additional tax. The requisitions of crops and animals from the population in the Second World War may be considered as a disguised form of forced labour, and will be examined in a subsequent chapter.<sup>3</sup>

By the Decree of 10 October 1944, the Additional Tax was transformed into a local tax, the taxe vicinale, which had a totally different character from personal tax. The tax vicinale entailed the establishment of a common fund of 10% of the total receipts to finance cercles most in need of public works projects.<sup>4</sup>

With the end of the War, the Constituent National Assembly dealt a death blow to forced labour in the AOF with the decrees of 22 December 1945 and 20 February 1946 against the Indigénat, and the suppression of forced labour on 11 April 1946 mooted by Houphouët Boigny. The Lois Lamine Gueye granting French citizenship to all inhabitants of overseas territories in 1946 meant there would be no further distinctions between subject and citizens as far as labour regulations were concerned.

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1. 13G34(180) Governor of Senegal, "Rapport succinct au sujet de la circulaire 600C du Haut Commissaire de l'Afrique Française", c.1941.
  2. AN 2G42-73 Sedhiou RPT second quarter 1942.
  3. See Ch. 5 on "The Chiefs' Role in Agriculture."
  4. 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.



Thus, until the late 1930s, the use of forced labour to improve communications proved relatively successful from an administrative point of view. The road network in the AOF grew from practically nothing in 1914 to 58,000 kilometers by 1940. But international opinion, local pressure from prominent citizens, urbanisation and the spread of education forced the French to abandon forced in favour of voluntary labour in their more advanced colonies like Senegal. This weakened the chiefs, who had relied on being able to obtain free services from their people as a substitute for a real chiefly wage. Prior to the widespread introduction of Additional Tax in 1938, many local European officials had also benefitted from the chiefs' practice of making people work on their fields for little or no pay and had turned a blind eye to this practice.

## CHAPTER FIVE

The Role of the Chiefs in Agriculture

The start of the period under consideration, 1919, coincides with the launching of the Plan Sarraut, a new policy for development (mise en valeur) for the AOF. We have already seen that the imposition of taxation and corvées on the local population formed an integral part of the plan to exploit the AOF's resources. For Sarraut, the Minister of Colonies between 1920 and 1925, the AOF held great potential as "le grand réservoir de matières grasses".<sup>1</sup> Plans for development in Senegal, lacking in mineral resources, concentrated largely on promoting cash crops. In practical terms, this meant a trend towards monoculture, as the groundnut had already proved the most viable commercial crop for Senegal. It had been introduced to West Africa from South America by Portuguese slave traders in the late fourteenth century but was not commercialised till 1850, when the Government of Senegal decided to abandon rubber as a cash crop.<sup>3</sup> During the calm of the interwar period, cultivation of the groundnut spread throughout Senegal, with major effects on Senegalese society. The cultivation of this crop and the fluctuation in its price on the world market gradually came to dominate the lives of the majority of Senegalese cultivators. As late as 1950, the President of the Société de Prévoyance of Louga wrote to the chef de province of Guet: "Vous savez tous que la vie du pays est subordonnée aux semences d'arachides."<sup>4</sup>

As in their other functions, the chiefs were expected by the colonial power to act as intermediaries in the field of agriculture, persuading the rural population to accept French projects. Much of this activity was to be within the framework of the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance

1. M. Michel, "Le concours de l'AOF à la France pendant la première guerre mondiale", Thèse d'état, Paris I, 1979, p. 950.
2. J. Fouquet, La traite des arachides dans les pays de Kaolack et ses conséquences économiques, sociales et juridiques, St. Louis, 1958, p. 19.
3. G. Peter, L'effort français au Sénégal, Paris 1933, pp. 53-54.
4. ARSD 1Z61 Circular from the President of the Société de Prévoyance of Louga to the chefs de province of that cercle, 23 November 1956. By this date, the word "indigène" had been dropped from the title of the Société de Prévoyance as this caused offence to many Senegalese.

(SIPs). The principal aim of these provident societies, first developed in Algeria in the 1880s,<sup>1</sup> was to protect cultivators against usurers, who, it was alleged, had previously loaned them groundnut seeds at such extortionate rates of interest that they were forced to sell their whole harvest to repay their debt. This set up a vicious cycle, as without seeds for further sowings, the cultivator had to borrow from the traders again. The interest on loans from Libano-Syrians was sometimes as much as 100%, to be repaid within six months.<sup>2</sup> The colonial government concluded that "La population, obérée par des dettes, ne s'en libérera jamais si elle est laissée à elle-même."<sup>3</sup> The SIPs were therefore set up in the first instance to loan groundnut seeds to cultivators which would be repaid at a reasonable rate of interest (20% by 1919)<sup>4</sup> and to store seed and food crops. These societies were gradually introduced into each cercle of Senegal from 1909 onwards, starting with Kaolack, Baol and Tivaouane.<sup>5</sup> The cercles of the Casamance were among the last to obtain such societies just before 1919. Initially, membership of the societies was voluntary and the Presidents were local notables.

But by the decision of 8 January 1915, membership of the SIPs and payment of an annual subscription became compulsory for all adult male subjects, while citizens were excluded from membership.<sup>6</sup> The commandant de cercle was to be President. Women were at first excluded from these societies until 1936 when Tixier after a Mission of Inspection, suggested that those women cultivating on their own account should be admitted as members.<sup>7</sup> The chiefs were to take note of

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1. K. Robinson, "The Sociétés de Prévoyance in French West Africa", Journal of African Administration, vol.II, No.4, October 1950, p.29.
  2. Fouquet, op.cit., p.65.
  3. Peter, op. cit., p.95.
  4. A circular of 20 June 1903 had recommended that reserve granaries be set up in each village, with rates of interest on the repayment of seeds at 5%.
  5. Peter, op.cit., p.95.
  6. Fouquet, op.cit., pp.65-66.
  7. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C630 D3-Mission Tixier- "Inspection of the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance of Senegal", 1936-37.

such women during the annual census. These societies had been established throughout Senegal by 1919, and between 1911 and 1935, the number of members grew from 150, 382 to 1,200,000.<sup>1</sup>

During the annual census, the chiefs or their agents were able to collect information useful to the colonial administration in planning a strategy for the SIPs. They were supposed to record details of the seeds distributed annually by the SIPs, the weight of seeds sown, the area given to various crops, the number and ethnicity of the navetanes (seasonal workers), the number of sowers, hoes, wells and warehouses belonging to the SIPs and the industries and food resources of an area.<sup>2</sup>

But more important, the chiefs played a key role in the organisation of the SIPs. According to the decree of 4 July 1919, chiefs could now become presidents of these societies.<sup>3</sup> Meissa M'Baye Sall, the chef de province of Saniokhor, was for a brief period President of the SIP of Tivaouane.<sup>4</sup> But fearing it might lose control of the SIPs to the chiefs, the administration soon reasserted its influence over these societies. The legislation of 5 December 1923 therefore ruled that a European administrator had to hold the Presidency.<sup>5</sup>

The 1919 legislation established a SIP in each cercle, which was divided into a number of sections corresponding to a canton or group of cantons. The chefs de canton and de province could be members of both the commission of the section and of the Council of Administration. The commissions of the section were to be composed of at least five members, in theory to be chosen according to local custom by the society members of the section.<sup>6</sup> In practice, however, the chefs de canton were able to dominate these commissions, co-opting their

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C630 D8-Mission Demongin-"Inspection of the SIPs of Senegal", 1935-36.
  2. ARSD 13G33 (180) Governor Debonne to commandants de cercle, 24 July 1933.
  3. JO Senegal 1919, Decision of 4 July 1919.
  4. ARSD 2G20-34 Tivaouane RPM February 1920.
  5. JO Senegal 1923, Decision of 5 December 1923.
  6. 13G33 (180) Governor to Presidents of the SIPs and the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance, 18 October 1934.

supporters among the chefs de village and notables. Once selected, members could hold office for life. The President of the section was elected by other members of the commission and was generally the chef de canton. This was not however, the case in the province of Guet in 1924, where the correspondence de départ listed presidents of the commission for each canton who were not chiefs.<sup>1</sup> Where several cantons were grouped into a section, the chief considered by the notables as the most important was made president. The President of a section was to be assisted by a secretary whom he himself chose, who was usually the one who assisted him in his duties as chief, and paid by the SIP at a salary fixed by the Council of Administration.

Society members were also to elect delegates from their sections to sit for three years on the Council of Administration. Membership of this body and the commissions of the section was not supposed to overlap, although chefs de canton had the right to sit on both. The council was to consist of no less than six members, who were in practice chosen by the chef de canton. So like the commission of the section, these bodies generally ended up being composed of chiefs and notables. The President was the commandant de cercle or his assistant, while the vice - president was chosen by the Governor from a list of three notables presented to him by the commandant de cercle. A list of members of the Conseil d' Administration for Bignona in 1929 had as president the commandant de cercle, Raunier, and as vice-president, the most important chief, Lamine Sonko, the chef de province of Djougouttes.<sup>2</sup> All nine members were chiefs of cantons in the cercle. The treasurer was a soldier, Sergent Maillet, while the secretary was an African clerk.

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1. 1Z78 Macodou Sall-correspondence de depart 1924-chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Cayor, 23 November 1924.
  2. ARSD 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.

Macodou Sall was appointed vice-president of the SIP of Tivaouane until the abolition of this cercle, when he became vice-president of the SIP of Louga.<sup>1</sup> The Council of Administration generally met at least once a year when convoked by its president to approve the annual budget of the SIP and to deliberate on loans. Degelgates were unpaid, and one third of them had to be reselected each year by the commissions of the sections. Just over half the members had to be present in order to form a quorum.<sup>2</sup>

The funds of the local SIPs came from subscriptions collected by the chefs de village from members. When the Tivaouane SIP was first created in 1910, members had to pay an annual subscription of 0.5 francs.<sup>3</sup> Another source of funding was from the sale of groundnuts paid as interest on the loan of seeds. All SIPs sent money to a Common Fund at St. Louis which purchased equipment for the societies in bulk and made loans to individual societies. This fund was managed and the societies coordinated by a supervisory committee at St. Louis consisting of the Secretary General as President and including among its members the Directors of Economic Affairs, the Agricultural, Veterinary and Forest Services, and Public Works, one President of an SIP, two notables, one businessman and the Inspector of Administrative Affairs.<sup>4</sup>

It is difficult to assess the impact of this organisational framework on the day-to-day running of the SIPs, but it would appear to have had little influence. What counted was the individual activity of the chiefs.

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1. 1Z56 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga - General information on Macodou Sall for publication in a biographical dictionary, 23 July 1949.
  2. ARSD 5Q78(77) JO AOF 1924, decree of 12 January 1924, and statutes of the SIP of the cercle of...
  3. IDI/3 Monograph of the cercle of Tivaouane by the commandant de cercle, 3 March 1911.
  4. Robinson, "The SIPs in French West Africa" op.cit., p.30.

In all matters concerning the SIPs, the chef de canton acted as a link between the commandant de cercle and chefs de village. They were to accompany agents from the Agricultural Service on tour and assist them and were to encourage the people to participate in agricultural campaigns, and attend fairs and meetings organised by the French.

A major task of the chiefs in the SIPs was to help promote cash crop agriculture, particularly of the groundnut. Since its introduction to Senegal, cultivation of this crop had spread throughout the country except for the Basse Casamance, where even by the interwar period, it had not made much impression. In this region, the SIPs were not so much concerned with persuading the local people to store seeds for the next sowing, as the Diola were in any case in the habit of keeping reserves. Rather, at the beginning of the interwar period, the SIPs in this area were concerned with popularising groundnut agriculture in an area dominated by subsistence farming. Rice was the chief crop of the Basse Casamance, but a wide variety of other plants were also important-palm trees, sesame, millet, maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes. As with many colonial innovations, the Diola at first resisted the introduction of the groundnut to the region, which took place in about 1909.<sup>1</sup> According to a report by the Agricultural Service, the spread of peanut cultivation corresponded with the degree of Islamisation of an area. While Christians, animists and Muslim women continued to cultivate rice, Muslim men preferred to concentrate on millet and groundnuts. Hence the groundnut was a more important crop in Bignona which was more rapidly Islamised during the interwar period than in Ziguinchor. While Bignona produced 1300 tons of groundnuts in 1933, Ziguinchor's total was only 120 tons.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Interview with Augustin Coly.

2. ARSI) 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.

In SIPs throughout Senegal, the key role of the chefs de canton and de village was the distribution, just before the first rains, of seeds of groundnuts and any other plant which the government might be trying to promote. To this end the chefs de canton had to compile annual lists of members of their SIP section which they sent to the provincial headquarters. Before seeds could be distributed, the chef de canton had to send the names of those of his subjects requiring seeds to the commandant de cercle. In the Basse Casamance, distribution was at the beginning of May, the start of the first rains, and in Cayor, in June. In 1928, appreciating the potential for marketing sesame from the Casamance, the administration ordered the chiefs in this region to distribute 2274 kg. of this crop along with 60,541 kg. of groundnut seeds.<sup>1</sup>

Distribution and recovery of seeds by the chiefs were in theory supposed to be under the surveillance of a European official. After the seeds had been distributed, the chiefs had to ensure that the cultivators neither ate them nor sold them to traders before sowing time. Following the harvest, the chiefs were to make sure that their subjects did not sell the groundnuts to merchants before they were ripe. They were to report any such offenses which were punishable under the Indigénat, with a 50 to 100 franc fine or six days' imprisonment.<sup>2</sup>

Often the chiefs' priorities as far as the distribution of seeds was concerned were not those of the administration. In an effort to persuade newcomers to stay in their cantons, the chiefs would often favour them over long-established cultivators. The commandant de cercle of Louga saw fit to send a circular to his chefs de province and de canton in 1929 stressing that their responsibility was to the mass of cultivators who constituted a stable element in the region, whereas newcomers more liable to leave in times of hardship.<sup>3</sup> He instructed the chiefs that

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1. ARSD 2G28-59 Casamance RPM August 1928.
  2. 13G33 (180) Governor to Presidents of the SIPs, 18 October 1934.
  3. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province of Guet and his chefs de canton, 1929.



the newcomers, who were probably without reserves, should be encouraged at first to cultivate food crops like millet and cassava rather than the groundnut in order to build up a reserve in case of dearth.

The chiefs were entrusted with the recovery from each cultivator of a quantity of groundnuts corresponding to the weight of seeds distributed, plus 20% interest on the loan. This generally took place just before the growing season. The interest was generally paid in groundnuts which the society then sold in order to raise funds for itself, but could also be in the form of a cash payment.

In some years, the chiefs also had to recover food products distributed during a period of dearth. Those least reliant on the French for food in shortages were the Sereres who by tradition kept plentiful reserves of millet. The Wolof on the other hand tended to concentrate on the groundnut at the expense of subsistence farming. Every year, the chefs de canton had to compile a list of those cultivators unable to pay back seeds because of exceptional circumstances, presenting this to the commandant de cercle before the next distribution of seeds so that he could decide who was to be given relief. In 1920, a year of dearth, members of the Guet section of the SIP of Tivaouane borrowed 4070 kg. of rice and 32,826 kg. of groundnuts. As this loan had still not been repaid by 1922, the commandant de cercle asked Macodou Sall to order the debtors to pay it at once.<sup>1</sup> If they had still not paid by March 1923, the chef de province was to send a list of their names to the commandant de cercle who would then summon them to the provincial capital. In 1939, owing to a bad harvest the previous year food crops like millet were short in all areas of the north except those inhabited by the Sereres. In Cayor 120 tons of millet obtained elsewhere in the region were distributed in a 12 km zone east of Kelle, Méckhé and Ndande.<sup>2</sup>

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1. ARSD 1761 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to Macodou Sall, October 1922.
  2. ARSD 2639-81 Tivaouane RPM November 1939.

In the same year, the chiefs in Louga received orders to purchase cuttings of cassava from those growing it for distribution in areas of dearth. The chiefs and agents of the SIP were to pay cultivators 2 francs 50 for every 100 cuttings of cassava they bought and were to make a list of the cuttings that had been collected by canton and then by secco.<sup>1</sup>

In order to encourage the chefs de canton in their task of recovering peanuts, they were to be paid a bonus per tonne collected. This rose from 1 to 2 francs in 1937, during which year a special credit of 55,156 francs was laid aside solely for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> In addition, they were to receive marks according to the degree of success they had in recovering the groundnuts which helped to determine the commission they received from the administration.<sup>3</sup>

Conversely, Macodou Sall suggested to the commandant de cercle of Louga in March 1929 that no bonus should be paid to those chiefs who had not yet fully repaid the SIPs.

During the course of the period, the SIPs became involved in a number of projects for rural, agricultural and social development. One of their aims was the extension of the cultivable area and the development of selected seeds, which would be facilitated by the mechanisation of agriculture. Chiefs were entrusted with loaning out agricultural implements and oxen belonging to the SIP as part of the scheme to promote the plough (culture attelée). From the 1930s onwards, the administration, anxious to educate rural producers in more modern agricultural methods sent agents from the Agricultural Service to instruct chiefs considered to be amenable to French methods on the use of seed drills, fertilisers, hoes and ploughs.<sup>4</sup> These implements were

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1. 1Z61 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province and chefs de canton of Guet, 30 July 1939; see Glossary.
  2. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C630 D3-Mission Tixier, 1936-37.
  3. See Ch. 10 on "The Income of the Commandement Indigène", Section: Prime de Rendement.
  4. AN 2G31-66 Baol RPM 20 January-20 February 1931.

to be sent to the chiefs before the sowing so that they could set an example to their subjects. While the Colonial Council was in existence, chiefly councillors like Bouna N'diaye and Boubakar N'déné N'diaye advocated the adoption of cultivation by the plough on several occasions. Chefs de canton also had to compile an inventory of the section's equipment and to supervise the seccos and warehouses.

Much of the interior was in desperate need of water during the long dry season. The SIPs were concerned with irrigation schemes in which the chiefs played an important role. The French favoured the construction of wells as a means of supplying water, for they had the additional effect of sedentarising nomadic groups like the Peuls by reducing the need for transhumance.<sup>1</sup> This made it easier for the administration to control and tax them. In 1928, 22 wells were built in Tivaouane alone.<sup>2</sup> Chiefs helped with surveys to decide where wells should be built. Macodou Sall was asked by his commandant de cercle in 1929 to make a list of villages in his province where wells could be found and their depth, and of villages most in need of water and the approximate depth of the watertable in each.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of this research, the administration decided to begin the construction of deep wells in Darou Mousty. This facilitated Mouride and Wolof penetration of the region and was deeply resented by the Peuls, the original inhabitants. The commandant de cercle asked the chef de province to assist with the supply and recruitment of helpers for the Europeans employed in this project.<sup>4</sup> Chiefs were to report any problems that might arise with the new wells. In 1931 the chef de

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1. For details of the plan, see 2G39-34 RPA 1939.

2. ARSD 2G28-78 Tivaouane RPA 1928.

3. ARSD 1Z70 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 30 September 1929.

4. ARSD 1Z65 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province of Guet, 18 July 1929.

province of Guet and chef de village of Darou Mousty, the Seringe Momar Diabo Backé complained to the administration on behalf of their subjects that the water level of the well was going down, and asked if an expert could be sent to rectify this.<sup>1</sup>

Other projects concerning the Sociétés de Prévoyance were the distribution of luxuries in the villages like coffee, tea and sugar and the campaigns against plant and animal diseases.<sup>2</sup> But as late as 1931, the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance concluded that the chiefs in that region still did not understand the full nature of the functions of the SIPs. He claimed that the chiefs seemed to think these were simply for the distribution of food crops and disseminated such inaccurate information to the local population.<sup>3</sup>

A number of problems arose from giving the chiefs such a great deal of influence in the SIPs. Placing the responsibility for the repayment of seeds on chiefs often made them unpopular, and could be exploited by their opponemts. The first task of Massamba Aram Diop when he became chef de canton of Diamatil in 1923 and hence President of this section of the SIP was to bring some order to the SIP accounts, as the society had still not been repaid for rice loans made during the dearth of 1920 in Cayor.<sup>4</sup> He made a list of the names and addresses of the debtors and sent the chefs de village and diarafs to chase them up. This aroused the discontent of many as repayment in 1923, another year of dearth, was difficult and methods of obtaining the amounts due were often harsh. Sanor N'diaye, the recently dismissed chief of this canton, was quick to exploit this discontent.

Issues concerning the SIPs reached the Colonial Council nearly every year, begining with the petition from the notables of Guinguineo in the Sine Saloum, presented to the December 1921 session. This alleged that the chiefs, acting on behalf of the administration, often obliged cultivators to sell their groundnut harvest at derisory prices to reimburse the SIP's for loans of food and groundnut seeds.<sup>5</sup>

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1. 1Z56 chef de province of Guet "Report on the Darou Mousty well", 1 April 1931.
  2. Robinson, op.cit., p.32.
  3. AN 2G31-66 Casamance RPA 1931.
  4. ARSD 2G23-66 Tivaouane RPM November 1923.
  5. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, second sitting, 12 December 1921.

As a rule, the chiefs on the Colonial Council defended the right of the administration to oblige cultivators to sell their produce to reimburse the SIPs. However, in the early years of the interwar period, Mbakhane Lat Dior Diop, the chiefly vice-president of the Council draw attention to a number of injustices which he claimed were perpetrated by the SIPs. In a letter to the President of the Permanent Commission of the Colonial Council in 1922, Mbakhane Diop explained that the SIP loans, far from relieving the cultivators, put undue pressure on them to repay.<sup>1</sup> Cultivators were often obliged to work on their fields well into November, and to sell their food reserves and sheep for Tabaski<sup>2</sup> to pay back earlier loans of rice and groundnut seeds during periods of dearth. Mbakhane Diop and Meissa M'Baye Sall affirmed that the administration often demanded interest on loans way above the official 20%, sometimes as much as 50%.<sup>3</sup> It was as a result of the chiefs' allegations that Jean d'Aramy D'Oxoby, a citizen councillor, demanded an inquiry into the abuses of the SIPs, in 1922.

It can be seen that contrary to their founding principles, the SIPs often encouraged improvidence. People sometimes did not save from the last harvest as they felt they could always obtain food and seed loans from the SIPs, and thus became increasingly indebted. In 1926, the chiefs in the Mandinka villages of Bignona like Kaba Kiandarang actually thanked the French for having refused them food supplies during the rainy season since 1924, as it encouraged their subjects to save from previous harvests.<sup>4</sup>

The administration was frequently behindhand in ordering seed distributions. One Ogo Seck complained to the Colonial Council in June

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1. ARSD 4E13 (135) Colonial Council-Permanent Commission, morning session, 6 July 1922.
  2. A Muslim Festival, Aid-El-Kebir, the Feast of the Sheep.
  3. 4E13 (135), Colonial Council-Permanent Commission, 6 July 1922.
  4. ARSD 2G26-66 Casamance RPA 1926.

1926 that groundnut seeds had not yet been distributed in Cayor. Chiefly councillors from Cayor and Sine Saloum in the sitting of 15 June confirmed that no orders had yet been given for the distribution of seeds. Massamba Sall of Ndoutte Diassane justified the delay, arguing that if the seeds were distributed too soon, the cultivators would sell them.<sup>1</sup>

The chiefly councillors resisted proposals in the June 1927 session that French citizens should be allowed to join the SIPs. A minor incident occurred when Amadou N'diaye, speaking on behalf of his chiefly colleagues, refused to vote on this motion.<sup>2</sup> The chiefs ostensibly opposed the inclusion of citizens in the SIPs on the grounds that the latter were slow in paying their dues to the administration yet could not be charged under the Indigénat. However, the real reason for this violent opposition was probably that the chiefs saw the entry of the citizens as a challenge to their monopoly of influence in the SIPs.

#### The Depression of the 1930s and the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance

As a result of the world economic crisis which began with the Wall Street crash of 1929, commodity prices of all oilseeds and many other primary products fell catastrophically on the world market. The effect of the fall in the price of the groundnut at Bordeaux and Marseilles was soon felt by local markets. At Thies, the price of the groundnut plummeted from a pre-crisis price in 1927 of 125 - 130 francs for 100 kg. of groundnuts to 72 francs for 100 kg. in 1929 to 50-65 francs at the beginning of the buying season (traite) in 1931.<sup>3</sup> Instead of following the normal pattern and rising at the end of the traite, the price of the groundnut fell further in 1931 to 30-37 francs per hundred kilos by the end of it. At the beginning of 1933, prices

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1. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 15 June 1926.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ninth sitting, 17 June 1927.
  3. ARSD 2G27-81 Tivaouane RPM November 1927, 2G31-72 Thies RPM January 1931.

for the groundnut were still low-50 francs per hundred kilos at Thies and 45 francs at Tivaouane .<sup>1</sup> These low prices coincided with a series of poor harvests. In the north, insufficient rain resulted in a low tonnage of poor quality peanuts. In Thies, the groundnut harvest was as follows:-

1929	97,000 tonnes
1930	64,000
1931	41,000 (2)

Despite warnings from business circles, the Senegalese government did not pass legislation making the constitution of a reserve of seeds obligatory till March 5, 1932, by which time, it was too late for that year. The SIPs, lacking seeds to distribute to the cultivators, were forced to borrow 15,000 tonnes of groundnuts from the traders at three times the going rate (135 francs for 100 kgs.) Short of funds, the SIPs had to borrow from the Caisse de Dépôts of the Government General, so that their annual debt rose to 1,600,000 francs. In order to repay their loan, SIPs throughout Senegal were obliged to raise their annual subscription to 2 francs and to raise the interest on loans in kind from 20 to 25%.<sup>3</sup>

Even after 1931, disappointing harvests continued. During the 1932 campaign in Thies, a quantity of seeds was distributed which was expected to give a harvest of over 100,000 tonnes of groundnuts. Instead, only about 70,000 tonnes were suitable for export.<sup>4</sup> This was because insufficient land was prepared and distribution of seeds was so rapid that chiefs did not have time to check the individual needs of each village. All the same, the 1932 harvest was a great improvement on that of 1931. The contrast between the 1931 and 1932 harvests regarding the area given over to and weight of groundnuts, millet and food crops is shown in the following table:

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1. ARSD 2G32-106 Thies RPA 1932.
  2. ARSD 2G31-72 Thies RPM January 1932, 2G32-106.
  3. Fouquet, *op.cit.* p.88. SIP subscriptions rose further according to the decision of 26 June 1937 to, for example, 3 francs in Ziguinchor and Thies and 4 fs in Louga. See Ch.3 on "The Role of the Chiefs in Taxation" for further details of subscriptions to the SIPs.
  4. 2G32-106 Thies RPA 1932.

	Hectares Cultivated		Tonnes of Crop Harvested	
	1931	1932	1931	1932
Groundnuts	100,000	125,000	41,000	80,000
Millet	130,000	143,000	71,500	97,850
Food Crops	20,000	32,000	15,000	22,400 (1)

As a result of the SIPs' difficulties during the 1930s crisis, state intervention and hence the activities of the chiefs in agriculture and commerce rose. In 1930, an Office de Conditionnement was established in each cercle to ensure that the groundnut was correctly processed.<sup>2</sup> Legislation in 1932 gave the administration control over the opening and closing of the traite and introduced sanctions for selling groundnuts outside this period.<sup>3</sup> The chiefs were expected to make sure that these dates were kept to and were to report any breaches. The legislation also centralised the groundnut trade, making administrative control easier, by reducing the number of trading posts (escales) involved in the traite and the number of seccos. It stipulated that in future, the chiefs should recover groundnuts on behalf of the SIP before the traite to avoid the risk of cultivators having no money left at the end of the traite to pay their debts.

During the economic crisis, the number of navetanes (seasonal workers) began to fall off in several cercles. The navetanes in the north of Senegal came mainly from the Soudan and French Guinea and those in the Basse Casamance from Gambia and Portuguese Guinea to help with the groundnut crop during the growing season and at harvest time. Navetanes generally worked four mornings a week for Senegalese cultivators who would provide them with land to sow and seeds, their lodgings and three meals a day.<sup>4</sup> These practices naturally became a burden on the peasant budget during the crisis. In 1932, the commandant de cercle of Thies, Duranthon, began a campaign to improve the conditions of the navetanes to persuade them to come to his

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1. 2G32-106 Thies RPA 1932.
  2. ARSD 2G30-92 Thies RPA 1930.
  3. AN 2G32-90 Baol RPA 1932 which mentions the decisions of 11 March 1932 regulating the closing of the traite and 17 May 1932 regulating the sale and distribution of groundnuts.
  4. Fouquet, op.cit., pp. 81-84.



cercle rather than going to Baol and Sine Saloum, which they generally seemed to prefer.<sup>1</sup> About 6,000 navetanes were required in Thies. The chiefs were instructed to give the navetanes preferential treatment and to avoid their tendency to exact prestations from them or make them pay head tax. In 1931, increased propaganda by chiefs in the Basse Casamance and improved conditions led to a rise in the number of navetanes from Portuguese Guinea and the Gambia.<sup>2</sup> So successful was the general campaign to attract navetanes to Senegal that the number rose by 25,000 between 1937 and 1938.<sup>3</sup> However, the majority were to be found in Kaolack, while Thies still failed to attract the required number:

Cercle	Number of Navetanes (1938)
Kaolack	56,743
Thies	577
Ziguinchor	2,472

At the same time, chiefs were supposed to keep a close check on navetanes to prevent them planting in their country of origin seeds distributed by an SIP in Senegal. This was a particular problem in the Casamance because of the ease with which frontiers could be crossed. From 1934 onwards, the administration in this region instructed the chefs de village to distribute seeds not to the navetanes but to the chefs de carre for whom they were working.<sup>4</sup> This measure enabled the heads of households to keep a closer watch on the navetanes. There were also to be numerous checks by agents of the administration.

By the decision of 9 November 1933, the SIPs were authorised to sell the produce of their members collectively replacing the previous system whereby individual cultivators tried to negotiate deals with commercial firms. This began as an experiment in five out of fifteen SIPs - Louga, Sine Saloum, Baol, Thies and Djoloff.<sup>5</sup> Once members deposited groundnuts with the SIP for sale, they received

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1. 2G32-106 Thies RPA 1932.
  2. ARSD 2G31-74 Casamance RPA 1931.
  3. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1938.
  4. ARSD 5Q78(77) Governor to Governor General, 2 November 1934.
  5. 5Q78(77) Decision of 9 November 1933.

an advance corresponding to three quarters of the value of their stock, as in the case of Djoloff, or its entire value, calculated according to the current market price in that trading area. The SIPs had meanwhile to operate within certain conditions. They had to obtain the best price possible for the cultivators, sales had to be public and they were not allowed to sell on external markets. In theory at least, cultivators still had the option of selling to the traders.

As might be expected, the Chambers of Commerce were very much opposed to this new method. Four traders from Thies sent a petition to the Governor in January 1934,<sup>1</sup> and numerous articles appeared in the local press, generally controlled by commercial interests, calling a halt to this "Dangerous Experiment".<sup>2</sup>

The vociferous opposition from business circles prompted the Governor General to suggest to the Governor of Senegal that a tripartite commission be established to examine and assess the results of the sales of the SIPs for their members during the 1934-35 campaign.<sup>3</sup> The commission was to consist of two representatives of the administration, Riviale, the secretary-general of the government of Senegal, and Champion, the commandant de cercle and President of the SIP of Baol, two representatives of the Chambers of Commerce of Dakar and Kaolack, and two chiefs, supposed to represent the indigenous population.<sup>4</sup> These were Ely Manel Fall, the chef de canton of Mbayar Tidiar (Baol) and Macodou Sall, the chef de province of Guet. The meeting of the commission on 8 August 1935 was boycotted by the Chambers of Commerce of Rufisque, Ziguinchor and Bordeaux, on the grounds that the SIPs' entry into commercial operations was illegal.

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1. 5Q78 (77) Petition of the traders of Thies to the Governor, 25 January 1934.
  2. The title of an article in Périscope Africain, 23 November 1935.
  3. 5Q78 (77) Governor General to Governor, 15 April 1935.
  4. 5Q78 (77) Official Report of the meeting of the Tripartite Commission, 8 August 1935, hereafter referred to as "Tripartite Commission."

Among the charges levelled by the delegates from the Chambers of Commerce at the SIPs was that the chiefs were forcing people, under threat of sanctions, to bring their harvest to these bodies to be sold rather than to the traders. It would appear that there was a thin line between pressure and persuasion in these circumstances, as Ely Manel Fall conceded " Il n'y a pas eu de pression, mais le chef de canton a guidé l'indigène. C'est du reste son rôle."<sup>1</sup> The representatives of the Chamber of Commerce felt that the SIPs would be better to concentrate on their other tasks rather than trying to engage in marketing the groundnut for which they in any case lacked sufficient resources. The representatives also tried to destroy the administration's argument that the experiment in the campaign of 1934-35 had been successful as the SIPs in their auctions had been able to offer better prices for the groundnut to their members than those of the traders. They maintained that the SIPs had merely benefitted from the rise in market prices in the 1934-35 traite. If these had not risen, the SIPs would have faced a serious loss. <sup>2</sup>

But the Governor of Senegal considered that the Tripartite Commission had vindicated the newly acquired marketing role of the SIPs because of the support it received from the two chiefs who had attended.<sup>3</sup> Macodou Sall argued "La Société de Prévoyance à mon avis, rend de grands services aux cultivateurs avec le système de ventes en commun,"<sup>4</sup> as cultivators no longer had to fear the low prices normally offered by commercial firms at the opening of the traite. The new system was also defended in the Council of Government by Abdoul Salam Kane, who claimed it would stop traders loaning seeds to the cultivators at extortionate rates.<sup>5</sup> But the practice where the SIPs sold the produce of their members collectively did not last very long and remained confined to a few cercles. By 1937, the administration

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1. 5Q78(77) "Tripartite Commission", 8 August 1935.
  2. 5Q78(77) Extract from the Official Report of the sitting of 20 August 1935 of the Chamber of Commerce of Dakar.
  3. 5Q78(77) Governor to Governor General, 24 September 1935.
  4. 5Q78(77) "Tripartite Commission", 8 August 1935.
  5. ARSD 13G6(17) Governor General Brévié to Minister of Colonies, "Report on the part played by the SIPs in the traite of 1934-35", 13 March 1935.

realised that the SIPs could not handle the whole peanut harvest, and a new era of cooperation between the SIPs and the traders began, with contracts for mutual purchases of groundnuts. On the basis of this collaboration, de Coppet envisaged the eventual creation of an Office d'Arachides.<sup>1</sup>

The economic crisis exposed the vulnerability of monoculture particularly in areas inhabited by the Wolof, who, unlike the Sereres, did not cultivate sufficient food for themselves.

The administration made some belated attempts to diversify agriculture, encouraging the cultivation throughout Senegal of more food crops like millet and rice and also of other cash crops. In the north, the French tried to promote "mixed farming" in order to assure a supply of manure for the fields.<sup>2</sup> Although this was already practised by the Sereres, it never really caught on with the Wolof. As part of the administration's drive to improve livestock, chiefs were to disseminate information on animal husbandry to the cultivators. Chiefs were also to inform the administration about the unlawful killing of animals.

From 1931, SIPs in the Basse Casamance promoted the cultivation of fruit such as coconuts, mangos, guavas, oranges, lemons and bananas. In 1934, 2,800 banana plants bought in Portuguese Guinea by the Administrateur Supérieur were distributed in Ziguinchor by the chiefs on behalf of the SIPs.<sup>3</sup> Another possible cash crop was rubber, which had been virtually abandoned with the exploitation of the groundnut. On 3 September 1934, a circular was sent to the chefs de canton in the Casamance to inform them about the possibilities of exploiting rubber which grew wild.<sup>4</sup> Although a small amount of rubber continued to be tapped in the bush, this never became a large scale prospect. The same applied to the French attempt to develop the oil palm.

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1. 5Q78(77) Governor General de Coppet to Governor, 15 November 1937.
  2. ARSD 2G40-55 Senegal - Annual Agricultural Report 1940.
  3. AN 2G34-68 Ziguinchor RPA 1934.
  4. 13G33(180) Governor Debonne's circular to the commandants de cercle, 1934-based on the Governor General's decision of 3 September 1934.

As early as 1924, both chiefly and elected Colonial Councillors had advocated the development of cotton cultivation on a commercial basis.<sup>1</sup> The conseil de notables of Tivaouane was consulted on the possibility of growing cotton in that cercle in 1926.<sup>2</sup> After the economic crisis, this was attempted in a few areas of Senegal, such as in the north and east of the Casamance,<sup>3</sup> but this was never established on a large scale.

More use was made of the chiefs to publicise the administration's agricultural campaigns in the years following the economic crisis. The commandant de cercle and his assistants would begin parleys with the chef de canton and de village for the next campaign a year in advance. Chiefs began a campaign in 1934 to encourage people to increase the area under groundnut cultivation the following year and to improve the tonnage and quality of this crop.<sup>4</sup> Chiefs also received orders to publicise the administration's five-year plan for the diversification of agriculture launched on 12 June 1936.<sup>5</sup>

Between 1932 and 1937, the standard of living of the average Senegalese cultivator rose, as the rise in the price of the groundnut on the world market was complemented by an increase in his purchasing power. Whereas in 1930, 100 kg. of groundnuts could only purchase 50 kg. of rice, in 1936 the equivalent amount of groundnuts could purchase 116 kg. of rice.<sup>6</sup> This encouraged a far greater emphasis on cash crop agriculture. 1937, the year of maximum groundnut export from Senegal was also the year of maximum rice import. Even in the Basse Casamance an area traditionally devoted to rice growing, there was an inexorable shift towards the groundnut as a result of its high world price, government

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, third sitting, 20 March 1924.
  2. ARSD 2G26-73 Tivaouane RPA 1926.
  3. AN 2G34-67 Casamance RPA 1934.
  4. 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 2 May 1934.
  5. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C630 D3-Mission Tixier, 1936-37.
  6. Fouquet, op.cit., p.114.

promotion of this crop by means of the Sociétés de Prévoyance, and the growth of a money economy.

Year	Total groundnut production in the Casamance (kg. )
1933	37, 057, 655
1934	41, 133, 050
1935	43, 579, 280
1936	60, 000, 000

Quinquaud commented on the success with which the groundnut had been promoted on Bignona in his inspection of this cercle's SIP in 1939.<sup>1</sup>

But the chiefs did not always put the many responsibilities with which they were entrusted by the SIPs to good use. During the economic crisis, their corruption exacerbated the wretched situation of the local populations. As the strain on the cultivators became increasingly unbearable, they addressed themselves, not to the administrators in the cercles whom they feared were on league with the chiefs but to a section of the local press hostile to the administration. Papers like L'AOF Républicain, Action Sénégalaise, Périscope Africain and La Sirène Sénégalaise edited by supporters of Galandou Diouf who were often small businessmen, were glad of the opportunity to attack the administration, the SIPs, the chiefs and Blaise Diagne, who sat in the National Assembly as Senegal's deputy till 1934.

In articles on the SIPs, journalists exposed some chiefs as enriching themselves at the expense both of the administration and of their subjects. Alfred Goux, a lieutenant of Galandou Diouf and editor of L'AOF Républicain wrote an article "Initiative déplorable" attacking the administration's decision to give the SIPs a marketing role and its lack of surveillance of the chiefs' activities in the SIPs. Goux's sarcasm was not lost on his readers "Entre les cultivateurs et l'administration, il faut des intermédiaires qui détournent à leur profit la plus grande partie du bénéfice de la collectivité."<sup>2</sup> Only after numerous complaints did the administration see fit to investigate a few of these charges.

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1. 13G42 (180) Quinquaud report - Bignona, 7 February 1939.
  2. L'AOF Républicain, 30 May 1934.

The newspapers alleged that the chiefs showed favouritism in the distribution of seeds which often corresponded to their political inclinations. Action Sénégalaise on 28 May 1932 claimed that certain chiefs on the Colonial Council used their influence in favour of Diagne's supporters to the detriment of cultivators who were Dioufists. In Tivaouane, Dioufists alleged that Diagne's supporters did not have to reimburse seeds, imposing an extra burden on the rest of the cultivators. This they blamed on Massamba Sall, the chief of Ndoutte Diassane, who it was said was acting on behalf of Duguay Clédor, the President of the Colonial Council and Diagne's principal lieutenant. According to the paper, the Governor and commandants de cercle concerned did nothing to counteract this tendency for fear of offending the Senegalese Deputy, and had become little better than "les esclaves d'un clan politique".

Often seeds were of poor quality and were distributed late. Chiefs sometimes failed to distribute the correct weight of seeds, retaining a reserve to sell the traders. Périscopie Africain on 18 July 1931 alleged that Dongo Fall, the chef de canton of Diack, would sometimes empty sacks of seeds, filling them with sand. To avoid a recurrence of this, the paper suggested a census of seccos by officials of the administration to count the number of seeds and food products in storage as a check on the chiefs.

Chiefs were also allowed to get away with negligence in the management of seccos. In what came to be known as the "Huchard affair", Benjamin Diatta, the chef de province of Oussouye in 1930 underwrote a cargo of 3000 kg. of groundnuts worth 4500 francs which was paid for but never delivered.<sup>1</sup> Although the commandant de cercle argued that this had exposed the chief as untrustworthy, he was not disciplined.

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1. AN 2G30-61 Oussouye RPA 1930.

The chiefs were able to make use of their role in distributing groundnuts and food crops to their subjects to engage in business ventures, although this was officially strictly forbidden. Périscope Africain alleged in 1931 that Boubakar N'déné N'diaye, the chiefly Colonial Councillor and a supporter of Blaise Diagne, had taken advantage of the food shortage in his area to sell rice to people on the black market.<sup>1</sup> He charged 450 francs for 100 kilograms of rice which the administration had brought from traders for between 175 and 200 francs.

The repayment of seeds often became the licence for pillage by the chiefs and their followers, to the extent that L'AOF Républicain asked: "Sont-ils les chefs du pays au temps de la barbaresque ou seulement les représentants de l'administration?"<sup>2</sup> La Sirène Sénégalaise ran a series of articles entitled "Les Pirates" in 1931 about the greed shown by the chefs de canton and some European administrators. It alleged that Boubakar N'déné N'diaye had seized the millet and groundnut reserves of two chefs de carre in his canton Diokoul Gandiaye, to pay their debts to the SIP and head tax.<sup>3</sup> The interest on repayment was often over 25%. L'AOF Républicain in an article of 1934 in which it described the SIPs as the "vaches laitières" of the administration claimed that the rate of interest was often over 40%.<sup>4</sup> In 1936, Périscope Africain pointed out that contrary to the founding principles of the SIPs, members were seldom consulted about their operations which merely reflected the wishes of the commandant de cercle and chefs de canton.<sup>5</sup>

Chiefs sometimes took advantage of their numerous functions in the SIPs to embezzle seeds and money. They also had the misfortune to be held responsible for embezzlement by their followers. After an enquiry by Reynier, the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor, Amath N'diaye

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1. Périscope Africain, 26 February 1932.
  2. L'AOF Républicain, 30 April 1934, in an article entitled "Etatisation des Sociétés".
  3. La Sirène Sénégalaise, 10 January 1931.
  4. L'AOF Républicain, 30 April 1934.
  5. Périscope Africain, 11 July 1936.



was removed from his post as chef de canton of Adeane on 16 March 1930 when his son Abibou, the secretary of the SIP section was found to have embezzled 16 tonnes of groundnuts and 2 tonnes of sesame from the SIP.<sup>1</sup>

Widespread complaints against the abuses of the chefs de canton in the SIPs and administrative fears that the chiefs were depriving it of its dues led the government to mount a full scale enquiry into the SIPs of Kaolack, Baol and Thies in 1934. All three inspections were carried out by the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, de la Rocca. Although fewer chiefs were implicated in Thies, and the inhabitants did not demonstrate the hatred shown to the chiefs in Baol and Sine Saloum, they readily came forward to report the chefs de canton. "Dans ce cercle, comme ailleurs fixé sur la morale des tyranneaux qui sont les mauvais chefs de canton, les gens le proclament. Ils savent que s'ils n'ont pas été davantage maltraités et volés, ce n'est pas à leur chefs qu'ils le doivent."<sup>2</sup> Three chiefs in particular were criticised for behaving like "roitelets", using their responsibility for the repayment of loans as an excuse for plunder and imprisoning those of their subjects who attempted resistance: Tanor Latsoukabé Fall, the chef de canton of Fadene, Salif Fall, the former chief of Thor Diander, and Mbakhane Diop, the chief of Mbayar Nianing. In the case of Salif Fall, the situation had become so bad in the first half of 1934 that the inhabitants of three villages including Pout had as a form of protest refused to accept seeds from the SIP.<sup>3</sup> In order to appease his subjects Salif Fall was sent to the vacant canton of Diack before the distribution of seeds in May. Here he was to remain, although the other chiefs were eventually dismissed.

De la Rocca's enquiry also revealed that about 250,000 kilos of groundnuts had gone missing from the Rufisque secco in one month.

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1. Interview with Assane Seck, Inspector of Taxes at Ziguinchor.
  2. 13G6(17) Inspector of Administrative Affairs de la Rocca, "Report on the investigation of the SIP of Thies," 25 December 1934, hereafter referred to as the de la Rocca report.
  3. ARSD 2D13-9 commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 28 May 1934.

The watchman was found to be responsible, but could not be sacked as he was a protégé of Duguay Clédor, <sup>1</sup> the president of the Colonial Council from 1924-34.

Although sanctions for chiefs found guilty of malversations grew heavier from the early 1930s onwards, some chiefs continued to get off relatively lightly. In 1929, the chief of Fadene, Matar N'Goye Diouf was dismissed and ordered by the tribunal civil et commercial to pay back the 47 tonnes of groundnuts seeds valued at 45,000 francs he had embezzled from the SIP secco at Toul. But five years later, he had repaid only 9,000 francs. <sup>2</sup> He even went so far as to request that he should not have to pay any further sums on the grounds that the SIP must by that time have been reimbursed by the inhabitants of the canton. But following Matar's trial, the elected and chiefly councillors passed a resolution to the effect that chiefs accused of malversation should in future be sent not before the tribunal civil et commercial but a criminal court, the tribunal de cercle.

By 1935, partly as a result of the role played by the chiefs, the SIPs were becoming as exploitative as commerce. Cultivators, either voluntarily or under duress from the chiefs were tending to borrow more seeds than they really needed, impoverishing themselves and making themselves captive to the SIPs. The administration felt obliged to instruct the chefs de canton to use their influence on chefs de famille to stop them taking more seeds than they needed from the SIPs. In 1935, chiefs in the Casamance were ordered to distribute seeds only to navetanes and exceptional cases. <sup>3</sup>

The revelation of widespread abuses during the economic crisis prompted administrative moves to reduce the role of the chiefs as intermediaries within the SIPs. As early as 1931, the commandant

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1. 13G6(17) de la Rocca report, 25 December 1934.
  2. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D4-Senegal RPA 1929 and 2D13-9 Governor to commandant de cercle of Thies, 3 April 1934.
  3. AN 2G35-67 Casamance RPA 1935.

de cercle of Thies suggested that the chef de carré and not the chef de village should be given responsibility for the repayment of seed.<sup>1</sup> As far as the distribution of seeds was concerned, commissions de réception et de distribution composed of representatives of the administration (staff of the Office de Conditionnement) were established. However, this scheme was soon dropped when the administration realised that the chiefs, freed from the responsibility for distribution assumed they had no further part to play in running the SIPs. This was shown by the fact that a number of chefs de village were late in the recovery of loans that year. In 1935, secco operations were taken out of the hands of chiefs and given to European officials.<sup>2</sup>

Following the crisis, the administration attempted more frequent and direct consultations with the cultivator. The Councils of Administration were to be called once a quarter instead of once a year.<sup>3</sup>

A decisive step was taken in 1937 when the SIPs were given charge of the management of their seeds and all accounting operations. In legislation not dissimilar to that relating to the tax collection system, chiefs were no longer able to detain the funds or merchandise of the SIPs on any pretext.<sup>4</sup> It was argued that this new ruling which also excluded the chiefs from the commissions of the section and the Council of Administration relieved the increasingly heavy burden of work on the chiefs. But it also meant that they lost any control or decision-making powers in the SIPs. Hence their role was reduced to one of surveillance only, encouraging cultivators to collect seeds from the seccos and to reimburse the SIPs after the harvest.

In his inspection of the SIP at Sedhiou in 1939, Quinquaud proposed putting the distribution and recovery of seeds under the intermittent control of Europeans as a further safeguard against the dishonesty

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1. 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931.
  2. 13G6(17) Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 13 March 1935.
  3. 13G33(180) Governor to Presidents of the SIPs, 18 October 1934.
  4. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.

of indigenous agents.<sup>1</sup> He suggested also that secretaries of the SIPs should not be left under the control of the chefs de canton, but should receive orders direct from the societies.

These measures by no means eliminated chiefly abuses in the SIPs, as the lack of European personnel forced the administration to continue to rely on the chiefs. Allegations of corruption continued, often by anonymous letter to avoid reprisals. Sometimes these complaints reflected family rivalries. Such was the case of the anonymous letter sent to the commandant de cercle of Thies in 1938 accusing Ibra Deguene Diop the chef de canton of Tabby Gatteigne of having embezzled 22 tonnes of groundnuts from the Koul secco.<sup>2</sup> The commandant de cercle suspected that this letter had been written by a member of the Sall family who coveted Ibra Diop's position.

#### Reserve Granaries

What the administration termed "improvidence" on the part of the African cultivator really applied only to the groundnut, a cash crop on whose success he was prepared to gamble. He was far more careful where millet, a subsistence crop and a vital part of his staple diet, was concerned. In order to combat the improvidence of the African regarding the groundnut, the colonial government ordered the chiefs to ensure that their subjects set up reserve granaries to stop cultivators selling off their whole stock to traders. The administration hoped that after a good harvest, the chef de carré would be able to put sufficient groundnuts, carefully selected from the rest of the harvest, in reserve to stop cultivators borrowing from the SIPs for the following year's sowing. Had these granaries achieved total success, they would have made the population self-sufficient and would have dispensed with the need for the SIPs.

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1. 13G42(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Quinquaud, "Report on the cercle of Sedhiou", 26 October 1938.
  2. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques - C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1938.

Reserve granaries were introduced in Senegal in conjunction with the SIPs, and were promoted in earnest after the First World War. In December 1922, the commandant de cercle of Cayor sent instructions to the chiefs to supervise the establishment of reserve granaries of groundnuts and millet by each chef de carre.<sup>1</sup> In this case, the minimum reserve of groundnuts was to be about 25 kgs. per person. The millet was supposed to see the inhabitants through the rainy season till the next harvest. This period, known as the "soudure", lasted from approximately 1 June till 30 September. The reserves were to be put in specially constructed granaries near the carré but sufficiently far away to be safe from fire.

In 1923, the commandant de cercle of Cayor expressed fears that at the end of the traite, in February, cultivators would be tempted to sell off all their groundnut reserves because of the high prices being offered.<sup>2</sup> Chiefs were supposed to inspect the granaries to ensure administrative orders were being executed and to stop cultivators using the reserves before 1 June. Macodou Sall, the chef de province of Guet, was asked to have his secretary check the reserve granaries by keeping records of the quantity of groundnut seeds and millet in each village between January and May. The chiefs were also supposed to check that reserves were sufficient to allow substantial sowings of the groundnut. The commandant de cercle or his assistant would periodically inspect the granaries themselves to double check the chiefs' work.

Many chiefs took their responsibility for constituting a reserve seriously. The chef de province of Oussouye suggested in 1929 that the floor of reserve granaries should be cemented against termites.<sup>3</sup> In the course of the period 1919-47, the administration consulted the

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1. 1Z61 commandant de cercle of Cayor to chef de province of Guet, 8 December 1922.
  2. ARSD 2G23-46 Tivaouane RPM October 1923.
  3. AN 2G29 - 78 Ziguinchor RPA 1929.

conseils de notables on the quantities to be kept in reserve. In 1933, the conseil de notables of Ziguinchor ruled that 15 to 30 kgs. of groundnuts were to be kept in reserve per inhabitant.<sup>1</sup> In Thies, the council ruled in 1931 that reserve granaries were to contain 100 kg of millet and 50 kg. of groundnuts for each inhabitant.<sup>2</sup>

The hardship suffered during the economic crisis underlined the need to constitute reserves. The Governor obtained the support of the conseils de notables for his ruling of 25 September 1934 which made the constitution of reserve granaries obligatory.<sup>3</sup> The reserve from the harvest, not to be consumed till 1 June the following year, was to consist of 120 kg. of millet (about 1 kg. of millet person per day) or 60 kg. of rice for each inhabitant, as well as the usual groundnut reserve. Failure by the chef de carré to obey this regulation was punishable under the Indigénat by 1 to 5 days' jail and a fine of between one and fifteen francs.

Chiefs at times proved unreliable in ensuring that reserve granaries were being kept up and in estimating the quantity of food and groundnuts within. Evidently, such inaccuracies could prove catastrophic as in 1932 when reserves both of food and groundnuts were found to have been insufficient.<sup>4</sup> In 1933, total groundnut production was less than 300,000 tons although the government had predicted 500,000 tons based on estimates from the chiefs.<sup>5</sup> As a result, just as it had relieved the chiefs of some of their functions in the SIPs, the administration in the 1937 legislation reduced the chiefs' responsibility for the reserves. Henceforth their role was to be one of surveillance only, as all their estimates were to be checked by European agents.<sup>6</sup>

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1. ARSD 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.

2. 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931.

3. 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 25 September 1934.

4. See p. 202.

5. La Sirène Sénégalaise, 18 and 21 May 1933.

6. ARSD 18G84(17) Director General of Economic Services and Production to Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 7 June 1937.

The Chiefs and Agriculture: General

The chiefs also had a more general role to play in the agricultural development of Senegal. Apart from checking to ensure that all administrative measures regarding the preparation of fields, the harvest, and the circulation, treatment and sale of produce were carried out, the chiefs were also supposed to set an example to their subjects by demonstrating new agricultural methods. The chiefs could make this contribution in their own cantons, as Colonial Councillors and as members of the conseils de notables.

In order to encourage the chiefs to be innovative and assist its agricultural programme, the administration awarded a medal, the *Mérite Agricole*. This contributed to the hierarchy which already existed among the chiefs, for as with the *Légion d'Honneur*, *Mérite Agricole* had different ranks, such as Officer, Chevalier, etc. Morane Sall was nominated for a Chevalier du *Mérite Agricole* for his experiments with various seeds, in 1933 and 1939, finally obtaining it in 1949.<sup>1</sup> Other members of the Sall family attaining this rank were Meissa M'Baye Sall, the chef de canton of Mbaouar, and Massamba Sall, of Ndoutte Diassane, for his promotion of cultivation by the plough. For his contribution to the agricultural development of his province, Macodou Sall was awarded the Officier du *Mérite Agricole* in 1938.<sup>2</sup>

A number of chiefs set up their own model fields. In 1917, Alceyni Cissé, the chef de canton of Bainoucks, sowed several fields with peanut seeds in an attempt to promote this crop in the Basse Casamance.<sup>3</sup> Chiefly colonial councillors were in a particularly advantageous position to obtain administrative aid for large scale projects. In the 1932 session of the Colonial Council, the realisation

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1. Interview with Morane Sall.
  2. 1756 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 23 July 1949.
  3. ARSD 2G17-36 Casamance RPM June 1917.

of two major schemes was made possible when Amadou N'diaye was granted 200 hectares in Tambacounda for a projected sisal plantation, and Bouna N'diaye obtained 199 hectares at N'Diara near Dahra, Djoloff, for market gardening and the cultivation of fruit trees.<sup>1</sup> The chiefs were the first to be given samples of millet and groundnut seeds to experiment with to discover which was better for their particular area. In July 1924, the chef de canton of N'dour was sent ten sachets of different varieties of groundnut seeds by the chef de province of Guet.<sup>2</sup> Abdoul Salam Kane requested administrative assistance in the November 1939 session of the Colonial Council to develop a variety of peanut called the "arachide de bouche" in Bakel and Matam.<sup>3</sup>

In order to monitor the country's agricultural development, the commandants de cercle throughout the period 1919-47 sent circulars to their chefs de province and de canton instructing them to send frequent reports. In theory, these reports were supposed to be fortnightly, beginning with the first rains. They were to give an account of the days, length and amount of rainfall, the quantity and variety of seeds and cash and food crops sown, the dates when this occurred, and their general impressions of the progress of the crops. These reports increased the burden of work on the commandants de cercle and chiefs and it is not surprising that they were not nearly as frequent as the central government would have wished. In his report of mid-September 1926, the chef de canton of Guet was able to tell his chef supérieur that a good harvest of groundnuts and millet was expected, exceeding that of the previous year.<sup>4</sup>

Chiefs were also supposed to be able to give forecasts for the traite. In August, chiefs in Tivaouane were predicting that the traite for 1924-25 would be bigger than that of the previous year, even if

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1. Colonial Council PV, third sitting, 11 July 1932.
  2. 1Z65 chef de canton of Ndour to chef de province of Guet, 21 July 1924.
  3. Colonial Council PV, sixth sitting, 9 November 1938.
  4. 1Z65 chef de canton of Guet to chef de province of Guet, 17 September 1926.



the harvest were bad as the area sown with groundnuts and millet was greater than in previous years.<sup>1</sup> During the economic crisis of the 1930s, the commandants de cercle began to require fuller quarterly reports on the state of the groundnut and millet crop for Cayor, and groundnut, millet and rice for the Casamance. The reports for Cayor were enlarged in 1939 to include accounts of the cassava and bean crops.

Chiefs were expected to assist in the struggle against plant and animal diseases. In 1924, the commandant de cercle asked Macodou Sall to alert his subjects to a disease of the groundnut called "la maladie des tâches brunes de feuilles".<sup>2</sup> He warned that the illness, a fungal parasite, had reached epidemic proportions in several areas of Cayor, and would have serious consequences for the crop's future. He sent a sample of a leaf affected with the disease to the chef de province, asking him to make a list of contaminated villages. But the chefs de canton of Guet replied to Macodou Sall that although they had closely questioned cultivators, no trace of the disease had been found. In 1929, Oussouye suffered a bad rice harvest because salt water had infiltrated the paddy. Benjamin Diatta suggested to the administration that the crop could be revived by certain traditional measures employed by cultivators from Kabrousse.<sup>3</sup>

Another major threat to crops throughout this period came from locust invasions. The commandant de cercle of Louga wrote to Macodou Sall in 1930s, emphasising that precautions against the locust must continue after the harvest, to include the destruction of eggs.<sup>4</sup> He stressed that the widely held belief that the locust need not be feared after the harvest was erroneous, as each locust laid about a hundred eggs.

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1. ARSD 2G24-61 Tivaouane RPA 1924.
  2. ARSD 1Z62 Inspector of Agriculture at Tivaouane to Macodou Sall, 3 October 1924 and replies from the chefs de canton of Guet to Macodou Sall, October and November 1924.
  3. ARSD 2G29-101 Tour of Ziguinchor by the Administrateur Supérieur, 1929.
  4. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Louga to his chefs de province, 20 January 1930.

The chiefs were to report any ill will in the execution of this task. Chefs de province and de canton were expected to report each flight of locusts and crickets to the commandant de cercle. In 1948, the administration went as far as to promise a bonus to the chef de village who reported the first three flights of locusts over his canton.<sup>1</sup> Two chefs d'équipe, who were familiar with the measures to be taken against locusts and were literate, were to be selected for each canton to help the inhabitants combat such invasions.

The chefs de canton were also the keepers of forest reserves, no concessions of which were to be made without consulting them. The administration promoted conservation of the forests to combat further soil erosion resulting from encroachments by the people into the forest zone to obtain lougans (plots for groundnut cultivation).

The chiefs on the Colonial Council made a number of constructive suggestions for popularising new agricultural methods. Abdoul Salam Kane in the 1921 session of the Colonial Council suggested the establishment of an agricultural school as in France to train veterinarians, particularly for the Fleuve region.<sup>2</sup> The following year, Sidi N'diaye proposed that the administration should put at the disposal of each commandant<sup>3</sup> agricultural agents who would be free to travel throughout the cercle advising cultivators. He also recommended the establishment of a model garden in each provincial capital. In the 1922 and 1923 sessions, Amadou N'diaye and Abdoul Salam Kane advocated a major transformation of the whole elitist emphasis of French education in Senegal. They pre-empted Brévié's projects of the 1930s to set up écoles rurales with their plans to stimulate a return of young people to the land by creating more farm schools to be financed by the SIPs. As Amadou N'diaye expressed it, "Au Sénégal, on a créé la maison et l'on a oublié la cuisine,

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1. ARSD 1Z65 Note from the Pest Controller of Louga to the chef de province of Guet and the chefs de canton, c. 1948.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, eleventh sitting, 19 December 1921.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, seventh sitting, 18 November 1922.

on a fait des avocats mais pas des agriculteurs. On n'a rien fait pour l'agriculture, et pourtant, c'est elle qui fait vivre le pays."<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes the chiefs found themselves defending the rights of small cultivators against private companies or their overlords. In the 1925 sitting of the Permanent Commission elected and chiefly councillors united in their opposition to the enclosure for sheep rearing of an area of 2,500 km<sup>2</sup> by the company at Richard Toll on the grounds that this would bring dearth to the inhabitants of the region.<sup>2</sup> The chef de province of Guet wrote to the commandant de cercle of Louga in defence of the rights of the inhabitants of Lompoul in the canton of Mbaouar, Guet, when these were threatened by Mbaye (alias Babakar) LÔ, the son of Fara Biram LÔ, the former chef de province of Ross Merinhagen.<sup>3</sup> Mbaye LÔ was the descendant of a family of lamanes, whose rights to the region of Lompoul had been confirmed by Faidherbe. In 1932, he was threatening the cultivators with expulsion unless they paid an excessive due. Macodou Sall appealed to the commandant de cercle to intervene in this affair to demonstrate that generosity "qu'anime nos dirigeants" and defend the cultivators who had occupied the region for many years against such claims.

In agriculture and commerce, the role of the conseils de notables complemented that of the chiefs. As far as agriculture was concerned, they endorsed administrative measures such as the constitution of food and seed reserves, and advised on the distribution of seeds, fixed the date for their repayment and discussed SIP loans. They would approve the agricultural plan of campaign for the following year, determining the variety of crops to be cultivated. The conseil de notables of Ziguinchor made several important resolutions in 1931

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, twelfth sitting, 31 October 1923.
  2. ARSD 4E16 (135) Colonial Council-Permanent Commission, 15 May 1925.
  3. 1Z56 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 22 June 1932.

about the diversification of agriculture and the promotion of cultivation by the plough.<sup>1</sup> It resolved to buy some hoes and seed drills, to create more nurseries for fruit trees and banana plantations and to encourage the cultivation of cassava and millet as food crops. In 1930, conseils de notables all over Senegal approved the creation of an Office d'Inspection et de Conditionnement de Produits Naturels, to regulate the treatment of the groundnut, and the manufacture in the Casamance of wax and palm oil. The conseils de notables endorsed the administration's efforts to stop the peoples of the Basse Casamance from making "vin de palme", an intoxicant, from the oil palm. These councils also discussed administrative measures concerning plant and animal diseases, and the action to be taken against locusts.

Conseils de notables were to advise the administration on the opening and closing days of the traite, the towns where trade in all cash crops except palm oil<sup>2</sup> had to be carried out (the pointes de traite). They also approved administrative measures regulating the sale of animals at fairs and markets. Chefs de canton and de village were expected to enforce these measures and to keep an eye on all these commercial operations, ensuring the fairness of weights and measures. They were to make sure that produce sold was clean and were to stop the sale of illegal products. They were also responsible for reporting the circulation of false money and refusals to accept French currency.

As might be expected, the chiefs often abused their responsibility for agricultural development. Chiefs sometimes did not carry out administrative instructions. During a tour in April 1932, the commandant de cercle of Thies found the chief of Fadene had sown an area specially reserved for groundnuts with millet.<sup>3</sup> The local press was not slow to

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1. ARSD 2G31-74 Casamance RPA 1931, Section: Conseils de Notables.
  2. The sale of this oil was not subject to any restrictions, according to a resolution of the conseil de notables of Ziguinchor, 27 July 1933.
  3. ARSD 2D13-7 commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 4 July 1932.

cite confiscations of lougans by the chiefs for themselves or to sell to the highest bidder. In an article on Abdoul Salam Kane, whom they called an "aristocratic pirate," in 1935, Le Progrès alleged that he made use of his powerful position as a Colonial Councillor to carry out the worst exactions, expelling people who had occupied land in his canton for thirty years and confiscating their harvests without any payment.<sup>1</sup> He was then supposed to have sold the land to enrich himself. The newspaper claimed that his canton was becoming depopulated as a result of his actions.

#### The Chiefs and Supply During the Second World War

The second World War brought a vast increase in the chiefs' powers as they were expected to make a vital contribution to supply. As a result of their new role, the chiefs became even more unpopular with their subjects. The growing isolation of the Vichy regime in the AOF, cut off from the metropole by the British naval blockade and the resulting pressure from the towns for supply, prompted the administration to switch its focus from cultivation of cash crops to subsistence farming (culture vivrière). In the north, this meant the promotion of food crops at the expense of groundnuts. The most important crop was millet, but secondary crops like beans and cassava were also encouraged, while cultivation of the sweet potato was to be resumed in the Niayes. The Vichy regime's focus shifted from the groundnut-producing areas of the north to areas which already had always concentrated on subsistence agriculture like the Casamance, "le grenier à riz du Sénégal",<sup>2</sup> which also had a fair-sized stock of animals.

Throughout the war, the chefs de canton were required to send full reports to the administration on the agricultural situation and were to make an inventory of the contents of the seccos in their cantons for the supply campaign. In the province of Guet, Macodou Sall

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1. Le Progrès in a series entitled "Roitelets et Tyranneaux du Fleuve", 13 June 1935 and 22 August 1936.
  2. J. Girard, Genèse du Pouvoir Charismatique en Basse Casamance, Dakar 1969, p.125.

coordinated reports of all his chefs de canton, and in September of each year wrote a full report for his whole province, including the region of Darou Mousty, the preserve of the Mourides under Thierno Ibra Faty Mbacké. In these reports, he analysed the progress of the different varieties of crop, and made predictions on the harvest. In 1941, he suggested that cassava cultivation should be increased.<sup>1</sup>

After the interruption of maritime relations with Indochina and Madagascar, the Vichy regime feared a blockade of the AOF. In 1942, the campaign for millet began in earnest with the administration aiming to collect 60,000 tons of millet for civil servants, the army, towns and worksites.<sup>2</sup> The commandants of each cercle sent their chefs de canton circulars instructing them to give details of potential vendors of millet. If the seller was in another canton, the chief was to make a request for the purchase to the chef de canton concerned.<sup>3</sup> All correspondence was to be sent to the commandant de cercle to enable him to come to a decision. Distribution of millet to needy areas began in July 1942.

But the campaign for millet was a failure. By February 1943, only 30,000 tonnes had been collected.<sup>4</sup> Fearing dearth, the majority of cultivators preferred to keep their millet reserves for themselves. With the lack of imports, cultivators had no need of the money they could obtain from millet sales. Those who sold preferred to do so on the black market, where the price for millet was high, rather than to sell to the administration at a much lower controlled price. Some ethnic groups, like the Sereres, had no tradition of selling millet. The administration turned a blind eye to the forced purchase of millet by the chiefs at prices below the official rate. This led to a number of incidents as at Touglou, a Serere village in Mbayar Nianing (subdivision of Mbour, Thies). When the chef de canton, Soce Fall arrived here

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1. 1Z65 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, "Summary of agriculture in the province of Guet", 29 September 1941.
  2. 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.
  3. 1Z61 commandant de cercle of Louga to all chefs de canton in Guet, 24 March 1942.
  4. 2G42-1.

with his retinue to collect millet, he was attacked by twenty Sereres armed with sticks.<sup>1</sup>

By 1943, the campaign had been called to a halt when the installation of the new Free French government at Dakar meant that links with the exterior were re-opened. This move was also designed to relieve the people of some of the heavy demands placed on them. In spite of the distribution of 2,500 tons of millet seeds in Tivaouane, the 1943 millet harvest was a poor one as a result of the locust invasion and because of a late distribution.<sup>2</sup>

In the same year as the millet campaign, 1942, the chiefs in the north were instructed to promote efforts to cultivate cassava and cotton. Macodou Sall visited the most important villages of Guet on horseback, following complaints by agents of the SIPs that these crops were not being sufficiently cultivated.<sup>3</sup> He discovered that cotton was in short supply as the SIPs had failed to deliver the requisite cuttings, but that by 1943, all chefs de carré in Guet possessed cassava fields. In a general effort to control the circulation of agricultural products, the administration passed legislation on 13 May 1942 forbidding the harvest of and trade in the fibre and leaves of the kinkilliba without a permit.<sup>4</sup> The chiefs were expected to ensure that such regulations were being enforced.

Throughout the war, the administration endeavoured to ensure the supply of meat to the towns. Once the mobilisation order was given on 1 September 1939, the chefs de canton of Guet province ensured the speedy dispatch of 130 cattle by 25 September to Dakar. They had to

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1. 2G42-1.

2. ARSD 2G43-81 Tivaouane RPA 1943.

3. 1Z65 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 7 September 1942.

4. 1Z56 Macodou Sall- Cahier de transmission 1942.

exercise greater tact in parleys with the most important keepers of livestock, the Peuls, explaining the necessity of these requisitions, as this ethnic group generally reacted strongly to threats to their stock. "Le peul tient plus au lait de sa vache qu'à celui de sa mère". The fact that all this was accomplished peacefully was taken by the administration as a sign that "Le peul que Delavignette a appelé un jour le sauvage de l'Afrique est accessible à un certain langage."<sup>1</sup> The chiefs received orders in 1942 to assist in combatting the smuggling of animals between Senegal and its neighbours and to facilitate the passage of a convoy of cattle and sheep from Soudan to Dakar.<sup>2</sup> These animals were to be escorted by Peul shepherds across the cercles of Tambacounda, Kolda, Foundiougne, and Thies.

In order to prevent the wholesale destruction of livestock, the government decreed in 1942 that only the Peuls who already possessed sufficient stock were allowed to sell their animals to repay SP loans. The slaughter of animals by Muslim and animist alike for religious reasons posed, in the view of the French, a threat to the future of the animal stock. Festivals among the Sereres during which animals were slaughtered, for example, often went on for a month. Consulted on this matter, Macodou Sall advised that these customs should be respected, but suggested that in order to protect numbers in future, only the males should be slaughtered and over-consumption should be checked.<sup>3</sup>

The year 1942 saw a fall in groundnut production from 419,000 tons in 1940 to 114,000 tonnes, the lowest it had been since 1906.<sup>4</sup> The peasant was discouraged from producing this cash crop by the lack of imports. In Cayor, the late rains meant that sowings were postponed. As a result, the whole crop could not be planted till 10 August, too late for groundnuts to reach maturity before the end of

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1. ARSD 13G46 (180) André, commandant de cercle of Louga, "Report on mobilisation in the cercle of Louga", 29 September 1939.
  2. 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.
  3. 1Z56 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, c. 1941.
  4. J.F. Ajayi and M. Crowder, History of West Africa, Vol. 2, London 1978, p. 606.



the hivernage.<sup>1</sup> But as with the depression of the early 1930s, the crisis in groundnut cultivation during the Vichy period in Senegal had some positive results. During the crisis of 1929, the process of shelling groundnuts in Senegal rather than in the metropole began. Similarly the isolation of Vichy Senegal from the metropole saw the beginnings of a groundnut processing industry in Senegal, as shelling had to take place locally.<sup>2</sup> The 1940 legislation forbidding the export of groundnuts in their shells was strictly enforced, ensuring a better price for the cultivators.<sup>3</sup>

The increased responsibilities of the chiefs on the Second World War gave increased opportunities for corruption. In 1941, Amadou N'diaye Abdou, a merchant in Mboul Khatta, denounced the chef de canton Meissa Anta Fall for embezzlement from the SIP at Tivaouane.<sup>4</sup> An administrative enquiry implicated not only the latter but Massamba Aram Diop, the chief of a neighbouring canton, Diamatil Djiguène, for gross negligence in his management of the SIP. Both were dismissed. In some areas, the chief's secretary demanded bribes from cultivators who wanted to receive loans of groundnut seeds from the SIPs.<sup>5</sup>

In his reply to Boisson's circular of August 1941, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Aubert, bemoaned the fact that thirty years after their inception in Senegal, the SIPs had not resulted in any major changes in the agricultural practices of the population.<sup>6</sup> The use of animals for ploughing and manuring was still not widely accepted, and the problem of dearth continued. He also favoured reducing the role of the chiefs and their followers in the SIPs on the grounds that this

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1. IZ65 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 10 August 1942.
  2. Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p.608 and Fouquet, op.cit., p.120.
  3. Fouquet, op.cit., p.120.
  4. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques - C598 D5 Senegal RPA 1941.
  5. ARSD 13G34 (180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Aubert, "Reply to Boisson's "Three Directives on African Colonisation", " 7 October 1941.
  6. Ibid.

encouraged corrupt practices. As an alternative, he proposed doubling the European staff employed by the SIPs. In order to raise money for this purpose, he suggested that more seccos be established in every cercle in order to reduce the cost of transporting groundnuts. He also wanted to clamp down on embezzlement and waste by putting seed distribution under the control of a European agent. However, these plans had to be shelved as not enough European officials were available for these tasks and the energies of existing personnel were absorbed by the war effort.

From November 1942 onwards, with Senegal's re-entry into the war on the side of the Allies, and the re-establishment of links with the exterior, the groundnut recovered its former importance. A campaign for this crop began in earnest, which was to continue till the end of the war. The chiefs put up posters in villages, which were intended to appeal to the "patriotism" of the people, with captions like "La Bataille de l'Arachide", "L'Afrique en Guerre" and "Pour La France".<sup>1</sup> The availability of food and goods from Britain and the United States encouraged cultivators to sell their crop. Massamba Sall, chef de canton of Ndoutte Diassane set up a centre at Keur Samba Yacine to develop high quality groundnut seeds, using agricultural monitors as assistants.<sup>2</sup>

But in spite of the dispatch of 45,000 navetanes by the Governments of Guinea and Soudan to help with the Senegalese groundnut crop, the 1943 Battle for the Groundnut did not reach Governor Deschamps' target of 400,000 tons.<sup>3</sup> Only 275,000 tons were produced, partly because cultivators preferred to sell their produce in the Gambia, where they received a higher price.

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1. 1Z56 Macodou Sall - Cahier de transmission-Macodou Sall to chefs de canton of N'doyène and Guet, 1 June 1943.
  2. 2G43-81 Tivaouane RPA 1943.
  3. Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit., p.607.

The chefs de canton and gendarmes were to be "une police économique sévère", reporting those responsible for diminishing the stock of groundnut seeds.<sup>1</sup> By the legislation of 1935, the sale of groundnut seeds on the black market, the domestic production of peanut oil and the consumption of seeds instead of sowing them made cultivators liable for prosecution before the tribunal de premier degré. In Cayor, there were a number of prosecutions especially in the cantons of Tabby Gatteigne and N'doutte Diassane.

The "bataille d'arachide" was to remain of paramount importance throughout the war. On 18 February 1945, the Governor General wrote to the Governor, "La métropole attend de ses colonies l'aide maximim pour son ravitaillement en matières grasses".<sup>2</sup> To this end, he proposed the formation of a Comité de la Propagande de l'Arachide to encourage production of the groundnut using local committees, merchants and religious and traditional chiefs as intermediaries.

The chiefs also had an important part to play in ensuring their own subjects were able to obtain rations. As the 1942 harvest of food crops and groundnuts was a poor one, the administration, fearing dearth, ordered the chefs de canton to send a list of their subjects to the commandant de cercle so that he could enter their names in ration books.<sup>3</sup> Chefs de canton were to instruct chefs de village to send their chefs de carre to the head of the SIP section in order to obtain ration coupons for the rainy season. As a result of another poor harvest of food crops in 1943, the SIPs distributed millet in January and February of 1944. Bonds were sent to the chefs de village in May of the same year so that they could collect millet, maize and semolina from the United States from the SIP section. They were to distribute these

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1. ARSD 2G44-104 Tivaouane RPA 1944.

2. Fouquet, op.cit., p. 116.

3. 2G44-104 Tivaouane RPA 1944. There was also a large gap between the price of the groundnut at 1f70 a kilo and cereals from the United States at 8fs a kilo.

products in each carré of the village in order to tide the inhabitants over during the rainy season. But in May 1945, the administration ordered the SIPs not to lend any more millet or food crops to the cultivators. Macodou Sall opposed this decision which exacerbated an already difficult situation and favoured the black market.<sup>1</sup>

During the War, the chiefs increasingly found themselves having to take orders from a great variety of services- the Service de Conditionnement, agents of the services of Agriculture and Weights and Measures and from the Veterinary Service. Some chefs were overwhelmed by the massive tasks thrust upon them and found themselves unable to maintain the strict control that was required. During the agricultural campaign of 1944, in the canton of Mécké M'Bar (in the subdivision of Cayor) groundnuts on their way to Dakar for export were seized by wandering bands without the knowledge of their chief, Massamba Yacine Sall.<sup>2</sup> As a result, he was dismissed, and his secretary, Abdel Kader Fall, appointed in his place. In 1945, it was discovered that Seringe Leye, the chief of Badane Sassal, Thies, was allowing cultivators to consume or embezzle a considerable proportion of the groundnut seeds advanced by the SIP in the 1944-45 agricultural campaign.<sup>3</sup>

The administration frequently placed excessive burdens on the people during the War, from which their chiefs sometimes defended them. A powerful chief like Macodou Sall was able to point out to the commandant de cercle of Louga that his request in June 1943 that cultivators in Guet set aside 25 hectares for the cultivation of the castor oil plant was unreasonable.<sup>4</sup> The chef de province argued that this demand, after the start of the rains, had come too late, and clashed with the campaign for the groundnut. The area sown with groundnut seeds had

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1. 1Z56 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 25 May 1945.
  2. AN 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.
  3. ARSD 13G18(17) commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 25 April 1945.
  4. 1Z61 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 5 June 1943.

been doubled and cultivators were already busy tending to this crop. They would therefore have to be forced to work on the castor oil plant. While defending the rights of his subjects, Macodou Sall committed himself to the enforcement of administrative policy if this was really required: "Dans le cas de force majeure, je les ferai travailler et ils quitteront leurs besognes citées là-dessus."

Despite the heavy load they placed on the population of Senegal, the requisitions of the Second World War did not meet with any major resistance, except in the Basse Casamance. This area demonstrated once again that the French hold on it was extremely shaky. The animist peoples of the Basse Casamance, particularly in the Floups area, bitterly resented the requisitions of rice and animals. This was partly for financial reasons, as they were offered only one third of the value of the requisitioned produce, but also because rice had a religious significance to the Diola apart from its subsistence value.<sup>1</sup> Benjamin Diatta, the chef de province of Oussouye had warned the French against the requisitioning of rice, but his request to have more time to prepare the people for administrative demands was rejected. The requisitions were also unfairly distributed. French administrators favoured certain villages inhabited by their protégés which were let off lightly, so that more had to be demanded from others. In 1942, Bainouck canton was exempted from providing 20 tons of rice as its chief, Alassane Cissé, was friendly with the Administrateur Supérieur, Sajous.<sup>2</sup> Instead, Oussouye had to bear the extra burden.

Faced with the recalcitrance of the inhabitants, the administration resorted to force. In October 1942, the king of Mlomp was imprisoned at Ziguinchor after his village failed to deliver the eighty-five animals

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1. Interview with Abbé Augustin Diamacoune Senghor.

2. Girard, op. cit., p.216.

demande by the French. The administration threatened to set fire to the village of Kagnout, Oussouye, unless they received the requisite number of cattle. The requisitioning of food crops, a vaccination tournee and the recruitment combined to spark off a revolt in Oussouye in the autumn of 1942, which was not to be fully quelled for another five years.<sup>1</sup> In February 1943, some villages in the Floups area refused to give paddy to the administration, even though the harvest was abundant. The situation was exacerbated by French efforts from 1943 onwards to force the people of Oussouye to grow the groundnut, a symbol of French (and Wolof) colonialism and not a tradition Diola crop. One of the tenets of the programme of Alinsitoué, the feticheuse at Kabrousse who inspired the revolt was to forbid her followers to cultivate the groundnut.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Post War Fate of the SIPs

During the interwar period and Second World War, the SIPs were disliked increasingly by the politically aware as tools of the local administration and chiefs. The emergence of political parties in the years following the war led to demands for the abolition of the SIPs as symbols of colonialism and their replacement by cooperatives. The SFIO<sup>3</sup> manifesto contained a clause pledged to the disbandment of the SIPs. However, a number of members of the SFIO rank and file, some of whom had worked for the SIPs, opposed this plan. In his reply to Dr. Ousman Soce's article in Paris-Dakar on 6 September 1947 attacking the SIPs, Youssouf Bargane Diop, the Secretary General of the Louga branch of the SFIO spoke on behalf of the indigenous personnel of the SIP of Louga. He argued that were the SIPs abolished, many of their staff, who were often well-versed in agricultural methods, would lose their jobs. In his view, the SIPs and checks by administrators

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1. See Ch. 6 on "The Role of the Chiefs in Conscription".
  2. Interview with Abbé Diamacoune Senghor.
  3. The main French socialist party at the time, the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière.

and chiefs were still required as rural producers continued to be improvident. He defended the SIP as "la seule société ayant une gestion saine et qui donne entière satisfaction aux Africains."<sup>1</sup>

But the law of 10 September 1947 abolished SIPs in the AOF, AEF, Togo and the Cameroons and set up agricultural cooperatives in their place.<sup>2</sup> These differed from the SIPs in that membership was optional and managers were elected by members and not imposed from above. In Senegal, cooperatives developed rapidly. By 1949, they numbered eighty and had produced 65,000 tons of groundnuts, one eighth of Senegal's total production.<sup>3</sup> But this change was not as dramatic as might first appear, since much of the original equipment and many of the staff of the SIPs were retained by the cooperatives. One major change was that the role of the cooperative was confined to marketing produce only. The part the SIPs had played in local betterment was taken by the Fonds de Génie Rurale, but these soon proved less effective than their predecessors.<sup>4</sup>

The Sociétés de Prévoyance were so successful in certain respects in promoting the agricultural and social development of the localities that Nemos, the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance in the late 1930s recommended "l'imprégnation de l'administration sénégalaise par les pratiques des SIPs."<sup>5</sup> In some of the tasks they performed in the framework of the SIPs and in some of their agricultural functions outside it, certain chiefs made a positive contribution, promoting varieties of seed and cultivation by the plough. But the chiefs were given such wide powers in these societies as to leave room for abuse. Although legislation in the late 1930s aimed to limit the part

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1. 1Z56 Youssouf Bargane Diop, "Memorandum on Provident Societies", September 1947.

2. Robinson, "The SPs in French West Africa", *op.cit.*, p. 33.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. 13G42 (180) annotated on the Quinquaud report on the cercle of Ziguinchor, 30 December 1938.

played by the chiefs in the SIPs, lack of European personnel made them indispensable.

During the Second World War, there was a major increase in the chiefs' power with respect to agriculture. Their role in requisitioning crops and animals from their subjects made them extremely unpopular. Some chiefs were unable to cope with the variety of tasks involved and government departments to which they became answerable. Even by 1947, the majority of the Senegalese population was still living in the countryside. As many had suffered in some respect from the exactions of the chiefs and SIPs prior to or during the war, it is not surprising that demands for the dissolution of these bodies to curb chiefly power were widely supported.



## CHAPTER SIX

### The Role of the Chiefs in Conscription

After the First World War, the French government was faced with the need to maintain a large standing army for the occupation of the Rhineland, and to police the enlarged French Empire which had emerged from the War. Yet on the other hand, it was under pressure to release the rank and file to assist in the recovery of France's economy. In view of the fact that France's birth rate was lower than that of Germany, the solution seemed to lie in recruiting subjects of France's Empire into the army.<sup>1</sup> The success of Diagne's recruitment in 1918 contributed to the French decision to keep conscription in her colonies in West Africa in peacetime.<sup>2</sup> Conscription was favoured over the recruitment of volunteers as the latter had to be paid higher premiums, and also because the colonial administration believed they might be difficult to find.

In France, the Conscription Act of 1919 required all Frenchmen declared physically fit to serve in the army for two years, a term which was further reduced to eighteen months seven years later. But in West Africa, the act was modified to suit the exigencies of the colonial administration. The decree of 30 October 1919 established an annual recruitment for young men between the ages of 19 and 28 living in all cercles of the AOF to serve in the army for three years.<sup>3</sup>

The chiefs were to play a vital role in helping the metropole fulfil its demands on its West African colonies. As no system of recording births and deaths existed in the AOF, and in view of the part they already played in the census, the chefs de canton rather than the commandant de cercle were entrusted with compiling lists of those eligible to serve. These lists were based on a special column in the notebook the chief used for the census, where names of potential recruits for the following year's conscription could be entered.

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1. M.J. Echenberg, "Paying the Blood Tax: Military Conscription in French West Africa 1914-1929", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1975, p.179.
  2. Ibid., p.181
  3. Ibid. p. 182 and ARSD 2D14-7 Circular from Governor to Commandants de cercle concerning the decree of 30 October 1919, 2 February 1920.

The commandant de cercle would often delegate his responsibilities for organising the recruitment to the chiefs if he was too busy. In 1929, Benjamin Diatta, the chef de province of Oussouye, was actually running the recruitment in the Casamance, and was calling up potential recruits.<sup>1</sup> The recruitment tables were generally sent to the Governor by the commandant de cercle in November if conscription was to take place the following March.

In the year preceeding the annual draft, the quota for the army in West Africa would be fixed in discussions between the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Colonies, and other members of the Cabinet. This was sent to the Governor who divided the quota among the eight colonies of the Federation. When the Governor of Senegal received his fixed quota from Dakar, he distributed it among the cercles. The commandants de cercle and chefs de canton would in turn divide this quota among the cantons and towns of the cercle. The chefs de canton would then instruct the young men concerned to appear before the draft board on a particular day at one of the main towns of the cercle.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of Tivaouane, the centres for recruitment were Kébémér, for the province of Guet and the towns of Guéoul and Ndande; Méckhé, for the cantons of Mboul Khatta, Diamatil, Djiguene Gallo, Méckhé M'Bar, Tabby Gatteigne, Mboul Gallo and the towns of Kelle and Méckhé; and Tivaouane for Ndoutte Diassane and the towns of Tivaouane and Pire.<sup>3</sup> Once Tivaouane became a subdivision of Thies in 1929, its centres were reduced to Meckhe and Tivaouane. The centres for Ziguinchor immediately after the First World War were Ziguinchor, Oussouye, Kamobeul and Diembéring, although the last two had been dropped by 1924. For Bignona, centres were at Bignona and Diouloulou, while this subdivision was in existence. The draft boards which met here were to

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1. 2G29-101 Tour of Ziguinchor by the Administrateur Supérieur, 1929.
  2. ARSD 18G84(17) Table: the functions of the chiefs in military matters.
  3. ARSD 2G26-73 Tivaouane RPA 1926.

combine civilian and military interests: they were chaired by a military officer who was seconded by the commandant de cercle or his deputy.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the boards were attended by a clerk from the military and one from the civilian administration, and a doctor to conduct medical examinations. The date of operation of the draft boards varied annually, but would generally be around March and April between the traite and period of cultivation. This ensured that young people would be at home in their villages, yet avoided interfering with the economic life of the region.

The chefs de canton and de village were to ensure that young men of the right age for conscription did not leave the region before the draft boards met, and some chiefs had to accompany potential recruits to the centre. The chefs de canton were to provide sleeping mats for the young men on their way to the board, and were to feed them while the board operations were in progress. These chiefs were to be reimbursed for their pains. In general, the Administration tried to ensure the whole process of selection took no more than about two days, so as to disrupt the economic life of the region concerned as little as possible.

Once the doctor had selected those who were in good health, the chefs de canton were to supervise the drawing of lots to determine who would ultimately be selected, a practice introduced in 1924.<sup>2</sup> Those drawing a "bad number" were to go into the army as the "first portion". Others whose numbers were not drawn were placed in the "second portion", and returned to their villages to form an inactive reserve to be called on in case of national emergency.<sup>3</sup> In the late 1920s, as we have already seen, they were used as a source of cheap labour for public works projects. Some, known as ajournés, were given cards and ordered to present themselves before the board the following year. Men in the

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1. Echenberg, op. cit., p. 183.

2. AN 2G24-13 AOF-Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble 1924.

3. Echenberg, op.cit., pp. 185 and 187.

"first portion" were not allowed to return home after the board had finished its work, but were kept together and marched to their military camps.

In order to stimulate the chiefs' zeal in the recruitment, they were given official proof of satisfaction in the form of money and decorations. In 1920, chefs de canton in Cayor were awarded 15 francs per recruit, and the commandant de cercle asked the Governor if official thanks could be extended to Meissa M'Baye Sall, the chef de province of Saniokhor and the chef d'escale of Pire, Matar Diogob.<sup>1</sup> He suggested that Dioucounda N'diaye of Mboul Mbakol, the only chef de province without a decoration, be awarded a Legion of Honour for his services during conscription. When he discovered that his contingent was short of seven men, he had presented seven of his diarafts to the commission. Code N'diaye, later chef de canton of Sandock Diaganiao, was awarded the Etoile Noire du Benin for his role in publicising Diagne's recruitment of 1918 while serving as an interpreter.<sup>2</sup> In some years, the government circulated lists of chiefs to be particularly thanked for their "zeal and devotion" during conscription. One such list, in 1921, included:-

For the Casamance - Ansoumane Mane of Djougouttes  
Sonkarou Maria, the chef bénévole of Bignona Kalounaye  
Abdoul Diallo of Firdou Sud

For Tivaouane- Macodou Sall of Guet  
Ibra Diop of Tabby Gatteigne  
Sambou Ndour of Mbaouar  
Massamba Sall of Méckhé M'Bar  
Lat Sène Fall- a notable from Tabby Gatteigne<sup>3</sup>

The death of many Senegalese soldiers in the First World War and the return of maimed ones did not make for good publicity for the annual conscription in its early years. A whole company from Bignona had, for

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1. ARSD 2D14-7 commandant de cercle of Cayor to Governor, 9 April 1920.
  2. IC11463 Code N'diaye-Report Book 1946.
  3. 1C803 Official list of chiefs who served well in the 1921 recruitment for Senegal.

example, been destroyed in November 1914 at Arras.<sup>1</sup> In order to still the fears of potential conscripts and encourage voluntary recruits, the chiefs were to work with former soldiers to inform young men of the advantages of military service.

Immediately following the First World War, the contingent demanded from the AOF remained high. In 1920, Senegal alone was to provide 3500 conscripts, with Tivaouane sending 340, Thies 320 and the Casamance 590.<sup>2</sup> The bulk of Senegalese people, who had by then become accustomed to colonial rule, accepted the recruitment, although with greater reluctance than taxation or the census. "Avec sa passivité habituelle et son fatalisme, l'indigène se soumet à tous les exigences de l'autorité. Mais le service militaire lui paraîtra longtemps la plus dure obligation."<sup>3</sup>

#### Resistance to Conscription and the French Response.

The early years of the interwar period saw violent resistance to conscription even in as stable an area as Cayor. Here, the 1920 recruitment was a dismal failure, partly due to an outbreak of plague, which meant that in some regions like Méckhé M'Bar, conscription had to be abandoned.<sup>4</sup> Other factors were the illness of Macodou Sall and resistance on the part of the inhabitants. When Massamba Sall, the chef de canton of Méckhé M'Bar, and his followers arrived at the village of Khissé for the recruitment on 2 March, they were forced to flee by an armed band.<sup>5</sup> Three days later, at Keur Doumba Gaye, they were surrounded by a crowd brandishing sabres and knives. This resistance was inspired by the traditional chief, Lat Diop Tabara, who fled the region with his herds. The following day, Ibra Diop, the chief of Tabby

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1. C. Roche, "L'Affaire Benjamin Diatta (1942-44)", Notes Africaines, No. 155, July 1977, p.71.
  2. 2D14-7 Governor to commandants de cercle, 2 February 1920.
  3. ARSD 13G13(17) Bureau Militaire-"Report on the 1922 recruitment in Senegal", December 1922.
  4. 2D14-7 commandant de cercle of Cayor to Governor, 11 March 1920.
  5. Ibid.

Gatteigne encountered opposition similar to what he had experienced in the recruitment of the First World War.<sup>1</sup> He and his followers were surrounded by fifty armed youths. At the same time, no one of similar standing was found to take the place of the ailing Macodou Sall in Guet, where 170 men were required. By April, only ten tirailleurs had been recruited in the cercle of Tivaouane, out of a contingent of 340. The chef de subdivision militaire demanded sanctions against villages supporting the deserters as a warning to others. As a result of administrative coercion, the contingent was made up in the course of the year. In 1923, absenteeism in Guet was still high.<sup>2</sup> In the cantons of Guet, Thilmakha and Mbakol, relatives outnumbered recruits at the meeting of the draft board, and in 1924, numerous desertions took place.<sup>3</sup>

During the interwar period, persistent opposition to conscription came mainly from those peoples for whom colonisation by the French had been more recent and less profound. These were generally nomadic groups like the Peuls, and the frontier peoples of Southern Tambacounda, Sine Saloum, the Casamance and Haute Gambie.<sup>4</sup> This resistance was generally passive, taking the form of flight, facilitated by the ease with which frontiers could be crossed and by poor communications with the chef-lieu. Although conscription was successful in Cayor after 1924, the Peuls of cantons like Ndour continued to pose problems.<sup>5</sup>

In the case of the Basse Casamance, whole villages were sometimes completely abandoned as potential recruits fled with their families. Such was the case of the villages of Berefaye and Boudial in Ziguinchor cercle in 1923.<sup>6</sup> When the villagers returned for the beginning of the rice growing season in May, the colonial authorities would grasp the opportunity to seize young men eligible for military service.

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1. 2D14-7 commandant de cercle of Cayor to Governor, 11 March 1920.
  2. ARSD 2G23-66 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to Governor, 23 February 1923.
  3. ARSD 2G24-61 Tivaouane RPA 1924.
  4. AN 2G27-18 Senegal RPA 1927.
  5. ARSD 2G26-73 Tivaouane RPA 1926.
  6. ARSD 2G23-54 Ziguinchor RPT-First quarter 1923.

Flight from military service in the Basse Casamance was facilitated by the "situation particulière de ce pays enclavé entre deux colonies étrangères".<sup>1</sup> In 1919, large numbers of Bainoucks and Mandjacques fled Ziguinchor for Portuguese Guinea to avoid conscription only to return in June to escape the prestations imposed by the Portuguese.<sup>2</sup> Inhabitants of villages in Bignona used to flee to the Gambia, as in the case of villagers from north and north-east Fogny in 1923 and 1924.<sup>3</sup> In a number of Diola villages in Bignona, in 1922, women went as far as stripping and dancing round the young men on their way to the draft board to tantalise them into not leaving.<sup>4</sup> A more widespread custom, which persisted in Oussouye as late as 1934, was for women to accompany the contingent for a certain distance, crying and moaning.<sup>5</sup> The French usually replied to this resistance with a show of strength, often sending a detachment of soldiers even to villages where there had been no question of violent opposition. In 1922, a detachment of tirailleurs was sent from Kamobeul to Point St. Georges to search for 42 deserters.<sup>6</sup>

Resistance was most intense in areas where animism was most deeply rooted. In 1926, the feticheur Dion Bossi in Brin Seleki encouraged young people and their families to flee the recruitment, but after his arrest, the inhabitants returned.<sup>7</sup> When in the same year, Patron Gomis proved unable to prevent young men fleeing Mandjacques canton for Portuguese Guinea, the commandant de cercle destroyed the fetishes in the villages in order to force them to return.<sup>8</sup>

In the years immediately following the First World War, the

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- 1 13G13(17) Bureau Militaire-"Report on the 1922 recruitment."
  - 2 ARSD 2G19-20 Ziguinchor . RPM June 1919.
  - 3 ARSD 2G24-50 Casamance RPA 1924.
  - 4 13G13(17) Bureau Militaire-"Report on the 1922 recruitment"
  - 5 ARSD 2G34-68 Ziguinchor RPA 1934.
  - 6 13G13(17) Bureau Militaire-"Report on the 1922 recruitment."
  - 7 ARSD 2G26-66 Casamance RPA 1926.
  - 8 Ibid.

resistance to conscription in the Basse Casamance was often compounded by the chiefs, particularly the chefs de village, who generally sided with their own people against the administration. All the young people in the villages of Bignona, apart from those living in the canton of Djougouttes and round the town of Bignona fled the 1922 recruitment on the advice of their relatives and the chefs de village.<sup>1</sup> In all, over one thousand fled to the Gambia and the big towns after the recruitment had been announced in June. Some chefs de canton simply failed to execute administrative orders. Kouyouga Koudiabé of Kalounayes Nord and Seremate Tamba of Djiragones were dismissed after the April 1925 recruitment when they allowed a large number of potential conscripts to flee to the Gambia.<sup>2</sup>

Resistance to the recruitment in the Casamance generally took a more active form when the chief and his escort themselves resorted to force. In the village of Mandaye in the region of Sinédian Guiro, Bignona in 1921, a scuffle broke out between Yoro Badji, the chef bénévole on the one hand, and the Diola inhabitants on the other, resulting in the death of three villagers and the wounding of two tirailleurs and a number of villagers. The inhabitants later claimed that Yoro's methods, which included the arbitrary arrest of two young men, had provoked the incident.<sup>3</sup>

In the early years of conscription, the commandants de cercle did not punish draft dodgers but expected some as a matter of course as a result of seasonal migrations and of unfamiliarity with the system. But by the end of the 1920s, the administration, under pressure from the military, began to take tougher action against draft dodgers.<sup>4</sup> The chefs de canton were to be present at the meeting of the draft board in the hope that this would prevent substitutions, and the presence of

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1. 13G13(17) Bureau Militaire "Report on the 1922 recruitment."
  2. AN2G25-43 Senegal RPA 1925.
  3. AN 2G21-8 Senegal RPT Second quarter 1921.
  4. Echenberg, op.cit., pp.187-188 and 2G24-14 Senegal RPA 1924.



notables was also encouraged. In order to stop absenteeism, the chefs de canton were to seek out the young men failing to turn up at the draft board in order to present them to the following year's board. Some young people who escaped the commission had in any case to be let off once they became too old to serve.

When the draft board met, chefs de canton were to compile lists of deserters, giving the name of their villages, relatives and where they were suspected to be hiding. The chefs de village were then expected to seek them out. The search went on across cercles. Chefs de canton would receive full descriptions of deserters from other cercles from the commandant de cercle, and would keep in touch with colleagues while the search went on.

By the decree of 30 July 1919, the chiefs were to bring absentees before the Tribunal de premier degré. If acquitted of wilfully attempting to evade conscription, the individual would be put at the top of the lists for the following year. If found guilty, he would be punished prior to being sent off for military service. Punishments were at times severe: one interviewee from the village of Séléki (Brin Séléki, Ziguinchor), reported that he was sentenced to a year's forced labour for attempting to evade conscription.<sup>1</sup> Relatives were also punished for assisting deserters.

The chief's search for absentees was often highly successful. In 1926, Tivaouane was supposed to provide 145 tirailleurs, but with the recovery of 73 absentees from 1925, only 72 fresh recruits were needed.<sup>2</sup> Even in the Basse Casamance, the numbers fleeing to Portuguese Guinea and the Gambia to escape the recruitment had fallen by 1930. Soon after the formation of the commandement indigène in Ziguinchor, an improvement in the recruitment was noted. The whole 1923 contingent was found within two weeks, along with nine volunteers'.<sup>3</sup> This led the

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1. Interview with Soyibou Bassene.

2. 2G26-73 Tivaouane RPA 1926.

3. 2G23-70 Casamance RPS First semester 1923.

Administrateur Supérieur to conclude: "L'organisation récente du commandement indigène a fait ses preuves et devra être maintenu dans ses grandes lignes."<sup>1</sup>

This improvement was also the result of the adoption of more realistic recruitment targets by the metropolitan government after the catastrophic West African conscriptions in the early years. Like Van Vollenhoven who had opposed Diagne's massive levy of troops in 1917, a number of colonial administrators opposed large scale conscription on the grounds that it would bring economic stagnation and even armed revolt by those at whom it was aimed.<sup>2</sup> The Administrateur Supérieur had argued that the contingent of 250 men requested in 1922 from the Casamance was too large, let alone the one of 590 demanded in 1920.<sup>3</sup> Heeding his advice, the government of Senegal requested smaller contingents from the Casamance and elsewhere after 1922. The total contingent for Senegal was reduced from 3500 in 1920 to 1950 in 1922. On the advice of the commandants de cercle, the 1922 contingent for the whole of Senegal was further reduced to 1100 and finally stood at 530. The French were by 1930 enforcing more strongly the 1917 accords with the governments of Gambia and Portuguese Guinea, which involved the extradition of deserters.<sup>4</sup>

During the 1920s, as former soldiers returned to their villages in good health after their peacetime military service and were able to inform their neighbours of its advantages, people became less reluctant to serve. The population of Bignona could see that soldiers at the local garrison enjoyed a good standard of lodgings, food and clothing. Chefs de canton, in their parleys with their peoples, were expected to inform them of the life and advantages of a tirailleur and his family. Naval recruitment was particularly favoured in the Basse Casamance, with

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1. 13G13 (17) Bureau Militaire "Report on the 1922 recruitment."
  2. Echenberg, op.cit., p.180
  3. 13G13(17) Bureau Militaire - "Report on the 1922 recruitment."
  4. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C597 D1-Senegal RPT First quarter, 1917 and C598 D4-Senegal RPA 1929.

30 enlisting in 1929.<sup>1</sup> There were as many as sixty volunteers for military service in Ziguinchor in 1934, of whom four could speak good French, seven were literate in it, and nineteen came from what the colonial administration considered to be "useful professions."<sup>2</sup>

In order to discourage absenteeism, the administration paid a premium to the families of recruits who enlisted, but this was abolished in 1926, to the disappointment of many, particularly in the Casamance and Haute Gambie.<sup>3</sup> This was however, a calculated risk as the majority of people in Senegal were becoming as accustomed to conscription as they were to taxes. However, soldiers in service continued to benefit from exemption from capitation and shared with veterans exemption from the Indigénat and prestations, a privilege they had won in the First World War. The number of absentees in Senegal as a whole dropped over the years:

Year	Absentees as a % of the total contingent.
1932	30.58
1933	25.58
1934	23.29
1935	19.56
1936	13.49 (4)

The majority of absentees were from the Fleuve region, in the cercles of Matam and Bakel , although the number dropped in these cercles also:

Cercle	Absentees in 1933	Absentees in 1936
Matam	56.26 %	18.22 %
Bakel	61.12 %	8.4 % (5)

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1. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  2. 2G34-68 Ziguinchor RPA 1934.
  3. AN 2G26-10 Senegal RPA 1926.
  4. Table compiled from figures in 13G33(180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 30 August 1933, 2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936, and 2G35-10 "Notes d'études relatives au Rapport Politique du Sénégal", 1935.
  5. AN 2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936.

Absenteeism remained high in Oussouye ( Ziguinchor). In his inspection of the cercle of Ziguinchor in 1938, Quinquaud noted that none of the young people from the villages of Youtou, Massar-Nialon, Diembéring, Boulouf (Floups), Ayoume, Kagnout or Ebrouyaye presented themselves before the commission of recruitment.<sup>1</sup> He suggested recreating the subdivision of Oussouye or increasing the personnel of the cercle so that a civil servant could spend at least fifteen days a week in the region. He felt also that the chiefs and administration, in parleys with the villagers, should promise them a number of concessions on condition that they participated in the recruitment.

Apart from the problem of absenteeism, the administration came across a number of other obstacles as far as the recruitment was concerned. As the draft board only travelled to a few centres in each canton, some young men on the lists living in isolated regions might find themselves having to march several days on foot to reach it. Again, once conscripts had been selected for the first portion, they might have long marches, sometimes of hundreds of kilometers, to their military camps. In this way, the colonial army lost roughly ten percent of certain contingents through death or disability.<sup>2</sup>

There was also resentment at the distinction in the colonial army between the citizens, on terms equivalent to those of Frenchmen in the metropole, and subjects. The latter had longer terms of service, lower pay and fewer privileges.<sup>3</sup> Nor did they have the same generous leave or food allowances or the opportunity to learn a profitable peacetime skill. Only a handful of conscripts became officers, and seldom rose beyond the rank of captain.

The administration restricted volunteer engagements as volunteers had to be paid a bigger premium, although their numbers rose during the 1920s. By 1932, volunteers formed one sixth of the contingent: 32

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1. 13G42 (180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs Quinquaud-"Report on the cercle of Ziguinchor", 30 December 1938.
  2. Echenberg, op.cit., pp. 188-189.
  3. Ibid., p.175.

volunteers out of 215. In 1933, the number of volunteers was limited to only fifty for the whole of Senegal so that a number had to be turned away in several cercles, like Bas-Sénégal, Djoloff, Tambacounda, Ziguinchor and Kolda.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the Governor of Senegal demanded that the contingent of volunteers for the following year be raised to 116. However, the Governor General wanted to keep volunteer engagements<sup>1</sup> limited to those who were literate or skilled in a trade. In a circular to the Governors of the AOF in 1934, he ruled that members of recruitment commissions and chiefs were to enquire into the background of volunteers for the army.<sup>2</sup> Only if they had no criminal record, a good reputation and were literate in French or practised a useful trade like masonry, carpeting or tailoring could their applications be accepted. Similar enquiries into literacy and the trade of conscripts of the "second portion" were also to be carried out, but these were for record purposes only.

But the greatest obstacles arose from the fact that the administration was obliged to delegate so much responsibility for conscription to the chiefs. Even when the chiefs were relieved of their task of drawing up the recruitment tables in 1926,<sup>3</sup> the figures continued to be based on the census, which remained in the hands of the chiefs. Without a civil births record, it was difficult to estimate ages accurately. This left the system open to abuse, as chiefs would allow favourites to escape the draft, which often meant that recruits would have to be found from elsewhere. The chefs de canton were often unwilling to present the fittest youth to the draft board as they feared this might adversely affect the economic life of the region. As a result, substitutions of weak individuals for healthy ones when the draft board met was a frequent practice. Sometimes former soldiers discharged from the army were included by the chiefs on their list of young recruits. In the cercle of Thies, in 1918, only 25% of those

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1. 2G34-5 Senegal RPA 1934.

2. 13G33 (180) Governor General to Governors of the AOF, 22 October 1934.

3. Echenberg, op.cit., p.183.

presented to the commission of recruitment at Nianing were called up, while at Joal Gohe, only 28 out of 98 potential recruits were sufficiently healthy to be accepted.<sup>1</sup>

In a circular to his commandants de cercle in 1933, the Governor of Senegal observed that the number of people fit to serve in the second portion had fallen in the years leading up to 1933.<sup>2</sup> Attributing this to deliberate omission of the fittest subjects by the chiefs, he suggested that in order to avoid this in future, the commandant de cercle should check the census tables and question the chiefs about them.

Through carelessness or in order to enhance their own prestige and increase the bonus they received per recruit, the chiefs often inflated the numbers eligible for conscription, including the old, infirm, children, strangers and even the dead on their lists. When the commandant de cercle of Thies checked the 2407 names on the tables for the recruitment in 1932, he discovered that 478 were too young to be called up.<sup>3</sup> Often the information the chiefs collected about the recruits was inadequate. They omitted their professions and education, and often failed to compile a list of draft dodgers after the commission had visited the cercle. In a circular of 1933, the Governor urged his commandants de cercle to ensure that the chiefs recorded more accurate details about potential recruits.<sup>4</sup>

In the years immediately following the First World War, the chiefs would often omit the names of their relatives from the recruitment tables. In some cases, this involved open defiance of administrative demands, as in Essynges in 1923. Here Adeoberane, the chef de canton fled with his son who had been included on the lists for the annual recruitment, to prevent his being conscripted.<sup>5</sup> This prompted

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1. ARSD 2D13-20 commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor of Senegal, 16 May 1918.
  2. 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 30 August 1933.
  3. 2G32-105 Thies RPA 1932.
  4. 13G33(180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 30 August 1933.
  5. 2G23-70 Casamance RPS First semester 1923.

his whole clan to follow him into the bush. The administration decided to make an example of the chief, sentencing him to a year's prison.

But the chiefs soon came to appreciate the advantages of having a few relatives in the army. Apart from winning French favour for his family by having served in the army, a former soldier stood a better chance of being awarded a chiefship than a brother who had not performed military service. The army in turn favoured the inclusion of sons of chiefs. The tendency of chiefs to present relatives for military service varied according to the cercle and ethnic group concerned, but by 1930 had become a general feature in the AOF.<sup>1</sup> Several of these relatives were actually volunteers. This served as useful propaganda for the French in their attempts to encourage the rest of the people to enlist.

From 1935 onwards, an annexe was to appear in Senegal's annual political reports containing the names and particulars of relatives of the chiefs who had enlisted. This included the names of the most important chiefly families like the Bours of Saloum, and the Almamys of Boundou (Bakel) as well as of former chefs de village, de canton and de province, and of chiefs still in service. The children of notables, like members of the Grand Conseil of Djolof, were also included on this list. However, as late as 1938, de Coppet was remarking on the small number of sons of chiefs who had enlisted.<sup>2</sup> The annexe of 1939 included the names of Siremba Diatta, the nephew of Benjamin Diatta, who according to his particulars was illiterate and a Diola, conscripted to the seventh regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais. Another recruit from the Casamance was Gorgui Diallo, a Wolof and nephew of Alassane Cissé, the chef de canton of Bainoucks, who volunteered for the air force and was also illiterate.<sup>3</sup> For Cayor, the lists included Demba Kâ, a cousin of the chief of Mbaouar, Meissa M'Baye Sall, for 1939, and the following year, Macodou Sall volunteered the services of his son Mamadou, who had received primary education.<sup>4</sup>

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1. AN 2G30-6 AOF Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble 1930.
  2. 18G84(17) Governor General to Governors, 7 January 1938.
  3. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.
  4. Ibid and 2 G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.

The chiefs were also able to use the recruitment for paying off old scores, and by making sure that the sons of their rivals were included on the lists. Often recruitment became a profitable business as the chiefs accepted bribes from families for keeping their relatives off the recruitment lists. An article in L'Ouest Africain Français in 1926 alleged there was "un compte recruteur dans la comptabilité administrative des chefs."<sup>1</sup> In the case of Tanor Latsoukabé Fall, the chief of Guéoul canton, Baol, the paper listed payments which had been made to him both by individuals and by entire villages trying to evade conscription. The administration did not begin an enquiry till two years later, as it believed that these allegations had been made by soldiers who had been conscripted and therefore had an axe to grind. In fact, Tanor Fall was not finally convicted of his offences in the recruitment till 1939, when he was sentenced to three and a half years in prison.<sup>2</sup>

In 1936, Boubou Sall of the village of Bangoye, Thilmakha, complained to the chef de province of Guet that the chief of his village, Mafall Niang, had asked him to pay 30 francs to exempt his son from the recruitment.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, he alleged that Mafall had omitted his own son's name from the list of those eligible. But after Boubou had made payments for two years, his son was ordered to appear before a draft board by the chef de canton, Morane Sall. Boubou tried to complain to this chef, only to be threatened by his diaraf, Abdoulaye Fall. In his letter to Macodou Sall, he demanded his money back from the chef de village.

A great deal of resentment was aroused by the extreme measures employed by the chiefs and their followers against those trying to evade or to shield others from military service. Referring to chiefly methods

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1. L'Ouest African Français, 6 May 1926.
  2. AN 2 G28-56 Baol RPM March-April 1928 and 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.
  3. 1Z75 Boubou Sall to chef de province of Guet, 26 March 1936.



of conscription, Le Petit Sénégalais wrote: "Le gouvernement français a purgé le pays de nos rois barbares. Je trouve que c'était inutile si ces rois devaient être remplacés par des chefs plus barbares qui souillent le nom de notre bonne république française."<sup>1</sup> L'Indépendant Sénégalais echoed this, stressing that protests were not directed against the numbers recruited, but against the abuses involved. Both papers alleged that Samba Laobé Fall, the chef de canton of Mbayard Nianing, had given orders in 1918 for over twenty five notables of the villages of Diougou and Thiombolodji to be exposed to the sun in irons for resisting conscription in their villages. An investigation by the commandant de cercle of Thies found these claims to be exaggerated "l'affaire a été grossie et que Samba Laobé n'a eu que le tort d'employer pour le but à atteindre un procédé qui se dresse dans les mœurs indigènes."<sup>2</sup> Apparently only four notables who had concealed the true ages of their children were punished in this extreme way, not by the chief himself, but by his diaraf, Boubou Diao. Samba Laobé was merely rebuked for the use of what the French termed "traditional" rather than legal methods.

#### The Chiefs and the Reserve

In view of the chiefs' responsibility for the état civil and the census, Brévié proposed that they should be entrusted with the administration of the reserves in their cantons, that is to say, the "second portion" in the recruitment. From 1932 onwards, the chef de canton was to record the names of reservists in his copy of the census register.<sup>3</sup>

But the administration of reserves remained somewhat haphazard. This inefficiency was exposed in the 1935 and 1936 reviews of the reserve in Senegal. It was not uncommon for chiefs to lose the register of reservists. A number of potential reservists were left off the chiefs'

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1. 2D 13-20 Extracts from Le Petit Sénégalais, 7 April 1918 and L'Indépendant Sénégalais, 22 April 1918.

lists as recruits for the second portion did not always report to the chef-lieu on their return from draft board. Many reservists, who claimed to be ignorant of their obligations, failed to respond to the call up.<sup>1</sup>

In conformity with the Popular Front Government of the AOF's desire to widen the chiefs' responsibilities in a number of spheres, the responsibilities of the chiefs in the administration of the reserve were increased.<sup>2</sup> Increasing international tension may well have played some part in the government's anxiety to put the organisation of the reserve on a sounder basis. Acting on the proposals of the commander-in-chief of the AOF forces, the Governor General ruled that two registers of reservists, one for the first and another for the second portion, were to be compiled by the commandants de cercle and chefs de canton from the *état civil* and census registers. These registers were to be kept by the chefs de canton, who were to record any changes in the composition of the reserve through death or departure from the canton. They were to present these registers to the commandant de cercle on the twenty fifth of the last month in each quarter, and were to give him the dead soldiers' servicebooks. It was also their responsibility to present new reservists to the administration and to track down those who had failed to respond to the 1934 and 1935 call up. In the event of mobilisation, the chef de canton was to gather the reservists together. In very populous cantons, some of these functions would devolve on the chefs de village.

From 1937 onwards, the marks the chiefs received for their administration of the reserve helped to determine the bonus they were to receive from the total sum of tax collected.<sup>3</sup> With this new responsibility came heavier sanctions for chiefs who failed to carry out their duties.

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1. 2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936.
  2. 18G84(17) Commander of Forces in the AOF to Governor General, 27 July 1937.
  3. See Ch. 10 on "The Income of the Commandement Indigène."

Chiefs were to be punished for failure to declare to the administration any event liable to affect the position of the reservists of the canton or if there were too many absentees when the call up of reserves took place. The chief himself was supposed to be present at this call up and could be penalised for absence.

### Mobilisation for the Second World War

With the threat of hostilities in Europe, mobilisation of regular troops, conscripts and reservists began on 15 December, 1938. It took place in the following stages:

I The call up of the "first portion" of 1939, consisting of 1300 men along with 150 absentees from previous years at the normal time of recruitment - March and April 1939.

II The first levee of 300 men from the second contingent- July 1939 .

III The second levee of 1800 men from the second contingent-August 1939.<sup>1</sup>

IV General mobilisation- the call up of reservists from the "second portion" of all preceding years - 1 September 1939-giving a total of about 12,600 soldiers. In addition, 534 volunteers were recruited in 1939 (compared with 57 for 1936 and 119 for 1937).<sup>2</sup> The number of volunteers in the Senegalese army had been unlimited from 1938 onwards, leading to a dramatic rise in numbers:

Cercle	No. of volunteers	
	1936	1938
Thies	11	46
Louga	7	11
Ziguinchor & Bignona	4	36
Total No. of volunteers for Senegal	57	329
Maximum No. of volunteers permitted	58	unlimited <sup>3</sup>

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1. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939. 2. Ibid.

3. Figures from AN 2G36-77 Casamance RPA 1936, and ARSD 13G46 (180) Note to the Governor from the Bureau Militaire concerning recruitment operations, 1939.

It would appear from the Rapports Politiques that the mobilisation went smoothly, due to a large extent to the combined efforts of the commandants de cercle and the majority of chefs de canton. Gatin, the chef de subdivision of Tivaouane, commented: "Les chefs de canton sont entièrement dévoués à la cause française."<sup>1</sup> They were also assisted by Sociétés de Préparation Militaire set up in each cercle to publicise conscription. The 1939 mobilisation was two-fold: of food supplies and of soldiers for the army.

As far as the military call up was concerned, the majority of subjects were by this time accustomed to the annual recruitment. Moreover, the decree of 14 May 1938 brought additional benefits for the recruits and their families in the form of exemption from capitation and prestations en nature during military service and a year after leaving the army, and permanent freedom from the Indigénat.<sup>2</sup> The French took popular consensus in the 1939 mobilisation to be an endorsement of their system of colonisation: "Association et collaboration".

When the mobilisation order arrived on 1 September 1939, the chefs de canton in Thies had already assembled the cercle's 998 reservists.<sup>3</sup> The week before mobilisation took place, all the notables of Louga, including the cercle's chefs de canton and marabouts had gone to the Residence to offer their support to the administration in the event of war.<sup>4</sup> Once the order for mobilisation had been given, chefs de canton and de village visited every village, sticking up posters to this effect. 266 men had already been called up in Louga in August, the "Periode de tension politique". Louga's reservists were very quickly assembled at Kébémér and Louga, and between 3 and 22 September, 795 infantry men were sent to St. Louis and 74 artillery men to Dakar, in vehicles requisitioned for the military authority by a special commission.

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1. 2G39-81 Tivaouane RPM November 1939.
  2. 13G46 (180) Note to Governor from the Bureau Militaire, 1939.
  3. 13G46(180) Maestracci, commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 16 September 1939.
  4. 13G46(180) André, commandant de cercle of Louga, "Report on mobilisation", 29 September 1939.

According to the commandant de cercle of Louga, some reservists marched sixty to seventy kilometers in a day in order to reach the recruitment centre on time. Although seventy volunteered for the army, only eleven passed the final medical examination at St. Louis and the rest were sent back. Macodou Sall in particular received praise from the commandant de cercle for his efforts in the mobilisation in Louga. Chefs de canton in Louga were given orders by the commandant de cercle to seek out 209 absentees for the second portion who failed to respond to the call up of 15 August 1939 and to send them to Louga under escort. If they had left Louga, the chiefs were to try to discover their whereabouts.

From August 1939 onwards, the chiefs in every cercle were given orders keep an eye on strategic installations like electricity plants, airfields and local industries, while those living on the coast were to help to guard it. They were to keep two lists of persons to be kept under surveillance in the event of war-individuals with direct contact with revolutionary organisations and those opposed to the French administration.<sup>1</sup>

Initially, many Diola in Bignona and parts of Ziguinchor were infected with enthusiasm for the war effort. That mobilisation was able to take place "dans un ordre et calme parfaits" can to some extent be attributed to the success of French propaganda. The French tried to convince their African subjects that they would fare badly at the hands of the Germans, with their notions about the supremacy of the Aryan race. Many Africans throughout Senegal responded favourably to the Governor's appeal to their patriotism in his radio broadcast of 11 September 1939. During a meeting of the conseil de notables of Ziguinchor on 22 September, 1939, there were cries of "Vive La France!"<sup>2</sup> Instead of their usual

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1. 13G46 (180) André, commandant de cercle of Louga, "Report on mobilisation", 29 September 1939.
  2. 13G46 (180) commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor to Governor, 20 September 1939.

attempts to dissuade men from enlisting, a number of Diola women meeting in Ziguinchor on 15 September implored their fetishes to destroy Hitler. Instituteurs and moniteurs from schools in the Basse Casamance wrote to the Administrateur Supérieur, offering their help in the war effort. Some like Bamba Diop, a grandson of Lat Dior, wanted to enlist.

From the beginning of 1939, chefs de canton sent declarations of loyalty and pledges to "servir la France jusqu'au bout". The chef de province of Oussouye, Benjamin Diatta and his fellow chefs de canton of Ziguinchor declared to the commandant de cercle Surlemont and to the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance that they wanted no other tutelage but that of the French, "qui a adopté ses enfants d'outre-mer au meme pied d'égalité que les Français de la métropole."<sup>1</sup> The chefs de canton of Bignona sent Surlemont a similar declaration, praising the benefits of French colonialism "avant sa domination, nous étions des véritables sauvages."<sup>2</sup>

During the general mobilisation, a number of chefs de canton even volunteered to join the colonial infantry. These included Massamba Sall (Ndoutte Diassane), Demba War Sall (Mboul Gallo), Meissa Anta Fall (Mboul Khatta), Meissa M'Baye Sall (Mbaouar), Massamba Aram Diop (Diamatil Djiguène) and Boubakar N'déné N'diaye (Diokoul Gandiaye).<sup>3</sup> The Governor and Governor General thanked these chiefs for volunteering but turned their services down, as might be expected, on the grounds that France had greater need of their help in the economic mobilisation:

"Il importe de ne pas trop dégarnir l'armature administrative. La

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1. ARSD 17G98(7) chef de province of Oussouye and the chefs de canton of the subdivision of Ziguinchor - "Declaration before the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor Surlemont and the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance," 25 January 1939.
  2. 17G98( 7) chefs de canton of the subdivision of Bignona - "Declaration before the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor," 11 January 1939.
  3. 17G98(7) This file contains letters to the Governor General from the aforementioned chiefs and others volunteering to join the army.

présence des chefs de canton est indispensable au pays pour organiser et réaliser dans de bonnes conditions le recrutement des soldats et le ravitaillement de la colonie ainsi que la métropole".<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Sambou Ndour, the former chief of Mbaouar who had been dismissed and who was a former soldier, was accepted as a volunteer.<sup>2</sup> Bouna N'diaye, the chef de province of Djoloff had already written several letters to de Coppet in September 1938, conceding that he was too old for active service, but offering his support to the French: "Allah m'a donné le pouvoir de calmer les agitations et sans brutalités".<sup>3</sup>

At the beginning of 1940, before the French withdrew from the war, a large scale recruitment similar to that of 1939 took place in Senegal. The "second portion" of the classes of 1937, 1938 and 1939 was called up in stages, in January, May and June, while the normal 1940 recruitment took place between February and March.<sup>4</sup> Altogether, about 4,000 men were recruited in this year for the first and second regiments of the tirailleurs sénégalais, and 4,200 for the reserve.

In order to check desertions which had increased from 13.1% in 1939 to 21.7% in 1940, chiefs were again given strict instructions to search out and arrest deserters.<sup>5</sup> The French warned them that the bonus they received from the total tax they collected from their subjects was to depend in part on this.

#### The Chiefs and Vichy

When France surrendered to Germany in June 1940, the Vichy government in the AOF was faced with the problem of how to disband an army of 118,000 West African troops, 80,000 of whom had already been

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1. 17G98(7) Governor to Massamba Sall of Ndoutte Diassane, 12 September 1939.
  2. ARSD 13G103(180) Governor to Sambou Ndour, 16 September 1939.
  3. 17G98(7) Bouna N'diaye to Governor, 30 August 1939.
  4. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  5. Ibid, and 18G84 (17) Boisson, Governor General and Haut Commissaire of the AOF to Governors, 12 January 1942.

sent to France.<sup>1</sup> The contingent from Senegal alone totalled approximately 16,000.<sup>2</sup> The colonial administration was anxious to avoid a large floating population of demobilised soldiers and also feared the spread of rumours that the military might of France had been broken. Once Pierre Boisson had been appointed High Commissioner for the AOF and AEF in July 1940, demobilisation began. It passed without incident, as the return of tirailleurs to their villages was controlled and not in vast droves.<sup>3</sup> This gave commandants de cercle and chefs de canton time to dispel ideas that the African soldiers had been abandoned by France and to ensure that the tirailleurs received their full pension and salary. In Boisson's own words, the chiefs were not to give their subjects the impression that "la puissance militaire de la France est ruinée et que le métier des armes n'est plus honoré comme par le passé".<sup>4</sup> The Vichy government transformed the Sociétés de Préparation Militaire into societies for General Education and Sports.

Recruitment on a much smaller scale continued in 1941 and 1942.

Year	First contingent	Volunteers	Second contingent
1941	2805	79	2352
1942	3946		1738 (5)

Although the Rapport Politique for Senegal for 1940 mentioned that some French, évolués, and tirailleurs in Senegal wanted to continue the struggle on the side of the Allies, veterans on the whole settled peacefully in their villages.<sup>6</sup> The majority of Africans could see little difference between Vichy and the Free French and took little interest in their quarrel. But with some experience of the world outside their villages, the veterans were better placed to oust unpopular chiefs like

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1. Ajayi and Crowder, *op.cit.*, p.598.
  2. 2G39-34 Senegal RPA 1939.
  3. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  4. 18G84(17) Governor General Boisson to Governors, 12 January 1942.
  5. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1941 and 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.
  6. 2G40-2.



Code N'diaye. Opposition to the latter had already grown up in the predominantly Serere canton of Sandock Diaganiao as a result of the activities of his Wolof entourage. The return of the tirailleurs precipitated his transfer to the cadre of interpreters.<sup>1</sup>

Most chiefs collaborated with Vichy as readily as with all previous colonial administrations. If anything, the Vichy regime must have been preferable to a number of chiefs as one of the keystones of its Native Policy was "the abolition of the political regime and the restitution of the rights of custom and tradition".<sup>2</sup> The Vichy government encouraged the chiefs to actively participate in the "National Revolution". Bouna N'diaye was made Directeur Fédéral de la Légion des Combattants de l'Afrique Noire, which had branches in every cercle. He declared: "Je suis heureux et fier de compter parmi les hommes qui doivent servir la Révolution Nationale qui satisfait entièrement à mes opinions."<sup>3</sup> He suggested to Vichy that it might win the favour of former soldiers by making them chefs de canton or de village where possible and by giving them a certificate of land ownership which would enable them to pass on land to their descendants. Governor Rey of Senegal at least took up the last part of this advice, affirming the decree of 8 October 1925 on landed property.<sup>4</sup>

As a propaganda exercise, the Vichy administration promoted the idea of holding a Semaine Impériale Française in each cercle from 15 to 21 July 1941.<sup>5</sup> It was to be organised in advance by the chiefs who were to take advantage of the occasion to start a collection in each canton for the prisoners of war. The Semaine Impériale was attended by civil servants, chiefs, notables, merchants, members of municipal commissions and schoolchildren. In Louga, it opened with a speech by the commandant

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1. Senegal RPA 1941.
  2. 13G34(180) Boisson, "Three Directives on African Colonisation", Circular 600C, 21 August 1941.
  3. 13G6(17) Bouna N'diaye to Governor Rey of Senegal, 26 January 1942.
  4. 13G6(17) Governor to Bouna N'diaye, 21 February 1942.
  5. ARSD 1Z63 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province and chefs de canton of Guet, 2 July 1941.

de cercle on the recovery of France under Marshal Pétain, expressing confidence in the future and with assurances to Africans that they belonged to 'la grande famille française'.<sup>1</sup> After this the chiefs and notables had to sign a Livre d'Or professing loyalty to Vichy. Bouna N'diaye then spoke on the benefits of French colonialism. In the course of the week, Macodou Sall gave a speech entitled "Senegal after Faïdherbe". He claimed that tyranny had reigned before the arrival of the French, who had brought peace and introduced a number of social benefits. The message of the speech was in tune with Vichy's paternalistic attitude towards the colonies, "Les Français connaissent mieux que nous nos intérêts," and ended with "Vive la France, Vive le Maréchal Pétain, Vive le Sénégal."

Religious leaders also took part and the Imam of the mosque at Louga made a speech about the generosity of France. Mactar N'diaye, local president of the Legion of Anciens Combattants, spoke about this newly formed institution. The Inspector of Schools delivered a speech on the French colonial effort and the new orientation of education towards a more practical training with the establishment of écoles rurales. Civil servants from various departments gave lectures on the agricultural and industrial achievements of Senegal, and on the benefits of the SIPs. Visits to Louga's maternity clinic and ferme école were organised to demonstrate the benefits of French innovations in health and education. Half way through the week, a minute of silence was organised for participants to ponder the benefits of the French colonial achievement, and the new mottos of Vichy, "Amélioration matérielle et morale des indigènes", and "Confiance, travail et discipline". In accordance with the desire of the Vichy regime in the metropole to promote sport to form the "whole man", the week was not short of festivities, with horse and donkey races, basketball matches and sack races. Presidents of relevant organisations were called upon to give speeches on sport and the scout movement.

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1. 1Z63 Programme of the Semaine Impériale Française at Louga, undated, but event scheduled for 15 to 21 July 1941.
  2. 1Z63 Plan of Macodou Sall's speech which appeared on the back of a letter from the commandant de cercle of Louga to the chef de province of Guet, 2 July 1941.

On the orders of the High Commissioner, Governor Rey wrote to the commandants de cercle in September 1941, asking them to request the chiefs, notables and heads of Muslim brotherhoods to write letters to the tirailleurs sénégalais at Djibouti encouraging them to support the Vichy regime in France.<sup>1</sup> It would appear that certain chiefs in this colony were encouraging resistance. Among the many French chiefs who sent such messages were Bouna N'diaye and Macodou Sall. The former praised Marshal Pétain for abolishing politics in both France and Senegal: "La politique qui était pareille à une plaie gangrenée qui rongait le pays."<sup>2</sup> Macodou Sall exhorted the tirailleurs: "Nous appartenons à Dieu et tôt ou tard, nous revenons à lui. Qu'est-ce que lui revenir un peu plus vite? C'est croire".<sup>3</sup>

One exception to the general rule of chiefly support for Vichy was the chef de canton of Kadiamoutes Sud, Samba Ira Sane, arrested in 1941.<sup>4</sup> It would seem that this chief had unwittingly allowed a deserter to slip across the frontier to Gambia, in contravention of Vichy's decree regulating movement between French and British territory. Imprisoned on Gorée, he mysteriously "disappeared".

With France's reentry into the war on the side of the Allies in June 1943, a fresh effort of recruitment was required of the chiefs, but not as great as in 1939 and 1940.<sup>5</sup> This recruitment suffered the usual problems of poor communications, of evasion, and of errors in the tables prepared by the chiefs. The administration decided that in order to give the chiefs time to carry out their orders, directives would have to be issued at least one month in advance of the recruitment. In addition, it renewed the regulations on conscription in force before 1942, which entailed a search for absentees by the chiefs, and a return to the usual time for the

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1. 1Z63 Governor Rey to commandant de cercle of Louga, 23 September 1941.
  2. 1Z63 message from Bouna N'diaye to the soldiers at Djibouti, 27 September 1941.
  3. 1Z63 Macodou Sall to the soldiers at Djibouti, 6 October 1941.
  4. ANSOM- Affaires Politiques-C598 D5-Senegal RPA 1941.
  5. 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942 and 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.

recruitment.<sup>1</sup> Under Vichy, this had been in November, but under the Free French, it was restored to April or May. Conscription in the years following 1943 had to take into account the emigration of young people from the countryside to the towns accelerated by the war.

#### Resistance to conscription during the Second World War

It would appear that the Hamallist movement in the French Soudan encouraging people to refuse to respond to the call up had little effect in Senegal.<sup>2</sup> Most of the opposition to increased conscription during the Second World War come from Ziguinchor cercle, demonstrating that French control of the Basse Casamance was still weak. The resistance arose from animist fears about dying in a foreign country, and the large-scale recruitment and requisitioning were resented for interfering with the economic life of the region. At the beginning of March 1940, a group of young people from Bliss and Karones fled to the Gambia, only to be sent back by the British.<sup>3</sup> This led to the dismissal of the chef de canton Lonka Demba and his replacement by Joseph Diatta. In the same month, a number of young men from Pointe St. Georges, Mandjacques and Floups fled to Sao Domingo in Portuguese Guinea.<sup>4</sup>

By June 1940, only 100 potential recruits for the subdivision of Ziguinchor had appeared before the draft board.<sup>5</sup> The administration complained that the chiefs concerned had not prepared the recruitment properly and had simply sent out summons to the local people. They also omitted to make out lists of absentees and the "second-portion". The salaries of Ambroise Sambou of Pointe St. Georges and Ampa Eloute of Floups were withheld for fifteen days as a punishment.<sup>6</sup> Of Ben'jamin Diatta, the commandant de cercle Dumas complained "C'est un chef parfait quand tout va bien, et un chef ordinaire quand le travail devient difficile."<sup>7</sup>

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1. 2G44-20.                      2. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940, also see Glossary.
  3. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  4. ARSD 2G40-93 Ziguinchor RPT-First quarter 1940-'Reports on non-French colonies.'
  5. 2G40-92 Ziguinchor RPT Second quarter 1940.
  6. 2G40-2.
  7. 2G40-92 Ziguinchor RPT Second quarter 1940.

Resistance continued into 1941. Of 611 recruits called up in Oussouye, only 113 presented themselves to the commission.<sup>1</sup> Although the commission arrived at Oussouye on 11 December 1941 at 7 a.m., recruits did not begin to arrive till one and a half hours later. 80% of the chefs de village were absent from the board's operations. Although the chef de province had six gardes de cercle, one sergeant and six tirailleurs at his disposal, 20% of the recruits fled in the night.

But the French, failing to realise that they were not approaching conscription in the right way, made the chefs de canton scapegoats for these failures. The chiefs had certainly tried to argue against the heavy-handed methods employed by the French in the recruitment and requisitions. Of the dismissal of Benjamin Diatta once the Vichy government came to power in the AOF, the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor, Dumas commented "Il a fallu l'instauration d'un ordre nouveau, celui de Vichy, pour mettre fin à la carrière d'un inutile et paresseux produit de l'ancien régime."<sup>2</sup> Benjamin Diatta and Ambroise Sambou were both dismissed on 17 January 1942 to be transferred to the cadre of interpreters for the judicial service at Dakar. The chiefs of Floups and Diembéring were issued with warnings. Benjamin Diatta's dismissal caused something of a stir among the Catholic community in Dakar, where Auguste Gomis, a colonial councillor, municipal councillor in Ziguinchor and a Gaullist tried to exploit the event to annoy the administration.<sup>3</sup> Although a European adjoint de services civils was appointed to administer the province directly,<sup>4</sup> the year 1942 saw no improvement in the recruitment, partly because the chefs de village continued to side with their subjects against the administration, and partly because of the activities of Alinsitoué.

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1. 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.

2. Roche, "L'Affaire Benjamin Diatta", op.cit., p.72

3. Ibid.

4. 2G42-1.

Any previous resistance paled in comparison with the agitation among the Floups, which reached its height in 1942 and the first months of 1943 but continued in one form or another till the 1950s, and is reflected in the following figures for Oussouye:

Year	Names on lists	Recruited for first portion	Second portion	Absentees
1939	358	18	115	63
1940	457	20	31	357
1941	366	30	0	258
1942	681	33	0	495
1943	348	36	63	74 (1)

This resistance almost attained the status of a full scale rebellion and coincided with the appearance in Kabrousse of the visionary Alinsitoué in August 1942. Formerly a market women in Dakar, Alinsitoué returned to her native village, Kabrousse, claiming to have received divine revelations promising the people of the Cassamance good rains and hence a good harvest, after two successive years of drought, if they practised the "traditional religion".<sup>2</sup>

Alinsitoué's message advocated no less than a renewal of the Floup nation, with religious, social, cultural, economic and political overtones. She wanted the restoration of animism, the retention of the positive heritage of the past, and preached the traditional Diola virtue of charity (kasila). Her followers offered sacrifices to her of animals, clothes, etc. She stressed the importance of the diversification of agriculture, opposing the cultivation of the groundnut and of imported rice, and the felling of the forest. Although Girard argues that she posed no real threat to the French, her programme opposed the colonial power in all fields.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Roche, "L'Affaire Benjamin Diatta", op.cit., p.72, Table I : "Recruitment in the Province of Oussouye".
  2. Girard, op.cit., p. 243.
  3. Ibid, p. 218 and interview with Abbé Diamacoune Senghor.

She encouraged her followers to refuse to pay the French taxes, to perform military service and prestations on the roads, and to sell their paddy to the French under duress.<sup>1</sup> Support for her came not only from Oussouye, but from Portuguese Guinea, the Gambia and Moyenne and Haute Casamance, and from Mancagnes, Mandjacques, Mandinkas and Peuls as well as the Diola. It is not clear whether Alinsitoué actually advocated armed struggle against the French to drive them from the Casamance, or simply preached passive resistance to their demands. But even passive resistance was damaging to colonial rule, particularly in conditions of war. It would be true to say however, that many of the fears of the colonial administration were the result of ignorance. Girard is probably correct in arguing that in the way he conducted this affair, Colonel Sajous, the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor, was seeking the glory he had missed on the battlefields of Europe.<sup>2</sup>

In Pointe St. Georges, the king of Mlomp, Sirande Fou, led resistance to conscription on a much smaller scale. The people, appreciating the king's great influence over the chef de canton, preferred to obey the former.<sup>3</sup>

Resistance to the administrative campaign for recruitment and supply were concentrated in the villages of Youtou, Effoc, Siganor, Ayoume and Niambalang. In the first two villages, Gnacoufouso, a disciple of Alinsitoué, went as far as encouraging armed rebellion.<sup>4</sup> On 15 January 1943, there were hostile demonstrations at Ayoume against the administration's forced purchase of rice.<sup>5</sup> After shots were fired at a detachment commanded by a European sergeant, Effoc, "le point de cristallisation de l'opposition la plus redoutable contre l'autorité,"<sup>6</sup> was occupied by soldiers on 19 January. The occupation of Effoc was

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1. 2G42-1.
  2. Girard, op.cit., p.224.
  3. AN2G44-85 Oussouye RPM August 1944.
  4. Girard, op.cit., p.224.
  5. 2G43-16 Senegal RPA 1943.
  6. Girard, op.cit., p.223.

followed by that of other refractory villages. While the men fled to the bush round Santiaba, where neighbouring villages supplied them with food in order to enable them to continue their resistance, their families fled to Portuguese Guinea. In all, it is estimated that 8,000 people deserted the villages.

Colonel Sajous, believing Alinsitoué to be the root cause of the administration's problem, decided to arrest her. Accompanied by Tete Diadhiou, the interpreter at the Residence, he travelled to Kabrousse on 29 January 1943. A scuffle broke out in which one of Alinsitoué's relatives, an innocent bystander, was killed. In order to prevent further violence, Alinsitoué gave herself up.<sup>1</sup> In retaliation for French actions, a French soldier was murdered on 9 February near Oussouye.

As Effoc was still deserted by April, Sajous ordered troops to seize the rice stocks and destroy the village. The inhabitants, fearing famine, entered into negotiations with the French, but the conditions on which these were based, that is the handing over of those who had killed the soldier, were unacceptable.<sup>2</sup> Although the inhabitants of other villages had returned by January 1944, those of Effoc did not reoccupy their village till nine years later when an unconditional amnesty was granted.

In June 1943, Alinsitoué, sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, was deported first to Bakel and then to Kayes.<sup>3</sup> Here, all trace of Alinsitoué was lost, and in the Casamance, rumour till this day has it that she is still alive. Seven of her followers were sent to Matam for five years, and nine to Podor for three years. By the end of 1943, eleven of these had died as a result of the wretched conditions of imprisonment. Five others who were too ill to be deported were imprisoned in St. Louis till their release in 1946, with the exception of one who had died in the intervening period.

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1. 2G43-16 Senegal RPA 1943.

2. Girard, op.cit., p.229.

3. See the table on the fate of Alinsitoué and her followers in Girard, op.cit., pp.226-228 and also 2G43-16.



To prevent further disturbances, the Free French transformed the region of Oussouye into a military subdivision in July 1943 with an unmarried European as chef de subdivision and a detachment of infantry.<sup>1</sup> In January 1944, the murderers of the soldier were arrested in Portuguese territory and extradited. Despite the arrest of Alinsitoué and the destruction of Effoc, the months of January and February 1944 saw a small resurgence of animism in Kabrousse. Wild rumours gained currency with reappearance of Alinsitoue's fetish, consisting of a stick threaded through three shells. A woman Koulouga claimed to have seen a white vision telling the people not to take dung to the rice fields, warning them of bad luck if they disobeyed.<sup>2</sup> The chef de subdivision saw this as a clear attempt to hinder the administration's plan to encourage cultivation for the supply campaign and threatened Koulouga, a married woman of fifty with two daughters, with the tribunal de premier degré or deportation if she persisted with her assertions.

Finally, the administration decided to restore the commandement indigène to its former strength with the reinstatement of Benjamin Diatta as chef de province of Oussouye. Deschamps, who had succeeded the Vichy Governor Rey, sent information on the dismissal of Benjamin Diatta to the Colonial Council, and on this basis, an enquiry was opened. The Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Lenoir, felt that Benjamin Diatta had been wrongfully blamed for the administration's failures in the recruitment. Despite opposition from Sajous, Benjamin Diatta was restored to his full powers.<sup>3</sup>

But resistance continued, and in August 1944, the three Floups villages of Ayoume, Karounaté, Siganor and Niambalang failed to present recruits.<sup>4</sup> However, Benjamin Diatta was left to settle the affair, and by October, nearly all the recruits from Floups and Diembering turned up including 113 draft dodgers from previous years. Pointe St. Georges

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1. 2G43-16
  2. AN 2G44-85 Ziguinchor RPM April 1944.
  3. Roche, "L'Affaire Benjamin Diatta", op.cit., p.73
  4. 2G44-85 Ziguinchor RPM April 1944.

still had a relatively large number of absentees, sixteen of whom came from the quarter of Mlomp Djicound alone. The administration reacted by arresting the king of Mlomp.

There was again some fetishist agitation in May and June of 1945 in Brin Séléki, Bayottes and Kabrousse, but this was soon dispelled when news of the Allied victory meant that demands on the population were lessened.<sup>1</sup> The improvement in the recruitment situation, which began under the Free French, is shown in the following table for Oussouye:

	1942	1944	1945
recruits present %	15	80	81.5
absentees %	85	20	18
recruits recovered in the course of the year	0	0	3 from previous classes presenting themselves to the commission. <sup>35</sup> recovered in the course of the year. (2)

#### The Impact of Former Soldiers on Senegal

Former soldiers from the First World War and the annual conscription of the interwar years who had served in other countries were more likely to question chiefly authority on their return to Senegal. Many acquired new ideas and a smattering of French during their period of service, and saw no reason to regard the chiefs as their superiors. During the interwar period, these veterans who remained in France to work in factories, at docks or as clerks, were able to make contact with radical black emigré communities in Paris and the ports.

A Senegalese veteran of the First World War, Lamine Senghor, stood in 1924 as a Communist Party (PCF) candidate in Paris. In the early 1920s, he founded the Comité de la Défense de la Race Nègre (CDRN),

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1. AN 2G45-72 Ziguinchor RPM May 1945.
  2. AN 2G45-73 Oussouye RPA 1945.

a radical anticolonial organisation which rejected ideas of Assimilation and Association in favour of a complete break with France.<sup>1</sup> Senghor condemned those Africans who attempted to compromise with the colonisers and attacked Diagne for his recruiting record in World War One. His organisation soon had branches in Le Havre, Marseilles and Nice where Senegalese sailors were to be found, and in Fréjus and St. Raphael which housed Senegalese garrisons. In 1926, a branch was established in Dakar, and although banned, anticolonial newspapers like Race Nègre, La Voix des Nègres (the mouthpiece of the CDRN) and Cri des Nègres found their way to Senegal. Lamine Senghor was also an active member of the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression where he met activists from British territories like Nkrumah.

But the Paris radicals had little impact on Senegalese political life. The activities of those veterans who returned to Senegal were more important in this respect. Ibrahima Sow stayed on after the First World War in France as a Commissioner of Pensions for the colonial army, and came into contact with radicals like Lamine Senghor. In 1928, he returned to Senegal to support Diouf's campaign for the Deputyship in the elections to the French National Assembly.<sup>2</sup> Together with one Louis Martin, he set up the newspaper Périscope Africain to back Diouf and oppose Diagne.

Although the majority of veterans returning to Senegal did not plunge into political activity, a number found it difficult to resume their old social patterns. This applied particularly in the Fleuve region, among the Toucouleur, where the French had already undermined the authority of the chef de famille by abolishing slavery. Of the tirailleurs returning to Matam, the commandant de cercle wrote in 1919, "Le seul point noir est la mentalité rapportée par certains tirailleurs, marins et permissionnaires qui bien que les ayant fait libres, essayent maintenant de s'affranchir de toute autorité en s'efforçant d'entraîner à leur suite quelques mauvaises esprits".<sup>3</sup>

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1. J. Spiegler, "Emergence of Nationalist thought among French-speaking West Africans", D. Phil., Oxford, July 1968, p. 113-124.
  2. G. Wesley Johnson, "Centenaire de Blaise Diagne", Notes Africaines, No. 135, July 1972, p. 69.
  3. AN 2G19-22 Matam RPM May 1919.

In general, however, Senegal did not experience the problems that Guinea had faced in absorbing the returning tirailleurs after the First and Second World Wars.<sup>1</sup> The Governor in his 1920 report observed "Les tirailleurs libérés sont très vite réadaptés à leur ancienne vie".<sup>2</sup> The Senegalese administration had been quick to advance seeds and food to the returning tirailleurs till the harvest and there was no shortage of employment on the Thies-Kayes railway.

Former soldiers and NCOs often coveted the post of chef de village or de canton. According to the Rapport Politique Annuel of 1930, only in cases where they failed to obtain a post would they directly challenge the authority of the chiefs. A number of former soldiers were integrated into the administrative structure as chefs de canton or de village, but as the French did not possess unlimited patronage, there was bound to be some discontent. In 1930, there is a case of former soldiers in Ziguinchor calling the authority of a chef de village and customary rules into question.<sup>3</sup>

As former soldiers obtained more concessions from the administration in exchange for their services, they became vociferous as a pressure group. In 1939, they were for the first time to have their own representatives on the Colonial Council. Massamba Sall, the chief of Ndoutte Diassane reported to the Inspector of Administrative Affairs that Amadou Dieng, a candidate for the anciens militaires in the Colonial Council elections, had been declaring that "Je brigue le suffrage des anciens militaires dans le seul but de contrecarrer l'action administrative jusqu'ici néfaste pour notre cause."<sup>4</sup> He declared that he wished to weaken the influence of the chefs de canton and even of the administrators. However, this was an isolated case and in the view of the Inspector of Administrative Affairs these had been merely "paroles inconsiderées".<sup>5</sup>

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1. R. W. Johnson and A. Summers, "World War I Conscription and Social Change in Guinea", Journal of African History, vol. 19, no. 1, 1978.
  2. 2G20-3 Senegal RPA 1920.
  3. ARSD 2G30-93 Ziguinchor RPA 1930.
  4. ARSD 13G43 (180) Massamba Sall to chef de subdivision of Tivaouane, 21 July 1939.
  5. 13G43(180) Inspector of Administrative Affairs to Governor, 4 August 1939.

After the Second World War, attacks on the chiefs by former soldiers increased. They considered that their services to the French entitled them and their families to the full rights of French citizens. Competition for the post of chief amongst former soldiers increased, but as there were insufficient jobs available, these contenders moved into opposition.<sup>1</sup> Although the subject suffrage for the elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1945 was a narrow one, former soldiers were amongst those who had the vote. The SFIO's platform of "a single category of Frenchmen having exactly the same rights in the way that all have the same duties, including that of dying for the same country"<sup>2</sup> would particularly appeal to the Second World War veterans.

The chiefs played a key role in conscription throughout the interwar period and in mobilisation and demobilisation during the Second World War. In the course of the 1920s, metropolitan pressures on the colonial administration for conscript troops grew to the extent that as long as the chiefs produced the requisite contingents, little effort was made to enquire into the methods they had employed. At the same time, military service became more acceptable to chiefly families. Conscription was an important illicit source of income to the chiefs and a way of settling old scores. It is difficult to estimate the full social cost of the recruitment, but it must have widened the gulf between the chiefs and their peoples.

It might seem that it was only the privileged elite of Africans from the Four Communes deprived of their political rights who can really be said to have lost out under the Vichy regime in the AOF. On the other hand, the recruitment tables for the Basse Casamance would indicate that the average rural cultivator preferred the rule of the Free French to that of Vichy as the number of absentees fell dramatically when Senegal went over to the side of the Allies. Or possibly Free French coercion was more effective! The vast majority of chiefs benefited under Vichy, which disapproved of African political activity as much as they did, and they proved as willing to collaborate with this government as with all preceding administrations.

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1. AN 2G46-19 Senegal RPA 1946.

2. B. Traore, Forces Politiques en Afrique Noire, Paris 1966, p.24.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### The Chiefs and Justice

Had the French possessed sufficient European administrators in Senegal, they might have conceived of the gradual assimilation of the whole population into a legal system based on the Code Napoléon. In what was intended to be a temporary measure, European administrators were armed with the Indigénat to deal with their African subjects. However, the shortage of personnel hampered both the exercise of the Indigénat as the sole form of justice and the introduction of a French judicial system, with French magistrates. Moreover, the French were anxious not to unnecessarily alienate potential collaborators by the arbitrary exercise of the Indigénat. They were therefore forced to compromise with customary forms of justice where these did not come into conflict with French law. It soon became obvious that "Le respect de certaines coutumes constituait un paradoxe dans la politique d'assimilation.<sup>1</sup>" Once Association policy, which sat more easily with the maintenance of respect for local custom, gained a hold in colonial circles in the years following the First World War, the implementation of justice indigène was accelerated.

The dearth of European magistrates forced the French to look to the traditional African elite of chiefs and notables to administer justice indigène. Members of this elite were to act as intermediaries, making colonial justice more palatable to the mass of the population. As the commandants de cercle were kept fully occupied with other tasks, the chiefs had a great deal of leeway in their implementation of justice indigène. So the chiefs, dispensing justice with the force of the state behind them, reflected not only the state's will but also their own immediate interest. The chiefs' role in justice indigène did not merely provide opportunities for abuse, it gave the chiefs ample opportunities to augment their power over people and resources.

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1. Bara N'diaye, "La Justice Indigène au Sénégal 1903-24", maîtrise, University of Dakar, 1978-79.

Customary law in Senegal varied according to pre-colonial polity, although the spread of Islam during the period had a unifying influence over judicial practice in much of the country, excluding parts of the Casamance. Principles of customary justice proved useful in civil and commercial cases, although traditional punishments in criminal cases were dropped as being contrary to French practices.

The 1903 decree on justice indigène took account of regional differences in establishing tribunals at village, cantonal and provincial levels, presided over by the relevant chiefs.<sup>1</sup> While the village and cantonal tribunals dealt with civil affairs, the tribunal de province also heard criminal cases and included two local notables who acted as assessors. The tribunal de province's maximum possible sentence for criminals was five days in prison and a fifteen franc fine. In his treatise on Cayor in 1904, Allys notes that at one stage, four tribunaux de province were to be found in this cercle.<sup>2</sup> In order to take account of the growing Muslim population in Cayor, each of these tribunals included a cadì as an assessor, while a cadì supérieur was to be found at the chef-lieu of the cercle. But for reasons of economy, the administration was obliged to reduce the number of Cadis. A major problem with the tribunaux de province was the illiteracy of the chiefs and lack of secretaries, so that reports on many cases were either non-existent or inadequate.<sup>3</sup> The chiefs often took advantage of the lack of administrative control to favour their own clients. Parties did however have the right of appeal to the tribunal de cercle, presided over by the commandant de cercle and including two notable assessors. As on the tribunal de province, one notable on the tribunal de cercle would be replaced by a cadì when the case concerned Muslims.

Following the 1912 decree on justice indigène, the tribunaux de village and de canton became more informal bodies concerned with

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1. Bara N'diaye, op.cit.
  2. IDI/3 Allys, Monograph of the cercle of Cayor, 26 March 1904.
  3. Bara N'diaye, op.cit.

conciliation. The tribunal de province was replaced by the tribunal de premier degré or tribunal de subdivision, which became the lowest unit of justice indigène to treat criminal cases as well as civil and commercial matters.<sup>1</sup> The President of the tribunal de premier degré no longer had to be chef de province, but still had to be an indigenous notable, chosen by the Governor from a list of five. This was possibly intended as a first step in the direction of the eventual separation of judicial and administrative powers. In the hope of checking known corrupt practices in the courts and ensuring more accurate reports, the Governor General ruled that the post of secretary on these bodies was to go to a European civil servant. Those who had been trained at the Ecole Coloniale during this period would have had some understanding of Senegalese legal practices. The Governor of Senegal opposed this legislation on the grounds that it would inevitably undermine the prestige of the chefs de province, those "conservateurs des coutumes et de tradition."<sup>2</sup> He felt that a European civil servant, whether competent in judicial matters or not, would inevitably gain control of the proceedings. If the chef de province were deprived of his judicial role, he would in effect become a mere tax collector. "L'autorité des chefs de province a déjà été beacoup diminué du fait qu'ils ne sont plus les chefs du pays mais seulement nos auxiliaires." The tribunal de cercle remained unchanged in composition and functions by this new law. In practice, this was not as radical a break from 1903 as it might seem, as there were not enough Europeans to fill the post of secretary.

Immediately following the First World War, a number of posts of President of the tribunal de subdivision were held by chefs de province and de canton. In Tivaouane, the following chiefs, all of whom were Muslim, held the post of president from 1920-22:

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1. Bara N'diaye, op. cit.
  2. ARSD 2D14-6 Governor to commandants de cercle, 17 September 1912.



Tribunal de Subdivision de Saniokhor - Meissa M'Baye Sall,  
Tribunal de subdivision de Guet - Macodou Sall,  
Tribunal de Subdivision de Mboul Mbakol-Dioucounda N'diaye (1)

In Thies, during the same period, presidents were:-

Tribunal de subdivision de Thies-Daouar Fall, chef de canton  
of Thor Diander,  
Tribunal de subdivision de la Petite Côte-Samba Laobé Diop,  
chef de canton of Mbayard Nianing  
Tribunal de la Banlieue de Rufisque-chef de village of  
Sebikotane.

Tribunal de subdivision de Provinces Sereres-Abdel Kader Fall,  
the chef supérieur.

The latter was replaced on his death on 24 November 1920 by Thierno Sall, chef de canton of Sandock Diagianiao and Sao N'diamack. This change involved shifting the seat of the tribunal from Fissel, where many of Abdel Kader's relatives still lived, to Diagianiao, to ensure they did not hinder the operations of justice.<sup>2</sup>

In the Casamance which had no established commandement indigène prior to 1922, two presidents of the tribunal de subdivision were later made chiefs. These were Sonkarou Maria, a chef *bénévole* and President of the tribunal de subdivision of Bignona, and Alceyni Cissé, a Muslim and President of the tribunal de subdivision of Ziguinchor who later became chef de canton of Bainoucks in 1922.<sup>3</sup> As Alceyni Cisse's time became increasingly taken up with chiefly duties, the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor in 1923 proposed replacing him with another Muslim, Famara Seydi.<sup>4</sup>

The other two presidents of tribunaux de subdivision in Bignona were Muslim notables, reflecting the growing importance of Islam in this cercle;

for Diouloulou-Aladji Bambo 5  
Sindian -Alounde Badji

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1. ARSD M117(112) list of the members of the tribunal de subdivision of Tivaouane, 1920-22.
  2. M117(112) lists of the members of the tribunal de subdivision of Thies, 1920-22.
  3. M117(112) list of the members of the tribunaux de subdivisions of Ziguinchor and Bignona.
  4. ARSD 2G23-54 Ziguinchor RPT First quarter 1923.
  5. M117(112) list of members of the tribunaux de subdivisions of Casamance, 1920-22.

To the south, presidents of the tribunaux de subdivision of Kamobeul and Diembéring, Sanguene and Kaeka respectively were animists like the vast majority of their people.<sup>1</sup>

Chefs de village sometimes acted as assessors like Alaene Badiana, the chef de village of Tendiene and Germain Coly of the village of Bignona, appointed to the tribunal de subdivision of Bignona by the decision of 9 March 1921.<sup>2</sup> These appointments aimed at creating a balance between ethnic and religious groups on the tribunal of Bignona, for while Badiana and Coly were Diola and animist, Sonkarou Maria, the President was a Mandinka and Muslim.

Notables representing major ethnic and religious groups were also made assessors. The names of three Mandjacques animist notables were added to the list of assessors for the tribunal de subdivision of Zigunichor on 6 February 1922.<sup>3</sup> These were Compridou and Lateance Gomis and Gaspard Gatepia. In the case of the tribunal de subdivision of Thies, Cherif Faye, a Wolof and Muslim and Thione Faye, a Serere animist were included among the assessors.<sup>4</sup>

But the tendency of the chiefs to abuse their powers prompted the administration to reduce their role in justice indigène. Dioucounda N'diaye and his diarafs had for example taken advantage of the distance of the court of Mboul Mbakol from the residence at Tivaouane and their freedom from surveillance by the commandant de cercle to extract a commission of 10% on the value of every transaction. In 1923, Dioucounda N'diaye was dismissed and the administration shifted the seats of the courts at Mboul Mbakol and Guet to Méckhé and Kébémér respectively to ensure closer surveillance.<sup>5</sup>

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1. M117(112) list of members of the tribunaux de subdivisions.
  2. ARSD M117(17) list of assessors of the tribunaux de cercle of Bignona and Diouloulou, Decision of 9 March 1921.
  3. M117(112) Decision of 6 February 1922, concerning the appointment of Mandjacque fetishist notables to the tribunal de subdivision of Ziguinchor.
  4. M117(17) Decision of 12 February 1922.
  5. ARSD 2G23-46 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to Governor, 6 October 1923.

Similar cases prompted the administration to attempt a more far-reaching reform of justice indigène in 1924, whereby the President of the Tribunal de premier degré in criminal matters was no longer to be a chief, but a European civil servant, such as the chef de subdivision.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the chiefs lost the power to call a session of this court to the commandant de cercle or chef de subdivision. But these European administrators continued to act on the basis of charges brought by the chefs de canton or de village. Chiefs or notables who were French citizens could no longer be presidents or assessors in courts for justice indigène, as they were supposed to come under French law.

By this reform, the list of assessors on the tribunal de premier degré was to be expanded from five to twelve, all of whom were to be chosen by the Governor. If the tribunal de premier degré was sitting at other than its usual seat, the commandant de cercle could choose two chiefs or notables not on the list but recommended by the president. The tribunal de premier degré also unburdened the tribunal de cercle of a number of criminal cases hitherto outside its scope, such as those concerning vagrancy and offences regarding health measures and conscription.

The tribunal de cercle became known in 1924 as the tribunal de deuxième degré, with the commandant de cercle, his assistant, the chef de subdivision or a police superintendent as president. For the first time, it was possible for a literate chief who was already president of the tribunal de premier degré in civil and commercial matters to hold the office of president in this court, although this took place only in a very few cases. Another important innovation was that on the tribunal de deuxième degré, the accused had the right to a defense lawyer in criminal cases.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Bara N'diaye, op.cit.

2. ARSD 1Z59 Circular from the Governor to commandants de cercle, "Instructions concerning the decree of 22 March 1924 reorganising Justice Indigène", 14 August 1924.

Administrative measures concerning the reform of justice indigène were the subject of debate between chiefly and elected colonial councillors. For the citizens members, the 1924 measures did not go far enough. Galandou Diouf and Lamine Gueye in the November 1925 session of the council demanded that subjects at all levels be assisted by a defense lawyer.<sup>1</sup> Amadou N'diaye was willing to concede this for criminal cases when the administrator or his assistant was judge, but not for civil affairs. He argued that cases on the tribunal de premier degré should continue to be regulated by customary and Koranic, and not by French law, on the grounds that most subjects were not sufficiently "évolués". He believed that a lawyer, by sophistry, could lead the President, whether a chief or notable, into error. Galandou Diouf retorted, "M. Amadou N'diaye veut bien un défenseur, un avocat, même, quand l'administrateur juge, mais il n'en veut pas quand c'est lui, M. Amadou N'diaye qui juge."

In 1926, chiefly councillors tried to reverse the clause of the 1912 decree which allowed non-chiefs to become Presidents of the tribunal de premier degré in civil and commercial matters.<sup>2</sup> This was strongly resisted by elected councillors who insisted that there was no need for the tribunaux de premier degré to be presided over by chiefs, and the 1931 decree confirmed this view.

The 1931 reform of justice indigene was intended to uphold respect for custom. Assessors on the tribunal de premier degré in civil and criminal cases continued to be indigenous notables nominated by the Governor.<sup>3</sup> But criminal justice at the level of the tribunal de deuxième degré passed entirely into the hands of Europeans. The commandant de cercle acted as President and was to be assisted by two European :

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1. Colonial Council PV, ninth sitting, 18 November 1925.
  2. ARSD 4E17(135) Note by the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs on the resolution of the Colonial Council, 1926.
  3. JO AOF 1931, Decree of 3 December 1931.

assessors. This legislation laid down strict conditions about the jurisdiction of the courts in civil and criminal matters. The tribunal de premier degré could hear only civil actions where claims did not exceed 500 francs, and the tribunal de deuxième degré was concerned only with claims under 3,000 francs. On the tribunal de premier degré, the maximum possible fine in criminal matters was 2,000 francs while the maximum possible term of deportation or prison was ten years.

### Codification of Customary Law

As early as 1901, Governor Clozel set up a commission in the Ivory Coast to codify local customs concerning civil and criminal matters and legal procedure,<sup>1</sup> for use in courts for indigenous subjects. Following similar studies by ethnologists and administrators, Clozel carried out an enquiry on a much larger scale in Haut-Sénégal-Niger in 1909, which was to furnish Delafosse with a great deal of information for his study.<sup>2</sup> In August 1913, Governor General Ponty began an enquiry into Islamic law in the AOF, but this was abandoned at the outbreak of the First World War, and the work of codifying indigenous customs was not resumed till Brévié became Governor General.

Anxious that the president and assessors of a court should be aware of local custom, Brévié ordered commandants de cercle in 1931 to start collecting information on the customs of their regions and to seek the advice of the conseils de notables.<sup>3</sup> He was particularly interested in custom relating to family law, property, inheritance and contracts. In order to coordinate these efforts, a commission was to be set up at the chef-lieu of each colony, presided over by the Inspector of Administrative Affairs and including a European magistrate, the chef

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1. Coutumiers Juridiques de l'AOF, vol. I, Paris 1939, p.2, hereafter referred to as Coutumiers.
  2. M. Delafosse, Haut-Sénégal-Niger, Paris 1912.
  3. ARSD 13G33(180) Governor General Brévié to Governors of the AOF, 19 March 1931.

de bureau politique and two notables. This activity resulted in a preliminary attempt at codification, viz. Geismar's Recueil des coutumes civils des races du Senegal in 1932.

The following year, Brevie declared that the bureau of every cercle was to have three copies of Geismar's work-one each for the commandant de cercle, his assistant and the secretary of the tribunal indigène de deuxième degré- and the bureau de subdivision one each for the chef de subdivision and secretary of the tribunal de premier degré.<sup>1</sup> Each chef de canton and de province was also expected to possess a copy. Geismar's work was by no means to be considered as definitive, and Brévié continued to issue instructions to the commandants de cercle to furnish further information on the customs of their people. All tribunal secretaries were to possess a register for the codification of any customs which had not already been recorded.

Attempts to codify local customs were complicated by the fact that these too were evolving in many areas, as this was a period of rapid Islamisation of Senegal. Despite Brévié's enthusiasm, not very much was achieved in the way of recording customs as the commandant de cercle, with a great deal of work in other spheres, tended to let these duties slip.

De Coppet therefore set up a further commission of codification in 1936, and commandants of particular cercles received strict instructions from the Governor as to which customs they were supposed to compile. Cayor and Baol were to send accounts of Wolof customs, the Basse Casamance Diola animist customs, Sine Saloum, Baol and the subdivision of Mbour, Thies, Serere customs, Sedhiou Mandinka customs, Podor, those of the Toucouleur, and so on. But de Coppet's efforts also failed because of the lack of personnel and because the

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1. 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 18 September 1933. This circular reminded them of the Governor General's circular of 19 March 1922 on this subject.
  2. AN2G36-5 Senegal RPA 1936, Section: Justice Indigène, Governor General's Instructions, Circular No. 243, 20 June 1935.

commandant de cercle had too much other work to do. Moreover, the development of new African elites during the Popular Front era meant that the use of custom in the judicial process was regarded by many in the administration as merely part of a "simple régime de transition,"<sup>1</sup> to a French system of justice.

In December 1937, the Ministry of Colonies asked the Governor General to set up a commission to draw up a Penal Code based on customary law, to be used by presidents and assessors. Interrupted by the Second World War, this was not completed till 1942.

### Pre War Legislation on Justice Indigène

The 1931 decree on justice indigène stressed the compatibility of the function of President and assessor with that of chief, and the annual report for AOF for the same year argued that indigenous magistrates were working well and were worthy of their tasks.<sup>2</sup> But the result of successive decrees in 1931, 1935 and 1936 was to transfer the Presidency of the tribunal de premier degré in civil and commercial matters from the chef de province or de canton to the chef de subdivision, mayor or civil servant.<sup>3</sup>

In 1936, Senegal still had eighteen chefs de canton and de province among its assessors on the tribunaux indigènes, including:

Cercle	Chief	Canton	Assessor of
Thies	Serigne Leye	Mbadane Sassal )	tribunal de 1er degré civil
	Amadou Dieye	Mbayar Nianing )	of Thies
	Massamba Yacine Sall	Méckhé M'Bar	tribunal of Méckhé
	Massamba Sall	Ndoutte Diassane	tribunal of Tivaouane and assessor in criminal cour (tribunal correctionnel)
Louga	Macodou Sall	Province of Guet	1er assessor on tribunal de 1er degré of the commune mixte of Kébémér

1. Coutumiers, op.cit., vol. I, p. 38, quoted from L. Geismar.

2. AN 2G31-5 AOF RPA 1931, Section: Justice Indigène.

3. ARSD 18G84(17) Governor General to Governors, 8 June 1937.

Cercle Ziguinchor	Chief Patron Gomis	Canton Mandjacques	Assessor of tribunal de 2e degre of Ziguinchor
	Bahobaye Sambou	Bayottes	tribunal de 2e degre of Ziguinchor (1)

But as a first step towards the separation of judicial and executive powers, Governor General de Coppet ordered in 1937 that the two assessors from Ziguinchor and Amadou Dieye be replaced by notables who did not hold the office of chief.<sup>2</sup> The Governor of Senegal promised his superior to exclude all chefs de canton and de province from the post of assessor on the tribunaux indigènes in the future.<sup>3</sup>

A survey in June 1937 showed that the majority of presidents of the tribunaux indigènes de premier degré in the AOF were European.<sup>4</sup> Out of 219 presidents, 154 were chefs de subdivision, 42 had degrees in law, of whom 12 were civil servants, and only 23 were indigenous notables. Abdoul Salam Kane alleged that the presidents of the courts were generally young civil servants who did not understand the customs of the people they were supposed to be judging.<sup>5</sup> As a result, they would often place too much confidence in their assessors who might be biased or themselves ignorant. One civil servant would often be President of several tribunals, which tended to slow down the process of justice. Finally, although according to the decree of 3 December 1931, assessors were supposed to be local notables, those who held this position were often ignorant of the customs of those who appeared before them. In one case of debt which came before the tribunal de premier degré at Dakar, one assessor was a Wolof, and the other a mixture of Bambara and Sarakolle although the parties concerned were Mauretanian.

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1. 18G84(17) Governor General to Secretary General, 13 December 1936.
  2. 18G84(17) Governor General to Secretary General, 11 May 1937.
  3. 18G84(17) Governor to Governor General, 24 June 1937.
  4. 18G84(17) Governor General of the AOF to Governors, 8 June 1937.
  5. 18G84(17) Quoted from a report by the interpreter Touradou Kamara, "Notice de renseignements: Justice Indigène", by Abdoul Salam Kane in his letter to the Director of Political Affairs, 11 December 1936. The subject of this letter was the organisation of native justice in the AOF.



In this way, the existing judicial system had become "ni la justice française ni la justice indigène", but a curious hybrid of customary, Koranic and French law. Abdoul Salam Kane urged the colonial administration to reinstate the chiefs as presidents of the tribunaux indigènes in the belief that this would put an end to these anomalies "Je n'hésite pas à dire que nous, les chefs indigènes, sommes tous désignés par notre connaissance du milieu aux fonctions de président d'un tribunal indigène."<sup>1</sup>

Although de Coppet recognised the lack of African presidents to be a real problem, he believed Abdoul Salam Kane's suggestion provided no solution. He regarded it as an interesting proposition as far as Muslim areas were concerned, but out of the question for "pays fétichistes", where he believed chiefs should have nothing to do with the operation of justice.<sup>2</sup> He appreciated, however, that the administration's short term solution to the problem of the poor quality of indigenous magistrates had in fact undermined justice indigène. The idea of making Europeans presidents or of using Europeans as secretaries until indigenous magistrates improved could only lead to the eventual disappearance of all African presidents. So in his circular to the Governors of the AOF on 8 June 1937, de Coppet stressed the need to have genuine notables as opposed to indigenous civil servants as Presidents of the tribunaux indigènes de premier degré in civil and commercial matters.<sup>3</sup>

The question of exactly who could become president of the tribunal de premier degré civil et commercial was clarified in the legislation of 1937.<sup>4</sup> He had to be an indigenous notable chosen by the Governor, but could now be a citizen where previously only subjects had been eligible. This would open up the post to more educated notables, provided they were acquainted with the customs of their particular area. The

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1. 18G84(17) Abdoul Salam Kane to Director of Political Affairs, 11 December 1936.
  2. 18G84(17) Governor General de Coppet to Governors, 8 June 1937.
  3. Ibid.
  4. JO AOF 1937, Decree concerning the conditions of admission and rewarding of Presidents of the tribunaux indigènes de premier degré in civil and commercial matters, No. 523 AP, 8 June 1937.

President had to be under 40, with a clean record, and literate in French and, in Muslim regions, in Arabic. He could have no elective functions apart from membership of the conseils de notables and could not be involved in industry or commerce. However, those who were already Presidents were allowed to retain their functions even if they did not fulfil these criteria.

In order to attract more notables to participate in justice indigène, the government of Senegal decided in 1936 to pay assessors a daily wage, an allowance for accommodation and for travel to the court while they were working.<sup>1</sup> The following year, a salary scale was established for presidents of the tribunaux indigènes de premier degré with pay ranging from 300 to 2,000 francs.<sup>2</sup>

A major reorganisation of justice indigène itself also took place under the Popular Front government in the AOF. In order to make up for the lack of qualified personnel, the tribunaux indigènes became itinerant in three areas in 1937:

- 1) Sine Saloum, with its seat at Kaolack
- 2) Thies and Baol with the seat at Thies
- 3) Bas-Sénégal, Dagana, Louga and Djoloff, with the seat at St. Louis.<sup>3</sup>

Another important administrative measure in 1937 was the introduction of a system of financing defense lawyers for those brought before the tribunaux de deuxième degré who had previously been unable to afford them.<sup>4</sup> But the administration continued to oppose the demands of citizen councillors to introduce defense lawyers on the tribunal de premier degré. Such lawyers could, it was felt, take advantage of this new position "pour faire le procès de

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 15 November 1936.
  2. JO AOF 1937, Decree of 8 June 1937.
  3. 2G37-17 Senegal RPA 1937.
  4. Ibid.

l'administration française",<sup>1</sup> and to humiliate the chef de canton in reminding him that he was not from a traditional ruling family.

By the late 1930s, justice indigène had become an interminably slow process as many chiefs, deprived of their role as president or assessors on the tribunaux indigènes, tended to lose interest. They delayed handing out summons for various cases and often failed to ensure that individuals appeared before the courts. The commandant de cercle of Louga complained to the chef de province of Guet about the inactivity of the chiefs of Thilmakha and Ndoiyène Dagam Ndour in 1939.<sup>2</sup> In order to spur the chiefs into action, commandants de cercle were to inform chiefs that the rapidity of their service was to be taken into account in awarding marks for their commission.

With the mobilisation of many of the presidents of the courts in 1939, justice indigène was thrown into some disarray.<sup>3</sup> But when Senegal withdrew from the war in 1940, the new mobile form of justice indigène was again able to operate normally.

#### The Role of the Chiefs in Conciliation

By the 1924 reform of justice indigène, the power of conciliation given in 1912 to chefs de village and de canton was extended to notables. The 1931 decree confirmed that "Le chef de village ou le notable du village ou du quartier (ou du groupe de tentes) est investi en matières civile et commerciale du pouvoir de concilier les partis."<sup>4</sup> Chiefs de village were to be the first choice for mediators, but where this was impossible, a notable was to carry out this task. The conseil de village was to be consulted by its chief if those to be conciliated were notables or if the matter was of extreme importance to the village. The

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1. 18G84(17) Henri Carbou, Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, "Note sur la justice indigène", 9 September 1938.
  2. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Louga to his chefs de canton, 2 August 1939.
  3. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  4. 18G84 (17) Decree of 3 December 1931 quoted in a letter from the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to the Governor, 7 May 1937.

administration believed a chef de canton was less likely to be qualified to act as a mediator for conciliation as he might be a stranger to the region. The chefs de village or notables, living in immediate contact with their people, were expected to understand their customs sufficiently to help them agree on collective conventions concerning hunting, pasturing and fishing. Conciliation was particularly important in regulating disputes about land, debt and marriage. The mediator was expected to arrive at a conclusion after closely checking the facts put before him.

Any agreement had to be approved by the commandant de cercle in the presence of the conciliator and parties concerned, and the document was to be kept by the chef de village. If dissatisfied, parties could take their case before tribunal de premier degré, but did not resort to this very often for fear of offending their chiefs and because of the expense involved in taking a case before a civil court.

In 1924, a number of disputes over land in Mboul Gallo, Mboul Khatta and Djiguène Gallo were regulated at the beginning of the growing season (the end of July) by Meissa M'Baye Sall by means of conciliation.<sup>1</sup> The amount of conflicts to be solved by conciliation rose as land became scarce. In Baol, disputes during the period of cultivation increased in the early 1930s with Mouride immigration to this cercle. The Mourides, the majority of whom were Wolofs and cultivators came into conflict for land with the pastoralist Peuls. Problems also arose when animals owned by Peuls wandered onto fields being cultivated by Wolofs, causing damage. The judgements of the majority of chiefs, many of whom were talibés and owed their appointment to the shaikhs, were biased in favour of the Mourides.<sup>2</sup> The French did not attempt to overturn these decisions as the Mourides were considered to be economically

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1. ARSD 2G24-61 Tivaouane RPM August 1924.

2. D. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides, Oxford 1971, pp.66-67.

more productive than the Peul herdsmen. The assistance of talibés like the long-serving chefs de canton Momar Lissa N'diaye of Lá and Cheikh Yaba Diop of Kael was crucial in assisting the Mouride penetration of Baol.

Sometimes, chiefs and other individuals would claim dues like assaka, consisting of a tenth of the harvest, on the grounds that their family had been the original inhabitants of an area. First occupants would initially welcome cultivators onto their land, but would start to claim dues once they had begun to develop it. Such was the behaviour of the Peuls towards the Wolofs in Baol and in the cantons of Mbaouar and Thilmakha in Guet. As late as the 1930s, many Serere cultivators were having to meet the claims of lamanes who owned huge stretches of land granted by former rulers, from which they were entitled to collect dues.

During his Governorship, Geismar attempted to check these privileges which offered their holders enormous opportunities for exploitation and which overburdened the machinery of conciliation with endless disputes over land. Drawing precedents from his research into Wolof custom, he ruled that if a cultivator had occupied and cultivated a piece of land for ten years, it was his by right and that he could not be forced off the land, even if he refused to pay his dues.<sup>1</sup> In other words, if dues had not been collected for the last ten years, they lapsed. If on the other hand, they had been paid, the cultivator could buy the land outright from the original owner if he paid him a sum worth five times the annual value of assaka. As a general rule, the commandant de cercle of Thies had advised his chiefs to assume that "La terre appartient à celui qui la cultive."<sup>2</sup>

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1. Coutumiers, op.cit., vol. I, p.137.
  2. AN 2G30-67 Baol RPM May-June 1930.

Land disputes along the frontier of two cercles called for conciliation by a commission including chefs de province, de canton, de village and notables. However, sometimes the problem proved to be beyond their scope particularly when different ethnic groups or powerful religious brotherhoods like the Mourides were involved, and the assistance of commandants de cercle had to be enlisted. In 1918, a problem arose when Momar Toure, the Wolof chef de village of Keur Makhoudia (Guet, Cayor) who had until 1917 paid tax in Baol where he cultivated land belonging to the Serere village of N'Guett (Diette Salao; Baol), suddenly began to pay tax in his own cercle. After complaints from the owner of the land in N'Guett, the inhabitants of both villages came to blows. A commission of conciliation composed of Meissa M'Baye Sall, Macodou Sall, the chef de canton of Lâ (Baol), the chef de village of Taouar (N'doyene) and three notables, two from Lâ and one from Ndour, met in December 1918 to settle the dispute.<sup>1</sup> But this failed to prevent an even more violent clash between the inhabitants of these villages in 1919. The commandants de cercle of Tivaouane and Baol, Lefillâtre and Boutonnet, were called in to solve the dispute, only to come into conflict with each other, when the latter refused to release eight villagers of Keur Makhoudia, imprisoned as a result of the dispute, for the harvest.<sup>2</sup>

Chiefs would often take advantage of their position as mediators in disputes over land and other resources to feather their own nests. In June 1933, the commandant de cercle received reports that Meissa M'Baye Sall had confiscated two disputed lougans ready to be sown in the villages of Dara Khara and N'Diombo (Mbaouar) for himself.<sup>3</sup> In the same year, it was revealed that after using customary methods of justice to solve a dispute in his canton Sandock Diagianiao concerning a herd of animals, Code N'diaye had demanded a large reward from the party whose

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1. ARSD 2D14-7 commandant de cercle of Cayor to Governor, 16 May 1919.
  2. ARSD 13G6 (17) Governor to Governor General, 14 September 1919.
  3. ARSD 1Z75 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province of Guet, 17 June 1933.

case he had favoured.<sup>1</sup> The case of M'Begane Dione, the chef de village of N'Gakhaye, versus Guerane Tine dated back to the cattle plague of 1891-92 in Senegal, when the chef de village complained that one of his cows had disappeared and was later found in the hands of Guerane Tine, a cultivator at that time living in the same village. The chef de village claimed the cow and any offspring it might have had. Successive chiefs of the region from Abdel Kader Fall onwards had attempted to solve this problem. By 1922, when Code N'diaye became chef de canton of Diaganiao, Guerane was living in Joal Gohé with a herd of 30 cattle, while the chef de village had only two cows and was claiming Guerane's whole herd. After a long period of inertia, Code N'diaye acted on the chef de village's complaints and gave him the herd. But when Guerane protested, Code N'diaye decided to employ witchcraft to settle the dispute. He made both parties swear before an idol, shortly after which, three members of Mbegane's family died. Code N'diaye hence proclaimed Guerane the rightful owner, but before taking any action, demanded from him 1,000 francs, 2 bulls, 3 goats and a millet granary. Guerane felt he could not take the matter before the tribunal indigène at Thies as Code N'diaye was on good terms with the commandant de cercle. He instead complained about Code N'diaye directly to the Governor.

Chiefs would sometimes use their role in conciliation to impose illegal fines and to protect their clients. In 1924, Macodou Sall received a number of complaints about Sambou Ndour, the chef de canton of Mbaouar.<sup>2</sup> Mandiaye Diop, a cultivator, alleged that when his niece came to blows with a woman and her son, Sambou Ndour had demanded an 800 franc fine from him. When the wife of another cultivator, Mamadou Sadio, accused one of Sambou's clients of sorcery, the chief extracted from her husband 1,000 francs, a pregnant donkey and a bull. Babacar Yate alleged that when he complained to Sambou after a Peul had let his oxen wander onto his field, he was himself fined 500 francs.

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1. ARSD 2D13-9 chef de subdivision of the Petite Côte to commandant de cercle of Thies, 1 May 1933.
  2. 1Z59 A series of letters to Macodou Sall from Mandiaye Diop, 2 February 1924, Mamadou Sadio, 24 March 1924 and Babacar Yate, 23 March 1924.

In spite of French stipulations that the local marabout was to be consulted as an expert witness only in matters of conciliation, it was frequently he who dispensed justice. This is because the chefs de village were often his clients and would refer the matter to him.

The drop in the number of civil and commercial cases reaching the tribunal de premier degré from 3,559 in 1930 to 2,649 in 1931 would indicate that the rural populations were using the machinery of conciliation to settle their disputes more frequently and effectively.<sup>1</sup> This might be interpreted as showing either the growing preference of people in the countryside to take their problems before the chefs de village, or alternatively, that chiefly power was reasserted during the world depression of the 1930s.

#### The role of the chiefs on the Tribunal de Premier degré: a case study

The office of President of the tribunal de premier degré gave the chiefs who held this position almost unbridled opportunities to increase their control over people, land and goods. This influence is well illustrated in the case of Macodou Sall, who over the period 1919-47 held the post of President of various tribunals in conjunction with that of chef de province. From his accession to the chieftancy of Guet till the 1924 legislation on justice indigène, he was president of the tribunal de province (subdivision) of Guet. After 1924, he became president of the tribunal de premier degré civil et commercial at Kébémér. With the attempts of the administration to separate judicial from executive powers, he became known for a short time as first assessor of the tribunal of the commune of Kébémér, but during the Second World War, he again acquired the presidency. In the course of his functions, Macodou Sall had to preside over a wide variety of civil and commercial cases, such as disputes over land, animals and goods, marriage, divorce, inheritance and declarations of births and deaths.

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1. 2G31-15 AOF Rapport Annuel d'Ensemble 1931, Section: Justice Indigène.



Prior to the legislation of 1924, Macodou Sall had to judge criminal cases, such as theft, assault, damage to property, rape, adultery, sorcery, fraud and illegal fines. A major contradiction of justice indigène was that it called on the chef de canton to dispense justice to someone he had brought before a court in the first place. Périscopie Africain argued that because the chiefs' "mentalité est restée très proche des anciens roitelets nègres", the colonial administration could not expect them to act impartially, especially in cases where their own interests were immediately concerned.<sup>1</sup>

Macodou Sall's judicial functions gave him wide-ranging influence over his subjects, so that in their eyes, he had almost monarchical powers. One plaintiff addressed him respectfully in 1931 as "chef et digne roi".<sup>2</sup> In his capacity as both a civil and criminal judge, he worked closely with two assessors who were generally Wolof and Muslim, as were the majority of inhabitants of his province. In cases concening Peuls, a Peul assessor would sometimes be present. In 1923, Macodou Sall received a set of elementary instructions from the commandant de cercle of Tivaouane on how to proceed in criminal cases, such as noting the correct date of the arrest and offense, making the accused swear an oath and establishing the guilt of the accused in a precise manner.<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, he instructed Macodou Sall to indicate what sanction would be imposed by custom before punishing the criminal by methods authorised by the French, like fining and imprisonment.

Macodou Sall was able to demonstrate his power over his subordinates in criminal cases involving chefs de canton within his province or their followers. On 6 January 1924, he sentenced Makhoudia N'diaye, diaraf of the chef de canton of Mbaouar, Sambou

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1. Périscopie Africain, 16 March 1935.
  2. 1Z75 Letter from Gueye, a cultivator, to Macodou Sall, 22 June 1931.
  3. 1Z59 commandant de cercle of Tivaouane to chef de province of Guet, 20 June 1923.

N'dour to 4 years in prison and fined him 200 francs for inflicting illegal fines amounting to 250 francs on local cultivators.<sup>1</sup> Makhoudia had for example fined Dioukouly N'diaye on the grounds that his wife was already married to a soldier who was still alive. In doing this, he had claimed to be working for his chief.

The chef de province sometimes had to preside over suits for damages in which his chefs de canton were defendants. In the case of Mamadou Kane of the village of Toubé Fall versus Lat Sène Fall on 1 January 1925, Macodou Sall found in favour of the plaintiff. Lat Sène Fall had borrowed a mare for his diaraaf during a vaccination tournee against the wishes of its owner, Mamadou Kane. The mare subsequently died in the chief's service. As she had been requisitioned for the diaraaf and not for the official vaccinator, Macodou Sall ordered the chef de canton to pay Kane 1000 francs.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of migrations to less populated areas and the penetration of the countryside by a money economy during the interwar period, the tribunaux de premier degré had to deal with an increasing number of disputes over land, dowries and debts. All conflicts that the chefs de village were unable to settle by conciliation were referred to them. In many parts of Senegal, disputes over land frequently involved the question of tutelage of a village. The chef de village of Matal Bante (Thilmakha) reported in 1933 that Morane Sall, his chef de canton, had taken his land to give to a favourite with a view to giving the latter his title as well. Although the commandant de cercle of Louga acknowledged that chefs de canton might prefer chefs de village who were more likely to work closely with them, "Ce serait un résultat absolument opposé à celui cherché de vouloir rompre avec la coutume que le chef de village soit désigné par les chefs de famille".<sup>3</sup>

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1. 1Z59 Records of the tribunal de subdivision of Kébémér, 1924, "The case of Makhoudia N'diaye," 6 January 1924.
  2. ARSD 1Z74 Records of the tribunal de premier degré civil et commercial of Kébémér, 1925, "The case of Mamadou Kane versus Lat Sène Fall and his diaraaf Lat Dior Diop," 1 January 1925.
  3. 1Z75 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province of Guet, 17 June 1933.

The question of land ownership was also used by chiefs as an excuse for interfering in other cantons. When Moustapha Toure left Thilmakha to settle in N'Diourky (Djiguène Gallo), he continued to hold lougans in the former.<sup>1</sup> This was held to be contrary to local custom but provided a convenient excuse for the chef de canton of Djiguène Gallo to exert influence in the adjoining canton. This resulted in friction between the inhabitants of N'Diourky and Thilmakha so that Macodou Sall was obliged to intervene in May 1929.

During the economic crisis, many cultivators became heavily indebted, forcing them into greater dependency on usurers, who were often chiefs or local merchants. The chiefs became increasingly involved in judging disputes concerned with debts and the pawning of objects in which they were often far from impartial. Occasionally, marabouts would make use of the practice of pawning to obtain valuable objects from their talibés. One case Macodou Sall had to deal with on 1 May 1929 concerned a complaint by Mare Seck, a fishmonger, against the marabout Amadou Sow living at Mbakol, Thies.<sup>2</sup> When the latter had asked the former to lend him 100 francs, the talibé did not have the money at hand, but anxious to please the marabout, gave him a necklace worth 1,720 francs. The marabout pawned this and claimed it back a few months later in his own name. When Mare Seck tried to recover his property, the marabout fled with it to Dakar.

Sometimes chiefs were to be found among the debtors. In mid-January 1929, the Compagnie Nationale de Commerce wrote to Macodou Sall in his capacity as President of the tribunal de premier degre to ask his brother Sangone Sall, chef de canton of Ndoiyène Dagam to repay his debt before the end of the month.<sup>3</sup>

Divorce cases were common and enabled the chiefs to demonstrate their control of the family in such matters as the division of the marriage

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1. 1Z59 chef de canton of Thilmakha to commandant de cercle of Louga, 29 May 1929.
  2. 1Z59 Records of the tribunal de premier degre of Kébémér, 1929, "The case of Mare Seck versus Amadou Sow," 1 May 1929. Unfortunately the records were in such disorder that the outcome of this case and of several others mentioned in this section were not available.
  3. 1Z59 Letter from the Compagnie Nationale du Commerce to Macodou Sall, 19 January 1929.

settlement. The frequency of divorce in Wolof society may be ascribed to the ease with which it could be obtained and to the widespread practice of betrothing children ten years before the marriage actually took place.<sup>1</sup> There were numerous cases of divorce being granted because a husband had abandoned a wife for a certain length of time. Here Macodou Sall showed some concern for the interests of women. On 31 January 1929, he wrote to the President of the tribunal de premier degré of the subdivision of Khombole asking him to order Momar M'Baye, originally of the village of Samba Aram (Guet) to attend the tribunal de premier degré of Kébémér.<sup>2</sup> This was in order to answer allegations by his wife that he had abandoned her for five years without support. When the court found in the wife's favour, Macodou Sall ruled the defendant would have to pay something towards her arrears of food and future maintenance.

According to Wolof custom, it was the husband's family which paid the dowry. An important divorce case occurred in 1930, involving no less a personage than El Hadj Khary Cissé, chef de province of Diambour Méridional and his wife Besse N'diaye, the daughter of the Cadi Momar Besse N'diaye, who had been one of Macodou Sall's assessors on the tribunal. Besse N'diaye's father explained to Macodou Sall that his daughter wanted a divorce from her husband, "et mariage n'est pas esclavage".<sup>3</sup> He initially declared his willingness to reimburse the marriage settlement of 2,500 francs he had received from Samba Khary Cissé, and an Arab horse worth 500 francs. But El Hadji Samba Khary Cissé claimed Momar Besse owed him 7740 fs in cash plus 1500 francs in expenses. He declared he wanted "Des deux choses une - ou ma femme ou mes biens - il n'y a pas lieu d'hésiter sur ces deux points." Macodou Sall was therefore obliged to judge the whole affair all over again, and found in favour of the chief.

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1. Coutumiers, op.cit., vol. I, p.163.
  2. ARSD 1Z70 chef de province of Guet to the President of the tribunal de premier degré of the subdivision of Khombole, 31 January 1929.
  3. 1Z59 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 2 August 1930 and El Hadj Samba Khary Cissé to Macodou Sall, 13 August 1930.

Macadou Sall frequently had to give judgment on inheritance cases, as inhabitants of Cayor generally died intestate or gave an oral testament which was open to different interpretations.<sup>1</sup> In 1918, he was made chief executor of the will of Thiéyacine Fall, the former chef de province of Mbaouar Guéoul.<sup>2</sup> The latter died leaving 4856 francs in debts and only 1,184 francs in cash, which Macodou Sall was supposed to divide between the creditors. In fact, much of this money mysteriously went astray. On 17 July 1928, he had the task of determining the heirs of Aly Thioro N'diaye who had died on 1 August 1927.<sup>3</sup> On the basis of testimony from the chef de canton Sangone Sall and a cultivator, he decided that the sole heir was N'diaye's wife.

Parties who were dissatisfied with the chief's verdict in civil and commercial cases could appeal to the tribunal de cercle (or tribunal de deuxième degré) by letter or orally. In fact, people seldom dared complain against the decision of powerful chiefs like Macodou Sall. Occasionally the judgements of the tribunaux de premier and de deuxième degré would conflict. Macodou Sall wrote to the chef du cabinet in 1926, complaining that M. Bancal, the President of the tribunal de deuxième degré at Tivaouane, was constantly reversing his judgements and putting the chief in bad odour with the commandant de cercle of Cayor.<sup>4</sup>

#### Disciplinary action on chiefs

The question of justice for the chiefs themselves posed a serious problem for the administration since the majority were not French citizens and hence came within the scope of justice indigène and the Indigénat. Van Vollenhoven stressed to the commandants de cercle that they should take a chef de canton before the courts only as a last

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1. Coutumiers, op.cit., vol. I, p.141. For details about the dowry, see Coutumiers, p. 126.
  2. 1Z59 Macodou Sall- Judicial matters-Judgment on the succession of Thiéyacine Fall, 1918 and 2 D14-7 commandant de cercle of Cayor to Governor, 21 December 1919.
  3. ARSD 1Z60 Records of the tribunal de premier degré of Kébémér, 1928.
  4. 1Z59 Macodou Sall as President of the tribunal de premier degré of Kébémér to M. Pal, chef du cabinet, 2 September 1926.

resort. He feared that frequent recourse to this method would undermine the institution, and thus weaken French authority.<sup>1</sup>

The administration was often able to sidestep this problem by dismissing offending chiefs rather than bringing them before the courts. Such was the case in 1925 when Meissa M'Baye Sall complained about his subordinate Momar Dieng, the chef de canton of Mboul Djiguène, whom he had "caught in the act" with one of his wives!<sup>2</sup> In Muslim law, this offense was punishable by the death penalty, but Meissa M'Baye, fearing a loss of prestige, used his influence to stop the case appearing before the tribunal de deuxième degré. On investigation of the affair, the commandant de cercle decided to dismiss Dieng for misappropriating tax. This served to get rid of a bad chief without diminishing the prestige of Meissa M'Baye.

Although people were encouraged to complain against chiefly corruption, the administration was anxious to avoid accusations prompted by personal animosity or family rivalries. In 1935, following a campaign of denunciation against the chiefs, the public prosecutor introduced stiffer sentences for false accusations against chiefs. Accusers could receive prison terms of between one month and a year, and fines ranging from 100 to 3,000 francs.<sup>3</sup>

The problem of what to do when a chief who was a French citizen was accused was even more acute. When the French decided to bring Boubakar N'déné N'diaye to justice in 1931, he could not go before the commandant de cercle, but had to be tried by a French magistrate.<sup>4</sup>

According to the reform of the chieftancy of 1947, all grades of chief from quartier to province had to be dismissed by the Governor

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1. Van Vollenhoven, "Les chefs indigènes...", op.cit., p.269.
  2. AN 2G25-43 Senegal RPA 1925.
  3. 18G84(17) Public Prosecutor to Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 30 March 1935.
  4. Périscope Africain, 21 March 1931.

for an offense. If the cause of dismissal was inefficiency, the chief could be temporarily suspended for between two and five years.<sup>1</sup> During this period, the chefs de canton and province affected were to be put on half pay.

Although chefs de canton were rarely punished under the Indigénat, chefs de village suffered this more frequently. One such example is Cor Faye, the chef de village of Nianing who acquired the reputation of being a sorcerer during his period of office.<sup>2</sup> People began to leave the village claiming that Cor Faye had brought about several deaths, and a European manager of a neighbouring concession alleged Cor Faye had threatened his workers with death if they continued to clear the forest. Fear of him affected the morale of the tirailleurs stationed in the area, prompting the military authorities to demand the chief's removal. Hence, in 1942, the French applied the deportation clause (Article 22) of the 15 November 1924 Act to Cor Faye, to keep him away from the region.

#### The Chiefs and Law and Order

Until the legislation of the mid-1930s which began the separation of judicial and executive powers of administrative agents, most chiefs combined judicial and policing functions. When a crime was committed, chefs de village were to seek out the culprits and witnesses and to gather evidence. They were to report offenses and send criminals before the chef de canton who was in turn to inform the commandant de cercle or chef de subdivision. Descriptions of criminals who had escaped from prison or were wanted in other cercles were circulated by the commandants de cercle to the chefs de canton and de village.

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1. JO Senegal 1947, Decree of 20 February 1947.

2. 2G42-1 Senegal RPA 1942.

Chiefs would sometimes take bribes and allow criminals to escape. Macodou Sall wrote to his son Bounama, the chef de canton of N'Diagne, in great anxiety in 1942 after learning that two Peuls who had stolen 500 francs and three bullocks had been allowed to flee by the latter's diaraf, who had kept the money and animals for himself.<sup>1</sup> Macodou informed his son that as he had not fulfilled his duty as chief by sending a report to his commandant de cercle, he had acted as an accomplice - "Le bruit court déjà un peu partout que vous aimez trop l'argent - pourquoi?"

In close contact with the rural population, chefs de village were seen as valuable sources of information. They were expected to keep an eye on strangers, vagrants and other suspicious characters, giving the authorities details about their place of origin, income, etc., and reporting subversive activities to the commandant de cercle. They were to assist the reintegration of former soldiers from the First and Second World Wars to their old milieu, reporting any problems to the authorities. Although instructed to respect family customs and freedom of religion, they were to report any proselytizing marabouts to the authorities, particularly Hamallists.<sup>2</sup> They were also expected to keep a close watch on the recruitment of pupils to confessional or Koranic schools. In the field of commerce, they were to watch over the workings of the traite, and were to oppose the black market, particularly in wartime.

In 1934, the Governor General reiterated the key role of the chiefs in providing information. Chiefs were to regard the commandant de cercle as both "un conseil et appui très sûr" and "un censeur vigilant",<sup>3</sup> They were to be warned that any failure to report subversive activity or

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1. 1Z75 Macodou Sall to Bounama Sall, 15 June 1942.

2. See Glossary.

3. 18G151 (108) Governor General of the AOF to Governors, 7 March 1934.



propaganda to him would lead to sanctions. On the other hand, commandants de cercle were warned to take care that the information they received was not distorted by the chief to increase his own importance or his influence at the expense of his enemies.

A chef de village was expected to maintain the peace of his village by regulating disputes. When the quarrel was beyond his control or that of his council, he would appeal to the chef de canton. Sometimes even the latter was unable to maintain order. The chef de canton of Thilmakha wrote in 1937 to Macodou Sall requesting his intervention to put an end to "histoires pour des affaires de rien du tout" in the village of Thilmakha.<sup>1</sup> As a result of competition for land between Adama Lô and Guitte Diao, the latter and his father sought out Lô, who was tending his flocks in the bush and attacked him with a sabre. So serious did the matter become that the commandant de cercle himself decided to go to the village to make an enquiry.

Chiefs were supposed to warn the commandant de cercle if a dispute was getting out of control. In the case of the Casamance, chiefs were to keep an eye on the consumption of vin de palme as drinking excesses sometimes led to brawls. In 1939, the shortage of land in Djougouttes Sud, the most populated canton in Bignona led to clashes over rice fields in the village of Diatoc culminating in pillage and the death of two persons. The chef de canton, Erikakène Sagna was reprimanded for failing to warn the commandant de cercle that this fighting was imminent.<sup>2</sup>

Another of the chiefs' policing duties was to expose arms smuggling and the illegal manufacture of gunpowder. Chiefs living in coastal villages were to assist boats in distress and were to patrol rivers to stop smuggling and illegal emigration. Chefs de village had also to

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1. 1Z75 chef de canton of Thilmakha to chef de province of Guet, 1937.

2. 13G42(18) Quinquaud report- Bignona, 7 February 1939.

ensure the efficient working of the postal services, recruiting porters if need be from their own people. They were to report any accidents to the mail to the authorities.

Although the role of the chefs de canton in the judicial sphere was reduced in the Popular Front era, the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs considered extending their functions regarding security. However, the Director General of Security felt that the chiefs already had sufficient responsibility as far as his department was concerned in acting as an auxiliary to the police and in providing the authorities with information on all inhabitants of the canton.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Chiefs and Justice during and after the Second World War

As early as 1926, Lamine Gueye, in a session of the Colonial Council, had proposed the abolition of justice indigène.<sup>2</sup> Although this was rejected outright as far as rural areas were concerned, the proposal to abolish it in the four communes was given some thought. In 1932, L'AOF, declaring justice indigène to be outmoded, demanded its replacement by a judicial system based on that of France.<sup>3</sup>

By 1943, the number of cases appearing before the tribunal de premier degré civil et commercial had fallen.<sup>4</sup> The French assumed this was because people preferred to refer these matters to their chiefs. In 1943 fewer cases came before the criminal courts than in 1942 as the economic situation had improved.

However, two years later, public opinion had swung in favour of bringing civil cases before the tribunaux indigènes precisely because

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1. 18G84(17) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to Director General of Security, 11 May 1937.
  2. ARSD 4E19(135) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the June 1926 session of the Colonial Council", 19 June 1926.
  3. L'AOF, "La Justice Indigène", 24 February 1932.
  4. AN 2G43-16 Senegal RPA 1943.

they were seen to be dispensing not a customary form of law, but one more akin to that of the French.<sup>1</sup> In matters like divorce, for example, custom was seen to be out of touch. The number of cases appearing before the tribunal de premier degre increased from 1,837 in 1938 to 1,975 in 1945.<sup>2</sup>

It was not until 1946 that justice indigène was abolished for criminal cases, and the executive and judicial functions of the French administrators were finally separated.<sup>3</sup> The accused were instead to appear before French magistrates known as Justices de la Paix. These judges believed that when the commandants de cercle and their assistants had possessed judicial powers, they had behaved like "oriental despots, Stalins of their regions."<sup>4</sup> The Justices de la Paix (JPs) were to operate in spheres similar to those which had previously been covered by the itinerant system of justice indigène. In 1946, they covered the following regions:

- 1) Thies and Kolda
- 2) Podor and Matam
- 3) Tambacounda, Kedougou and Diourbel.

JPs for Louga and Sedhiou were also projected.

But the new system of justice lacked personnel and facilities. In 1949, there were only 4 JPs to cover the whole of Diourbel, Thies, Tambacounda and Kedougou.<sup>5</sup> The number of cases appearing before JPs actually fell from 972 to 959 between 1947 and 1948.<sup>6</sup> Justice indigène therefore continued under a new guise, with the replacement of tribunaux de premier degré civils et commerciaux by tribunaux

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1. AN 2G45-73 Kolda RPA 1945.
  2. AN 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948.
  3. Ibid.
  4. W. Cohen, Rulers of Empire, Stanford 1971, p.172.
  5. AN 2G49-27 Senegal RPA 1949.
  6. 2G48-30 Senegal RPA 1948.

coutumiers.<sup>1</sup> These bodies were to consist of a president, who could be a chef de canton or local notable, and twelve notable assessors. They could judge all civil and commercial matters apart from questions relating to the état civil which were to continue to go before the tribunal de premier degré. Many assessors on the tribunaux coutumiers were literate in Arabic and well versed in Koranic law. Although these courts were intended to favour all customs equally, customary law was only applied where it did not clash with French or Islamic law. A symbiotic relationship sometimes developed between custom and Koranic law as for example in matters of dowry, agricultural dues, and pre-emption in land ownership.

The power of the majority of chiefs over their peoples was greatly augmented by their role in dispensing justice. Although some abused this task by extracting land, goods and money from their subjects, the French allowed them to retain their dominant position in justice indigène till the Popular Front era because of the lack of French magistrates versed in customary law. Even when deprived of their functions as president and assessors on the tribunaux indigènes, the chiefs continued to play an important role in conciliation. During the Second World War, lack of personnel meant that chiefs were able to recover their influential positions on the tribunaux indigènes.

The French were never very successful in discovering precolonial legal systems and the spread of Islam during the interwar period meant that justice indigène developed into a combination of French, Muslim and customary law. By the end of the Second World War, the first two forms of law were dominant in civil cases. Since 1924, when European

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1. 2G49-27.

civil servants had taken over the presidency of the tribunaux de premier degré in criminal matters, the indigenous criminal courts were increasingly influenced by French law. The extension of French citizenship to all subjects in 1946 and popular disillusionment with justice indigène forced the French to abandon the pretence that they were following customary methods in criminal cases, so that criminal justice as practised in France became available to all.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

The Role of the Chiefs in Hygiene and Education

The French attempted to justify their colonisation of the AOF by arguing that it was not purely exploitative, but that their "mission civilisatrice" brought the colonised peoples social welfare and education.<sup>1</sup> The educationalist Hardy in his "Plan d'Etudes" formulated just before the First World War argued that French ideas and education methods "dont l'usage constitue notre supériorité morale, sociale, économique, transforment peu à peu les barbares d'hier en disciples et auxiliaires."<sup>2</sup> Because of their contacts with the rural population and the isolation of many villages, the chiefs were called upon to play an important part in promoting and implementing French programmes of hygiene and popular education.

Chiefs during the period 1919-47 were expected to provide some form of relief for vagrants, children, the old and abandoned, and were to consult their village and cantonal councils on these matters. The chiefs in Guet were obliged to set up a mutual help organisation ("une fraternelle entre-aide") in cases where the administration declared its incapacity to assist all victims, such as when fire occurred.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the interwar and Second World War periods, epidemic disease remained a major killer in Senegal. Among the worst diseases were bubonic plague, smallpox, sleeping sickness and yellow fever, while leprosy and hereditary syphilis were endemic.

Although those chiefs who had attended the Ecole des Fils des Chefs had received a rudimentary education in methods of hygiene, the French found it necessary to invite the participation of the chieftancy as a whole in the enforcement of sanitary measures. In the event of an epidemic disease, chiefs were expected to take prompt action by isolating the sick and putting a stop to movement in and out of affected

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1. L. Cayla, Terres d'Outre Mer, Paris 1948, p.138.
  2. G. Hardy, Une Conquête Morale: L'Enseignement en AOF, Paris 1917, p.ix.
  3. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Cayor to chef de province of Guet, c. 1924.

villages. In some cases, the chiefs supervised the construction of quarantine centres for the sick by forced labour. They were at once to notify the authorities, from whom they received further instructions and who would send a European or African doctor to the area. Chiefs were to give these medical agents all the assistance they required, reporting and presenting the suffering to them. They were expected to be able to suggest possible origins of the epidemic. Chiefs failing to enforce administrative measures regarding health were punished as a warning to others.

In Cayor, bubonic plague posed the greatest problems till the early 1930s. Chiefs generally cooperated in carrying out administrative measures to combat the disease. During the 1920 epidemic, Macodou Sall distinguished himself in preventing the spread of plague in his province.<sup>1</sup>

In 1923 and 1924, plague hit the Sereres of Mt. Rolland very hard.<sup>2</sup> The commandant de cercle began the practice of setting up a cordon sanitaire to prevent the spread of the disease. Chefs de canton and de village received orders to burn huts in the contaminated quarters of the villages and the clothing of those with plague, and to try to keep the villages and their surroundings clean. The dead were to be buried as deep as possible in cemeteries some distance from the villages. Chefs de village in Mt. Rolland were ordered to stop all movement within the region. An agent of the health service, Anta M'Baye was sent to the village of Thiar (Mbaouar) to ensure that these measures were put into effect.<sup>3</sup> The French were very concerned about the way in which plague was affecting tax collection. As late as June 1924, Ndoutte Diassane and Meckhe M'Bar still owed 8451 francs in tax.<sup>4</sup>

Chefs de village who failed in their duty to combat the plague and other epidemics were often punished under the Indigenat. The chef

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1. ARSD 2G20-35 Tivaouane RPT Third quarter 1920.
  2. ARSD 2G23-46 Tivaouane RPM June 1923 and 2G24-61 Tivaouane RPM March 1924.
  3. ARSD 1Z 78 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Cayor, 24 November 1924.
  4. ARSD 2G24-61 Tivaouane RPM June 1924.

de village of Thiar (Mbaouar) was brought before the tribunal de cercle in December 1924 when he failed to inform the authorities after plague spread to his village from Gandiolas (Louga).<sup>1</sup> As a result, 10 people died in the ensuing epidemic.

As a preventive measure against the plague, the commandant de cercle of Cayor entrusted the chiefs with the task of killing rats (known as "dératisation"). This was practised sporadically in 1924, but from 26 January 1925, the killing of rats was put on a more organised basis in Tivaouane.<sup>2</sup> Chiefs of villages which had suffered from the plague in the last two years were to order the killing of rats by their subjects every eight days and those in villages who had not been hit by the plague, every fifteen days. Chefs de canton were to report on the killings to the commandant de cercle on the fifth of each month. Chiefs in the province of Guet were to send their carnets de dératisation to Macodou Sall so that he could send an état de dératisation for the whole province to the chef-lieu. Chefs de canton were to be paid commission according to the number of rats they killed. The état de dératisation for Guet for February 1925 was as follows:

Canton	Chief	No. of rats killed
Mbaouar	Sambou Ndour	1568
Guet	Massamba Sall	5627
Thilmakha	Gallo Thieyacine Sall	4400
Ndoyene Dagam	Sangone Sall	1454
Ndour	Lat Sene Fall	1000 (3)

The practice of vaccinating the population of Cayor against smallpox and the plague was first tried out in 1923.<sup>4</sup> As it met with a great deal of suspicion, the chiefs were expected to set an example to their people by agreeing to undergo vaccination. In July 1927, a year of plague and smallpox, there were disturbances in the escale of

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1. 2G24-61 Tivaouane RPM December 1924.
  2. ARSD 2G25-55 Tivaouane RPM 26 January 1925.
  3. ARSD 1Z78 Macodou Sall file - "Etat de dératisation de la province de Guet", February 1925.
  4. ARSD 2G24-63 Tivaouane RPA 1924.



Tivaouane as inhabitants demonstrated against quarantine and vaccination, protests which the French ascribed to political opposition.<sup>1</sup> But pressure from the chiefs forced the acceptance of these measures, and the practice of vaccination was generalised the following year.<sup>2</sup>

In May 1929, the approach of the rainy season prompted the commandants de cercle of Louga and Thies to send detailed instructions to the chefs de canton and de village on how to avoid the spread of diseases like the plague.<sup>3</sup> The importance of hygiene was impressed on them, and they were to instruct their subjects to keep their homes clean, to burn household wastes which attracted flies and rats, to protect millet granaries against rodents and to get rid of rats' nests.

Despite these instructions, the plague epidemic of 1929 turned out to be one of the most severe of the period, coinciding with severe outbreaks of smallpox, influenza and malaria.<sup>4</sup> There were many reports throughout the year of cases of plague from the cercles of Diourbel, Thies, Louga and St. Louis.<sup>5</sup> The worst cases were in the subdivision of Tivaouane, in the cantons of Méckhé M'Bar, Mboul Gallo and Mboul Khatta.

Plague broke out in Guet canton in March, and had spread by August to Thilmakha. Chefs de canton were asked by the commandant de cercle to provide the medical service with lists of the villages in their canton where plague prevailed, where these were located and how many were sick or dead. By May, 23 villages in the canton of Mbaouar were already listed as being affected by plague, with two deaths.<sup>6</sup> The doctor in charge of the administration's Assistance Médicale went on a tour of the province of Guet in September to instruct the chiefs of cantons where the plague was raging on the best ways to combat it.<sup>7</sup> The chiefs were in turn to provide agents from the medical service on

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1. ARSD 2G27-81 Tivaouane RPM July 1927.
  2. ARSD 2G27-90 Tivaouane RPA 1927.
  3. 1Z56 commandant de cercle of Louga to chef de province of Guet and chief of police of the cercle, 21 May 1929.
  4. ARSD 2G29-99 Thies RPA 1929.
  5. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C598 D4-Senegal RPA 1929.
  6. 1Z70 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 11 May 1929.
  7. ARSD 1Z 67 Doctor in charge of Assistance Médicale to Macodou Sall, 27 September 1929.

their tournées with helpers. Strict restrictions on movement were again implemented, particularly in Mboul Gallo, one of the worst hit regions. Only those with a card to prove they had an anti-plague vaccination were allowed to travel.<sup>1</sup>

In February 1929, the chef de canton of Mbaouar, Sambou Ndour, was in trouble for failing to point out a case of smallpox which had broken out in the village of Romnane one month previously. By the time the chef de province heard of this, ten to fifteen people had died. Even after Macodou Sall had written to the chief of Mbaouar asking him to carry out an enquiry, he received no reply. So the following week, he took matters into his own hands and sent a medical assistant, Diao, to Romnane to vaccinate the villagers and other inhabitants of the region. According to Diao, the numbers dead or sick from the plague were as follows:

Village	Dead	Sick
Romnane	8	19
Sabb No. 1	6	3
Sabb No. 2	4	4 (2)

while the chef de canton had taken no action. All things considered, Sambou Ndour got off lightly, with a public rebuke from the commandant de cercle.

In 1933, thanks to the prompt anti-plague measures taken by the chiefs in the subdivision of Cayor, the plague epidemic was halted by the end of March. By this time, people were becoming accustomed to vaccination. But in September of the same year, a severe epidemic of yellow fever brought 200 deaths.<sup>3</sup>

As late as 1934, the anti-plague measures had not been fully understood by the population. The complaint against Tanor Latsoukabé Fall which appeared in L'Humanité on 4 September 1934 arose from a

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1. 1Z67 commandant de cercle of Louga to Macodou Sall, 9 August 1929.
  2. 1Z67 chef de province of Guet to commandant de cercle of Louga, 27 February 1929.
  3. ARSD 2G31-84 Thies RPA 1931.

misunderstanding of a hygienic measure taken by an agent from the health service.<sup>1</sup> This involved burning down some huts in a plague-contaminated area and was reported as evidence of the chief's brutality!

Smallpox epidemics occurred nearly every year in Senegal till the early 1930s. While chiefs in the North cooperated in persuading their subjects to be vaccinated, chiefs in the Basse Casamance proved less willing to incur the opprobrium of their peoples. The commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor reported that during a smallpox epidemic in Pointe St. Georges in 1928, the people were hostile to vaccination and their chiefs apathetic.<sup>2</sup> In 1929, Bignona had its severest smallpox outbreak involving the vaccination of 14,000. This epidemic did not die down till 1932, and sporadic cases were recorded in 1933.<sup>3</sup>

By 1932, the struggle against plague and smallpox had been brought under sufficient control for the administration to shift its attention to malaria and yellow fever, both of which were carried by the mosquito. Chiefs were advised of the connexion between this insect and stagnant water. They were to ensure their subjects took care over their drinking water, and were to stop the formation of stagnant pools in the villages by pouring petrol on them; In May 1933, the help of chefs de canton all over Senegal was enlisted in an enquiry into yellow fever and malaria. They were asked to give details on the nature of the victims, the symptoms and rhythm of the disease and treatment.<sup>4</sup>

Cases of malaria were found to be more common in the Casamance than elsewhere in Senegal. In 1934, the chiefs of the villages of Santiaba, Boucotte and Bouckdi in Ziguinchor were given mosquito nets to distribute to poor families to protect the newly born.<sup>5</sup> Although

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1. ARSD 13G43 (180) Carrière, commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 12 February 1935, see also Ch. 3, "The Role of the Chiefs in Taxation," p. 152.
  2. ARSD 2G28-59 Ziguinchor RPA 1928.
  3. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929, 2G32-96 Bignona RPA 1932 and 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.
  4. 13G33 (180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 23 May 1933.
  5. AN 2G34-67 Casamance RPA 1934.

the chiefs declared their gratitude to the French for their interest in the population, they resented the extra burden of work this placed on them. Even by 1936 the struggle against malaria had not progressed very much. Whereas 32,000 in the Casamance had been vaccinated against smallpox and 960 against the plague, only four had had anti-malarial vaccinations.<sup>1</sup>

The Popular Front government decided to clarify the chiefs' role during epidemics, by sending them detailed instructions on how to combat the most common ones.<sup>2</sup> In addition there was to be a European doctor and auxiliaries at the chef-lieu of each canton to act as specialist advisers (conseillers techniques) to the chiefs and conseils de notables. The Health Services proposed an expansion and improvement of the hygiene course at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs.

Another disease which affected the Casamance more than other areas of Senegal was sleeping sickness. An article added to the Indigénat on 20 June 1925 laid down sanctions for subjects including chiefs not participating in the struggle against this disease. As far as the chief was concerned this entailed persuading people to attend medical examinations, stopping the migration of infected persons and gathering them together for quarantine with the aid of a garde de cercle. In order to encourage the chiefs, it was suggested in September 1935 that their primes de rendement should in part depend on their contribution to the struggle against sleeping sickness.<sup>3</sup> This idea was not taken up, but in 1939, the Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Administratives suggested that an extra bonus, a "surprime" should be given apart from the main prime de rendement.<sup>4</sup> He maintained that if the mark given to the chief for his participation in the fight against sleeping sickness was used to determine his prime de rendement, he might concentrate on this at the expense of his other activities. However, by July 1941, Governor General Boisson rejected the idea of a supprime in favour

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1. AN 2G36-75 Casamance RPA 1936.
  2. 18G84(17) Health Services of the Colony to the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 15 May 1937.
  3. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940 mentions the circular of 10 September 1935.
  4. 18G84(17) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to the Inspector General of Medical Services at Dakar, 1939.

of giving the chief a mark for his contribution to the struggle against sleeping sickness which would be used to work out his total commission.<sup>1</sup> Boisson also wanted to increase the amount awarded to the chief in the prime de rendement using money either from the tax collected from the indigenous population or from additional tax. The following month, the Governor reported to the Governor General that the chefs de canton and de village had grasped the importance of these instructions and that the struggle against sleeping sickness was obtaining good results.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, sanctions were taken against those showing reluctance to carry out administrative measures. In 1940, on the request of the doctor in charge at Ziguinchor, the following chiefs were punished for inaction in the struggle against sleeping sickness, by retention of their salaries for the following periods:

Chief	Canton	No. of days salary retained
Mamadou Faty	Adeane	8
Alassane Cissé	Bainoucks	6
Patron Gomis	Mandjacques	6
Mathias Sambou	Bayottes	4
Pierre Bassene	Brin Seleki	6 (3)

In 1944, the chef de canton of Pointe St. Georges was dismissed for inactivity in the campaign to promote the anti-smallpox vaccination and the fight against sleeping sickness.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, measures against sleeping sickness were very difficult to enforce as they were highly unpopular with the local population, particularly in the Casamance where people were forced to comb the forest for the tse tse fly. This was an extremely difficult task and the ensuing resentment helped spark off the revolt in Oussouye during the Second World War.<sup>5</sup>

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1. 18G84(17) Governor General to Governors, July 1941.
  2. 18G70(17) Governor to Governor General, 28 August 1941.
  3. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  4. AN2G 44-85 Ziguinchor RPM December 1944.
  5. Interview with Abbé Diamacoune Senghor.

As late as 1940, the Inspector General of the Health Services, Morque, was still concerned about the continuing influence of sorcerers and healers.<sup>1</sup> He stressed the need for chefs de canton and de village to warn their subjects against these, to publicise French medicine and vaccination campaigns to their people and to encourage those in rural areas to attend general and maternity clinics.

With the War, the administration was faced with the combined problems of disease and dearth. Cerebro-spinal meningitis became a major problem and plague resurfaced.<sup>2</sup> In January and February 1943, meningitis appeared in north-east Tivaouane, while bubonic plague began in May, quickly spreading across the subdivision.<sup>3</sup> Chefs de canton and de village were on the whole very efficient in implementing the normal preventive measures before the health service had time to intervene. In 1945, an epidemic of meningitis in Cayor coincided with one of smallpox, although no instances of plague were recorded.<sup>4</sup>

Following the bad millet harvest of 1942, the cercles most severely threatened with starvation were Louga, Linguère, and Diourbel, where cases of malnutrition among children were recorded. The situation was aggravated by the selfishness of some chefs de famille. The chefs de canton were instructed to bring all children from every village for a medical examination.<sup>5</sup> These took place at soup kitchens in the villages as well as in clinics, and the most urgent cases were treated at once. 1,592 children were fed in this way, over half of whom (815) came from Louga. The chefs de canton also distributed food on credit to families. As a result of this prompt action, only 20 deaths from malnutrition were recorded. Although some chefs evidently took advantage of this distress to make a profit, there were few sanctions.

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1. ARSD 21G143(108) Morque, Inspector General of Health Services, to commandant de cercle, 14 May 1940.
  2. 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.
  3. ARSD 2G43-81 Tivaouane RPA 1943.
  4. ARSD 2G45-96 Tivaouane RPA 1945.
  5. 2G44-20. The threat of dearth from the harvest of 1942 persisted till 1944.

## The Chiefs and Education

With the laicisation of education in the AOF in 1903, the administration obtained full control over public education in Senegal.<sup>1</sup> We have already dealt with the elitist education provided for the relatives of certain chiefs in an earlier chapter. The chefs de canton and de village also had a more general role to play as far as education was concerned. They were to set an example to their subjects by sending their children to village and regional schools. By the mid-1920s the chiefs in Bignona were being encouraged to send their sons to the Ecole de Bignona and to persuade inhabitants of the cercle to do the same.<sup>2</sup> Powerful patronage was bestowed on the chef de village when he was given the responsibility of deciding, with the aid of his council, which children were to be sent to the village and regional schools.

Chefs de canton and de province were to provide the administration with details of repairs and equipment required by village and regional schools. Macodou Sall, the chef de province of Guet, was in constant contact with the two instituteurs at Kébémér and Ndande, and frequently inspected the schools in his area.<sup>3</sup> The chiefs were to ensure that the children sent to school were properly fed and clothed by their family during vacations.<sup>4</sup>

Most chefs de canton appeared to accept the system of education brought by the French willingly, as it was seen as a stepping stone to power and wealth in a changing society. Both the highly educated and illiterate chiefs took a great deal of interest in the education of children from their region in general and of their own children in particular. Although himself illiterate, Arfan Sonko of Djougouttes Nord asked the administration to build a number of schools in his canton as a reward for his contribution to the road network of the Casamance.

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1. D. Bouche, L'Enseignement dans les territoires français de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, thèse d'état, Vol. 2, Lille 1975, pp. 500-501 bis.
  2. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.
  3. ARSD 1266 Note from the commandant de cercle of Louga to all chefs de province, 1929.
  4. 18G84(17) Table concerning the functions of the chiefs in education, law and order.

The first school was built in Bessire in 1930, with Wolof teachers, and similar schools were soon built in all the villages of the canton.<sup>1</sup>

Arfan forced parents to send their children to school, and as result of his efforts, his region has to this day the most schools in the whole of Bignona. Educated chiefs like Macodou Sall and his son, Meissa M'Baye Sall, acted as tutors for a number of children of less educated chefs de canton, de village, and of notables and their followers. Meissa M'Baye Sall paid for the education of approximately 30 children who were not his own. He sent one, Sanghone Sall, the son of Macodou's less educated brother, Massamba Kangui Sall, the chef de canton of Guet, to school in France.<sup>2</sup>

The chefs de canton and de province were also to ensure that all pupils of the Ecole des Fils des Chefs and Ecole Blanchot in their area were sent to the Residence in time for the return to school. Those pupils who were late without a good excuse were automatically expelled.<sup>3</sup>

In an effort to popularise education, Brévié introduced in 1932 a system of écoles rurales with education of a more practical orientation for the mass of the population.<sup>4</sup> The chiefs were expected to promote these "écoles populaires" which concentrated on agricultural and manual work. French was still taught, but in its most rudimentary form. The establishment of these schools must also be seen in the context of the depression, which had obliged the administration to cut back on its education budget, and therefore on good teachers and equipment. In addition, as a result of the decline in employment opportunities following the crisis, the administration resolved to do nothing to increase the ranks of the educated unemployed.

The écoles rurales proved disastrous in several respects. Educational standards fell and lack of public interest obliged the

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1. Interview with Ibrahima Sonko. (2) Interview with Sanghone Sall.
  3. 1266 Governor Beurnier to commandant de cercle of Louga, 5 October 1929.
  4. R. W. Johnson, "Educational Progress and Retrogression in Guinea 1900-43", in Hiskett and Brown (eds), Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa, London 1975, pp. 217-218.



administration to embark on a programme of forced recruitment. Disobedient pupils were punished by having to do forced labour on the village fields.

After the Second World War, the chefs de province and de canton were sources of information on the ambitions of pupils at the Ecoles Régionales. The administration asked them to ascertain whether pupils were more likely to follow technical or commercial education.<sup>1</sup>

Some chiefs found that the recruitment of pupils for schools conflicted with the need for as many hands as possible for the harvest. In 1945, chiefs under pressure from the administration to ensure that pupils attend school in Boutoupa (Ziguinchor cercle) complained that children doing manual work at school would have been better employed in the fields.<sup>2</sup>

The chiefly colonial councillors were leading advocates for the construction of more clinics and schools in their areas. In 1922, Macodou Sall reiterated his request to the Secretary General, the representative of the administration on the Council, for the construction of schools at Guéoul and Kébémér.<sup>3</sup> Massamba Aram Diop made repeated requests in the Colonial Council sessions between 1926 and 1930 for the creation of a school at Kelle to save inhabitants of the area having to send their children to Tivaouane and Méckhé.<sup>4</sup> In 1930, Massamba Sall asked for a school for the Sereres at Mt. Rolland.<sup>5</sup> In 1926, the Permanent Commission, which included three chiefs-Massamba Sall, Sidy N'diaye and Boubakar N'déné N'diaye-produced a report on

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1. 1Z66 Headmaster of the Ecole Régionale of Kebemer to the chef de province of Guet, 2 April 1949.
  2. AN 2G45-75 Ziguinchor subdivision RPA 1945.
  3. ARSD 4E13(135) Colonial Council-Permanent Commission, 5 July 1922.
  4. Colonial Council PV, fourth sitting, 14 June 1930.
  5. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 17 June 1930.

primary and secondary education in Senegal<sup>1</sup>.

The enthusiasm of notables for education is shown in the petition sent by the notables of Tivaouane to the President of the Colonial Council in July 1932, requesting the enlargement of the primary school in their escale to increase the number of classes.<sup>2</sup> They also asked for the construction of a maternity clinic and place for the sick. All members of the Council were in agreement except for Amadou N'diaye who opposed the motion as a form of protest. He claimed the scheme was expensive and unfair in view of the fact he had been asking for a school for Tambacounda for eleven years. Chiefly members of the Colonial Council revealed in various sessions that so keen were notables in many areas that local children should receive a decent standard of education that they sometimes pooled their own resources to build schools if money from the administration was not forthcoming. Such was the case of the school at Dioune War Niandior in the subdivision of Bas-Saloum and the Ecole Préparatoire at Koumpetoum.

Chiefs were also anxious to keep up the standards of schools in rural areas. In the 1934 session, Amadou N'diaye suggested that instead of making tournées so frequently, the Inspector of Education should make fewer and stay for longer periods in each region.<sup>3</sup> Abdoul Salam Kane, perturbed by the low standards of the écoles rurales in 1937 requested a second Inspector of Education to ensure that these schools were inspected at least once a year.<sup>4</sup> In 1934, he had expressed concern that rural areas were losing track of their own history-"les traditions se perdent". He suggested that instituteurs in the écoles rurales should start to compile local histories of their areas.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, fifth sitting, 15 June 1926.
  2. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 11 July 1932.
  3. Colonial Council PV, sixth sitting, 30 June 1934.
  4. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 24 July 1937.
  5. Colonial Council PV, sixth sitting, 30 June 1934.

In order to solve the problem of the education of the sons of chiefs coming to a dead-end after their certificate of primary studies when they failed to get into the Ecole Blanchot, Boubakar N'déné N'diaye, Alioune Sow and a citizen councillor, Etienne N'diaye requested that a new school be constructed for them.<sup>1</sup> They argued that sons of chiefs "appelés par leur naissance même à remplacer leurs pères doivent être à la hauteur de leurs fonctions", rather than being thrown out into the streets after school. A number of citizen councillors like Le Gros opposed this motion as a waste of resources. However, the President, Moustapha Malic Gueye, sympathised with the chiefs' aim to "éviter aux enfants le contact pernicieux de la rue".

As early as 1922, El Hadj Samba Khary Cissé was demanding that the colonial administration recognised the importance of Islam by giving it a place in the education system.<sup>2</sup> He suggested that moniteurs be appointed for French schools to teach the Koran for at least two hours a day, and that Muslim children should be encouraged to pray at appropriate times. Although Bouna N'diaye seconded this proposal, it is not surprising that it did not meet with the approval of the French administration.

By 1946, sujets français in the AOF had been awarded French citizenship, and freedom from the Indigénat and forced labour. In order to safeguard these newly-won rights, it was vital that they should have equal educational opportunities. In one of the last sessions of the Colonial Council before it was renamed the General Council in 1946, Sekhou Diop, a citizen member put forward the motion that a full-blown system of education should be extended to the population of the AOF as a whole<sup>3</sup>. Of the fourteen signatories of this petition, five were

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1. Colonial Council PV, fifth sitting, 30 October 1937.
  2. Colonial Council PV, eighteenth sitting, 29 November 1922.
  3. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, third sitting, 20 June 1946.

chiefs-Benjamin Diatta, Boubakar N'déné N'diaye, Alioune Sow, Amidou Kane and Fode Diouf.

In this chapter and preceding ones, we have seen that the chiefs were expected to carry out a wide variety of tasks. It was therefore difficult for the commandant de cercle to keep any systematic check on them, and hardly surprising that they fell short in many areas. As the chiefs were unlikely to be able to make illegal profits from their functions regarding health and education, some of the more venal ones let their duties slip. But many more performed their tasks conscientiously. However, their subjects remained suspicious of administrative measures for which they were given no explanation. This chapter, coming at the end of this section of the chiefs' functions in the localities, shows that although there was corruption, there was also government.

## CHAPTER NINE

### The Role of the Chiefs on Councils

In order to justify their system of governing by means of the commandement indigène, the French were anxious to preserve the fiction that the chiefs were the natural representatives of their peoples. In their conciliar functions, the duality of the chiefs' role again became apparent. Although the chiefs received salaries from the administration, the French were anxious to keep them distinct from civil servants, stressing that they sat on councils not as agents of the administration, but as "les représentants qualifiés de nos sujets." <sup>1</sup>

The Colonial Council rose from the ashes of the former General Council on 4 December 1920. The General Council, founded in St. Louis in 1879, was Senegal's first territorial council, with powers based on like councils in departments of the metropole. <sup>2</sup> As members of its single electoral college were elected by universal suffrage by citizens of the Four Communes, the Council was able to administer territories under direct administration only. But with the fusion of the budgets of the "territoires d'administration directe" and the "pays du protectorat" in 1920, the administration decided to make the council a body representative of the whole colony. While the decree of 4 December 1920 continued to allow half of the Colonial Council's members to be citizens of the four communes elected by universal suffrage, the other half had to represent the peoples of the protectorate. <sup>3</sup>

The administration was thus faced with the problem that frequently those best qualified to represent the people possessed only the rudiments of the French language. It realised that it could best rely on the chefs de province and de canton to represent its interests on the council. The French could legitimise the right of the chiefs to speak for the subject

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1. 1G34 Governor of Senegal, "Report on the Commandement Indigène" 8 May 1931.
  2. W. Mackenzie and K. Robinson, Five Elections in Africa, Oxford 1960, pp.289-290.
  3. Ibid.

populations on the grounds that they were "descendants des vieilles familles" representing tradition and experience.<sup>1</sup> These new chiefly councillors were to be elected from amongst themselves. Both chiefly and elected councillors were elected for six years and could be re-elected indefinitely.

Senegal was divided into four electoral districts, which remained broadly the same throughout the period, to facilitate voting:

- a) the Fleuve, consisting of Podor, Matam, Bakel, Dagana, St. Louis and Louga.
- b) The Voie Ferrée, comprising Thies, Dakar, Rufisque and Tivaouane.
- c) Sine Saloum, composed of Sine Saloum, Baol, Tambacounda and Haute Gambie.
- d) The Casamance, consisting of Ziguinchor, Bignona, Sedhiou and Kolda.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Permanent Commission of the Colonial Council was also equally divided between chiefly and elected members, with four apiece. The decree ruled that a mandate for the Colonial Council was incompatible with membership of the Privy Council. At the first sitting of a particular session, the posts of President and secretary were to be taken by the oldest and youngest members respectively. They were then to supervise the election by secret ballot of a citizen member as President, two vice-presidents and two secretaries from each of the groups of chiefly and citizen councillors.<sup>3</sup>

In the first session of the Colonial Council, which opened on 13 June 1921, the chiefly members from the Voie Ferrée region included Thierno Sall (of Sandock Diagianiao), Samba Laobé Diop (Mbayer Nianing, Thies), Macodou Sall (province of Guet) and Meissa M'Baye Sall (Saniokhor, Tivaouane) and for the fourth region, Abdoul Diallo of Firdou.<sup>4</sup> Chiefly

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- 1. ARSD 4E4(14) Governor General Carde to Minister of Colonies, 6 March 1925.
  - 2. ARSD 13G46(180) Results of the Colonial Council Elections, 17 May 1936.
  - 3. 4E4(14) Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 8 August 1921.
  - 4. ARSD 17G 41(2) chefs de province and de canton on the Colonial Council, Decision 1312 of 13 June 1921.

members of the Permanent Commission were Mbakhane Diop, Macodou Sall, Meissa M'Baye Sall and Coumba N'Dofene Diouf, the Bour Sine.<sup>1</sup> The chiefly vice-president in the 1921 session was Mbakhane Diop of Keur Bacine (Louga) while the secretary was Samba Niébé Couly Diop of Foss Gallodjina (Dagana).

The Colonial Council continued to exercise the most important function of its predecessor in deliberating and approving the budget proposed by the Governor, except that the budget now applied to the whole of Senegal. However, the power of Colonial Councillors over finance was reduced, as the budget was divided into two sections, compulsory and discretionary, with the Colonial Council having a say in the latter only.<sup>4</sup> The Colonial Council also had the power to legislate on public property and on the contribution of the colony to public works projects. It met twice a year, usually in June or July, and in November and December.

While in session, the Council had two major commissions on which the chiefs held just under half the seats, but of which the president could not be a member. These were the Commission of Finances and the Commission of Miscellaneous Affairs.<sup>3</sup> In addition, there were various committees on education, public health and welfare on which the chiefs held seats.<sup>4</sup> A chiefly representative was also sent along with the President of the Colonial Council to the Council of Government of the AOF at Dakar. This office was held by Samba Niébé Couly Diop till his death in 1927, when he was succeeded by Abdoul Salam Kane.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 9 August 1921.
  2. Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit., Vol.2, p.550.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 12 November 1925. In this year, the Commission of Finances included five chiefs out of its total membership of thirteen. Four of the ten members of the Commission of Miscellaneous Affairs were chiefs.
  4. These committees were 1) public education; 2) hostels, prisons and hygiene; 3) agriculture; 4) sanitation; 5) fairs and exhibitions.
  5. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 7 November 1923.

Mbakhane Diop resigned from the post of vice-president of the Colonial Council in 1923, along with his post as chef de canton of Thor Diander (Thies), to be succeeded by Macodou Sall, who held the post till 1928.<sup>1</sup> The latter resumed his post for a year in 1935, when Amadou N'diaye resigned due to ill health. In 1925, Massamba Sall was elected by the chiefs as their secretary on the Council, a position he held for much of the rest of its working life.<sup>2</sup>

The chiefly membership of the Colonial Council remained relatively constant, although there was a small turnover as chiefs died, resigned, were dismissed from their functions or were voted off the council. In 1925, the Thies and Tivaouane contingents from the second electoral district had lost Thierno Sall and gained Massamba Sall (Ndoutte Diassane), Massamba Aram Diop (Diamatil) and Ndongo Fall (Diobas).<sup>3</sup> Abdoul Diallo was joined by Benjamin Diatta for the Casamance and they were to remain on the council till 1940. In 1934, vacancies in the second electoral district created by the resignation of Ndongo Fall of Diack and the deaths of Samba Laobé Diop of Mbayar Nianing and Meissa M'Baye Sall of Saniokhor were filled by Mamadou Leye, the chef de canton of Badane Sassal, Code N'diaye of Sandock Diaganiao, and Mbakhane Lat Dior Diop, voted onto the council for Mbayar Nianing in this instance.<sup>4</sup>

Blaise Diagne, Senegal's first black Deputy at the National Assembly dominated the Senegalese political stage from his election in 1914 till his death in 1934.<sup>5</sup> As a former customs officer, an "out" trying to obtain an entry to positions of power and patronage, he initially mobilised the discontented in the Four Communes in order to win the 1914 and 1919 elections. Because of his poor relations with

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 16 October 1923.
  2. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, July 1925.
  3. Ibid.
  4. ARSD 2D13-9 Decision of 31 May 1934.
  5. G. Wesley Johnson, The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal, Stanford 1971.



Merlin, Governor General from 1918 to 1922,<sup>1</sup> he sought allies amongst the citizens on the Colonial Council, which frequently meant opposing administrative measures.

It is not surprising that citizen councillors (also known as elected councillors) resented the introduction of the Colonial Council and of the chiefly councillors as undermining their influence and constantly questioned the legitimacy of the chiefs' presence. The chiefly councillors responded to these objections by maintaining that as representatives of the majority of the population, they had just as much right to sit on the council as the citizens. The administration was able to make use of this chief/citizen rivalry in order to get its measures carried. It could generally count on the chiefs' support while keeping the citizen opposition disunited. But the administration was prevented from "packing" the council with "tame" chiefly members by Blaise Diagne, who was anxious to retain the support of the citizen members.

For instance, by the reform of 30 March 1925, an imbalance was introduced into the Colonial Council in favour of the citizens, who gained four members at the expense of the chiefs.<sup>2</sup> Blaise Diagne could have played a part in this measure, which might be seen as an effort on his part to retain the support of some citizens after he fell out with one of his principal lieutenants, Galandou Diouf. Henceforth, citizen members numbered twenty four and chiefs sixteen. Similarly, the Permanent Commission was to consist of five citizens and three chiefs. On 13 January 1930, the membership was again adjusted, with

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1. Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit. vol. 2, p. 549.

2. 4E4(14) Governor General of the AOF to Minister of Colonies, 6 March 1925. According to this measure, representation was to be as follows:

Electoral district	citizen(elected) councillors	chiefly councillors
1) Fleuve	7	3
2) Voie Ferrée	11	5
3) Sine Saloum	5	6
4) Casamance	1	2
Total	24	16

citizen and chiefly councillors each gaining by two members.<sup>1</sup>

One of the first incidents which gave rise to protest by the citizen councillors was the administration's selection of chiefs to be sent to the Colonial Exhibition at Marseilles as representatives of the colony. The Permanent Commission had during their sitting of 4 May 1922 nominated a delegation of three citizen and three chiefly members to promote Senegalese interests at the Exhibition, consisting of Louis Guillabert (the President of the Colonial Council). Jean Daramy d'Oxoby, Michel Sangue, Mbakhane Diop, Meissa M'Baye Sall and Macodou Sall. But the administration sent a delegation in June composed entirely of chiefs and excluding the citizens. In the sittings of 5 and 6 July 1922, citizen members protested vehemently to the administration that they had never been consulted on the composition of this delegation, and that they would have been more suitable representatives, as they had at least been elected by universal suffrage.<sup>2</sup> In their view, the chiefs had gone as representatives of the administration rather than of the colony. Governor Maillet replied that the council had not been consulted as it was a political assembly, and did not represent Senegal's economic interests, to which the elected councillors retorted "Nous sommes une assemblée administrative." D'Oxoby, a citizen councillor, protested against the administration's having put the chiefs in second class berths, on the grounds that this besmirched the dignity of the Legion of Honour. He pointed out that the administration had pre-empted attempts by the Colonial Council to block the delegation by advancing credits to chiefly delegates from the Sociétés de Prévoyance.

1. 4E4(14) Minister of Colonies to Governor General of the AOF, 6 December 1929. Representation was to be as follows:

Electoral district	citizen(elected) councillors	increase from 1925	chiefly councillors	increase from 1925
1) Fleuve	7	nil	4	1
2) Voie Ferrée	13	2	5	nil
3) Sine Saloum	5	nil	7	1
4) Casamance	1	nil	2	nil
Total	26	2	18	2

2. ARSD 4E13(135) Colonial Council-Permanent Commission, 5 and 6 July 1922.

Blaise Diagne backed the protests of the elected councillors in this matter as a means of striking a blow at his old enemy Merlin. During a meeting of the Permanent Commission on 6 July 1922, d'Oxoby read out a letter from Diagne addressed to the Minister of Colonies, in which the Deputy protested that although the delegation had travelled at the expense of the colony, Governor General Merlin had failed to consult the council.<sup>1</sup> Diagne also objected to the omission of one of his chiefly supporters, Mbakhane Diop, from the delegation, in spite of the fact that this chief held a Legion of Honour, was vice president of the Colonial Council and was the first chiefly volunteer to become an army officer. He alleged that only those chiefs who were friendly with the Governor had been chosen, while Mbakhane Diop had had "le grave tort de marquer quelque indépendance d'esprit, de ne pas céder à la pression du gouverneur général".

At the opening of the ordinary session of the Council on 4 November 1922, the citizens found themselves in a minority, as four of their number were absent; Louis Guillaibert was in France, another had died, and two others failed to turn up.<sup>2</sup> Of the chiefs, only the Bour Sine, Coumba N'dofene Diouf, did not attend. The government was therefore in a position to win on key issues. On 18 November 1922, d'Oxoby, backed by other citizen councillors, attacked the chiefs for refusing to join a walk-out in protest against a government proposal to shut the Lycée Faidherbe.<sup>3</sup> His protest vote against the government's motion won 18 votes as opposed to the chiefs' 15. Speaking on behalf of those chiefs who had voted, Abdoul Salam Kane objected that this vote had been taken before the Governor General's response had been heard.

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1. ARSD 4E13(135) Colonial Council-Permanent Commission, 5 and 6 July.
  2. ARSD 4E14(135) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the ordinary session of the Colonial Council of 4 November till 3 December 1922", undated, prob. 1923.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, sixth sitting, 18 November 1922.

During a debate on the budget in the same sitting, Amadou N'diaye attempted to avenge himself on Blaise Diagne for his attack on the chiefly delegates to the Colonial Exhibition by trying to get the Deputy's special indemnity reduced.<sup>1</sup> He argued that Diagne's behaviour towards the chiefs at Marseilles, where he had ignored them, showed that he did not consider himself to be the representative of the subject sector of the Senegalese population. Instead, Amadou N'diaye proposed that part of his indemnity should be used to pay for a Senegalese delegate at the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies, who would truly represent the subjects. But this proposal was rejected by twenty votes to eleven.

This tempestuous session ended in high drama, when the elected councillors, following the lead of Duguay Clédor, one of Diagne's lieutenants, staged walkouts on 30 November, 1 December and again on 3 December 1922 in protest at the administration's attempts to raise the tax on stamp and mortgage registration (droit d'enregistrement de timbres et d'hypothèque).<sup>2</sup> But the session continued with only the nineteen chiefs left in the Assembly, with Mbakhane Diop as President. These chiefs voted in favour of all the administrative measures put before them, including a proposal to raise capitation by one franc.<sup>3</sup> Protest as the elected councillors might on their return, the decree of 4 December 1920 had made this eventuality perfectly legal.

In the sitting of 3 December 1922, the citizens declared their refusal to accept the chiefs' vote in these matters. "Nous, les habitants citoyens français ou indigènes ne sauraient être placés sous la juridiction de conseillers soumis à l'Indigénat."<sup>4</sup> The chiefs strongly

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, thirteenth sitting, 24 November 1922.
  2. 4E13(135) Telegram from the Secretary General to Governor, undated, prob. December 1922.
  3. 4E13(135) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the ordinary session of the Colonial Council", 1923. When the elected councillors had been present, the chiefs had voted with them for a reduction in head tax, but once the former had left, the administration was able to persuade the chiefs to change their minds on this issue.
  4. 4E14(135) Governor General Merlin to Minister of Colonies, "Report on the session of the Colonial Council of November to December 1922", 26 February 1923.

protested against the word "conquis" used by the elected councillors to describe them, claiming that as representatives of at least eight-tenths of the population, they had just as many rights.

The year after this stormy session began badly for the administration. The four elected members of the Permanent Commission (Chimère, Galandou Diouf, Sangué and d'Oxoby) declined to attend its session in February 1923 in protest against the administration's manoeuvres the previous year. They refused to sit with their chiefly colleagues on the grounds that the latter had not been properly elected.<sup>1</sup> Only the four chiefly members (Amadou Mactar Wane, Boubakar N'déné N'diaye, Macodou Sall and Samba Souna Fall) responded to the government's invitation. This inconvenienced the administration, which wanted the Permanent Commission to vote the supplementary credits of the 1922-23 budget, but it managed to find a loophole, submitting these instead for approval to the Privy Council and the Permanent Commission of the Council of Government. Diagne sided with the citizen councillors, protesting to the Minister of Colonies about the incidents in the previous session of the Council.<sup>2</sup> In order to give their tempers time to cool, the Government of Senegal decided not to call the council for the extraordinary session in June.

By the next ordinary session in November 1923, Abdoul Salam Kane had been able to mediate between the chiefs and citizen councillors, persuading the former that there had been a misunderstanding, and that they had misheard the word "conquis".<sup>3</sup> Amadou N'diaye unwittingly corroborated the citizen councillors contention that the chiefs were "yes men" for the administration by declaring that they were not ashamed of being equated with government servants. As for the legislation they had passed concerning registration, they had not understood what was entailed and had simply voted with the government!

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1. 4E14(135) Governor to Governor General, 15 February 1923.
  2. 4E14(135) Governor to Governor General, 12 March 1923.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 6 November 1923.

The citizen councillors were able to call the chiefs' claim to represent the population into question on a number of occasions, particularly over the issue of prestations and requisitions. In the 1923 session, Boubakar N'déné N'diaye defended the administrative practice of forcing cultivators in the Sine Saloum to sell millet to it at much lower prices than they would have obtained from traders.<sup>1</sup> Alioune Gueye, the elected representative for the Sine Saloum reproached the chiefs on the grounds that "vous êtes mandataires des intéressés, vous devez les défendre au sein de l'assemblée".

Merlin's departure from the post of Governor General on 27 May 1922 assisted Diagne's rapprochement with the administration. By 1926, he had fallen out with his former lieutenant, Galandou Diouf and had become a pillar of the establishment.<sup>2</sup> Having come to terms with the Bordeaux houses, Diagne began to woo the chiefs in order to build up a clientage network in the countryside. But Diagne's relationship with the chiefs was always ambiguous. On the one hand, he needed their support because they generally sided with the administration against his political opponents on the Colonial Council, but on the other, the chiefs could pose as rivals for the administration's favour.

Diagne's rapprochement with the chiefs began when he together with Duguay Clédor, the President of the Colonial Council and one of his principal lieutenants, pushed through the sessions of 1925 administrative proposals to increase the chiefs' salaries. This prompted a number of chiefs like Benjamin Diatta, Meissa M'Baye Sall and Massamba Sall to pledge their support for Blaise Diagne. Amadou N'diaye wrote to Duguay Clédor declaring "Nous n'avons pas regretté de marcher avec le parti Diagne; en réalité, c'est à vous que nous devons cette faveur."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, second sitting, 17 October 1923.
  2. Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 551.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, second sitting, 9 June 1926, in which the President read out the thank-you letters from the chiefs.

Duguay Clédor helped the chiefs and administration defeat the Dioufists on the Colonial Council when he abstained over the issue of prestations in the June 1927 session.<sup>1</sup> But Duguay Clédor by no means gave the chiefs unqualified support. On 17 June 1927 the few citizen councillors remaining clashed with the chiefs over citizen membership of the SIPs. During this debate, the President found an opportunity to have a dig at Amadou N'diaye, the chiefs' spokesman: "Chez les chefs comme partout ailleurs, il y a des gens de famille et des gens de basse extraction et je m'étonne de voir des descendants des Bours s'incliner devant Amadou N'diaye!"<sup>2</sup>

In 1929, Duguay Clédor defended the chiefs against a Dioufist resolution put forward by d'Oxoby calling into question the right of the chiefs to sit on the Colonial Council on equal terms with the citizens. D'Oxoby was demanding that the citizen president, vice-president and secretary be elected by the citizen councillors alone, on the grounds that the chiefs were "conseillers fonctionnaires."<sup>3</sup>

In 1934, Blaise Diagne died and Galandou Diouf was elected to the post of Deputy. Opposition to him on the council and in the country as a whole was led by Lamine Gueye, who had connexions with the French SFIO.<sup>4</sup> Galandou Diouf was therefore anxious to come to terms with the administration. But clashes between the chiefs and elected councillors continued. In the sitting of 17 June 1935, Medoune Diouf, an elected councillor charged that the lowering of the ceiling above which people were liable for income tax from 30,000 to 18,000 francs had been voted by "une voix de majorité et par les chefs."<sup>5</sup> Abdoul Salam Kane protested against these remarks: "Il n'y a pas de chefs ici mais des conseillers qui ont voté comme des conseillers et non comme chefs".

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1. See Ch. 4 on "The Chiefs and Forced Labour", p. 165.

2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 17 June 1927.

3. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 23 March 1929.

4. Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit. vol. 2, pp. 553-554. Gueye established links with the SFIO which lasted till the 1950s during the 1928 elections in Senegal.

5. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 17 June 1935.

In the November session of 1936, the citizen councillors, finding themselves in a majority of 17 to 15 used this to systematically oppose the administration's proposals such as exemption of the disabled from capitation, the suppression of duties on the slaughtering of animals, and the reduction of the tax on animals. This may have been a manoeuvre by the Dioufists to pressurise the administration to come to terms with them, or to do away with chiefly membership on the Colonial Council.

In the sitting of 22 July 1937, during a debate on income tax, eighteen citizens voted that the tax should be imposed only on those with incomes over 30,000 francs. But the President, Moustapha Malic Gueye, and the chiefs voted against it, so that the motion was defeated by one vote. Larrieu, an elected councillor, reminded the chiefs of an accusation made by a citizen councillor in an earlier session, "Chaque fois que l'administration prend une position bien nette, vous la suivez aveuglément, défendant en cela votre situation."<sup>2</sup> He sarcastically suggested that for the sake of economy, the administration should simply be given the chiefs' eighteen votes on every occasion. Abdoul Salam Kane justified the chiefs' support for the administration: "Nous sommes conscients de ce qu'a fait la France pour nous et pour toute la population de la colonie".

In October 1937, a motion to raise la contribution foncière sur les propriétés non-bâties<sup>3</sup> which aimed at reducing the budgetary deficit was passed by the votes of the chiefs, President and three elected councillors. This provoked the citizen councillors into again calling the right of the chiefs to sit on the council into question. Paul Bancal, an elected councillor, raised the issue of the separation of powers, asking how the chiefs could have the right to "approuver un budget auquel ils

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1. ARSD 13G46(180) Governor Martine to Governor General, 13 November 1936.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 22 July 1937.
  3. See Ch. 3 on "The Role of the Chiefs in Taxation."



émargent".<sup>1</sup> Sekhou Diop, another citizen, took up an ironic defense of the chiefs, saying that were he in their position, he would vote for "celui qui me donne à manger".

As in 1926, the citizen councillors in the 1938 session systematically opposed administrative plans concerning proposed taxes for 1939 and the recovery of arrears for 1937 and 1938. In this, the 19 citizen councillors present constantly found themselves coming up against the 17 chiefs. While the chiefs backed the extension of personal tax to the female inhabitants of the Four Communes who had hitherto been exempt, citizen councillors strongly opposed this. Louis Besnard, an elected councillor insisted that the 70 000 000 francs tax required of Senegal in 1939 was excessive.<sup>2</sup> The claim of the chiefs to represent the population of the interior was again called into question when Amadou N'diaye, a citizen councillor, asked them if they thought the inhabitants of the interior would respond to the sacrifices requested of them. Abdoul Salam Kane's bland reply "Je suis persuadé que les habitants de la brousse répondront à l'affirmative," caused a stir on the citizen benches. The citizens also refused to countenance any rise in the tax on patents and licenses. The Governor of Senegal claimed that because of the citizens' opposition, the 1939 budget would not be sufficient to fund the modernisation of the colony. He alleged that they had resolved to make the administrative plans fail for political motives, that is to say, to escape the tutelage of himself and the Governor General. However, the government could always by-pass the Colonial Council by financing the scheme from the Caisse de Réserve.<sup>3</sup>

Opposition to the presence of chiefs on the Colonial Council gave rise to demands by citizen councillors for a return to the General Council. These began in 1925 with a petition to the President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Colonies signed by most St. Louis electors calling for the re-establishment of the General Council.

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 27 October 1937.
  2. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 4 November 1938.
  3. 13G46(180) Governor to Governor General, 5 November 1938.

This move would appear to have been instigated by Lamine Gueye, the mayor of that city.<sup>1</sup>

In the same year, citizen members from the Fleuve region who were supporters of Lamine Gueye tried to persuade their colleagues, mainly followers of Galandou Diouf, to drop their campaign against the chiefs and reach some accommodation with the administration but the latter refused. They sent yet another petition to the Minister of Colonies to re-establish the General Council, declaring the Colonial Council to be a useless body.<sup>2</sup>

After Diagne had reached an accommodation with the administration and chiefs, demands for a return to the General Council became less frequent. But if citizen councillors were unable to secure a return to the General Council, they were at least determined that they should maintain their edge in voting by outnumbering the chiefs. However, as a result of death or retirement of elected councillors, the chiefs predominated in March 1933.<sup>3</sup> On this occasion, the President, Duguay Clédor, wrote to the Governor demanding elections in all districts on the grounds that the decree of 30 March 1925 ruled that the elected councillors should always outnumber the chiefs. According to Duguay Clédor, the situation was as follows:

district	total possible no. of councillors	total possible no. of elected councillors	total possible no. of chiefly councillors	vacancies (C) (D)
				(A) (B)
1) Fleuve	11	7	4	3 / 4 4
2) Voie Ferree	18	13	5	5 / 8 5
3) Sine Saloum	12	5	7	3 / 2 7
4) Casamance	3	1	2	nil / 1 2
	44	26	18	11 15 18

A) No. of elected councillors B) No. of chiefly councillors (4)  
C) Final total of elected councillors D) Final total of chiefly councillors.

1. ARSD 4E6(14) Governor to Governor General, 9 January 1925.
2. ARSD 4E16(135) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs "Notes on the debates of 10 and 12 November 1925." In attempting to please the administration by defending the chiefs from attack by other elected councillors, Gueye may have been trying to effect a rapprochement with Blaise Diagne. At all events, this failed.
3. 4E4(14) Duguay Clédor, President of the Colonial Council to Governor General, 29 March 1933.
4. Ibid.

From the above table, it can be seen that in 1933 the chiefly councillors outnumbered the elected councillors by three. But as it was to the administration's advantage to have the elected councillors in a minority, Governor Beurnier was in no great hurry to make adjustments. He simply intended to hold elections to fill the vacancies left by the chiefs, Ndongo Fall, who had resigned, and Samba Laobé Diop, who had died.<sup>1</sup> However, he was overruled by the Governor General, Brévié, who declared in February 1934 that as the number of citizen councillors had fallen below the number of chiefs, there should be elections in all districts where vacancies had arisen.<sup>2</sup>

A year after the death of Blaise Diagne, citizen councillors renewed their demands for a return to the General Council with great vigour. The split between them and the government of Senegal had widened in the years following 1925, partly because of the personal animosity between Governor Beurnier and Duguay Clédor, long-time president of the council,<sup>3</sup> and because of the formation of a group on the council opposing Blaise Diagne led by Galandou Diouf.

The decree of 26 February 1935 ruling that no civil servants or soldiers in active service in the Four Communes could stand for election to the council provided the elected councillors with the ammunition they required in their struggle to revive the General Council. Georges Videau, acting President of the Colonial Council, wrote to the Minister of Colonies in March 1935, arguing that this decree was but a half measure : "les salariés de l'administration doivent être écartés aussi bien de la fraction sous ses auspices que de la fraction élue par des citoyens français."<sup>4</sup> The logical extension of the 1935 decree was that the chiefs, in the pay of the administration should not sit in the assembly. In his opinion, elected notables, artisans, cultivators and merchants were far better qualified to represent the mass of the people than were the chiefs, who were merely "les agents d'exécution de décisions administratives placés sous le contrôle étroit du chef de la colonie, hommes licenciés ou révoqués par décision de ce haut fonctionnaire."<sup>5</sup>

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1. 4E4(14) Governor to Governor General, 18 March 1933.
  2. 4E4(14) Governor General Brévié to Minister of Colonies, 8 Feb. 1934.
  3. 4E4(14) Georges Videau, Vice President of the Colonial Council to Governor General, 30 January 1935.
  4. 4E4(14) Videau to Minister of Colonies, 25 March 1935.
  5. Ibid.

Later that year, in a newspaper article, Galandou Diouf, now Deputy for Senegal, came out in favour of a policy of Assimilation which he believed gave equal place to subjects and citizens.<sup>1</sup> He demanded for Senegal a return to a General Council with powers similar to those of the French West Indies and Réunion. In order to keep the budgetary unity of the colony, he suggested that the representatives for the whole colony should be elected by universal suffrage. One of the pledges on Lamine Gueye's Profession de Foi for the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais in April 1936 was the re-establishment of the General Council.<sup>2</sup>

In the sitting of 17 June 1938, Louis Besnard put forward the following motion on the grounds that the indigenous population of Senegal had evolved sufficiently: "Que le decret du 4 décembre 1920 soit modifié, afin d'obtenir une assemblée composée uniquement de conseillers élus par les citoyens français et les notables indigènes."<sup>3</sup>

Abdoul Salam Kane, speaking on behalf of the chiefs, insisted "Nous sommes ici par la volonté du peuple et nous représentons la majorité". The President, Moustapha Malic Gueye again sided with the chiefs, reminding Besnard that their presence was legitimised by the decree of 4 December 1920.

Although this motion was rejected, Larrieu, another citizen councillor put forward a resolution on 8 November 1938 in support of the call by the Radical and Radical Socialist congress at Marseilles for a return to the General Council. He wanted subjects to elect their own representatives "indépendants et libres, non salariés de l'administration mais élus librement".<sup>4</sup> At present, the administration

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1. 4E6(14) copy of Galandou Diouf's article-no indication as to the newspaper in which it appeared or the exact date.
  2. Périscope Africain, "Profession de Foi de Lamine Gueye", 22 April 1936.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 17 June 1938.
  4. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 8 November 1938.

could count on the "votes fidèles et automatiquement assurés de leurs conseillers salariés". That very morning, he pointed out that the chiefs had complied with an administrative instruction to delay voting for the budget. Another elected councillor, Amadou N'diaye stated that the chiefs had not spoken out at all during the November session. Boubakar N'déné N'diaye retorted that this was because "Nous sommes ici pour travailler et non pour bavarder." Abdoul Salam Kane declared that the chiefs would only agree to a return to the General Council if the order came from the Governor or the metropole. Should this occur, the chiefs, on behalf of the mass of the people, would request the separation of the budget of the interior from that of the Four Communes.

While the elected councillors were attacking the chiefly presence on the Council, the administration was stoutly defending it, as the chiefs generally constituted a reliable block for backing its measures. Following the session of November-December 1922 when the elected councillors had walked out in protest, and the administration's proposals had only been passed thanks to the chiefs, Governor Maillet defended the principle of chiefly membership. In a letter to Governor General Merlin, Maillet spoke of the chiefs "collaboration sincère, sage et courageuse" during this session.<sup>1</sup> He remarked "Les conseillers élus acceptent très volontiers l'extension territoriale des attributions de l'assemblée, mais ils protestent contre toute diminution des prerogatives de l'ancien Conseil Général."

Governor Beurnier found himself pressing the case for chiefly representation in 1929 and again in 1931.<sup>2</sup> He argued that the practice of attending meetings of the Colonial Council would be of enormous value to the chiefs' personal development and would thus improve the standard of these auxiliaries. Their outlook would be widened by

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1. 4E14(135) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the ordinary session of the Colonial Council", 1923.
  2. 1G34 Governor of Senegal, "Report on the commandement indigène" 8 May 1931.

travelling to St. Louis twice a year to spend several weeks with colleagues discussing matters relating to other areas of Senegal, and even to the AOF. This applied in particular to chiefs who had travelled in France or on special missions. In 1930, Abdoul Salam Kane travelled with Medoune Diouf, an elected councillor, to the Soudan on one such exercise.<sup>1</sup> On the second such mission in 1933, in honour of the fiftieth anniversary of Bamako, Boubakar déné N'diaye took Abdoul Salam Kane's place. The aim of this trip had been to discover why the flow of Soudanese migrant workers (navetanes) had diminished as this was having adverse effects on groundnut cultivation.<sup>2</sup> Beurnier also believed that attendance at sessions of the council would help the chiefs understand administrative needs better, and appreciate the achievements of the French elsewhere in Senegal, taking some ideas back with them to their regions. He felt that during sessions, the chiefs were most attentive and critical, fully appreciating the repercussions of various measures on the peoples of the interior. In all, they had shown themselves to be "collaborateurs très utiles aux idées du progrès."

But Beurnier's most far-reaching defense came in 1935, following demands from citizen councillors for a return to the General Council. He argued that of the total population of Senegal of 1,638,255, only 25,899 were on the electoral lists, which meant that the chiefs on the council represented 95% of the population (that is to say, all those of statut indigène).<sup>3</sup> Citing Van Vollenhoven and Carde's attempts to consolidate the authority of the chiefs, he described chiefly representation on the Council as "un acte de foi dans le loyalisme, dans l'attachement à nos institutions de ces représentants des anciennes familles régnantes."

The chiefs themselves attempted to increase their own numbers

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 5 November 1930 and 23 February 1933.
2. See Ch. 5 on "The Chiefs and Agriculture".
3. 4E4(14) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the Colonial Council", 23 July 1935.

on the Colonial Council at the expense of the citizens. In November 1927, Macodou Sall, the vice-president, wrote to the President requesting an additional chiefly member for the Fleuve region.<sup>1</sup> This was ignored, but ten years later during the session of July 1937, Sidy Diop put forward a similar proposal, on the grounds that in the Fleuve region, of 435,741 inhabitants, only 3,428 names were on the electoral lists.<sup>2</sup> Although some citizen councillors strongly objected, the President of the Commission of Miscellaneous Affairs sent the resolution to the Governor.

The latter naturally approved this move, as it would increase administrative support on the Council. He argued that although the elected councillors considered the chiefs to be mere "salariés et agents d'exécution de l'administration", they were in fact "les représentants des collectivités ethniques et les seules qualifiés pour soutenir les justes intérêts des autochtones."<sup>3</sup> He wanted to go even further than the resolution suggested and have an extra chiefly member for the fourth district, the Casamance, pointing out that although the total population of this area was 272,586, only 308 were on the electoral lists. He stressed that the first and fourth districts were both vital to the colony's food production and constituted 40% of the colony's population (481,952 out of a total of 1,110,506 taxpayers). Yet they were represented by only six out of a total of eighteen chiefs, while the citizen councillors from these areas had been elected only by a tiny minority.

The Governor's proposal was again reiterated in October of the same year by Abdoul Salam Kane.<sup>4</sup> Auguste Gomis, an elected councillor, declared he would agree provided the number of citizen councillors was also raised by two, according to the principle that there should be more elected councillors than chiefs. Le Gros sarcastically suggested that perhaps all the elected councillors ought to be replaced.

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1. Colonial Council PV, second sitting, 9 November 1927.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, seventh sitting, 27 July 1937.
  3. 4E4(24) Governor Lefebvre to Governor General, 15 September 1937.
  4. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 30 October 1937.

by chiefs. When Paul Bancal questioned the right of the chiefs to sit in an elected assembly, Macodou Sall retorted, "Je déclare que nous, nous représentons la majorité du peuple et qu'il est logique que nous ayons le même nombre de sièges que vous dans cette assemblée."<sup>1</sup> With the President's support, the chiefs managed to get their resolution passed, and to defeat Gomis' proposal to raise the number of elected councillors by two. Le Gros accused the President of manoeuvring "Le conseil est convoqué en session à une époque qui ne permet pas aux élus d'être en majorité." Bancal tried unsuccessfully to push through a resolution on the separation of powers, on the grounds that "Tout ce que nous faisons ici est entaché d'illégalité". But the following year, the Governor General revealed to the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs that nothing had been done to implement Abdoul Salam Kane's resolution.<sup>2</sup>

The chiefs not only clashed with elected councillors but with each other, particularly in the early days of the Colonial Council. These differences generally arose from political allegiances, family rivalries or feelings of personal superiority. In the session of August 1921, a dispute broke out amongst the chiefly councillors when Mbakhane Diop, the chiefly vice-president attacked the disparity between chiefs' salaries.<sup>3</sup> He pointed out that while some chiefs, like Samba Souna Fall of the province of Nguick Merina (Louga) who had served as chief for twenty four years, were receiving only 5,000 francs per annum, others were earning about 22,000 francs per annum. Although he mentioned no names, it was obvious he was referring to Bouna N'diaye, the highest salary earner among the chiefs and a great ally of Governor General Merlin. He demanded that salaries be based squarely on seniority and the importance of the area the chiefs were administering.

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, 30 October 1937.
  2. 4E6(14) Governor General de Coppet to Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 9 July 1938.
  3. Colonial Council PV extraordinary session, fourth sitting, 13 August 1921.



Galandou Diouf and other Diagnistes supported Mbakhane Diop's proposals, but he was opposed by the Secretary-General, the administrative representative on the council and by those chiefs who were quite satisfied with their salaries and were anxious to retain the administration's favour. Abdoul Salam Kane and Amadou N'diaye attacked Mbakhane Diop for asking them to produce accounts. Bouna N'diaye, addressing his colleagues in Wolof, reminded them that as representatives of the administration, they should follow the example of the Secretary General who had already walked out in protest. But only Sidy N'diaye, his brother, and Amadou Moctar Wane followed him out. The incident gave Mbakhane Diop the opportunity to flaunt his pedigree at the expense of Bouna N'diaye and his supporters: "Leurs pères ont fini dans un épisode de la pénétration, tandis que le mien (Lat Dior) était tombé glorieusement au plus ardent de la lutte."<sup>1</sup>

Although most chiefs voted with the administration against proposals to reduce disparities in chiefly salaries, a few did not. Bouna N'diaye and Amadou N'diaye were able to report the names of those chiefs who had "betrayed" the government and voted with the elected councillors to Governor General Merlin, together with suggestions on how to deal with each.<sup>2</sup> Mbakhane Diop was protected by his friendship with Blaise Diagne, but was vulnerable to attack over his corrupt practices in Keur Bacine. Coumba N'dofene Diouf and Meissa M'Baye Sall could be ousted from the council on the grounds that they did not speak French. Bouna N'diaye advised Merlin to instruct the Governor to follow up a report by the Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Sicadoux, on the misdeeds of Coumba N'dofene Diouf and to combat the influence of Meissa M'Baye by playing him off against the chiefs in his area who were jealous of his authority. Although Macodou Sall and Samba Niébé Couly Diop had stepped out of line on this occasion, their support for the administration could generally be counted on. The latter had acted out of jealousy for Fara Biram Lô, and all that was required was a word of caution from the commandant de cercle of Dagana.

1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, fourth sitting, 13 August 1921.
2. 13G6(17) Bouna N'diaye to Governor General Merlin, 20 August 1921.

Bouna N'diaye ascribed the problems the administration had encountered in the 1921 council to Diagnisme, and made a list of 'reliable' chiefs on whom the administration might count on to wage a campaign against the Deputy.<sup>1</sup> He suggested other ways of combatting Diagne might be the wider use of the conseils de notables and to restrict the vote in the Four Communes. The movement of Diagne's agents might be curtailed by the introduction of an identity card and a severer law on vagrancy. In this way, Bouna N'diaye won administrative support for his plan of salary rises for the most important chiefs which accompanied his letter about Diagnisme. Amadou N'diaye also took advantage of this opportunity to ingratiate himself with Merlin to ask if several of his friends could be made chefs de province.<sup>2</sup>

A dispute arose during the voting for the chiefly members of the Permanent Commission of the Council in 1921. Three had already been elected and competition for the fourth was between Fara Biram L<sup>^</sup>o and Coumba N'dofene Diouf, each of whom had the same number of votes.<sup>3</sup> In normal circumstances, the place should have gone to the elder of the two, but Fara Biram L<sup>^</sup>o, as a literate French citizen, insisted that he should be given precedence. When his rival emerged victorious, he sought consolation in a formal protest. At the same time, Bouna N'diaye backed by five other chiefs protested at the composition of the Colonial Council on the grounds that it contained illiterates like Meissa M'Baye Sall and Coumba N'dofene Diouf.

Although Galandou Diouf alleged that the chiefs on the Colonial Council "formaient une masse compacte, toujours prête à suivre les directives de l'administration,"<sup>4</sup> the chiefs did not always blindly endorse French proposals. The administration's confidence that the majority of chiefs would generally vote as instructed was shaken during the world slump of the early 1930s.<sup>5</sup> In his annual political report of

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1. 13G6(17) Bouna N'diaye to Governor General Merlin, 20 August 1921.
  2. 13G6(17) Amadou N'diaye to Merlin, 22 August 1921.
  3. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, second sitting, 11 August 1921.
  4. 4E4(14) quoted in a letter from the Minister of Colonies to the Government General, 4 December 1935.
  5. See Ch. 3 on the "The Role of the Chiefs in Taxation" and Colonial Council PV, Second sitting, 8 July, 1931.

1932, the Governor noted that "au cours de l'année dernière, certains chefs n'avaient rien fait pour réagir contre la propagande incitant les indigènes à refuser de payer leurs contributions."<sup>1</sup> He was shocked to discover that some chiefs believed their functions obliged them to put the interests of their peoples before those of the administration! He ascribed this to the chief's desire to be re-elected to the Council getting in the way of their sense of duty.

The chiefs also put forward constructive suggestions on a wide range of issues, many of which were approved by the elected councillors, and some of which were implemented by the administration. Their most important suggestions concerned the mise en valeur of Senegal. As Abdoul Salam Kane pointed out, "Depuis plusieurs années, les anciens pays du protectorat qui fournissaient la plus grande partie des ressources du budget n'ont pas pu bénéficier des travaux d'utilité générale, d'amélioration". The chiefs made several proposals to improve communications and transport, such as the series of proposals put forward in the June 1926 session by the citizen councillor Noguier and his two colleagues Abdoul Diallo and Benjamin Diatta concerning the Casamance, including a request for a larger grant from the government to build more roads, bridges and quays.<sup>2</sup>

Chiefs also appreciated the importance of wells. In June 1927, Benjamin Diatta and Abdoul Diallo, together with the elected councillor Noguier reported that the town of Ziguinchor lacked water and risked being totally deprived. They asked for 300,000 francs to be allocated from the budget for building wells in this region.<sup>3</sup>

Land was another obvious area of interest. In the session of June 1928, Boubakar N'déné N'diaye and Abdoul Salam Kane opposed the restrictive clause in Article 12 of the Decision of 8 October 1924, denying

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1. 4E4(14) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the Colonial Council", 23 July 1935.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, 16 June 1926.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, eighth sitting, 17 June 1927.

to Africans the right to sell or rent land.<sup>1</sup> In 1938, Abdoul Salam Kane supported Vidal's motion to return to Senegal that part of the flood basin of the river Senegal, which belonged to Mauretania, known as chamanat.<sup>2</sup>

In 1926, Massamba Sall stressed the need for greater efforts in the struggle against plague, which had appeared in Cayor every year since 1916.<sup>3</sup> He wanted quarantine centres to be set up at Tivaouane and at other areas in Cayor. In June 1927 and again in June 1934, he complained nothing had been done.<sup>4</sup> In view of the recurrent plague in Thies, Massamba Sall in 1930 stressed the need for special medical personnel there.<sup>5</sup>

The traite also came in for some interest. In June 1934, a number of chiefly councillors from Thies and Baol, backed by five elected councillors, requested new "points de traite" in these cercles.<sup>6</sup> Two years later Abdoul Diallo and Benjamin Diatta asked for new centres for the traite near the Gambia at Medina Yoro and Manpate Mewade (in the Basse Casamance).<sup>7</sup> In July 1937, an elected councillor proposed the abolition of groundnut treatment in the interior on the grounds that this encouraged corruption, a call that was backed by Boubakar N'déné N'diaye.<sup>8</sup>

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, third sitting, 13 June 1928.
  2. Colonial Council PV, seventh sitting, 9 November 1938.
  3. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, tenth sitting, "Debate on the budget", 18 June 1926.
  4. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, eighth sitting, 17 June 1927.
  5. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, second sitting, 13 June 1930.
  6. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, seventh sitting, 30 June 1934.
  7. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, sixth sitting, 14 July 1936.
  8. Colonial Council PV, seventh sitting, 27 July 1937.

The Colonial Council provided a platforms where ordinary subjects or notables could complain against the abuses of the chiefs. In such cases, chiefly councillors would generally defend their colleagues. In the case of repeated accusations by the people of the province of N'Diambour Méridional in 1929 and 1930 against their chief Samba Khary Cissé and his sons, Abdoul Salam Kane and Amadou N'diaye urged caution on the part of the administration.<sup>1</sup> On 17 June 1930, however, a full scale enquiry by all colonial councillors was opened, which established that many of these charges were accurate.

On the insistence of a number of chiefly councillors in 1930, the Governor withdrew the decision to dismiss Alioune Sow.<sup>2</sup> It would appear that the reasons for dismissal of this former Colonial Councillor who had served the administration for 30 years were somewhat shaky. Even a citizen councillor, Galandou Diouf, spoke up for him.

The chiefly councillors were open to requests from former chiefs and their families for an increase in their allowances. On 16 June 1930, Alioune Sylla put forward a motion increasing the aid given to the orphans of Abdel Kader Leye, the former chef de provinces sereres, from 840 to 2000 francs.<sup>3</sup> On 30 June 1934, Amadou N'diaye made a request on behalf of Laty Couly Diop, the former chef de canton of Foss (Dagana) who had been dismissed after an enquiry into the Société de Prévoyance in his area.<sup>4</sup> The chief had not only his own family of four to look after, but also that of his brother, the late Samba Niébé Couly Diop, a former chef de province and Colonial Councillor. In view of Laty Couly's participation as a soldier in the First World War, and his twelve-year service as chef de canton, Amadou N'diaye proposed that the Colonial Council at least assist Samba Niébé's children, while re-examining his brother's case.

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, third sitting, 21 June 1929.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, sixth sitting, 17 June 1930, and extraordinary session, 7 November 1930.
  3. Colonial Council PV, fourth sitting, 16 June 1930.
  4. Colonial Council PV, sixth sitting, 30 June 1934.

The connexion between chiefs and political groupings in Senegal is an important subject, but one for which hard evidence is difficult to come by. The principal source is the scurrilous local press, although it is important to note that many of these newspapers were associated with local politicians and that their reporting was by no means unbiased. The Colonial Council was a great source of patronage. Chiefs sought alliances with politicians to strengthen their own position within their regions and vis-a-vis the administration, and to obtain nomination for decorations like the Legion of Honour. As Deputy, Blaise Diagne had many contacts in high places both in the AOF and in the metropole, and his patronage was therefore very much in demand. In his early days as Deputy, Blaise Diagne had backed Mbakhane Diop in his struggle for supremacy in Cayor against the Sall, but was gradually able to effect a rapprochement with the latter. In 1930, his lieutenant Duguay Clédor wrote to a number of chiefs informing them that Diagne, at that time in Paris, intended to tour around Senegal canvassing support.<sup>1</sup> Amongst the recipients of these letters was Macodou Sall, whom Duguay Clédor asked to prepare Tivaouane and Guet for the Deputy's arrival.

Chiefs would sometimes help the administration to interfere in the election of citizen councillors to secure amenable delegates for this assembly. In 1932, La Sirène Sénégalaise alleged that the commandant de cercle of Baol, Chartier, and Ely Manel Fall had been arranging for cars to take electors, who had been carefully primed to vote for particular citizen candidates, to the polls.<sup>2</sup> Some of these so-called electors, as non-citizens, had no right to vote.

Citizen councillors and the Sengalese Deputy to the National Assembly<sup>3</sup> would back candidates to the chieftancy in exchange for

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1. ARSD 1Z 58 Circular from the Central Committee of the Republican Socialist party to the President and members of the Republican Socialist committee in Kébémér, 24 February 1930.
  2. La Sirène Sénégalaise, 19 May 1932, No doubt the commandant de cercle and chief were thought to be on the side of Blaise Diagne.
  3. Blaise Diagne was deputy from 1914-34 and Galandou Diouf from 1934-40.

donations to themselves, their party or the promise of rural support during the election. Corruption was engrained in the political fabric of Senegal. In 1932, La Sirène Sénégalaise, a newspaper which supported Galandou Diouf, accused Duguay Clédor of receiving two race horses valued at 5,000 francs each from Massamba Aram Diop.<sup>1</sup> The archivist of the Council, M. Portès, implicated Duguay Clédor's successor as President, Aby Kane Diallo, the mayor of St. Louis, in a corruption scandal in 1937. Portès observed that since his accession to the Presidency, in June 1935: "M. Aby Kane Diallo n'a pas négligé le secteur chefs indigènes qui depuis longtemps a été un filon précieux pour la présidence du conseil colonial."<sup>2</sup> With the proceeds of his takings, he had been able to buy a stable of racehorses. Among donors were the chiefly colonial councillor, Abdoul Diallo, and chefs de canton like Bocar Séga. The latter had allegedly written to the President asking "s'il a reçu ce qu'il lui a envoyé et s'il a besoin d'autre chose."<sup>3</sup> However, the administration considered such cases to be so widespread as to make a mockery of prosecution.

It was alleged that Galandou Diouf and Alfred Goux, his lieutenant editor of Le Sénégal and Mayor of Dakar, had sent emissaries to M'Birkelane (Kaolack) to secure the nomination of Baidy Aly Kane, a stranger from the Fleuve.<sup>4</sup> In return, the chief was said to have paid 15,000 francs into the coffers of Diouf's party to support their campaign in the 1935 municipal and 1936 legislative elections.

Patronage from political links forged through the Council was such that "Il existe au Sénégal une immunité beaucoup plus grande et plus opérante qu'une immunité parlementaire."<sup>5</sup> But while those chiefs

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1. La Sirène Sénégalaise, 11 February 1932.
  2. ARSD 13G46(180) Portès, "Report on the Colonial Council", 24 May 1937.
  3. 13G46(180) Governor to Governor General, "Report on the Colonial Council 1937", 1 July 1937.
  4. ARSD 18G70(17)Kaolack: "Renseignements", 1935.
  5. La Sirène Sénégalaise, 11 February 1932. The editor of this paper was F. Baye Salzmänn, a Dioufist.

who were clients of the Deputy had carte blanche in their regions, those failing to support him risked incurring the wrath of the administration and losing their position. According to La Sirène Sénégalaise, a campaign against anti-Diagniste civil servants and chiefs had begun in 1932, in a move to bring the commandement indigène under Diagne's control.<sup>1</sup> Acting on accusations against these chiefs in Diagne's paper La France Coloniale, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs Sicamois, who was supposed to be a client of the Deputy, began an enquiry. It was alleged that he took advantage of the chaos that had arisen as a result of the depression to dismiss those chiefs hostile to Diagne.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, clients of Diagne shown by the enquiry to have committed serious offenses were kept on, like Boubakar N'déné N'diaye and Ndongo Fall, the chef de canton of Diack.

These practices continued after Diagne's death in 1934. Highly placed administrative officials, far from being impartial, continued to ally themselves with powerful local politicians, as can be seen in the selective punishment of chiefs during the Kaolack scandal of 1934. Le Progrès, a local socialist paper, took up the defense of Mahoua Diouf, "une descendante authentique des familles régnantes du Saloum", a colonial councillor since 1924, a former soldier and a Chevalier de La Légion d'Honneur.<sup>3</sup> The paper alleged that Galandou Diouf had taken advantage of his newly attained position as Deputy to encourage the administration to open an enquiry into the Sociétés de Prévoyance in order to strike at his predecessor's supporters among the chiefs like Mahoua Diouf, Boubakar N'déné N'diaye and Mahécour Diouf. The day after the legislative elections of 29 July 1934, the representatives of the new Deputy arrived in Sine Saloum to collect contributions for their party from local notables. But Mahoua Diouf refused to give them either the bull or the 2000 francs they requested. After this incident,

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1. La Sirène Sénégalaise, 11 February 1932.

2. See Ch. 3 on "The Role of the Chiefs in Taxation".

3. Le Progrès, 30 November 1934 and 22 December 1934.



de la Rocca, the Inspector of Administrative Affairs and an ally of Diouf, published his findings on the Sociétés de Prévoyance. Georges Videau, the vice-president of the Colonial Council pointed out that while Mahoua Diouf was thrown into jail like the commonest criminal, the administrator who had founded the "caisse noire" was admitted to honourable retirement.<sup>1</sup> But Périscopie Africain, Diouf's paper, defended the Deputy from these allegations, and asked Le Progrès to show "un peu de sincérité et moins de bluff."<sup>2</sup>

In 1935, Le Sénégal became the Dioufist mouthpiece and Périscopie Africain switched its allegiance to Lamine Gueye. In 1938, Périscopie Africain accused Galandou Diouf, the commandant de cercle of Diourbel, and Ely Manel Fall of conspiring to have Tanor Latsoukabé Fall, the chef de canton of N'Dadene (Diourbel) arrested and imprisoned on very tenuous grounds. "Il est pénible de constater... que l'administrateur de Diourbel, qui représente l'autorité et la justice est un ami vrai du député du Sénégal".<sup>3</sup> At the same time, investigations had begun into Alioune Sylla of N'Goye "qui a le défaut de n'être pas un ami du député actuel".<sup>4</sup> The newspapers themselves were part of the network of corruption, blackmailing those they accused. They would often promise further articles on allegations which were never followed up. In a later article on the incidents concerning the chieftancy in Diourbel, Périscopie Africain threatened: "Il ne nous reste qu'à ouvrir le dossier du Sine Saloum, revivre des actes commis à Messirah, pour sonner le glas de la danse de Diourbel."<sup>5</sup> But no such revelations appeared.

The membership of the Colonial Council was enlarged in 1939 to include 18 "sujets français ayant accompli leur service militaire" to be elected by former African soldiers.<sup>6</sup> Although the chiefs officially had no part to play in electing subject representatives, certain candidates in Louga complained that chiefs were canvassing votes for their protégés.<sup>7</sup>

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1. 4E4(14) Videau to Governor General, 30 January 1935.

2. Périscopie Africain, 12 January 1935.

3. Périscopie Africain, 22 October 1938.

4. Périscopie Africain, 1 October 1938.

5. Ibid.

6. 4E6(14) quoted from article 20 of the decision of 18 August 1939.

7. 4E6(14) commandant de cercle of Louga to Macodou Sall, 1939.

The chiefs concerned got off lightly with a reprimand from their commandant de cercle. At all events, this chamber was abrogated in the face of imminent war on 6 September 1939.

Unlike a number of other elective bodies, the Colonial Council was not actually dissolved during the Vichy period as the decree of 27 September 1940 merely postponed its sessions.<sup>1</sup> On 14 May 1943, it was reestablished by the Free French along with other elected assemblies.<sup>2</sup>

In May 1945, in accordance with a proposal at the Brazzaville Conference, a commission to study representation from overseas territories in the future Constituent Assembly was set up at the Free French Consultative Assembly in Paris.<sup>3</sup> Presided over by Monnerville, a former minister and President of the Commission of France Outre-Mer in the Assembly, it included personalities like Apithy from Dahomey and Léopold Sédar Senghor. Their work paved the way for the Decree of 30 August 1945 which established two colleges, one for citizens and the other for subjects, in each territory of the AOF to elect representatives to the Constituent Assembly. The suffrage for subjects for the First Constituante was restricted to évolués notables, members and former members of local assemblies, union members and members of the conseils d'administration of the SIPs, holders of decorations and of certain diplomas, civil servants, the president and assessors of justice indigène, religious leaders, former soldiers, licensed traders and chiefs.<sup>4</sup>

The chiefs had a crucial role to play in the gradual extension of the suffrage in the AOF after the Second World War. They had the difficult task of informing the rural population, 95% of which was illiterate, of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in October 1945.<sup>5</sup> So restrictive were the electoral qualifications that the chiefs of the two

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1. 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  2. AN 2G43-16 Senegal RPA 1943.
  3. Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit., Vol. 2., p668.
  4. Mackenzie and Robinson, op.cit., p.291.
  5. AN 2G45-73 Sedhiou RPA 1945.

largest villages of Djougouttes (Bignona) found they had only one elector .apiece.<sup>1</sup> The chefs de village regarded voting as a service to the French rather than as their right, and were more concerned about whether they would be provided with food by the administration during their travels to and from the polling station.<sup>2</sup>

The strongest party to emerge in the 1945 elections was Lamine Gueye's Bloc Africain affiliated to the metropolitan SFIO. The urban bias of the suffrage meant that most of its support came from merchants and civil servants. After the February 1947 reform of the chieftancy, which went some way towards its democratisation, the SFIO began to woo a number of chiefs, like Macodou Sall. However, the union of rural and urban peoples, citizens and former subjects, intellectuals and non-intellectuals, and traditional and modern cadres in the SFIO was an uneasy one. When in 1948 Senghor left the SFIO to form the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), he was able to appeal to former subjects who had only recently arrived on the political scene.<sup>3</sup> Lamine Gueye had allowed himself to become too closely tied to the civil servants and urban bourgeoisie at the expense of winning wider rural support, so that his party was weakened by the progressive widening of the suffrage. Senghor's success in obtaining the backing of a number of chiefs and religious leaders brought him a wider mass following which was crucial to his victory in the 1951 elections.

Officials of political parties continued to make use of their influential position to squeeze money from chefs de canton who hoped for a favour. In 1947, it was revealed that Abdoul Karim Sow, the secretary-general of the SFIO had obtained from Lat Fatim Sall and Konko Cire Ba<sup>^</sup> two and five thousand francs respectively for their reinstatement as chiefs.<sup>4</sup>

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1. AN 2G45-73 Bignona RPA 1945.

2. Ibid.

3. Traore, op.cit. pp.46-49.

4. ARSD 13G18(17)Thies: "Information", 4 April 1947.

Membership of the Colonial Council had not been renewed since 1936 and numbers had been reduced by death or resignation. In June 1946, the President declared "Les attributions du Conseil Colonial avaient été diminuées de telle sorte que, trop souvent, nous avons été obligés de nous incliner sans avoir cependant protesté véhémentement,"<sup>1</sup> and called for a return to the General Council. The constitution emerging from the Second Constituent Assembly in October 1946 introduced local representative assemblies in each Overseas Territory modelled on the General Councils of the French departments, with financial but no legislative powers.<sup>2</sup> Despite the abolition of the distinction between citizen and subject in the AOF in May 1946, the system of separate electorates for citizens of metropolitan and local status was used for all the new territorial assemblies, except for that of Senegal, where a common roll was used.<sup>3</sup> Since the local assemblies had such restricted powers, the main focus for African political leaders became the National Assembly in Paris.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Conseils de Notables

The administration was anxious to include chiefs in consultative councils not only at the seat of government, but on a more decentralised basis. The legislation of 21 May 1919 facilitated the establishment of conseils de notables: "Dans les circonscriptions administratives de l'AOF où le degré d'évolution de la population indigène le permettra, des conseils consultatifs dénommés conseils de notables pourront être créés par arrêtés des lieutenants gouverneurs par leurs colonies respectives."<sup>5</sup> Each cercle was to have a council, presided over by the commandant de cercle, who in turn was to recommend 8 to 16 members for nomination from amongst the chiefs and principal notables, to the Governor. Members of these councils were to be called by the President for meetings at least once a year. The conseil de notables of Bignona in 1929 included all the chefs de canton together with the chefs de village of Bignona (Réné Coly) and Baila (Sirignati Coudiaby) and two notables, one of whom was a marabout, from Coubalan and Darsilam (Mohammed Cissé and Cherif Mohammed Haidara Fadel).<sup>6</sup>

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1. Colonial Council PV, extraordinary session, first sitting, 2 June 1946.
  2. Mackenzie and Robinson, op. cit., p. 291.
  3. Ibid., p. 291-292. (4) Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., Vol. 2., p. 671.
  5. JO Senegal 1919, Decree No. 19.405, Article 1.
  6. ARSD 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929.

These councils were supposed to be consulted on taxation, prestations, plans of campaign for agriculture and for road works, patents, public works and general questions concerning development in the cercle. But they were to have no legislative or executive role, and could only debate matters presented to them by the president, who alone could correspond in the name of the council. Although unpaid, members of the council received a travelling allowance.

The aim of these councils was to foster links between the administration and local population, in order to accelerate the evolution of the masses. The creation of the conseils de notables was an important aspect of Association policy. At their inception, the Minister of Colonies foresaw "Les meilleurs éléments de la population étant ainsi appelée à collaborer à la gestion des affaires dans leurs circonscriptions, une élite devrait se former peu à peu capable de coopérer plus tard et d'une manière plus personnelle à la vie économique et financière de la colonie."<sup>1</sup>

The first conseils de notables were established in Senegal, the most developed country in the AOF, in the following order:  
On 26 August 1919 they were established in:

Cercle	Number of members
Louga	12
Thies	15
Sine Saloum	16
Tambacounda	8
Dagana	8
Podor	12
Matam	12
Bakel	8

and on 17 September 1919 in

Ziguinchor	16
Sedhiou	8
Kolda	8
Baol	8
Tivaouane	8
Salde	16 (2)

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- 1) ARSD 18G77(17) Minister of Colonies to Governor General of the AOF, 17 June 1931.
- 2) ARSD 18G54(17) Governor to Governor General, 30 December 1921.

The Governor had intended to set up a single council for the Casamance in 1919, but the Administrateur Supérieur persuaded him this would be inconvenient to the notables of the Haute Casamance, who would have to travel all the way to Ziguinchor. As the inhabitants of Bignona were not considered to be sufficiently advanced, ("certaines parties de ces régions étant encore incomplètement soumises à notre autorité")<sup>1</sup> the formation of the conseil de notables was postponed till 1921. Similar councils were subsequently introduced in Dahomey, Soudan and the Upper Volta. In 1920, councils throughout Senegal were consulted on the administration's plans to introduce a tax on animals.<sup>2</sup>

Until its dissolution in 1929, the conseil de notables in Cayor was only occasionally called upon to carry out important functions. In 1919, Meissa M'Baye Sall had guided the other notables in attempting to settle a border dispute between Baol and Cayor.<sup>3</sup> When Tivaouane was split between Louga and Thies in 1929, its conseil de notables was dissolved.<sup>4</sup> Louga's council was already full, so could not immediately accommodate notables from the cantons it had newly acquired. The immediate solution was to admit notables for the new cantons on a consultative basis, and to modify the list of members at the renewal of the council in 1931. There were however, vacancies on Thies' council for notables whose cantons became part of this cercle.

In 1928, the conseil de notables in Ziguinchor stepped out of line with the administration for the first time in opposing government plans to limit points de traite. This was because they feared the abandonment of groundnut cultivation in certain cantons, and that the Gambia would usurp the place of some towns engaged in the groundnut trade.<sup>5</sup>

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1. 18G54(17) Governor to Governor General, 9 August 1919.
  2. AN 2G20-5 Senegal RPT second quarter 1920.
  3. AN 2G21-8 Senegal RPT second quarter 1920.
  4. ARSD 2G29-94 Louga RPA 1929 Governor to commandant de cercle of Louga and Djoloff, 1 April 1930.
  5. ARSD 2G28-59 Ziguinchor RPA 1928.

It was not until the time of Governor General Carde that the councils received any real impetus. From 1931, a special chapter appeared on the conseils de notables in the Annual Political Reports for Senegal. This attitude filtered down to the commandants de cercle, and in 1930, the conseils de notables were called in to help in the struggle against locusts. Referring to this, Reynier, the commandant de cercle of Zigunichor, declared "Cette participation de l'indigène aux affaires tend à développer un plus grand sentiment de cohésion et de solidarité qui permet à l'administrateur de faire exécuter les mesures prises en commun avec plus de facilité." <sup>1</sup> The authorities renewed their efforts to promote the influence of traditional rulers among the population. In the 1929 and 1930 reports for Bignona, special consideration was given to its conseil des anciens in the Djougouttes region, the only one of its kind which still existed in the cercle. <sup>2</sup> In a survey commissioned in 1931 on the conseils de notables, the Governor informed his superior they were being called at least once a year. Those of Podor and Ziguinchor had been called twice between 1930 and 1931 and that of Bakel four times. <sup>3</sup>

This trend towards more frequent meetings continued under Governor General Brévié. In a letter to the Minister of Colonies, he explained that the conseils de notables, from at first being consulted only on those matters which had to be submitted to them according to the law of 1919, were now being called upon to give an opinion on all questions concerning the economic life of the cercles. <sup>4</sup> The notables were becoming less hesitant in expressing their opinions and administrative measures were accepted more readily by the population. In addition to the usual proposals with which they had to deal, the conseils de notables in the Casamance were presented with questions on health and agriculture like the distribution and reimbursement of seeds, the

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1. ARSD 2G30-93 Zigunichor RPA 1930.
  2. 2G29-83 Bignona RPA 1929 and 2G30-84 Bignona RPA 1930.
  3. ARSD 18G77(17) Reply to a questionnaire sent by the Governor General to Governors of the AOF on 9 July 1931, concerning the conseils de notables.
  4. 18G54(17) Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 28 January 1932.

reserve granaries, and the improvement of productivity.<sup>1</sup> In 1933 the conseil de notables in Ziguinchor was consulted on five-year economic plans for agriculture and the road network and on a range of issues concerning the traite and processing of agricultural produce.<sup>2</sup>

In 1932, Brévié proposed that the conseils de notables "les représentants naturels des indigènes,"<sup>3</sup> should meet more frequently. This regular contact in his view facilitated the rapid transmission of instructions and helped to reinforce the authority of the chiefs. At the same time, the Director of Political and Economic Affairs tried to introduce a ruling that the conseils de notables had to be consulted on the revision of agricultural plans of campaign and on measures concerning health, reserve granaries and disaster relief, as in the case of locust attacks, fires and floods. However, the Director of Economic Affairs argued that when measures had to be carried out urgently, there was no time to consult members of the councils. He suggested that it should be compulsory to seek their advice only in the case of less urgent matters.<sup>4</sup>

In 1932, a particularly difficult year, commandants de cercle all over Senegal were concerned with the economic crisis which had brought with it a crisis in authority. At meetings of the conseils de notables, the importance of the family was stressed. Councils in areas of groundnut cultivation like the Sine Saloum received instructions to treat navetanes well, for the Senegalese economy would suffer without them.<sup>5</sup> In the same year, the conseil de notables in Matam discussed the reduction of customary dues on the land in order to facilitate the cultivation of cotton by the local population.<sup>6</sup>

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1. AN 2G33-60 Casamance RPA 1933.
  2. ARSD 2G33-61 Ziguinchor RPA 1933.
  3. 18G54(17) Governor General to Minister of Colonies, 28 January 1932.
  4. 18G54(17) Director of Economic Affairs to Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 16 November 1933.
  5. 18G54(17) Official Report of the meeting of the conseil de notables of Sine Saloum, 27 September 1932.
  6. ARSD 2D10-5 commandant de cercle of Matam to Governor of Senegal, 7 May 1932.



In accordance with Association policy, Brévié was anxious to facilitate the decentralisation of the administration by extending the scheme of conseils de notables. He put forward a plan to erect commissions at provincial, cantonal and village levels in each cercle with similar functions and membership to the conseils de notables. At the top of the structure of native administration, he wished to erect a conseil supérieur de notables with representatives from each conseil de notables, in every colony except Senegal, which already possessed the Colonial Council.<sup>1</sup> This body was intended to be a 'congrès indigène' with annual or biannual meetings, at which the colony's budget was to be presented to these notables. The Minister of Colonies agreed to the establishment of bodies below the level of the conseils de notables, but felt that the establishment of a superior body was premature, as conseils de notables had only just been set up in Guinea-Conakry and the Ivory Coast.<sup>2</sup>

Even by 1934, disillusionment with the conseils de notables was setting in. It was felt that they had become too closely associated with the administration, and isolated from the population of the interior, instead of being a mouthpiece for their aspirations. The conseil de notables of Bignona in this year was described as "une confrérie de 'oui, oui', "which rarely expressed any personal opinions or showed initiative. Much of this problem arose from the fact that many of its members were illiterate and unable to speak French, so that they could not communicate with their President.<sup>3</sup>

In 1936, the councils were opened to more educated members when it was ruled that African citizens could sit on these as well as becoming chefs de canton.<sup>4</sup> The conseil de notables in Matam took the initiative in 1937 in requesting that Additional Tax be extended to their cercle as it

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1. Brévié, Circulaires... , Section:Conseils Indigènes, 28 September 1932.
  2. ARSD 17G81(17) Governor General Brévié to Governors, July 1934.
  3. ARSD 2G34-86 Bignona RPA 1934.
  4. ARSD 18G34(17) Decree of 1 April 1936.

had been over most of Senegal.<sup>1</sup> The current price of the rachat of prestations at twenty francs was felt to be too high, and it was pointed out that many were fleeing to Mauretania to avoid paying this tax.

Conseils de notables in Senegal continued to be consulted on the redrawing of boundaries between cantons, the creation of new schools and the preservation of forests. In 1940, notables from Bignona, Ziguinchor and Sedhiou were consulted by Haumant, the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor on the readjustment of the border of Bliss and Karones in the subdivision of Bignona.<sup>2</sup> The meeting was composed of the chef de province of Oussouye, four chiefs each from Ziguinchor and Sedhiou, two from Bignona, and one notable each from Ziguinchor and Bignona. As far as Haumant could see, the problem with Bliss and Karones arose partly because Lonka Demba was a bad chief. But "Il y a aussi la grande difficulté pour un chef résidant à Kafountine, pays d'arachides, de comprendre la mentalité particulière des cultivateurs de riz vivant dans les îles et complètement hors des courants du cercle".<sup>3</sup> The solution he proposed was to attach the groundnut producing villages of Kafountine, Cassel and Dima to Fogny Combo (Bignona). Apart from Benjamin Diatta, the majority of chiefs knew nothing about the matter and declined to comment. No objections were raised to this proposal.

In spite of Brévié's measures, the commissions villageoises were still an unknown quantity as late as 1939 as far as the administration was concerned and were rarely referred to in official correspondence. These may have worked fairly well, as the practice of chefs de village consulting elders was well rooted in tradition, long before the administration attempted to formalise this process by calling it a "commission". The

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1. ARSD 13G91(180) Official Report of the meeting of the conseil de notables of Matam, 4 September 1937. See also Chapter 4, "The Chiefs and Forced Labour".
  2. 18G34(17) Official Report of the meeting of the conseil de notables of Ziguinchor, 9 May 1940.
  3. Ibid., extract from Haumant's opening speech.

cantonal commissions were not particularly effective, although many chefs de canton consulted their chefs de village and notables on an informal basis. But the administration drew comfort from the fact that the conseils de notables had taken a long time to mature.<sup>1</sup> In 1943, the commission villageoises and cantonales were established on a more formal basis and given the additional responsibility of advising the commandant de cercle on the appointment of the chefs de village and de canton respectively.<sup>2</sup>

When Kolda and Ziguinchor were fused in 1944, the commandant of the new cercle suggested the creation of conseils de notables by subdivision in order to take account of the diversity of the Casamance.<sup>3</sup> This would also save notables having to travel huge distances to Ziguinchor in order to meet.

By the decree of 15 December 1944, the composition of the conseils de notables was to be monitored more carefully by the government. Those in a district with less than 40,000 inhabitants were to have 8 members, appointed by the commandant de cercle, those in a district of 40 to 70,000 were to have twelve, and in a district of over 70,000 sixteen members<sup>4</sup>. Despite the legislation of September 1943 and December 1944, the most influential families and some ethnic groups in certain regions found themselves excluded from the conseils de notables and commissions cantonales. This was because the commandant de cercle was often too busy to concern himself with appointing members to these councils and instead entrusted this task to the chef de canton, who would try to pack these bodies with his clients.<sup>5</sup>

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1. ARSD 17G107(17) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs Berthet, "Notes on Consultative Assemblies at village and cantonal levels," 26 April 1939.
  2. See Ch. 2 on "The Selection of the Chiefs" (Decision of 17 September 1943).
  3. 2G44-20 Senegal RPA 1944.
  4. ARSD 2D13-32.
  5. 2G44-20 and 2D13-32 Governor to commandants de cercle of Thies, 10 February 1945.

It would seem that the administration failed in its aims to enhance the prestige of the chieftancy and to improve its channels of communication with the mass of the population by giving the chiefs a conciliar role. Conseils de notables never really got off the ground in several cercles. Despite sporadic opposition to administrative measures and a number of constructive proposals on the development of and welfare for their regions, both the chiefs on the Colonial Council and conseils de notables were seen as "yes men" for the French. While citizen councillors often opposed administrative measures, the government could generally count on the chiefs and on the chief-citizen rivalries to have its own way.

But the chiefs' membership of the Colonial Council brought them into contact with politics at a national level. Blaise Diagne and Galandou Diouf as Deputies for Senegal, as well as a number of citizen councillors were anxious to win financial support from chiefs, who could also bring a wider rural following to the urban-based parties. With the gradual extension of the suffrage to the rural populations after the Second World War, the chiefs continued to be sought after by political parties. But because the chiefs on the councils had allowed themselves to become too closely identified with the colonial administration, neither the évolués nor the rural peoples bemoaned the abolition of the Colonial Council in 1946 and its replacement by the territorial assembly, the old General Council, in a new guise.

## CHAPTER TEN

### The Income of the Commandement Indigène

Preceding chapters have shown that the chiefs had to perform many burdensome tasks, some of which drew the opprobrium of their people. Yet by the 1930s, there was fierce competition for the post of chief in certain areas. It would therefore seem that the office of chief held many attractions, both material and non-material. The chiefs continued to collect customary dues along with their revenues from the French.

In his famous 1917 circular, Van Vollenhoven had stressed "Je ne pense qu'il soit ni possible ni désirable de constituer un cadre de chefs indigènes avec des classes, des tableaux d'avènement et toute cette réglementation."<sup>1</sup> All subsequent governors and governors-general paid lip service to this principle, as Association theory advocated the retention of the traditional African elite. But this presented the administration with a dilemma. Having deprived the traditional chiefs of old sources of income of which they disapproved, the French were obliged to provide them with new resources with which to maintain their households and keep up their standards of living. The result was that the posts of chef de canton and de province soon became stratified into grades with corresponding salaries and perquisites. In this way, contrary to the wishes of Van Vollenhoven and many theorists of Association, the chefs de canton and de province increasingly resembled civil servants. The chefs de village, however, were always less subject to this system of salaries and grades.

A major problem encountered in writing this chapter has been the dearth of statistical material concerning the value of the franc and inflation during the period under consideration. It has therefore been difficult to gauge whether increases in the chiefs' salaries brought corresponding increases in their real purchasing power, or whether

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1. Van Vollenhoven, "Les chefs indigènes", op.cit., p.268.

chiefs' salaries were able to keep pace with inflation. Sources for prices of retail goods prior to 1930 are extremely rare. Nevertheless, Fouquet's Traite des arachides dans les pays de Kaolack provides a useful source for prices of primary products from 1930 till the early 1950s, and goes some way to exploring the purchasing power of the Senegalese peasant during this period.

#### The Chief's Official Salary

Prior to 1912, the chefs de province received an official salary from the administration equivalent to 5% of the capitation they collected from the population, while the chefs de canton and de village remained unpaid.<sup>1</sup> In 1912, a system of fixed annual salaries for chefs de canton and de province was introduced over most of Senegal except for the Casamance. In Cayor, the new salary scale was as follows:

chefs de province	annual salary(fs)
Meissa M'Baye Sall - Saniokhor	7500
Macodou Sall Guet	3500
Dioucounda N'diaye Mboul Mbakol	1600 (2)

Salaries for all chefs de canton in Cayor were to be 2200 francs per annum. All three chefs de province received salaries for the cantons they administered in addition to their total salary. From 1917 onwards, chefs de village were to be paid not by a fixed annual salary, but by receiving 4% of the tax they collected.

Salaries of chefs de canton and de province rose gradually during the First World War. In 1920, chiefs in Cayor were given a further salary rise to balance increases in the cost of living. However, these increases proved inadequate and both the chiefs and commandants de cercle proposed further rises. On 20 August 1921, Bouna N'diaye submitted a plan to the Governor concerning salary increases for chiefs who had given long service and held important positions.<sup>3</sup> For Cayor,

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1. IDI/3 monograph of the cercle of Cayor, 3 March 1911.
  2. ARSD 2D14-6 Decree of 21 December 1912.
  3. ARSD 13G6(17) Bouna N'diaye to Governor General Merlin, 20 August 1921.

these included Macodou Sall, who had served for twenty years and Dioucounda N'diaye, who administered a population of 11,800. Bouna N'diaye suggested an increase in salary for the former to 12,000 francs and for the latter to 8,000. He requested an increase in his own salary of 6,000 to 28,000 francs on the grounds that he had served as a chief for twenty six years and administered 27,000 people. Among the fourteen others he proposed for salary increases were Abdoul Salam Kane, Ely Manel Fall and Amadou N'diaye. In May 1922, Mbakhane Diop, the chiefly vice-president of the Colonial Council, Coumba N'dofene Diouf and Meissa M'Baye Sall petitioned the President of the Colonial Council to request an increase in the chiefs' salaries.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of these requests, the administration introduced new legislation in September 1922 which again raised the chiefs' salaries.<sup>2</sup> What was novel about this legislation was that it regularised the chiefs' pay, introducing 20 grades for the office of chef de canton and de province, each of which had a corresponding wage. But the problem of the discrepancy between the chiefs' salaries remained unsolved. A huge gap remained between those chiefs in the first grade receiving 12,000 francs per annum, and those in the bottom grade at 1,000 francs, let alone between the latter and in the chiefs in the highest grade "de classe exceptionnelle" or "hors classes"). This grade was reserved for long-established chiefs from traditional ruling families, who did not have a fixed maximum salary. It included chiefs like Bouna N'diaye of Djoloff on 24,000 francs per annum, Coumba N'dofene Diouf, chef de province of Sine on 22,000 francs and Fara Biram Lô, chef de province of Ross Merinhagen on 15,000 francs. As the vast majority of chiefs were in the lower grades, these high salaries aroused a great deal of resentment.

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1. ARSD 4E13(135) Colonial Council, Permanent Commission, 3 May 1922.
  2. ARSD 2D14-7 Decree of 6 September 1922. It should be noted that the franc referred to in this thesis was in use throughout the AOF and was freely convertible with the French Franc till 1945. After this, a separate currency, the Franc CFA, was issued, with a fixed rate of exchange with the French Franc.

In Cayor, salaries rose as follows between 1920 and 1922:

canton/province	chief	salary(fs)		Sept 1922	grade
		Jan 1920	May 1920		
Saniokhor	Meissa M'baye Sall	8000	8500	12000	1
Canton Ndoutte		2600	3000		
Diassane		<u>10600</u>	<u>11500</u>		
province of Guet	Macodou Sall	4000	4500	10000	2
canton Sagata		2500	2600		
Merina Guet					
canton Ndour Peuls		<u>1800</u>	<u>2000</u>		
		8300	9100		
province Mboul	Dioucounda N'diaye	2500	3000	6000	10
Mbakol					
canton Mboul Digue					
Djiguène		<u>2200</u>	<u>2600</u>		
		4700	5600		
Méckhé M'Bar	Massamba Sall	3000	3600	5000	12
Mbaouar	Sambou N'dour	3000	3600	5000	12
Tabby Gatteigne	Ibra Diop	3000	3600	5000	12
Mboul Diamatil	Sanor N'diaye	3000	3600	5000	12
Thilmakha	Yoro Coumba	3000	3600	5000	12 (1)

The average salary of a chief in Cayor thus rose from 4830 in January 1920 to 5525 francs at the end of 1920 to 6630 francs in 1922. The average chief's salary in Tivaouane in 1932 was above average for Senegal (4350 francs)<sup>2</sup> The only cercle where chiefs received a higher average salary was Salde. Here the two chefs de canton, in the eighth class, received annual salaries of 7000 apiece.

When the commandement indigène was established in Ziguinchor (in 1922) and in Bignona (in 1923)<sup>3</sup>, all the new chiefs began on much lower salaries than the chiefs in the north except for Benjamin Diatta, the chef de province of Oussouye. While Diatta, in the tenth class, was

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1. ARSD 2G20-34<sup>1</sup> "Table of salaries of the chefs indigenes in the cercle of Tivaouane," and 2D14-7 Decree of 6 September 1922.
  2. Calculated from figures in Sénégal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses 1923, "Salaries of the chefs de provinces and de cantons of Senegal", pp. 181-183.
  3. See Ch. 2 on "The Selection of Chiefs".



receiving 6000 francs, his fellow chiefs in Ziguinchor were in the 17th, 18th and 19th classes, earning between 1500 and 2500 francs.<sup>1</sup> Initially, all the chiefs in Bignona were in the 20th grade on 1000 francs per annum with the exception of Moussa Coudiaby and Sonkarou Maria in the 19th class on 1500 francs per annum and Ansoumane Diatta and Lamine Sonko, the two chefs de province in the 18th class on 2000 francs per annum. In 1922, the average salary for a chief in the Casamance, 2340 francs, was well below the national average for Senegal and chiefs in Cayor.

But the reform of 1922 failed to solve the problem of huge differences in salaries between different grades of chief. Macodou Sall wrote a memo to the Colonial Council at the end of 1922, following this reform: "La classification des chefs indigènes laisse beaucoup à désirer. Il est inadmissible de voir des chefs qui ont accompli plus de vingt ans de service être moins traités que d'autres qui n'ont pas plus que dix ans de service."<sup>2</sup> In a session of the Colonial Council in 1925, Samba Niébé Couly Diop stressed that the salaries of the chiefs were too low to support their obligations, which included the upkeep of their households and entertaining civilian and military personnel passing through their cantons.<sup>3</sup> Chiefs would also have to buy horses for themselves and their diarafs. Although the cheapest Mpars horses cost only 60 francs, chiefs with a dozen or so followers could end up paying nearly 1000 francs. Chiefs with more expensive tastes might have to pay about 2000 francs for an Arab horse.<sup>4</sup> Samba Niebe Couly Diop argued that "Il est indispensable de donner à ces précieux et dévoués auxiliaires de l'administration un certain prestige et les moyens nécessaires pour accomplir leurs lourdes charges." He won the support of both elected and chief councillors for his proposal that the number of grades of chiefs

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1. ARSD 2G23-70 Casamance RPS Second Semester 1923.
  2. ARSD 1Z75 Fonds Macodou Sall- Resolution presented to the Colonial Council, requesting the revision of the classification of chefs indigènes.
  3. ARSD 4E16(135) Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, eighth sitting, 17 November 1925.
  4. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, seventh sitting, 18 November 1922, intervention of Amadou N'diaye.

de canton be reduced from 20 to 10, with the lowest grade receiving a basic salary of at least 6,000 francs.

Some of these suggestions were taken up in the legislation of 10 February 1926 and 3 March 1926. Although the number of grades was reduced to ten, the extra grade of "hors classes" was retained, while a new class of stagiaires was introduced. The salary scale for chiefs from the first to the tenth grades remained the same, and the majority of chiefs were to be found in the lowest (10th) grade.<sup>1</sup> The Senegalese budget recorded a large increase in expenditure on the chiefs as a result of these reforms, from 628,781 francs in 1926, to 1,034,000 in 1927.<sup>2</sup> In Cayor, the salary of Meissa M'Baye Sall, who had already been promoted to "hors classe" rose from 12,500 to 14,000 francs. Macodou Sall, who had been promoted to the first grade in 1925, was to receive 1,000 francs more as a result of the reform, i.e. 13,000 francs.<sup>3</sup> All the rest of the chiefs in Cayor were, from 1926 onwards, to be in the tenth grade, with salaries of 6,000 francs per annum.

By the legislation of 1926, salaries of chiefs in the Casamance had caught up with those of chiefs in the north. In Ziguinchor, Benjamin Diatta was promoted to the sixth grade, with a salary of 8500 francs to go with it, while all the other chiefs were put in the tenth grade, on salaries of 6,000 francs.<sup>4</sup> The 1926 legislation meant that all the chiefs in Bignona belonged to the tenth class, on salaries of 6,000 francs. In Bignona, this increase in chiefly salaries involved a rise in budgetary expenditure from 17,000 francs in 1926 to 66,000 francs in 1927.<sup>5</sup> The average salary of a chief in Ziguinchor rose from 2,409 francs at the end of 1922 to 6,250 francs in 1926. That of a chief in Bignona rose from a mere 1,214 francs in 1922 to 6,000 francs in 1926.

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1. JO Senegal 1926, No. 399 BP-Decree revising the salary and grades of the chefs de province and de canton, 3 March 1926.
  2. Comparison of total amounts of the chiefs' pay in Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses, 1926 and 1927.
  3. Comparison of data en Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses, 1926 and 1927.
  4. Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses 1927.

But two years later the chiefs' salaries had to be readjusted in accordance with rises in the cost of living.<sup>1</sup> The gulf between the salaries of ordinary chiefs and chefs hors classe widened further. While stagiaires were to receive 7,000 francs, Bouna N'diaye, the highest paid chief, was receiving 32,000 francs. Salaries of chiefs between the tenth and first grades which had ranged from 6,000 to 13,000 francs in 1926, ranged from 8,000 to 18,000 francs following the 1928 legislation. As a result of these further salary rises, expenditure on the chiefs rose from 1,034,000 francs in the 1927 budget to 1,407,000 francs in the 1929 budget.<sup>2</sup>

In the province of Saniokhor, now part of the subdivision of Cayor in the cercle of Thies, Meissa M'Baye Sall's salary rose to 20,000 francs by the legislation of 14 May 1928.<sup>3</sup> All his chefs de canton were in the ninth class, earning 9,000 francs. In the province of Guet, by this time part of Louga, Macodou Sall, now "hors classe" was earning a salary of 19,000 francs, while his chiefs, still in the tenth grade, were earning 8,000.

In Bignona, Lamine Sonko was promoted to the ninth class while his colleagues remained in the tenth. Benjamin Diatta of the province of Oussouye was also promoted, this time to the fourth class earning 14,000 francs. His colleagues in Ziguinchor remained in the tenth class with the exception of Djiboudié Sambou of Pointe St. Georges, promoted to the ninth class.

The following year, Carde was pressing for further reforms in the material conditions of the chiefs in order to bind them to the

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1. AN2G28-8 Senegal RPA 1928.
  2. Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses, 1927 and 1929.
  3. Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses 1929, "Salaries of the chefs de cantons and de provinces of Senegal", pp.204-207.

administration, and free them from their worries about their finances.<sup>1</sup> It was feared that they might otherwise be driven to embezzlement from the administration and to plunder from their subjects on a much greater scale. The chiefs were still badly off in comparison with certain indigenous civil servants, many of whom had served for shorter periods than the chiefs and were entitled to a number of extra benefits from which the chiefs were excluded. These extra allowances included a special indemnity, a weighting allowance and a family allowance.

Salary-Francs

Chief in the tenth grade	8,000
Chief in the fourth grade	14,000
Commis principal in the <u>Service Financier</u> "classe exceptionnelle"	42,700 (with allowances)
Commis with less than 18 months' service in the Service Financier	13,500 (with allowances)
<u>Expéditionnaire</u> - Service Financier	12,500 (with allowances) <sup>2</sup>

In 1930, a delegation of chiefs asked the President of the Colonial Council to intercede with the Governor to obtain salary rises for them to complement those of other cadres of the administration. The President persuaded the Council to pass a motion laying 120,300 francs aside from the 1931 budget in order to raise their salaries.<sup>3</sup>

During the economic crisis of the early 1930s following the world depression, the chiefs' salaries probably fell in real terms as a result of declining terms of trade for the producer.<sup>4</sup> It was not until 1932 that the administration saw any need to slightly increase the chiefs' salaries to compensate for the fall in their purchasing power during the depression. The following table shows that the chiefs between the stagiaire and sixth grades received the greatest percentage salary increases:

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1. ANSOM-Affaires Politiques-C838D1-Governor General Carde to Governors of the AOF, 11 October 1929.
  2. Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses 1932, "Office of the General Secretariat", p.39.
  3. Colonial Council PV, second sitting, 7 November 1930.
  4. Fouquet, op.cit., Table: "Variations in the buying power of the Senegalese peasant," pp.250-251.

Grade	Salary		% increase in salary
	1931	1932	
stagiaire	7000	7600	8.5
10	8000	8600	7.5
9	9000	9800	8.8
8	10000	10800	8
7	11000	11800	7.2
6	12000	13000	8.3
5	13000	14000	7.6
4	14000	15000	7.1
3	15000	16000	6.6
2	16000	17000	6.25
1	18000	19000	5.5
classe	variable-highest salary -		
exceptionnelle	35000	36500	4.2 (1)

Chiefs' salaries still lagged behind those of civil servants:

	Salaries (1932) (francs)
chef de canton in the 10th class	8600
chef de canton in the 4th grade	16000
commis principal service financier	48500
classe exceptionnelle	
commis in service financier before 18 months' service	27400
expéditionnaire service financier	11300 (2)

During the depression, there were a number of complaints about the conditions in which the chiefs' salaries were paid. At a session in 1932 when he could count on the support of Amadou N'diaye, the chiefly vice-president of the Colonial Council, Samba Souna Fall asked if the salary of the chefs de canton could be paid at the end of each month.<sup>3</sup> Up till then, salaries of certain chiefs had been kept back until the bulk of loans of food and seeds distributed to the people at the beginning of the hivernage had been recovered. Here again, the position of a chief compared unfavourably with that of a civil servant "Il n'est pas possible de faire travailler un fonctionnaire jusqu'à la fin du mois et de le priver de sa solde pour lui ôter les moyens d'existence."<sup>4</sup> The chiefs agreed that this delay

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1. Figures given in Sénégal: Budget local de Recettes et Dépenses, 1931 and 1932.
  2. Sénégal: Budget Local de Recettes et Dépenses, 1932, "Office of the General Secretariat", p. 41.
  3. Colonial Council PV, second sitting, 2 April 1932.
  4. Ibid.

in payment at times forced them to abuse their position. "Toutes les dépenses d'un chef sont supportées par sa solde, si on le prive de cette dernière c'est l'inciter à trafiquer de ses fonctions." The Commission of Miscellaneous Affairs of the Colonial Council agreed to recommend that this motion be implemented by the administration.

From 1932 to 1937, salaries of individual chiefs rose as they were promoted but the salary scale remained the same. Their purchasing power probably remained the same or rose from 1934-36, as terms of trade improved. Imported rice for example became increasingly less expensive in relation to the groundnut.<sup>1</sup>

#### Thies, subdivision of Tivaouane

canton/province	Chief	Salary (francs) and grade		
		1929	1932	1937
Saniokhor	Meissa M'Baye Sall	h.c. 20,000	h.c. 22,500	dead
Ndoutte Diassane	Massamba Sall	9th 9,000	7th 11,800	5th 14,000
Méckhé M'Bar	Massamba Sall	9th 9,000	8th 10,800	7th 11,800
Tabby Gatteigne	Ibra Diop	9th 9,000	7th 11,800	6th 13,000
Diamatil ) Djiguène Gallo)	Massamba Aram Diop	9th 9,000	7th 11,800	6th 13,000
Mboul Khatta	Momar Dior Dieng	10th 8,000	7th 11,800	6th 13,000
Mboul Gallo	Meissa Balle Sall	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	8th 10,800

#### Guet province, Louga

Province Guet	Macodou Sall	h.c. 19,000	h.c. 22,500	h.c. 22,500
canton Guet	Massamba Kangui Sall	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	7th 11,800
Mbaouar	Sambou Ndour	10th 8,000	8th 10,000	note 1'
N'doyène Dagam	Sangone Sall	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	9th 9,800
Thilmakha	Morane Sall	- -	10th 8,600	9th 9,800

note 1 - In 1937, Sambour Ndour was replaced by Meissa M'Baye Sall, in the tenth grade, on a salary of 8,600 francs.

#### Ziguinchor

province Oussouye	Benjamin Diatta	4th 14,000	2nd 17,000	1st 19,000
Bainouck	Alceyni Cisse	10th 8,000	8th 10,800	8th 13,000
Brin Seleki	Tété Sagna	10th 8,000	7th 11,800	note 2
Adeane	Moussa Seck	note 3	10th 8,600	note 4
Mandjacques	Patron Gomis	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	8th 10,900
Bayotte	Bahobaye Sambou	- - -	10th 8,600	9th 9,800
Pointe St. Georges	Ambroise Sambou	- - -	10th 8,600	9th 9,800
Floups	Simedji Diatta	- - -	10th 8,600	10th 8,600
Diembéring	Djivoasil	note 5	10th 8,600	note 6 (2)

1. Fouquet, op.cit., pp.250-251.

2. Data for all cercles from Sénégal: Budgets locaux de recettes et dépenses 1929, 1932 and 1937, "Salaries of the chefs de cantons and de provinces of Senegal". (Notes 2-6 on next page).

note 2 - In 1937, Tete Sagna was replaced by Pierre Bassene, a stagiaire, on 7,600 francs.

note 3 - In 1929, the chief of Adeane was Amat N'diaye in the tenth class, on 8,000 francs.

note 4 - In 1937, Moussa Seck had been replaced by Mamadou Faty, a stagiaire.

note 5 - In 1929, Aidier was chief of Diembéring, and was in the tenth grade.

note 6 - in 1937, Mandiagane M'Baye, another stagiaire, became chief of this canton.

### Bignona

canton	chief	salary and grade		
		1929	1932	1937
Kadiamoutes				
Nord	Sania Badji	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	note 7
Kalounayes	Tepero Diadhiou	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	note 8
Kadiamoutes Sud	Youssouph Badji	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	8th 10,800
Djougouttes				
Nord	Arfan Sonko	10th 8,000	8th 10,800	6th 13,000
Sud	Akamga Diabone	10th 8,000	9th 9,800	note 9
Bliss and Karones	Lonka Demba	10th 8,000	10th 8,600	8th 10,800
Fogny Combo	Lan Diadhiou	10th 8,000	10th 8,600	9th 9,800
Bignona	Demba Sane	10th 8,000	10th 8,600	9th 9,800
Djiragones	Ansoumane Sane	- - -	stagiaire	
			7,600	10th 8,600
Narangs	Bourama Diatta	10th 8,000	10th 8,600	10th 8,600

note 7 - In 1937, Samba Ira Sane, a stagiaire, became chief of Kadi amoutes Nord.

Note 8 - In 1937, Tepero Diadhiou was replaced by Bocar Ba, another stagiaire.

Note 9 - In 1937, Erikakène Sagna, a stagiaire, became chef de canton of Djougouttes Sud.

cercle	average salary for a chef de canton		
	1929	1932	1937
subdivision of			
Tivaouane, Thies	9,300	11,300	12,600
province of Guet,			
Louga	10,750	12,140	12,500
Ziguinchor	8,800	10,270	10,420
Bignona	8,000	9,200	9,400

These compare with average salaries of chefs de canton for

Senegal as a whole of:

1929	-	9,200 francs
1932	-	11,260
1937	-	11,502

This shows that chiefs' salaries did not rise very markedly between 1932 and 1937, and that while salaries for chiefs in Cayor were slightly above the national average, those of chiefs in Casamance remained lower. However, the gap between the salaries of chiefs in the north and those in the south was never allowed to become as wide as it had been in the early 1920s.

The 1937 salaries for chiefs compare with the following salaries and allowances of African civil servants in the Service Financier in the same year:

commis principal classe exceptionnelle (with less than four year's service)	35200 francs
commis with less than eighteen months' service	27600 francs
expéditionnaire	11900 francs (1)

While the majority of chiefs' salaries were still lower than those of civil servants in the Service Financier in 1937, they far surpassed the average salary of an unskilled worker in Dakar. Between 1922 and 1941, the gap between an average chief's salary and that of an unskilled worker grew.

	approx. annual salary of an unskilled worker (francs)	average chiefs' salary - Senegal in a particular year (francs)	worker's salary as % of chiefs' %
1919-21	828	3405 (1921)	24.3
1922-26	1379	4350 (1922)	31.7
1927-31	1655	9200 (1929)	18
1937-41	2257	11502 (1937)	19.6 (2)

1. Senegal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses, 1937, "Office of the General Secretariat", p. 39.
2. A Vanhaeverbeke, Rémunération du Travail et Commerce Extérieur, Louvain 1970, p. 186, Table 52. The figures for the worker's salary are derived from an hourly rate, and assume that he was in full employment, working for at least eight hours a day approximately six days a week.



During the Second World War, under the Free French, the salaries of chiefs were again raised to put them on a par with other administrative cadres. Real incomes of the chiefs and the Senegalese peasantry fell during the period of hostilities and immediately after the War because of the disruption of trade relations with the rest of the world, severe inflation in France, and marketing policies in the agricultural export sector of the French West African economy. French African consumers were, for example, denied access to markets outside the Franc zone.<sup>1</sup> It is estimated that in the decade between 1938-39 to 1948-49, the purchasing power of the Senegalese cultivator fell by 28%, as the price of the groundnut rose more slowly than that of imported products.

commodity	price(fs per kg.) 1938-39	price (fs per kg) 1948-49	coefficient of increase
groundnut	0.90	14.5	16
rice	1.40	45	32
sugar	3	65	22
soap	2.50	55	22
percale	3	90	30 (2)

The purchasing power of the Senegalese peasant rose slowly after 1946 but did not regain pre-war levels till 1950.

After 1945, the chiefs were given huge salary rises to offset inflation and to soften the blow of democratisation of the chieftancy in 1947. The new salary scale of 1947 was as follows:

chef stagiaire	30,000 francs
10th grade	35,000
9th	40,000
8th	45,000
7th	50,000
6th	55,000
5th	60,000
4th	65,000
3rd	70,000
2nd	75,000
1st	80,000
hors classe	90,000 (3)

1. E.J. Berg, Economic Transition in Africa (eds. M.J. Herskovits and M. Harwitz), London 1964, p.210. Although the chiefs were to some extent cushioned by their other sources of income from the fall in the price of groundnuts in relation to other commodities during the Second World War, they, as cultivators, were also adversely affected.
2. Fouquet, op.cit., p. 134.
3. Jo Senegal 1947, p.138, Decree of 20 February 1947.

From the earliest sessions of the Colonial Council, chiefs not only wanted to be paid a salary, but to receive other benefits, many of which resembled those awarded to civil servants. To reward the chiefs for their cooperation on the First World War recruitment, Tellier, the interim governor of Senegal in 1921 put forward the proposal that the administration should construct residences for chefs de canton and de province, where the latter could be lodged "copieusement et même sp'cieusement."<sup>1</sup> The chief's home was to consist of a house for the chief, quarters for his many dependents-family, secretaries, servants and followers- and a field for cultivation, on which the inhabitants of the area would work according to local custom. These residences were intended to go with the job and were not to remain in the possession of an individual once he was no longer chief. However, such a scheme never came to fruition.

The move to obtain travelling expenses for chiefs on official business was less ill-fated. Governor Tellier's suggestion that the chiefs (and, in the case of important chiefs, their followers) should receive an indemnity when they were summoned to the chef-lieu was accepted.<sup>2</sup> In 1922, Mbakhane Diop proposed to the Permanent Commission of the Colonial Council that chief councillors should receive travelling expenses and a daily indemnity when the council was in session. Although the President, a citizen councillor, retorted, " You can accept the mandate of the Colonial Council or not, as you please," the Secretary General representing the administration promised to give the question some thought.

Even by the 1930s, there was still no clear-cut system relating to the status or promotion of chiefs. In 1928, the chefs de canton in Sine Saloum who had originally been soldiers demanded the same advantages as their counterparts in the civil service as far as promotion was concerned.

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1. ARSD 4E6(14) Governor Tellier to commandants de cercle, 8 August 1921.

2. 4E6(14) Governor Tellier to commandants de cercle, 12 July 1921.

"nous faire bénéficier de cet avantage comme nos collègues, fonctionnaires indigènes".<sup>1</sup> The President of the Commission of Miscellaneous Affairs backed this "Tous les fonctionnaires bénéficient des rappels et bonifications au titre des services militaires, il n'y a pas raison pour que les chefs de province ou de canton fasse exception". But the administration failed to act.

In 1936, Adama Lô, a citizen councillor, mooted the creation of a regular cadre of chefs de canton, like that of civil servants, to stop unfair burdens being placed on these "dévoués serviteurs".<sup>2</sup> Chiefs in the lowest cadres were receiving only about 600 francs a month, yet incurred heavy expenses. He suggested that chiefs should be given the same indemnities as civil servants as far as hospitalisation, travelling and lodgings were concerned. Citizen councillors balked at this, arguing that chiefs were not like other civil servants in so far as they were allowed to sit on the Council. In the December 1936 session of the council, chiefly councillors repeated their request for military service to be taken into account when promotion was being considered.<sup>3</sup>

But the Governor General wanted to keep the chiefs distinct from civil servants, by preserving "le caractère traditionnel de l'institution".<sup>4</sup> He emphasised the political nature of the chiefs' functions ("de l'ordre essentiellement politique") which had nothing to do with seniority. Although he conceded that military service might be taken into account in the promotion of chiefs, he stressed that there were to be no hard and fast rules, and that the Governor was to retain his discretionary power.

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, third sitting, 13 June 1928.
  2. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, sixth sitting, 14 July 1936.
  3. ARSD 18G84(17) Governor to Governor General, 21 December 1936.
  4. 18G84(17) Governor General to Governor, 12 March 1937.

It was not until 1937 that specific regulations concerning the promotion of chiefs were introduced.<sup>1</sup> Chiefs below the fifth grade had to complete two years service in a grade before they could be promoted, while chiefs in and above the fifth grade had to perform at least eighteen months' service. At the end of a probationary year, chefs stagiaires were promoted to the tenth class if satisfactory, and if not, were to be dismissed.

In a session of the Colonial Council a year later, Adama Lô pointed out that chefs de canton incurred heavy expenses in the recruitment as they had to provide food for the young men eligible for military service while the draft board was in operation.<sup>2</sup> But the administration reimbursed them for feeding only those young men selected as "bons pour le service". He referred to the chiefs as civil servants: "La situation de ces fonctionnaires est fort délicate et s'ils en arrivent à se créer des dettes, le débiteur s'empressera de recourir à l'administration." Elected councillors were prepared to pay the chiefs a further indemnity as long as this entailed no new tax.

The chiefs' position vis à vis the administration was not regularised until 1943 when they were given superior status to the civil servants in the local cadres and awarded the advantages of civil servants in the seventh category as far as hospitalisation and travelling were concerned.<sup>3</sup> Chiefs were to be on half-pay in hospital, and the administration would also pay a share of their relative's hospital bills.

#### Other official sources of income

From the information available, it would appear that the chiefs' salaries alone would have been insufficient to support them and their entourages. In 1930, for example, the price of imported rice was 1f 60 a kilo.<sup>4</sup> A chief with an entourage of say, 30 persons might

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1. JO Senegal 1937, Decree of 6 May 1937.
  2. Colonial Council PV, fourth sitting, 17 June 1938.
  3. 2G43-16 Senegal RPA 1943.
  4. Fouquet, *op.cit.*, p.248, "Graph showing the variations between the price of imported rice and that of the groundnut, 1930-42."

have to provide them with at least 7 kgs. of rice a day in addition to millet, their staple diet, which was generally grown locally. This expenditure on rice alone would have cost the chief approximately 4100 francs a year. Yet in 1930, the lowest salary for a chef stagiaire was 7000 francs and for a chief in the tenth class 8000 francs. In addition, the chief would be expected to provide accommodation for his entourage, horses for his diarafts, and hospitality for strangers.

But the chiefs had sources of income apart from their salaries which to a certain extent made up for the fact that rival civil servants of local cadres had certain indemnities not available to the chiefs. One very important source which at times outstripped their wages was commission from the tax they collected, known as remises. This bonus from capitation was the only form of payment the chefs de province received prior to 1912. By 1922, all chefs de province and de canton were receiving, in addition to their salaries, annual commission consisting of 2% and 1% respectively of the total tax (capitation and the tax on animals) they had collected. The only pay the chefs de village received were these remises of 1%.<sup>1</sup>

The procedure of granting remises went as follows: The commandant de cercle made a list of chiefs who had been selected to receive commission. This list was to be countersigned by the cercle's accountant and sent to the Governor for approval. The Payeur or Agent Spécial was then to pay them personally. Even before the establishment of the commandement indigène in Bignona, chefs bénévoles had been paid commission from the tax they collected to encourage them in their tasks.<sup>2</sup>

The administration was often slow in paying remises to the chiefs. Abdoul Salam Kane in the December 1921 session of the Colonial Council alleged that commission for the tax year 1919-20 had still not

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, eighth sitting, 17 November 1925, intervention of Samba Niébé Couly Diop.
  2. ARSD 2G21-27 Bignona RPT third quarter 1921.

been paid to the chiefs in Thies.<sup>1</sup> The following year, Meissa M'Baye Sall drew the attention of the Permanent Commission of the Council to the fact that in some regions where all the tax had been collected, the chiefs had still not received their commission. Maillet, the governor at the time, promised to look into the situation.

In conjunction with the efforts of the elected and chiefly colonial councillors in 1925 to improve the chiefs' salaries was a move to increase the commission the chiefs received on the tax collected to 6%, with chefs de province, de canton and de village each receiving 2%. In fact, the 1926 reform doubled the commission the chiefs received according to the 1922 legislation to 4% of the total tax collected. This increase resulted in the chefs de canton and de province together, and the chefs de village alone, each receiving 2%<sup>2</sup> of tax collected.

So vital had this commission become in supplementing the chefs' de canton income that they continued to receive it even during the early 1930s, when they were no longer directly responsible for tax collection. In 1934, an Inspection Mobile in Senegal discovered that as a result of the economic crisis, the chefs de canton and de village were receiving less commission for tax collection in 1932 and 1933 than 1931.<sup>3</sup> This was because total receipts had fallen since 1931 and the tax was coming in late. In Thies, for example, the amount of tax collected in 1932 fell to 56% of the 1931 total:

Thies	Total tax recovered	remainder to be recovered
1931	5,823,075	673,024
1932	3,282,974	561,385
1933	3,405,348	222,133 (4)

During the economic crisis of the early 1930s, the administration attempted to economise by depriving the chefs de canton of their commission

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1. Colonial Council PV, ordinary session, tenth sitting, 18 December 1921.
  2. Colonial Council PV, eighth sitting, 17 November 1925.
  3. 18G84(17) Governor General to Governors of the AOF, 30 May 1934.
  4. ARSD 2G32-105 Thies RPA 1932.

from the tax whose collection they supervised. However, the Governor of Senegal warned that without this source of income, the chiefs would be constrained to reduce their living standards, which would be a blow to their authority and prestige.<sup>1</sup> He warned that they might turn to illegal sources of income as an alternative. But Brévié felt that a situation whereby chiefs were being rewarded with commission when they were not actually collecting the taxes should not be allowed to continue. He wanted to find a way of rewarding the chiefs not only for their fiscal tasks, but for their general contribution to the running of the administration. So a new system of encouraging "deserving" chiefs was devised-the prime de rendement, which like the remise was to be paid annually: "Un bon chef arrive ainsi à doubler le montant de sa solde fixe."

Originally, the administration intended that the prime de rendement for the chefs de canton should not constitute over one quarter of the total commission paid out to all the chiefs from the tax collected(i.e.1%).<sup>2</sup> The chefs de village, directly responsible for tax collection were to continue to be uniformly awarded remises of 2% of the total sum collected. But the Governor pointed out that a lowering of the prime de rendement to constitute 1% rather than 2% of the total tax collected would mean an unacceptable fall in the emoluments of the chefs de canton and de province, particularly when the administration was demanding from them "une collaboration chaque jour plus étroite."<sup>3</sup> Senegal was compared unfavourably with French Guinea, where remises constituted 5.4% of the total tax collected. Although the chiefs' salaries in Guinea were lower than those in Senegal (at 2000-4000 francs compared with salaries ranging between 7600 and 20,000 francs), the acting Governor General Boisson agreed that the chiefs in Senegal should not be forced to reduce their living standards.<sup>4</sup> So it was decided in 1936 that the prime de

- 
1. ARSD 13G33(180) Governor General to Governors, 26 February 1934, and reply of the Governor of Senegal, 11 January 1935.
  2. According to the original decree of 11 January 1935.
  3. 18G83(17) Governor of Senegal to Governor General, 5 June 1935.
  4. 18G84 (17) Governor General Boisson to Governor, 29 July 1935.

rendement was to constitute at most 2% of the total tax collected by the chiefs. The actual prime awarded to each chef de canton was to vary according to his performance in a number of tasks.

The legislation of 11 and 17 January 1935 abolished the payment of remises to the chefs de canton from the beginning of 1936, replacing them with primes de rendement. The decree of 11 January 1935 stipulated that: "Les chefs sont retribués par des soldes fixes, des primes de rendement qui peuvent leur être attribués par décisions du lieutenant Gouverneur sur propositions motivés des commandants de cercle."<sup>1</sup> The bonus the chef de canton received was to be determined by marks he received for:

- a) the census and tax collection
- b) prestations and the upkeep of roads
- c) agricultural development and the promotion of the use of the plough
- d) the constitution of reserve granaries.<sup>2</sup>

According to the decision of 3 July 1936, chiefs were to receive an extra mark for their administration of the military reserve and their ability to keep registers of these. Chiefs were to receive marks between 0 and 20 for each of these functions and an average was worked out from these four marks, giving the following bonuses (primes):

Mark	Bonus as a percentage of the total tax collected for the canton
18-20	2%
16-17	1.75
14-15	1.5
12-13	1.25
10-11	1
below 10	nothing

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1. ARSD 13G89(180) Decree of 11 January 1935 reorganising Native Administration, Article 12.
  2. 13G33(180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 11 January 1935.



The introduction of this new source of income was to be explained to the chefs de canton by their commandants de cercle at meetings of the conseils de notables. In 1936, the prime de rendement was to be calculated from the total personal tax and AMI collected as the tax on animals had been temporarily suspended.<sup>1</sup> With the introduction of the prime de rendement, the total official income of the chefs de canton and de village rose from 2.3% of the total budget of the AOF in 1933 to 2.7% in 1936.<sup>2</sup> In the same year, salaries of chefs de canton amounted to 1,627,780 francs while their primes de rendement equalled 750,000 francs.

As late as 1937, the issue of the advantages of the primes de rendement over remises were still being debated on the Colonial Council. Gomis, a citizen councillor, wanted the chefs de canton to continue to be paid remises like the chefs de village.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary General representing the administration was obliged to reiterate that chefs de canton were not eligible for the same system of payment as the chefs de village since "Le chef de canton n'a pas le droit de toucher à un sou des sommes versées par les indigènes à leur chef de village."

But the payment of commission to chefs de village and de canton ran into certain problems. As far as the remises were concerned, the payment was left to the chefs de canton who frequently failed to give each chef de village his due. Sometimes, chefs de village would not travel to the chef-lieu of the canton to collect the remise if the sum concerned was very small.<sup>4</sup> The Governor instead suggested that in future, the chef de village should be able to obtain his remise on the same day that he paid the tax he had collected into the cercle Treasury or Agence Spéciale. The commandant de cercle or chef de subdivision often omitted to carry out the necessary documentation for the payment of primes de

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1. See Ch. 3 on "The Role of the Chiefs in the Census and Taxation".
  2. 18G84 (17) A comparison of the figures from a table of tax collection in the AOF in 1933 with those given in a letter from the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to the Directeur du Cabinet, 10 December 1936.
  3. Colonial Council PV, fourth sitting, 29 October 1937.
  4. 13G33(180) Governor to commandants de cercle, 11 January 1935.

rendement. The commandant de cercle of Thies' request for a prime de rendement to be paid to four chiefs in 1936 was delayed by the Governor until the chiefs had managed to recover the seeds owing to the SIPs.<sup>1</sup>; Similarly, the 1937 and 1938 primes de rendement for Bignona and Ziguinchor were not paid till 1939 as the Administrateur Supérieur had failed to provide the Governor with sufficient information on the tax collected or on the chiefs' performance of their various duties.<sup>2</sup> Quinquaud in his Inspection of Bignona in 1938 urged that these should be paid as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup> Several former chefs de canton interviewed in the Casamance (in 1981) seem never to have received their prime de rendement, which suggests that in certain cases it may have been withheld by the chef de subdivision.

The following tables give some idea of the sums involved in the prime de rendement in the Cayor region:

Subdivision of Tivaouane

chief	canton	average mark		% prime		total prime(fs)	
		1938	1940	1938	1940	1938	1940
Demba War Sall	Mboul Gallo	18	17.2	2	1.75	3335	3363
Massamba Sall	Méckhé M'Bar	18.2	17.4	2	1.75	8944	9070
Massamba Sall	Ndoutte	18.8	19	2	2	8644	9527
	Diassane						
Ibra Deguène	Tabby						
Diop	Gatteigne	18.4	16.8	2	1.75	8301	7959
Massamba Aram	Diamatil						
Diop	Djiguène Gallo	17.2	17.8	1.75	1.75	n.a.	6075
Meissa Anta Fall	Mboul Khatta	-	12.4	-	1.25	-	2173(4)

Guet province

Macodou Sall	Guet	19	19	2	2	30,563	33,078
Mamadou Sall	Thilmakha	16.4	18.2	1.75	2	5,452	6,819
Meissa M'Baye Sall	Mbaouar	17.2	18.2	1.75	2	8,653	10,789
Sangone Sall	N'doyène Dagam	17	18	1.75	2	5,791	7,165
Massamba Sall	Guet	17.2	18.4	1.75	2	6,844	8,303

(5)

1. 13G89(180) commandant de cercle of Thies to Governor, 19 May 1938.
2. 13G89(180) Governor to Administrateur Supérieur, 11 August 1937.
3. 13G42(180) Quinquaud, Inspector of Administrative Affairs, "Report on the cercle of Bignona", Section on Chiefs, 7 February 1939.
4. 13G89 (180) List of primes de rendement-Thies, 1938 and 1940. Meissa Anta Fall did not become a chief till 1940.
5. 13G89 (180) Primes de rendement-Louga, 1938 and 1940, according to the decrees of 28 May 1938 and 29 April 1940.

From these figures, it can be seen that there was little change in the amount involved in the prime de rendement between 1938 and 1940. The primes rose gradually each year from 1936 onwards, even when the percentage of tax the chief was to receive dropped. While the percentage of tax received by the chiefs rose in Guet between 1938 to 1940 from 1.75% to 2%, it fell in the subdivision of Cayor. Chefs de province received substantially more in primes than did the chefs de canton. Macodou Sall's prime was greater than his salary, which in the late 1930s was 22,500 francs, while that of most chefs de canton was below their salary.

The primes de rendement for chiefs in the Casamance were lower than for chiefs in the north.

#### Ziguinchor

Chief	canton/province	average mark		% prime		total prime(fs)	
		1938	1940	1938	1940	1938	1940
Mamadou Faty	Adeane	17.75	18.28	1.75	2	1164	1356
Sambou Bahobaye	Bayottes	15.75	17.14	1.5	1.75	1087	1547
Patron Gomis	Mandjacques	14	16.71	1.5	1.75	347	689
Pierre Bassane	Brin Séléki	15.75	17.57	1.5	1.75	1534	2023
Benjamin Diatta	Oussouye	19	17.57	2	1.75	8950	8254
Mandiagane M'Baye	Diembéring	15.75	15.57	1.5	1.5	1236	1279(1)
Ambroise Sambou	Pointe St. Georges	15.75	n.a.	1.5	n.a.	2323	n.a.
Ampa Eloute	Floups	17.75	n.a.	1.75	n.a.	3462	n.a.
Alassane Cissé	Bainoucks	n.a.	17.71	n.a.	1.75	n.a.	2481

When Alceyni Cissé died on 17 August 1938 at Kande, the sum he had earned from the prime de rendement for tax collection in the canton of Bainoucks for the years 1937 and 1938 was given to his heirs:<sup>2</sup>

Alceyni Cissé - Tax collected 232,222 francs - 1937 and 1938  
 mark - 19.3  
 % prime - 2%  
 total prime - 4644 francs.

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1. 13G89 (180) Primes de rendement-Ziguinchor, 1937-38 (not awarded till 8 March 1939) and 29 April 1940.
  2. 13G89 (180) Secretary General to Administrateur Supérieur, 20 March 1939.

With the prime de rendement, the administration had a lever with which to punish chiefs who were not carrying out their duties satisfactorily. After the failure of the 1941 recruitment, Benjamin Diatta's prime was reduced by half.<sup>1</sup>

### Bignona

Chief	Canton	mark		% prime		total prime(fs)	
		1938	1940	1938	1940	1938	1940
Samba Bâ	Bignona	17	16.57	1.75	1.75	6401	6001
Ansoumane Sane	Djiragones	15.2	16.28	1.5	1.75	1073	1435
Arfan Sonko	Djougouttes Nord	18	18.14	2	2	7948	8056
Erikakène Sagna	Djougouttes Sud	15.2	16.57	1.5	1.75	4577	4606
Landing Diadhiou	Kalounayes	15	16	1.5	1.75	2318	2678
Moussa Diatta	Narangs	15.4	17	1.5	1.75	686	845
Samba Ira Sane	Kadiamoutes Nord	15	17	1.5	1.75	1311	1637
Moussa Coudiaby	" " Sud	15.2	17	1.5	1.75	5334	6857
Landing Diémé	Fogny Combo	15.6	18.82	1.5	2	2417	3066
Joseph Diatta	Bliss and Karones	(2)	16	-	1.75	-	1309(3)

The primes de rendement for chiefs in Bignona seem in general to have risen between 1938 and 1940. Those for certain chiefs like Samba Bâ, Arfan Sonko and Moussa Coudiaby equalled those of their contemporaries in the north.

An enquiry to examine the salaries and allowances of the chefs de canton was launched in 1939, encompassing the whole colony.<sup>4</sup> This enquiry also looked into the chiefs' other official sources of revenue, like the primes de rendement and the commission they received from the SIPs for the repayment of groundnuts.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the salaries of those chiefs who acted as Presidents of the tribunaux indigènes were also taken into account.<sup>6</sup> Out of Senegal's 133 chefs de canton in 1939, it was discovered that:

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1. ANSOM - Affaires Politiques-C598D5-Senegal RPA 1941.
  2. In 1938, Bliss and Karones was still part of the cercle of Ziguinchor, with Lonka Demba as its chief.
  3. 13G89(180) Primes de Rendement-Bignona, 1938 and 1940.
  4. AN 2G40-2 Senegal RPA 1940.
  5. See Ch. 5, "The Role of the Chiefs in Agriculture".
  6. See Ch. 7, "The Chiefs and Justice".

No. of Chiefs	Gross Salary (francs p.a.)
13	36,000
34	24,000 - 36,000
24	18,000 - 24,000
51	12,000 - 18,000
11 *	less than 12,000

\*8 of whom were auxiliary chiefs and stagiaires.

From this investigation, the administration concluded that since the chiefs appeared by this time to be giving up their costly retinues, their salaries and and extra earnings ought to be sufficient reward. They failed to take into account, however, the fall in the chiefs' purchasing power from 1936 onwards.<sup>1</sup>

By 1940, the marks the chief received for the prime de rendement also took into account his efficiency in registering births, marriages and deaths. In the Casamance, chiefs were also marked on their contribution to the struggle against sleeping sickness.<sup>2</sup>

Between 1939 and 1945, total budgetary expenditure on the chiefs (honorary chiefs, chefs "hors classe", stagiaires and chiefs from the first to the tenth grades, civil servants acting as chiefs and secretares d'administration indigène) rose from 1,892,208 francs to 7,527,000 francs.<sup>3</sup> This total for 1945 includes sums of 1,250,000 francs to be paid to chefs de canton as primes de rendement and to chefs de village as remises, and 10,000 francs to be paid to members of conseils indigènes.

The criteria for determining whether a chief was to be promoted were not dissimilar from those on which the calculation of the prime de rendement was based. Governor Dagain in 1944 asked commandants de cercle to send him information on the conduct of chiefs proposed for promotion in the following fields:

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1. Fouquet, op.cit., pp.250-251.
  2. 13G89(180) Primes de rendement-Ziguinchor; 1940, comments on chiefs by the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor.
  3. Sénégal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses, 1939 and 1945.

- a) the recruitment and search for absentees
- b) the state of food crops and reserve granaries in the canton
- c) groundnut production
- d) how many of his children of school age were attending classes
- e) the management of the Société de Prévoyance in his canton.(1)

### Honorary Chiefs

In order to retain the prestige of a chief too old or infirm to continue to exercise his functions, the administration created the post of chef honoraire. To qualify for this, a chief had to have given long and valuable service. A chief holding this office was able to retain his salary for the rest of his life as long as this did not place too heavy a burden on the colony. Opa Boubakar, who exercised great influence in Boundou, Bakel, as a descendant of the ruling family of Almamys was made Sènegal's first chef honoraire in 1930.<sup>2</sup> His functions were to be exercised by his nephew Bokar Issaga, who was made a chef stagiaire. By 1939, Senegal had six honorary chiefs - three in Louga, including Meissa Balle Sall on 7500 francs per annum, and for Thies and Djoloff respectively Mbakhane Lat Dior Diop on 6000 francs and Bouna N'diaye on 36,500 francs.<sup>3</sup>

The creation of the post of chef honoraire should not be equated with the practice of paying pensions to civil servants. In a session of the Colonial Council in 1922, Bouna N'diaye requested the establishment of what amounted to a pension fund for the chiefs.<sup>4</sup> He suggested that chiefs should be authorised to invest 5% of their monthly salary in the Caisse Nationale de Réserves in preparation for their retirement, or to support their family in case of disaster. The administration was to fix an age limit when the chiefs were to retire and to start to collect money from the Caisse. However, this scheme did not amount to anything largely because of administrative resistance to any attempts to put the chiefs on

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1. ARSD 2D13-32 Governor Dagain to commandant de cercle of Thies, 1944.
  2. ARSD 17G119 (17) Decree of 20 May 1930.
  3. Sénégals Budget local de recettes et dépenses 1939, "Salaries of the chefs de cantons and de provinces of Senegal", p.269.
  4. Colonial Council PV, eighteenth sitting, 29 November 1922.

a par with civil servants. Sidy Khouya Diop, the chef de canton of Diadji Oulingara, Louga, put forward a similar scheme in 1938 but this was again rejected by the Governor General.<sup>1</sup> However, civil servants who had become chiefs were allowed to draw a pension on retirement. Code N'diaye, the former chef de canton of Sandock Diagianiao who had been readmitted to the cadre of interpreters was awarded a pension for his forty two years service which ended in 1945. This amounted to 129,000 francs in 1947 and 153,000 the following year.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Chiefs' Unofficial Sources of Income

But the chef de canton's salary and prime de rendement alone would not have made him rich, and a study of these sources of income in isolation does not explain the fierce competition for the post of chief, particularly during the 1930s. The main attraction was the possibility of obtaining money from illicit sources. Earlier chapters have shown how the chief could benefit from his role as a middleman and was to profit from his various administrative functions. Such corruption was widespread and the administration was prepared to turn a blind eye except where it affected political stability or dug too deep into administrative revenues.

Even those chiefs who were not from traditional ruling families could lay claim to customary dues by virtue of their office. Access to these sources underlines the dissimilarity between chiefs and civil servants. We have already seen how a chief was able to make use of his position to extract virtually free labour from his people and obtain land from his subjects. An example is assaka, which involved giving the chief a tenth of the harvest, and was an important source of income to chefs de canton in Toucouleur and Wolof regions.<sup>3</sup> Few chiefs held economic resources independent of their office and it was difficult to hold onto the gains they had made once they were out of power.

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1. 18G84(17) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to Director of Personnel, 15 November 1938.
  2. ARSD IC11463 Code N'diaye-Report Books for 1947 and 1948. His pension for 1948 included an allowance for his family.
  3. See Ch. 7, "The Chiefs and Justice".

In an attempt to prevent abuses of power, the administration forbade the participation of chiefs in commercial operations.<sup>1</sup> But this was precisely where the prosperity of some chiefs arose. A few like Ibou Seck and Bocar Bâ<sup>^</sup> had been businessmen before becoming chiefs. Some like Boubakar N'déné N'diaye were able to get round these restrictions by using the SIPs as a "front" for their activities<sup>2</sup>. Despite repeated instructions from a series of Governors General, as from de Coppet in December 1937, the French proved unwilling to check these practices. Chiefs could always circumvent legislation by claiming that members of their large families were actually running the business. The Seck family in Adeane was always associated with commerce.

A special part of the budget was actually set aside for political gifts for chiefs and notables. While Brévié had condoned this system and had sent some chiefs and marabouts money annually, de Coppet was at first opposed to it. He expressed his disapproval when the marabout of Yoff, Seydina Issa Leye wrote to the administration in 1937, requesting his usual gift.<sup>3</sup> However, a few months later, de Coppet found himself obliged to send Seydou Nourou Tall 1,000 francs for Maolaoud to distribute to the five chefs de quartier of St. Louis.<sup>4</sup>

Chiefs also received gifts ranging from sums of money to goats and sheep from subjects trying to obtain their favour. As one chief's follower interviewed put it: "Il faut dorer la palme du chef."<sup>5</sup> Much of this wealth was however, redistributed in traditional displays of largesse. The chief entertained not only visiting administrators and military men, but many less elevated persons from his canton and travellers. He had also to support his family and entourage. According to many informants, the general attitude prevailing in the countryside was "La maison du chef, c'est la maison de tout le monde".<sup>6</sup>

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1. 18G84(17) Governor General of AOF to Governors, December 1937.
  2. Périscope Africain, "La Comédie Continue", 10 January 1931.
  3. ARSD 21G143(108) Governor General to Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, 6 February 1937.
  4. 21G143(108) Cadi of the Muslim tribunal of St. Louis to Governor General, 31 May 1937.
  5. Interview with Assane Seck, Inspector of Taxes at Ziguinchor.
  6. Interview with Massamba Sall.



Some chiefs managed to get heavily into debt by engaging in speculative ventures. In 1930, Benjamin Diatta of Oussouye got into difficulties by acting as guarantor for traders with unsound businesses, while at the same time owing 30,000 francs to Maurel and Prom for materials he had bought in Oussouye in 1928.<sup>1</sup> Yet during this period, the chief's annual salary was only 15,000 francs.

#### Non-material benefits

Some chiefs were also able to obtain non-material benefits from their office like French citizenship, enabling them to bridge the gulf in Senegalese society between citizen and subject. Among the benefits to which French citizens were entitled were the right to vote for a deputy for the National Assembly, exemption from conscription and justice under French law rather than justice indigène. Chiefs could acquire French citizenship by being born into one of the four communes, by being the son of a French citizen or by applying to the Governor.<sup>2</sup> In 1935, ten chefs de canton out of a total of 128 investigated were French citizens by birth.<sup>3</sup> These included Abdoul Salam Kane, the chef de canton of Damga (Matam) and Boubakar N'déné N'diaye of Diokoul Gandiaye (Sine Saloum), both of whom had been born in St. Louis. One chief, Amadou Diama Niang, had already acquired French citizenship before he was made chef de canton of Gandiolas (Bas Sénégal). At the same time, Benjamin Diatta was also trying to obtain French citizenship.

The administration did not encourage chiefs to become French citizens as it felt that this widened the gulf between them and their peoples. In a note for the Governor General in 1935, the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs advised against giving chiefly posts to assimilés

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1. ARSD 2G30-83 Ziguinchor RPM September 1930.
  2. ARSD 18G94(17) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to Governor General, 14 May 1935.
  3. 18G94(17) "List of chefs de canton in Senegal holding French citizenship", compiled in 1935 at the request of Governor General Brévié.

who had embraced all aspects of French culture.<sup>1</sup> The Governor General, who supported the idea of Association, endorsed this view, on the grounds that, "Le chef de province ou de canton doit être un représentant, une émanation du milieu ethnique en même temps qu'un agent de l'administration."<sup>2</sup> One of the major criticisms levelled at Benjamin Diatta in the early 1930s by the commandant de cercle of Ziguinchor and the Administrateur Supérieur of the Casamance was that he was no longer a Diola, but "un civilisé sans autorité sur l'autochtone."<sup>3</sup> He had become divorced from the indigenous milieu, living in a European style and wearing European clothes. The French felt that he had lost the respect of his people by failing to abide by the Diola tradition of maintaining close links with the soil by working on the land.<sup>4</sup> Citizens were only allowed to become chiefs if they continued, as far as the French could see, to maintain ties with their peoples.

The French also awarded the chiefs decorations for good service in a variety of fields to enhance their prestige and to bind them closer to the French. Chiefs in the north often possessed many decorations. Macodou Sall of Guet held, for example:

decoration	date of award
Chevalier )	1913
Officier ) de la Légion d'Honneur	1934
Commandeur )	1947
Grand Officer)	1956
Chevalier )	1915
Officier ) de l'Etoile Noire du Benin	1919
Commandeur )	1947
Chevalier ( de lère classe du	
( Nicham El Iftikhar	1916
( du Nicham El Anouar	1921
Médaille des Epidémies	1922
Officier du Mérite Agricole	1938
Commandeur du Mérite Humanitaire	1953 (5)

1. 18G94(17) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs to Governor General, 14 May 1935.
2. Ibid, quoted from Governor General's circular to Governors, 13 March 1935.
3. AN 2G30-60 Casamance RPA 1930.
4. ARSD 2G30-83 Ziguinchor RPM June 1930.
5. ARSD 1Z56 Macodou Sall to commandant de cercle of Louga, 23 July 1949. Even after Independence, when no longer chef de province, Macodou Sall was awarded the Grand Officer de l' Ordre National du Lion in 1962 by the Senegalese government.

Chiefs from the Casamance were awarded more modest decorations. A number like Alceyni Cissé and Benjamin Diatta were awarded the Legion of Honour.<sup>1</sup> In 1944, Arfan Sonko was awarded the Etoile Noire du Benin for his contribution to the communications system and education in Djougouttes Nord.<sup>2</sup>

Many Senegalese with political interests strongly opposed the administration's tendency to distribute honours to the chiefs indiscriminately which, they argued, debased the whole system of awards. In its edition of 4 November 1931, Périscope Africain followed an account of the corrupt practices of Boubakar N'déné N'diaye, a chiefly colonial councillor with an article entitled "Pauvre Légion d'Honneur".

The Ministry of Colonies in the metropole suggested to the Governor General that the French send chefs de province and de canton to the Colonial Exhibition at Marseilles in 1922 as a propaganda exercise. The exhibition was, for the French, to be a "manifestation de notre activité et de notre puissance économique."<sup>3</sup> The chiefs were to be chosen from all colonies of the AOF except the Niger on the basis of their influence, "intelligence", education and activity, as "sujets d'élite susceptibles de dépeindre plus tard à leurs congénères la force de rayonnement de notre génie national."<sup>4</sup>

The chiefs finally chosen for Senegal were Fara Biram Lô of Ross Merinhagen, Abdoul Salam Kane of Damga, Bouna N'diaye, chef supérieur of Djoloff, Ely Manel Fall of Mbayar Tidiar, and Amadou N'diaye of Provinces Orientales. Meissa M'Baye Sall of Saniokhor was also on the list, but he declined the invitation as he did not wish to leave Senegal. Mbakhane Diop was anxious to take his place, but the Governor General, Merlin, was

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1. ARSD 2G34-67 Casamance RPA 1934.
  2. AN 2G44-85 Bignona subdivision RPA 1944.
  3. ARSD 17G41(2) Governor General to Governors, 9 February 1922.
  4. 17G41(2) Governor of Senegal to Governor General, 27 February 1922. Because of his lack of education, the Bour Sine was left out of the Senegalese contingent.

opposed to his participation.<sup>1</sup> The contingent was also to include the marabout of Kaolack, Aladji Abdou Kane, as Amadou Bamba and El Hadj Malic Sy were considered to be too old to be sent. The contingent embarked on 15 June from Dakar in the "Tchad", with the chiefs in second class, the marabout in third class and their followers in steerage.<sup>2</sup> In addition to having their transport and lodging paid for by the Senegalese government from the 1922 budget, the chiefs were each given an allowance of 1,000 francs.<sup>3</sup> Their salaries were to continue to be paid during their absence.

On its arrival in France, the contingent was to be met by the Governor General and after a visit to the Exhibition they were taken on a tour of Paris and to the battlefields of the First World War. The chiefs returned to Senegal on 27 July, with at least one declaring in official earshot, "Je ne croyais pas que la France fût si grande."<sup>4</sup>

In 1931, Massamba Sall of Ndoutte Diassane, Abdoul Salam Kane and Samba Souna Fall (of the province of Guick Gandiolas) were sent by the Government of Senegal to another Colonial Exhibition at Vincennes.<sup>5</sup>

Thus it can be seen that the exigencies of Association theory left the chiefs in an anomalous position. Although they developed into a distinct cadre with grades and corresponding salaries, the administration was reluctant to regularise their status and provide them with the indemnities of civil servants. It is also probable that the chiefs' salaries were unable to keep pace with inflation, particularly during the 1930s depression and the Second World War. These factors left the chiefs dependent on a

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1. ARSD 21G133(108) Mbakhane Diop to a person he addressed as "brother" (possibly Abdoulaye Racine Kane), 26 May 1922. See also Ch.9, "The Role of the Chiefs on Councils", p.326.
  2. 17G41(2) Director of Political and Administrative Affairs, to Governor General "Note on the chiefs' journey to Marseilles", 1 May 1922.
  3. 17G14(2) Decree granting an indemnity to chiefs and notables travelling to Colonial Exhibition at Marseilles, June 1922.
  4. 17G41(2) Report by Agence Havas, July 1922.
  5. Interview with Massamba Sall.

number of unofficial sources of income. On the other hand, with the spread of education and with economic development after the Second World War, much of the rural population was no longer willing to continue paying customary dues to the chiefs.

In this way, the chiefs fell between two stools, losing their "traditional" status yet never becoming civil servants. It would seem that the chiefs did not become a distinct social group between 1919 and 1947 as they were obliged by custom to redistribute the wealth they amassed from their many sources of income to their followers. However, as we have seen in the chapter on the Chiefs' Education, many invested what remained in their children's education. In this way, the chiefs have helped to lay the foundations of the bureaucratic and professional castes in Senegal today.

## CONCLUSION

In demonstrating that the French had to have recourse to the chiefs in nearly all their dealings with their rural subjects, this thesis calls into question the old generalisation that the French practised Direct Rule. Shortage of French personnel and of funds forced the colonial administration to seek the help of indigenous intermediaries. Association theory was a recognition of the French need to share power to some extent with certain Africans, while always maintaining the upper hand.

In order to prepare the way for a more complete Association between Europeans and Africans, the French set up the Ecole des Fils des Chefs at St. Louis in 1922. Not only did the school attempt to teach the relatives of serving chiefs the French language and administrative methods, but also to impart to them the French colonial ethos. In providing access to the chieftancy, the school became a political instrument, enabling the French to promote chiefs often without customary claims but who were more sympathetic to the aims of the colonial administration over more traditional ruling families. As a result of spending some years away from their regions in a school very much dominated by French ideas, pupils from the Ecole des Fils des Chefs often became alienated from their subjects. So great was the French emphasis in the syllabus on obedience that rather than creating better auxiliaries, the school in many cases discouraged initiative and encouraged total subservience to the colonial power.

But the way in which the commandement indigène operated in practice had little connexion with French colonial theory. Although Association paid lip-service to the need to support the prestige of

traditional chiefs, the influence of the chefs de province, the majority of whom were from old chiefly families, was greatly weakened from 1913 onwards, as provinces were split into cantons, and in the early 1920s, when they lost the power to directly administer territories. The authority of the chiefs came to depend more on French support rather than on any traditional claim they might possess. During the 1920s, the importance of the cantonal chiefs, many of whom were not from traditional ruling families and owed their power solely to the French, grew at the expense of the provincial chiefs.

The selection of chiefs did not conform to nebulous ideas like the Politique des Races or Association but was thoroughly pragmatic. Decisions concerning nominations involved balancing the French desire for literate, trained and reliable chiefs against African demands for a legitimate ruler, although considerations of French interest were always paramount. The administration had to make political decisions in its chiefly appointments when attempting to compromise between rival families, and ethnic and religious groups.

This study had shown the varied success of the commandement indigène in the north and south of Senegal. The French were more successful in areas like Cayor, with its long-established tradition of chiefs, than in the Basse Casamance where they found themselves obliged to create chiefs as late as 1922. Attendance at the Ecole des Fils des Chefs was largely confined to the north, and the northern chiefs were more successful in maintaining their influence and carrying out their functions than the "straw chiefs" in the south. In Cayor, it was not however a traditional ruling family which acquired control of chiefly posts under the French administration, but a notable family originating from another region of Senegal and from a different ethnic group. The French preferred this state of affairs as the Sall owed their authority entirely to the colonial power. This family was able

to retain its dominance throughout the interwar period because of its important position in Cayor for over a century and because of French support. As the majority of Diola in the Basse Casamance were anxious to avoid all contact with the colonial administration, the French chose as chiefs either those who had already had dealings with the French as former soldiers or traders, or strangers.

The chiefs were expected to fulfil a dual role as the representatives of their peoples and as agents of the administration. Instead, they became further alienated from their subjects who clearly saw them as French nominees, by the unpopular administrative tasks entrusted to them. Throughout the period under consideration chiefs in all areas of Senegal except the Basse Casamance played a key role in the census, which provided the French with information on a whole range of socio-economic and political questions. Most important, it provided the information for tax collection in which the chiefs again played an important part. In all its demands on the population, the administration was concerned with the results, and not the methods of extraction. As the French in any case lacked sufficient personnel, the chiefs were given a great deal of leeway in their role as middlemen. The chiefs' role in justice indigène gave them wide-ranging powers over their peoples and their property.

The more the French demanded of a chief, the bigger his retinue became and the more he had to resort to extracting money from his subjects. Corruption flourished as a substitute for a real chiefly wage. This explains why chiefly appointments became attractive, in spite of the burdensome tasks they had to perform. While the clients of the chief, who constituted a favoured minority, escaped administrative dues, others had to pay. Methods of extraction from the



unfortunate majority became increasingly brutal . Because of the burden of work placed on them, it was difficult for the commandants de cercle to check the abuses of the chiefs. Although some local French administrators tried to defend the rural populations, the central administration was determined to keep the flow of revenue into its coffers constant. A number of dishonest French administrators benefitted from the "rake off" from the chief's extra-mural earnings.

During the economic crisis of the early 1930s, cultivators faced with low prices for the groundnut and bad harvests were unable to pay their taxes and a number of chiefs resorted to even more vicious methods. As pressures on the population became increasingly intolerable, complaints against the chiefs grew. The administration, which was itself losing revenue from tax and the SIPs, felt obliged to open enquiries into the chiefs. As a result, attempts were made in the 1930s to check the power of the chiefs in the census, tax collection, the SIPs, conscription, justice indigène, and the recruitment of forced labour, but because of the administration's staff shortages, these attempts proved largely abortive.

The chapters on the role of the chiefs in agriculture, hygiene, education and justice demonstrate that although corruption was widespread, some chiefs made a major contribution to local administration. The chiefs on the Colonial Council and conseils de notables did not always blindly endorse administrative proposals and sometimes defended the well-being of their subjects. However, the administration had ensured that the chiefs would be the sole representatives of the subject population on these bodies as they could generally be relied upon to support French interests. The chiefs therefore soon acquired the reputation of being mere agents of the administration. Nevertheless, the chiefs played an important (and underresearched) role in national politics. They were wooed by Senegals

Deputies and citizen colonial councillors for their financial support and for the rural vote. Their backing became particularly important with the extension of the suffrage beyond the Four Communes after the Second World War.

Throughout the period 1919-1947, the chiefs suffered from the French inability to decide whether they should retain their traditional role or become fully fledged civil servants. The first alternative became increasingly less feasible as the chiefs were seen to derive their power primarily from the French rather than from any particular customary claim. This dilemma concerning the chief's exact status was reflected in their education, designation and pay. Although the commandement indigène developed an intricate system of salaries and hierarchy, Association policy dictated that the chiefs should not lose their "traditional" character. As chiefs' salaries were not sufficient to support their retinues, or to maintain them in the lifestyle expected of them by their subjects, they remained dependent on customary dues and illicit sources of income.

It was during the Second World War that the final alienation of the chiefs from their subjects took place. Firstly, the former played a major part in the mobilisation of a large number of young men in 1939. While the évolués suffered a loss of their privileges under Vichy, the powers of the chiefs increased considerably, as they were ordered to requisition crops and animals from their subjects on an unprecedented scale. Taxes rose steadily during the war while the standard of living of the majority of Senegalese fell. After 1945, most people were only too glad to see the power of the chiefs weakened by the abolition of the Indigénat, of forced labour and of the distinction between citizens and subjects and by the return to the old General Council.

During the period under consideration, there was an increasing tendency for the rural population to look for protection from the colonial power not to the chiefs whom they saw as agents of the administration, but instead to the marabouts, who could offer charismatic leadership. These were years of rapid diffusion of Islam in Senegal, even in the Basse Casamance. Of the three major brotherhoods, support for the Mourides and Tidjanes in particular was greatly increased. The "saints" of Muslim brotherhoods took over a number of chiefly functions like conciliation and the promotion of agricultural production. Unlike the chiefs who were totally dependent on administrative support, the Muslim Khalifas with their mass followings had a great deal of bargaining power in their dealings with the French. Recognising the superior influence of the marabouts, many chiefs became their clients.

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#### AOF - Affaires Politiques

Carton 598-Dossier 4 - Senegal - Rapport Politique Annuel 1929

- " " " " " " 1930

-Dossier 5 - Senegal - " " " 1938

- " " " " " " 1941

Carton 629-Dossier 8 - Mission of Inspection of the Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance by Demongin, 1935-36

Carton 629 - Dossier 8 - Mission of Inspection of the SIPs by Tixier, 1936-37

Carton 630 - Dossier 3 - The Sociétés de Prévoyance, 1936-37

Carton 638 - Dossier 1A and 1 B - Circular of Governor General Carde to Governors of the AOF, No. 279b AP/2 of 14 October 1929, extract from Brévié's opening speech to the Council of Government of the AOF, December 1930 and Brévié's circulars on indigenous administration and Councils, September 1932

#### AOF-Affaires Financières

Carton 63-Dossier 1 - Muller - Inspection of Tax Collection in Senegal, 1929

#### Archives Nationales, rue des Francs-Bourgeois

Here I examined microfilm of much of the series 2G-Rapports périodiques des Gouverneurs et chefs de service - for the AOF. This series contains the Governor Generals' annual political reports for the AOF, the

Governors' annual reports and the commandants de cercles' monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and annual reports, from 1895 to 1950. I concentrated on the Governor of Senegal's Rapports Politiques Annuels (1919-47), and those reports of the commandants de cercle in Senegal that I could find. The cercles best documented in Paris were those of the Casamance, Matam, Podor, Bakel, Dagana and Diourbel.

### Senegal

#### Archives de la Republique du Senegal, Dakar (ARSD)

These archives are divided into archives for the AOF and those for Senegal. The most important series examined for the AOF was Series G-Politique et Administration Générale, for the period 1919 to 1947. 2G - a further collection than that found in Paris. Unlike the rest of Series G, which can only be consulted up till 1940 in Dakar, series 2G can be viewed till about 1950, after which it has still not been organised. Series 2G is incomplete as reports on a number of cercles and for certain years are missing. Of the colonies of the AOF, the most complete information exists for Senegal, although a great deal of correspondence is still at St. Louis and is yet to be catalogued.

1G - Etudes générales, Missions, Notices et Monographies

4G - Missions d'Inspection

13G- Affaires Politiques, administratives et musulmanes, Senegal

13G1- 13G79 - the political and administrative situation in the cercles.

13G360-13G386- the history of the Casamance (1820-1919)

17G - Affaires Politiques AOF

18G - Affaires Administratives AOF

19G - Affaires Musulmanes

21G - Police et Surêté

Other series referred to were:

1C - concerns the indigenous personnel employed by the Government General, including personal files on some chiefs. Files could not be examined unless the individual concerned had been born over one hundred years ago.

5C - Affairs concerning personnel, with the emphasis on European administrators

4E1-13-Le Conseil Colonial - contains reports of the sessions of both the Colonial Council and the Permanent Commission of the Colonial Council, as well as correspondence between the Governor of Senegal and the Governor General concerning these sessions.

K- Esclavage et Travail-includes information on travail obligatoire, prestations and the second contingent of the annual conscription in the AOF

M- Tribunaux Judiciaires - M79-240-Justice Indigène

Q- Affaires Economiques

5Q- on the Sociétés de Prévoyance

6Q- on exhibitions involving the AOF.

The archives examined for Senegal were:

1D- Monographies - 1D1/3 Tivaouane - monographs

1D3/12 Tournées of administrators

2D - Archives des cercles. Up to 1935, these are well organised, but although sources exist for a later period, they have not yet been catalogued.

1G34-45-L'Ecole des Fils des Chefs, from the school's origins as the Ecole des Otages in 1855 till 1942.

1Z - Les Fonds Privés - 1Z56-80 concern Macodou Sall, who dominated Cayor for many years, serving as chef de province of Guet from 1902 till Independence.

#### Private Papers

- 1) Of Bocar Ba, in the possession of his son Abou Ba, a trader at Bignona.
- 2) An unpublished account by Tété Diadhiou on the establishment of the commandement indigène in the cercle of Ziguinchor.
- 3) Letters sent to me by François Marie, a former colonial administrator who served in many cercles of Senegal between 1938 and 1953.

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available at ANSOM

Senegal: Budget local de recettes et dépenses, 1921-40-available at both  
ANSOM and the ARSD

Conseil Colonial-Procès Verbaux - 1921-38 and Conseil Général,  
Procès Verbal - June 1946 - fullest series at ARSD

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on the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, the selection and salaries of chiefs-  
ANSOM and the Bibliothèque Nationale

## Newspapers and Periodicals

Figures in brackets indicate years consulted.

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Renseignements Coloniaux-available at the School of Oriental and  
African Studies, London, on microfilm  
Dépêche Coloniale et Maritime (1919-1930)- British Library  
Paris-Dakar-1935-biographies of eminent chiefs-IFAN(Dakar)

b) Senegalese-available at the Bibliothèque Nationale(Paris) and at IFAN  
L'Action Sénégalaise-published St. Louis (1932-34), weekly  
L'AOF-pub.Dakar (1924-32), irregular  
L'AOF Républicain-pub. Dakar,(1932-36),weekly  
L'Ouest Africain Français-Dakar, (1925-27),weekly  
Périscopes Africain-pub.Dakar, (1931-38), weekly  
Le Progrès-Dakar, (1934-38), irregular  
Le Sénégal- (1934-35)  
La Sirène Sénégalaise-(1932-35), weekly

## INTERVIEWS

### Paris

Robert ANTOINE - 25 July 1980- served as a commandant de cercle in  
Dahomey, Mauretania and the Ivory Coast (1942-1960)

Pierre MIALHE-7 July 1980-served as a colonial administrator in the  
Sine Saloum (1937-1960)

Robert GATIN-22 October 1980-colonial administrator (1930-1958),  
including service in Louga, (1930-33),chef de subdivision of Tivaouane  
and commandant de cercle of Thies (1933-1939). Also served in  
Guinea, Mauretania, Ivory Coast and Madagascar.



Senegal

Bernard ARCENS-17 March 1981- a trader-Ziguinchor

Abou BA - 17 March 1981-son of Bocar Bâ, former chef de canton  
of Kalounayes and Kadiamoutes Sud-Ziguinchor

Pierre BASSÈNE-12 March 1981-former chef de canton of Brin  
Séléki-Ziguinchor

Soyibou BASSENE-11 March 1981-village elder-Séléki

Doudou BODIAN-22 March 1981-son of Alpha Bodian, former chef de  
canton of Djougouttes Sud

El Hadji Ousman Coly BOUFFE-18 March 1981-notable-Bignona

Alassane CISSE-10 March 1981-former chef de canton of Bainoucks-Kande

Augustin COLY-13 March 1981-notable-Bignona

Moussa COLY-14 March 1981-former deputy for Bignona-Bignona

Sibakouyane DIABONE-19 March 1981-king of Oussouye-Oussouye

Tété DIADHIOU-10 March 1981-Interpreter-Ziguinchor

Salif Cheikou DIAO-29 March 1981-former chef de canton of Koudoura  
Niampaio (Kolda)-Dakar

Abdou DIATTA - 15 March 1981-former chef de canton of Djougouttes

Nord-(successor to Arfan Sonko)-Bignona

Bruno DIATTA - 8 April 1981 - grandson of Benjamin Diatta and chef du  
protocole in the present day Senegalese government

Alassane DIEHIOU-14 March 1981-son of Landing Diedhiou, chef de  
canton of Kalounayes-Ziguinchor

Landing DIEME- 15 March 1981-former chef de canton of Fogny Combo-  
Badiana

Fode GOUDIABY - 16 March 1981- chef de village of Baila-Baila

El Hadj Ousman Coly MACANDE- 18 March 1981- notable-Bignona

Arfan MANGA - 11 March 1981 - chef de village-Enampore

Bouna Semou NIANG - 9 April 1981-former chef de canton of Niani

Kalonkadougou (Tambacounda) - Dakar

El Hadj Kane SAMBE - 3 April 1981 - traditional historian(griot) of  
Cayor - Dakar

Assane SECK - 2 February 1981-son of Ibrahima Seck, a former chef  
de canton of Adeane, served in the Senegalese government since 1966  
currently Ministre de l'Equipement - Dakar

Assane SECK-16 February 1981-son of Moussa Seck, a former chef  
de canton of Adeane, secretary to Ibou Seck, another chief of Adeane,  
now Inspector of Taxes-Ziguinchor

Abbé Augustin Diamacoune SENGHOR-20 March 1981- a historian of  
the Casamance - Kafountine

El Hadj Massamba SALL-21 February 1981-President of the Association  
of Chefs Coutumiers and former chef de canton of Ndoutte Diassane-  
Tivaouane

Meissa M'Baye SALL - 3 May 1981-former chef de canton of Thilmakha-  
Mbour

Sanghone SALL - 15 April 1981 - son of Massamba Kangui Sall, former  
chef de canton of Guet and grandson of Macodou Sall, the former chef  
de province of Guet

Ibrahima SONKO - 28 March 1981-son of and secretary to Arfan Sonko,  
former chef de canton of Djougouttes Nord

Mohammed SONKO - 8 April 1981 - grandson of Arfan Sonko and Directeur  
du Cabinet to the Minister for Armed Forces in the Senegalese government-  
Dakar

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APPENDIX

Governors General of the AOF (1917-47)

Joost VAN VOLLENHOVEN	8 May 1917 - 27 December 1917
Jules CARDE (interim)	27 December 1917 - 22 January 1918
Martial MERLIN	22 January 1918-28 February 1923 interim-BRUNET, OLIVER
Jules CARDE	28 February 1923-3 October 1930 interim OLIVER, DIRAT
Jules BREVIE	3 October 1930-8 August 1936 interim-DIRAT, FOURNIER, BOISSON
Marcel DE COPPET	8 August 1936 - 18 April 1939 interim VADIER, GEISMAR, BOISSON
Leon CAYLA	18 April 1939-25 June 1940
Pierre BOISSON	25 June 1940-1 July 1943 (known as Haut Commissaire de l'Afrique Francaise)
Pierre COURNARIE	1 July 1943-3 April 1946
Rene BARTHES	3 April 1946 - 27 January 1948


Governors of Senegal (1917-47)

Fernand LEVECQUE	20 March 1917-24 July 1921 interim DIDELOT, TELLIER
Pierre DIDELOT	24 July 1921 - 23 May 1926 interim MAILLET
Leonce JORE	23 May 1926 - 12 March 1929
Maurice BEURNIER	12 March 1929 - 24 October 1936 interim MAILLET, DEBONNE, SOLOMIAC, MARTINE
Louis LEFEBVRE	24 October 1936 - 29 July 1938
Georges PARISOT	29 July 1938 - 1 January 1941
Georges REY	1 January 1941 - 22 December 1942

Hubert DESCHAMPS	22 December 1942 - 2 December 1943
Charles DAGAIN	2 December 1943 - 30 May 1945
Pierre MAESTRACCI	30 May 1945 - 28 March 1946
Oswald DURAND	28 March 1946 - 20 May 1947
Laurent WILTORD	20 May 1947 - 19 October 1950


COLONIE DU SÉNÉGAL  
COUTUMES DOMINANTES

M A U R I T A N I E






Subdivision de  
TIVAOUANE  
Carte Politique










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